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THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE
It is easy . . . to understand why protest becomes a
distinctive moral feature of the modern age and why in-
dignation is a predominant modern emotion....
[P]rotest is... that negative phenomenon which char-
acteristically occurs as a reaction to the alleged invasion
of someone's rights in the name of someone else's utility.
The self-assertive shrillness of protest arises because the
facts of incommensurability ensure that protestors can
never win an argument; the indignant self-righteousness
of protest arises because the facts of incommensurability
ensure equally that the protestors can never lose an ar-
gument either. Hence the utterance of protest is charac-
teristically addressed to those who already share the
protestors' premises. The effects of incommensurability
ensure that protestors rarely have anyone else to talk to
but themselves. This is not to say that protest cannot be
effective; it is to say that it cannot be rationally effective
and that its dominant modes of expression give evidence
of a certain perhaps unconscious awareness of this.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE'
INTRODUCTION
If protest, so aptly described by MacIntyre, has become the
characteristic form of moral discourse in our culture, abortion is its
paradigmatic subject. As we began to write this article, a new Su-
preme Court Justice was about to be reviewed by the Senate; me-
dia coverage suggested' that the abortion issue was the only one
that counted in assessing the fitness of the nominee.2 One is
tempted to blame the media for fanning hysteria, yet it is all too
1 A. MACINTYRF, AFrER VmTuE A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 71 (1984) [hereinafter A.
MACINTYRE, A R VIRTURE].
2 See, e.g., Gorey, Supreme Confidence, TimE, Sept. 24, 1990, at 46. "IT]he bachelor from
Weare, N.H., keenly senses that he has been chosen by Bush and history to cast perhaps the
deciding vote on whether to overturn Roe v. Wade, the landmark 1973 decision that made
abortion legal in all states." Id. See also Cohn, The "Soon-to-Be" Supreme, NEwsvTE_,
Sept. 24, 1990, at 27. "To the frustration of committee liberals and women's-rights activists,




apparent that a Supreme Court decision, Roe v. Wade,3 has be-
come an ideological commodity invested with awesome powers and
significance, to be defended at all costs by one side and annihi-
lated, also at all costs, by the other.
The rhetoric is appropriately extreme. Those who are "pro-life,"
who may number as many as half the population, regard the other
half as actual or potential murderers; those who are "pro-choice,"
who may also number as many as half the population, regard the
other half as violating the fundamental human rights of women.'
For sociologists Peter and Brigitte Berger, "the abortion issue
reveals a highly significant rupture in the moral fabric of contem-
porary Western societies." Lacking any moral consensus, one finds
a "moral pluralism"' that is mutually and contemptuously
intolerant.
One is drawn to recall slavery and prohibition as the historical
analogues to this controversy. In the absence of any common moral
ground for debate, the usual American move is to invoke the coer-
cive force of the law. As the Bergers observe:
[T]his moral difference touches directly on an important
area of actual conduct in social life, therefore demands
legal regulation, and therefore makes it very difficult for
people amicably to "agree to disagree."
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (Roe's companion case).
I A review of opinion poll data, with due respect for its fallibility, leaves one with the
impression that some 20-25% of the American public believe that abortion should be illegal
in all or nearly all circumstances, some 20-25% believe that it should be legal in all circum-
stances and the rest will vary, depending on the form of the question, the timing of the
abortion (first trimester versus later trimesters) or the reason for the abortion (rape or phys-
ical danger to the mother versus family size or simply inconvenience). See, e.g., C. CONDIT
DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING SOCIAL CHANGE 147-51, 167-68, 170 (1989);
Callahan, The Abortion Debate: Is Progress Possible?, in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFER-
ENCES 309, 313 (S. Callahan & D. Callahan eds. 1984) [hereinafter ABORTION: UNDERSTAND-
ING DIFFERENCES]; Segers, Abortion and the Culture: Toward a Feminist Perspective, in
ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES, supra, at 229, 232-34. See generally Lamanna, So-
cial Science and Ethical Issues: The Policy Implications of Poll Data on Abortion, in
ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES, supra, at 1-23.
On the distinction between opinion polls and "public opinion," the latter reflecting the
actualities of disproportionate power in the process of opinion formation, see C. CONDIT,
supra, at 7-8.
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. . . It is only logical, then, that each side seeks the
coercive support of state power-the "pro-choice" side no
less than the "pro-life" side.... The law. ., may con-
tinue to uphold abortion against those who consider it
murder, deepening their alienation from the society; or
the law may reverse itself and proscribe abortion once
again, thereby creating a new explosion of "crime" for
which the prohibition era provides a good preview. A
sociologist must believe that "victory" would be Pyrrhic
in either case.7
That the abortion issue has become intractable, as observed by
the Bergers, is not to say that it must be so or that it has always
been so. Some seem to have an investment in proclaiming and per-
petuating its intractability, as does Laurence Tribe in his recent
book," in order to advance his implicit agenda in favor of the pro-
7Id. at 75-77.
8 L TRaIB, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990). From an advocacy perspective, the
strategy of Tribe's book is to keep the two sides as far apart as possible, especially empha-
sizing the pro-life position as necessarily incapable of compromise, so as to leave the reader
who is unwilling to criminalize all or nearly all abortions with no choice but to reaffirm Roe
v. Wade.
For a similar reaction to Tribe's book, see Recent Publications, 25 HARv. C.-C.L. L REv.
625, 625-29 (1990). For instance, the author notes that "[wihile [Tribe] critiques both the
pro-life and pro-choice positions, the bulk of his criticisms are reserved for the pro-life pro-
ponents. Thus, Tribe's desire for compromise is somewhat thwarted by his apparent intent
to fuel pro-choice advocates with criticism of the pro-life position." Id. at 626.
Tribe's repeated rejection of potential areas of compromise is troubling in view
of what he proclaims is the purpose of the book. As a result, the book may
demonstrate the very intractability of the positions on abortion which Tribe
seeks to mediate. Thus, Tribe fails to deliver fully on his promise to set the
stage for compromise.
Id. at 629.
For a particularly glaring example, consider Tribe's assertion that "[bly the late 19603 as
many as 1,200,000 women were undergoing illegal abortions each year: more than one crimi-
nal abortion a minute." J- TRIE, supra, at 41. Tribe cited J. MOHs, ABomoN IN AmEmcA-
THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICy 254 (1978), where this sentence appears:
"By the late 1960's estimates of the number of illegal abortions performed in the United
States each year ranged from 200,000 to 1,200,000." Id. (On the difficulties implicit in mak-
ing such calculations, see C. CONDIT, supra note 4, at 37 n.4).
While Tribe's "as many as" is not technically inaccurate, from the perspective of our own
legal training and experience, we think the difference between Mohr's very qualified state-
ment and Condit's careful evaluation, on the one hand, and Tribe's coverage of the same
issue, on the other, is the difference between a scholarly agenda and an advocacy agenda.
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choice status quo exemplified by Roe v. Wade. In contrast, others
claim that Roe v. Wade is itself a compromise between the ex-
tremes,9 or that despite rhetorical excess, practical compromise is
already existent and widespread, belying the bleakness of the de-
bate.10 We find ourselves unpersuaded by either the "intractabil-
' Tribe takes this position. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 78-79. See, e.g., Olsen, Comment:
Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARv. L. REV. 105 (1989), characterizing Roe as a "political,
legal, and social compromise." Id. at 107. Thus,
Roe v. Wade was a compromise. The case legalized most abortions but it did
not grant the plaintiffs everything they wanted ....
Id.
For a characterization of Roe, from the pro-life side, as something other than compromise,
see J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES 10-12 (1979)
[hereinafter J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE]. As Noonan sums it up,
Vis-a-vis the childbearing woman who wanted an abortion, the unborn child
was valued by The Abortion Cases [Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton] at zero
before viability and as less than a whole human being after viability.
Id. at 119. This is not to affirm Noonan's characterization, but merely to suggest that the
assertion of Roe v. Wade as "compromise" is substantially belied by both the substantive
positions of its critics and the politics which followed the decision. For more on Noonan,
who is a significant figure in the history we seek to relate, see infra text accompanying notes
294-327.
10 With respect to the issue of "compromise," even Condit, in her otherwise excellent
study, leaves her readers perplexed. Condit's book is a sophisticated, and studiously unbi-
ased historical account of abortion as situated in public discourse from 1960 to 1985. Her
careful and critical depiction of the rhetorical moves utilized by both sides (described as the
"heritage tale" of the illegal abortion for pro-choice, C. CONDIT, supra note 4, at 22-42, or
the "Pro-Life Human History," id. at 43-58) makes the book a rarity in an area usually
characterized by the production of polemical excess, not by reflection upon its content. Yet
Condit seems determined from the outset to have her story end with "legal and cultural
consensus." Id. at xii.
In her strongest statement on the issue, at the end of a chapter reviewing prime-time
television coverage of abortion in the early 1980s, Condit announces that the "general ac-
ceptance of a compromise position on the abortion issue" serves to refute the "social pessi-
mists," like Alasdair MacIntyre, who see such issues as instances of moral "incommensura-
bility." Id. at 141. For a discussion of Alasdair MacIntyre, see supra note 1; inIra text
accompanying notes 189 & 770-71. Conceding that "rationally generated" compromise was
not possible, Condit nevertheless claims that the ambivalence revealed in scenes such as a
long dialogue between Cagney and Lacey reveals the existence of "pragmatic resolution" or
"working compromise." C. CONDIT, supra note 4, at 142, 126-33.
The assertion of compromise depends upon a number of problematic items of evidence:
that, basically, Roe v. Wade was itself a compromise; that, even if not a compromise, it
somehow authoritatively settled the abortion issue; and that the "public" in some sense
agreed to live with it and settled down to proceed from there. Thus, Condit says that in Roe
the Court "constructed a compromise," id. at 112, yet on the same page she recognizes that
the compromise was rooted in an "individualism" that "exacts a clear price" and that the
rhetoric of "choice" itself leads to no-choice in the form of being held "economically respon-
sible for all such choices." Id.
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ity" or "compromise" characterization of this issue.
Most people who write about this subject do so to serve and
shore up agendas that are strongly pro-choice11 or strongly pro-
life.12 That agenda is not always disclosed, especially by editors of
More significantly, she does not consider how Roe might be considered not a compromise
at all, but a pro-choice victory. For one thing, her study discounts the importance of religion
in this debate. She recognizes that "religion has been the underlying motivation and world
view of most pro-Life activists," see id. at 215-16 n.1, but she cannot bring herself to take
theological issues seriously as such. Her very statement of the "compromise" achieved by
the 1980s belies its credibility or stability: "The compromise negotiated about abortion
framed it as a woman's choice but also as an undesirable moral act. Abortion was to be
legally permitted but not publicly financed. It was to be undertaken primarily in the first
term of pregnancy." Id. at 199. [But see Roe??] Against that background, it should have
been no surprise, as Condit points out, that activists on both sides became increasingly mili-
tant, self-righteous and unwilling to enter into dialogue with the other side, preferring the
purity of their own posturing. Id. at 159-60, 164-66.
Ultimately, the compromise Condit insists upon depends on the precedential immortality
of Roe. Although Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), was de-
cided after her book had gone to press, Condit does agree that Webster "substantially alters
the consensus and conditions that obtained during the period examined by this book." C.
CONDIT, supra note 4, at 198. Our own view is that neither consensus nor compromise was
possible after Roe.
n E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 8; see also 1R. PErcHasKy. ABORTIoN AND WoMEN'S CHICE
THE STATE. SEXUALrY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FaEnotM (1984). According to Condit, "Petchesky
appears to believe that any moral decision is merely an inappropriate ploy by men to con-
trol women." C. Cormrr, supra note 4, at 16 n.7.
12 E.g., J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE, supra note 9. In his introduction, Noonan appeals
to readers who are confused and concerned about this issue by promising to address those
who, given the cultural reality of the United States at this time, "hold that abortion, like
war, is a social necessity." Id. at 4. The remainder of the book, while containing some fair
criticism, especially with respect to the jurisprudence of Roe v. Wade, is basically a relent-
less pro-life tract, often propagandistic in argument, which never addresses the particular
concerns of those who are troubled about abortion yet regard it as a necessity in at least
some cases. Compare these thoughts with those of James Gustafson, who may have been the
source of the war analogy. "As the morally conscientious solder fighting in a particular war
is convinced that life can and ought to be taken 'justly,' but also 'mournfully,' so the moral-
ist can be convinced that the life of the defenseless fetus can be taken, less justly, but more
mournfully." Gustafson, A Protestant Ethical Approach, in THE MoALITY oF ABORTn:o
LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 122 (1970). Gustafson's treatment of abortion is con-
textual and particular, rather than abstract and categorical, with due respect for the life and
death character of the issue. See infra text accompanying notes 603-14.
More difficult to situate is MA GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESrERN LAw:
AhwRucAN FAnmuREs, EuROPEAN CHALLENGES (1987) [hereinafter MA. GLENDON. ABORION
AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW]. We disagree strongly with the hostile denunciation Glendon
received in Cohen, Review Essay, Comparison-Shopping in the Marketplace of Rights, 98
YALE IJ. 1235 (1989) (reviewing M.A GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WEsrmiN LAw,
supra) which displays an unabashed hostility toward the pro-life position. Glendon does call
for legislative compromise on the abortion issue, using the various European approaches to
illustrate the possibility of compromise, and she correctly points out that the "rights" ap-
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anthologies, many of which have an implicit tilt.18 We therefore
feel obliged to disclose our own somewhat odd agenda and its rela-
tionship to this article. We undertook this project because, as Part
I will discuss, we were struck by a set of unusual correspondences
proach, as deployed by either side, is not consistent with such compromise. She clearly re-
gards Roe v. Wade as a social policy failure; we think one can take this position without
thereby being or becoming a pro-life extremist.
The question raised by Glendon, however, is what insights can be derived from the Euro-
pean experience. It is hard to imagine at this time, at least, American legislation that would
successfully combine the objective easy availability of first-trimester abortions with a pub-
licly mandated attitude of respect for unborn lives, as she suggests occurs under the 1975
French law. Similarly, one fears, based on American experience, that mandatory counselling
and delay provisions, if adopted today, would be seized upon by pro-life extremists to
frighten and harass women contemplating abortions, even early ones.
On the other hand, one must concede that a post-Roe v. Wade world might reveal pos-
sibilities of compromise that are not now regarded as such, so long as Roe is the perceived
enemy of pro-life advocates. Thus, one leaves the Glendon book uncertain as to whether the
European experience reveals or suggests a common ground of moral debate, which might be
the basis for real compromise. The possibility, even historically, of such a common ground,
is a major theme in this Article. We therefore regard our basic agenda as consistent with
that of Glendon.
"3 E.g., THE ETHICS OF ABORTION (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds. 1989) (pro-choice tilt);
ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (J. Garfield & P. Hennessey eds. 1984) (pro-
choice tilt). Some are not at all subtle in their position. Compare ABORTION AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION: REVERSING Roe v. Wade THROUGH THE COURTS (D. Horan, E. Grant & P. Cunning-
ham eds. 1987) [hereinafter ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION] (explicitly pro-life) with THIE
PROBLEM OF ABORTION (J. Feinberg 2d ed. 1973) (a balanced anthology, most of which was
written before the decision in Roe v. Wade).
A number of works, in addition to C. CONDIT, supra note 4, stand out for their willingness
to take both sides seriously, regardless of the authors' own views. See, e.g., H. RODMAN, B.
SARviS & J. BONAR, THE ABORTION QUESTION (1987) [hereinafter THE ABORTION QUESTION],
whose authors predict (not recommend) "that ultimately U.S. policy will permit early abor-
tions and prohibit late abortions, and that the intensity of the abortion controversy will
subside by the first decade of the twenty-first century." Id. at 171. For sociological profiles
of the women activists on both sides, see F. GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVES: THE ABORTION
DEBATE IN AN AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1989) [hereinafter F. GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVES]; K.
LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984). For good philosophical treat-
ments, see R. HURSTHOUSE, BEGINNING LIVES (1987) (neo-Aristotelianism); L. SUMNER, AnOR-
TION AND MORAL THEORY (1981) (utilitarianism). Despite its vintage, D. CALLAHAN, ABOR-
TION: LAW, CHOICE & MORALITY (1970), still stands out as a "must-read" for anyone
interested in this issue.
Strikingly unique for this field is ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES, supra note 4,
which offers a rare instance of actual dialogue between proponents of the two sides. All but
one of the 12 contributors are women (the exception being Daniel Callahan), who not only
present their views in essays but also, with few exceptions, comment directly on the views of
other contributors. The overall result is a rich and thought-provoking dialogue, perhaps fa-
cilitated by the fact that the Callahans themselves, who are spouses, are on opposite sides of
this issue (she is pro-life; he is pro-choice).
930
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between the issue of animal rights and the issue of abortion. That
connection became clear to us as we were teaching a course in envi-
ronmental ethics, a course which inevitably raises questions central
to the abortion debate-whether it is possible in our culture to
deal publicly with hard moral issues, whether there is any available
discourse for doing so.*"
Our goal in this Article is not to advance one side or the other in
the abortion debate, but rather to explore whether we are necessa-
rily stuck with the grim and destructive fact of moral incommensu-
rability.15 To do that we move back in time, to the period before
1" In this regard, the role of explicitly theological or religious discourse in public debate
becomes important. This Article may be regarded as a part of the larger ongoing discussion
of that issue. For discussions advocating a place for religion in public political discourse, see
K GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); At PaRRY LOaVE AD
PowER (book forthcoming); M. PERRY. MoRALnTY. POLITICS & LAW 180-84 (1988); Gaffney,
Politics Without Brackets on Religious Convictions: Michael Perry and Bruce Ackerman
on Neutrality, 64 Tu. L REV. 1143 (1990); Perry, Comment on The Limits of Rationality
and the'Place of Religious Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 W. &
MARY L REV. 1067 (1986). For an excellent example of such discourse, see M. BALL. LYING
DOWN ToGgrHEm LAW, METAPHOR AND THEOLOGY (1985).
For some debate about these issues, see RELIGION, MORALrrY AND TH LAW: NOMOS XXX
(J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1988); Gaffney, Biblical Religion and American Politics:
Some Historical and Methodological Reflections, 1 JL & RELIGION 171, 171-240 (1983);
Symposium on the Religious Foundations of Civil Rights Law," 5 J.L. & RELIGION 1-108
(1987) (especially the panel discussion from 95-108). On the revival of interest in law and
religion, see generally Vogel, A Survey and Commentary on the New Literature in Law and
Religion, 1 J.L. & RELIGION 79 (1983). For some constitutional implications of a fresh look at
religion in American public life, see Gedicks & Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Val-
ues: Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CALL.  REV. 1579
(1987); McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARv. L REv. 1409 (1990).
" For a philosophical and historical reevaluation of what purports to be moral discourse
in our culture, concluding with the reality of incommensurability, see A. MAcNTYRE, supra
note 1. For his specific application of the problem to abortion, see id. at 6-7. Our use of
Macntyre for our introductory quotation underscores our indebtedness to him. See supra
text accompanying note 1.
Appreciating his critical insights, however, does not compel us to embrace either his solu-
tion, Aristotelianism, or his more recent work. We are thus content to follow him through
the first eight chapters of After Virtue, without necessarily agreeing that the question he
poses at the beginning of chapter 9, "Nietzsche or Aristotle?," is the correct question at all.
A. MAcIThRE, supra note 1, at 109. Our position may be similar to MacIntyre's with respect
to Nietzsche and Sartre, that they were "at their philosophically most powerful and cogent
in the negative part of their critiques." Id. at 22. On his more recent work, see Nussbaum,
Recoiling from Reason, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Dec. 7, 1989, at 36 (reviewing A. MAcIhrvR.
WHOSE JUsTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1989)).
For an approach that parallels that of lacntyre, see L WFawNA NATURAL LAW AND
JUSTICE (1987). For Weinreb's position on MacIntyre, see id. at 251-59. For some insightful
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
Roe, in an effort to recapture the context within which the moral!
theological debate about abortion was unfolding. That examination
leaves us with the conviction that it might have been other-
wise-although we hasten to emphasize the "might." Despite a pe-
riod of considerable confusion in American churches, especially in-
cluding confusion about the role of women, serious theologians
were, on ethical grounds, moving toward a position of some com-
promise on the sanctity of fetal life question.
The effect of Roe's "rights" formulation of the issue was to
render that process of moral dialogue abruptly irrelevant for law-
making purposes. Whatever the advantages of Roe, chiefly in re-
moving a divisive moral problem deeply affecting women's lives
from the state (male-dominated) legislative process, there were
also costs. People troubled by the moral/religious implications of
abortion as an absolute right even throughout the second trimester
(which at the time was not viewed as moral compromise) became
hardened absolutists in their opposition to all abor-
tion-compromise became more, not less, unthinkable. Moreover,
so long as Roe seemed securely in place, that absolutism too easily
took on the character of moral "high-ground," at no political cost.
Undeniably, that phenomenon helped mobilize religious support
for Reagan and the "new right" generally.
The pro-choice side, meanwhile, could too easily employ a close-
out "rights" and "choice" rhetoric in an aggressive refusal to en-
gage in moral discourse altogether. When compromise did inevita-
bly come, it was not a compromise hammered out through moral
dialogue, but rather a compromise achieved at the expense of the
most vulnerable-in the cases upholding legislative denial of pub-
lic funding.16 Ironically, those cases drew on the rhetoric of "pri-
vate choice" which undergirds Roe. We suspect, too, that in the
absence of moral consensus on the basic "life" issue, the process of
attempts to describe the actuality of moral discourse in a world of incommensurability, seo
Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869 (1988); Winter, Transcendental Non-
sense, Metaphoric Reasoning and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105
(1989). See also Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545
(1990) (discussing particular rhetoric of law).
"e Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977). For the Supreme Court's most recent "compromise" achieved at
the expense of the vulnerable, see Rust v. Sullivan, 59 U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S. May 21, 1991)
(upholding curb on federally funded abortion counseling).
[Vol. 25:923932
1991] THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE 933
achieving easy political compromise by victimizing the most vul-
nerable women will continue-as may be the case with parental
consent requirements.17
At this point, we digress, as has been customary among some
people writing about this issue,18 to offer an account of our own
experiential relationship to the abortion issue, supplying some per-
haps relevant autobiographical data in the process. The history is
one of almost perfect irresponsibility, of the kind that absolutely
precludes self-righteousness.
One of us (Betty) has had three abortions: one illegal, as a scared
teenager; a second when she was the single parent of two small
children; and a third, after we were married to each other, out of
(probably exaggerated) fear of abnormality due to a prescription
drug taken before the pregnancy was suspected.
The same one of us has four children (outrageous, from an envi-
ronmental perspective) aged twenty-one, twenty, eight and five.
For the last two an amniocentesis was performed, and the results
indicated no problem; we have never had to consider a late
17 See Halpern, The Fight Over Teen-Age Abortion, N.Y. Rsv. BooKs, March 29, 1990, at
30.
These laws do not propose to outlaw abortion (and so lack the moral authority
of those that do). Instead they propose to throw a few obstacles in the path of
those who are already limping along-the girls who cannot talk to their par-
ents, the girls without the money to travel to states without restrictions, the
girls from broken homes.
Id. at 31. See also Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Family Planning
Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class (1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
" We were struck particularly by the autobiographical accounts in AnonsioN. UNDEa-
STADING DIFRENCES, supra note 4. Condit, as well, carefully introduces herself as "a ca-
reer woman (not solely a homemaker) who has never faced an unwanted pregnancy and who
has adequate resources to insure a relatively high degree of control over her fertility." C.
CoNnrr, supra note 4, at xii (footnote omitted).
We also recognize that some readers may find our histories so offensive as to distract their
attention from the remainder of the article. Both of us grew up in cultural settings that were
starkly secular, where religion played a role that was formal and conventional at most. Also,
we were teenagers in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a time when the stifling conventions of
1950s morality (including rigid gender roles) were being rejected. We surely understand that
our experience must seem inaccessible and alien to those who experience life as regularly
mediated by religious tradition.
On the other hand, the goal of this Article is to explore whether moral dialogue is possi-
ble, a goal that would be ill-served by deceit. We have for some time been questioning the
adequacy of a wholly secular understanding of the world, and rethinking as well the priority
assigned by the culture of the 1960s to freedom of lifestyle. Admittedly, that is a reevalua-




The other of us (Alan) has borne witness to three abortions with
respect to which he was the responsible other in the pregnancy:
one was illegal, and both mother and father were teenagers; a sec-
ond, which he reluctantly served as bystander to, probably contrib-
uted to the breakup of his first marriage; and the third, described
above.
We have both been identified with the left/liberal side of law
and politics, a setting in which unquestioning adherence to the
pro-choice position has seemed obligatory; for that reason we have
gone out of our way to understand and relate the pro-life side of
this debate. We are, perhaps, in some as yet undefined sense, grop-
ingly religious people, but we are neither Catholic nor fundamen-
talist, nor do we believe that any single religious creed offers a cat-
egorical "answer" to the abortion dilemma.
Since we are investigating the possibility of genuine public moral
debate on this issue, we refuse to regard either the pro-choice or
pro-life position as categorically correct. With respect to the for-
mer, we do not accept that the only correct "feminist" position is
unswerving support for Roe v. Wade. For one thing, there are
many women, some of whom see themselves as feminists, who are
nevertheless on the pro-life side.19 Moreover, in saying that there is
a debatable moral issue with respect to abortion, we are acknowl-
edging that there is an issue about fetal life that cannot be dis-
9 See, e.g., Cahill, Abortion, Autonomy, and Community, in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING
DIFFERENCES, supra note 4, at 261-276; S. Callahan, Value Choices in Abortion, in id, at
285-301; Elshtain, Reflections on Abortion, Values, and the Family, in id. at 47-72; Meehan,
More Trouble Than They're Worth?: Children and Abortion, in id. at 145-70. See generally
Abortion and the Law: Perspectives on a Painful Dilemma, SOJOURNERS, Nov. 1989, at 14-
22.
For recognition that one might in good faith as a feminist support a pro-lifo position, see
K. McDONNELL, NOT AN EASY CHoICE: A FEMINIST RE-EXAMINES ABORTION (1984); Colker,
Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron? A Study of the Briefs Filed in William L. Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 137, 161-164 (1990); Putnam, Being
Ambivalent About Abortion, TIKKUN, Sept./Oct. 1989, at 81-82. Thus, we cannot accept the
charge that "pro-life feminism, as currently formulated, is a contradiction in terms," as ex-
pressed by Kathy Pollitt in her hostile review of F. GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVES, supra note
13. See Pollitt, Everything's Up to Date in North Dakota, TIKKUN, Jan./Feb. 1990, at 57-60;
see also MA. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 50-58 (abortion as a woman's issue); Rosenblum &
Marzen, Strategies for Reversing Roe v. Wade Through the Courts, in ABORTION AND TIlE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 195, 205-06.
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missed by simply invoking "reproductive freedom." 20 Women, even
more than men, do take seriously moral and theological issues that
are not fully entailed by a rigid categorical feminism: three-fourths
of American women report that they consider religious faith the
most important influence on their life.2 1 Even apart from moral/
theological issues, the particular rhetoric of "privacy" and "choice"
may represent an effort to universalize a particular and class-based
instance of feminism.22
20 For examples of the "reproductive freedom" approach, see R. PETCIESKY, supra note
11; Estrich & Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L.
REv. 119 (1989); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. Rav. 955, 1016-28
(1984); Marcus, A Response to Michael J. Quirk: Who's Directing Traffic?, TIERUN, March/
April 1990, at 93-94.
We of course recognize that regulatory abortion laws speak directly to the lives of women,
as they do not to men, and that one should at least be wary of moral pronouncements
largely developed by male theologians when only women are the recipients of their instruc-
tion. Thus, in an important sense abortion is properly regarded as a woman's issue.
Nevertheless, we cannot accept that those perceptions lead necessarily to the successful
deployment of "reproductive freedom" as a close-out argument that renders abortions, at
least within the Roe v. Wade scheme, immunized from any meaningful public moral debate.
As mothers know (and the one of us with that capability has had four full-term pregnancies)
from experience, there is a time when the experience of "being pregnant" becomes the expe-
rience of nurturing and protecting a little life. The point is not to suggest that we
recriminalize abortions, but to appreciate that there is more to the pro-life position than can
be flicked away with words like "freedom" or "choice." See C. CONDrr, supra note 4, at 74
n.5. Condit also notes that the "reproductive freedom" claim belongs more to the world of
academic feminists and activists, than to the stories and lives of "ordinary" women. Id. at
76-77 n.25.
And at some point the claim of "freedom" collapses back into the rhetoric of "choice."
See L. FRmDesA, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE 182-85 (1990). Friedman's book is simultaneously
an historical sociology and celebration of "choice" as the dominant cultural motif for our
contemporary notion of "freedom." Yet his discussion of abortion, the issue that surely tests
the dominance of "choice," ends in nothing but the conflict, confusion and incommensura-
bility we have described earlier, casting some doubt on Friedman's entire thesis.
21 R. WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF WAMICAN RELIGION: Socixm AND F~ri SIcE
WORLD WAR II 226 (1988). The gap between female and male membership in churches is
lessening. In 1985, 73% of women and 63% of men were church members. Id. at 226 n.15.
Notably, however, a gender gap persists even when young women with college educations
and full-time jobs are compared with male counterparts. "Rather than being simply a pe-
ripheral issue that can be relegated to the dark comers of the past, religion remains a vital
aspect of the public and private lives of the vast majority of American women." Id. at 226.
22 On the middle-class tilt of the public discourse of "choice," see C. CoNDrr, supra note
4, at 188, 195-95; K McDoNNELL, supra note 19.
Moreover, a growing literature is questioning, on both epistemological and moral/political
grounds, the more extreme versions of feminist "essentialism," which universalize the expe-
rience of all women as against that of all men, often reducing all social/cultural issues to
ones of gender at the same time. Thus, a number of authors have suggested that claims
made on behalf of all women may reflect little more than the experience and privilege of
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With respect to the pro-life side, we reject the persuasive power
of the theological close-out. If theological discourse has a place in
public moral debate (which we see as still an open question) it can-
not be of the variety of "It's my religion, so shut up and don't
question me about it." That position, too, is no more than a re-
newed invitation to the barricaded scene of the protest. If theologi-
cal argument is to play a valuable role in public debate, it must
appeal not to privileged sectarian authority but to some version of
the common good,23 as Catholic tradition has in fact recognized.
Moreover, even while seeking to be universal rather than sectarian,
it must do so in the face of a pluralist reality that may render uni-
versalism impossible, a problem that lies at the heart of the
church/state dilemma.
We are of course far from being able to have public discussions
about the common good. Consensus is no substitute for substantive
moral dialogue, for when consensus breaks down we have nothing
to appeal to but rampant and incommensurable subjectivity. Such
is the case with abortion. The alchemical fantasy of liber-
alism-that process can turn itself into substance24 -is belied by
the reality of conflict. The larger question is whether we can re-
cover any sort of meaningful moral vocabulary. Thus the issue of
abortion quickly becomes one of substantive morality in post-En-
white middle-class professional women. See, e.g., E. SPELLMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMANM
PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Kline, Race, Racism and Feminist Legal
Theory, 12 HARv. WOMAN'S L.J. 115 (1989); see also Geertz, A Lab of One's Own, N.Y. REV.
OF BOOKS, Nov. 8, 1990, at 19 (questioning the existence of "feminist" science). To allow
women their particularity would welcome the richness and difference of their experiences,
including religious and cultural differences, which is a strength of F. GINSBURG, CONTESTED
LIVES, supra note 13.
The usual left response that the women on the wrong side (pro-life) must be victims of
"ideology" or "false consciousness" seems increasingly facile and outmoded. Cf. C. GEERTz,
Ideology as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 193-233 (paperback ed.
1973).
23 We do not intend to suggest that this is a simple dichotomy. Starkly sectarian views
may well play a valuable role in public moral dialogue. The bottom line is a willingness to
engage in such dialogue. For an excellent introduction to these issues, see Panel Discussion
with Richard Neuhaus, Robert Cover, Lisa Cahill, reprinted in Theological Perspectives, 5
J.L. & RELIGION 95-108. For more discussion of these issues, see infra text accompanying
notes 652-80.
24 See Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 13, 24-33 (D. Kairys ed. 2d ed. 1990); see also G. KELLY, POLITICS AND
RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS IN AMERICA 274 (1984).
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lightenment Western Culture: is there any substantive space be-
tween the incoherence of Kantian formalism and the grim reality
of Nietzschean nihilism? 25 Can a revival of theological traditions,
which after all serve to mediate our relationship with death itself,
and are at once seemingly moribund and surprisingly vital,2 6 serve
such an enterprise?
Since much of the pro-life side of the abortion debate is couched
in theological terms, we decided to try hard to understand abortion
as a theological issue, principally a Christian one27 (given the pub-
25 As noted above, Alasdair MacIntyre perceives the same problem with his version of
Aristoteliansim as the only solution. See A. MAcINrm, supra note 1.
26 See, e.g., T. CAPLOW, H. BAHR & B. CHADWicK, ALL FAITHFUL PEOPLE: CHANGE AND CON-
TINUITY IN MIDDLETOWN'S RELIGION (1983); J. CARRoLL. D. JOHNSON & M. MAIRY. RELIGION
IN AMERicAc 1950 TO THE PREsEmr (1979); A. GREELEY. RELIGIOUS CHANGE I AmERICA (1989);
M. MARTY, A NATION OF BEHAVERS (1976); i ARTM. PnLGMS IN THIR OWN LAND 500
YEARS OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 461-77 (1984); THE NEW RELIGIOUS CoNSCIOUSNESS (C. GlOCk
& R. Bellah eds. 1976); A.J. RECHLEY, RELIGION IN ALIERCAN PUBLIC LIFE 243-339 (1985);
RELIGION AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIF (M. Lacey ed. 1989); W.
ROOF & W. McKINNE, AMERICAN MAINLINE RELIGION: ITS CHANGING SHAPE AND FUTURE
(1987); R WuTmNow, supra note 21.
27 Thus we will give scant attention to the Jewish theological position on abortion. For
the most part, Jewish teaching on abortion is rooted in the particularistic and technical
realm of halakah (Jewish law). And from that realm comes a variety of positions on the
issue, ranging from a traditional opposition to all but a narrow category of therapeutic abor-
tions to a liberal pro-choice position supported by Reform Jewish theologians. The most
thorough review of this issue that we have found concludes that Jewish law prohibits abor-
tion "for less than a serious reason" and mandates "a solemn awareness of the potential life
involved." For the author, serious reasons include pain to the mother, but not "ordinary
pain," and certainly not "economic or social inconvenience." D. FELDmAN. BIRTH CONmOL IN
JEWISH LAW 251-94 (1968). For other examples of the restrictive view, see Jakobovits, Jew-
ish Views on Abortion, in ABORTION AND TH LAW 124-43 (D. Smith ed. 1967); Rosner, The
Jewish Attitude Toward Abortion, in CONTEMPORARY JEWISH ETHIcS 257-69 (M. Kellner ed.
1978); Klein, Abortion and Jewish Tradition, in CoNTEMPoRARY JEWISH ETHICS, supra, at
270-78. For liberal Jewish positions, see Brickner, Judaism and Abortion, in CoNTsuPoRmy
JEwISH ETHIcs, supra, at 279-83; Margolies, A Reform Rabbi's View, in I ABORION IN A
CHANGING WoRLD 30-33 (1970) (to be discussed further at infra text accompanying note
686). For the view that Jewish law "presents a number of central opinions that, when car-
ried to their logical conclusions, lead to a range of possible rulings on abortion in Jewish
Law," see Biale, Abortion in Jewish Law, TIKKUN, July/August 1989, at 26.
Moreover, in our experience (largely in the academic world), ethnic Jews have preferred
and even insisted on the propriety of secular, not theological, moral discourse. "American
Jews, especially the liberal-to-moderate majority, have long held that integration would be
fostered by advancing the tolerant pluralism of middle-class liberalism and adopting a
universalistic ethic, allowing them at least nominal continued identification as Jevs." W.
RooF & W. McKINNEY, supra note 26, at 225. On the outsider-as-insider motif in American
Jewish experience, focusing on the particular case of Felix Frankfurter, see R. Buwr. Two
JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROmISED LAND 37-61 (1988).
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lic rhetoric). We also sought to situate the particular abortion issue
in the larger setting of the substantive and institutional role of the-
ology in fashioning or influencing American public morality, espe-
cially in the period since World War H. We have made every effort
to comprehend these theological issues in their own terms; the re-
sult is a discourse that may well be alien and forbidding to many
law review readers, if not threatening and anxiety-inducing. We
hope you will bear with us in the service of replacing stark incom-
mensurability with something closer to mutually respectful
dialogue.
Part I of this Article offers a comparative perspective on animals
and abortion, leading up to the confrontation of both with nature
and Nazis. Part II picks up with the Nazis as representing the ulti-
mate challenge to the presumption of Western morality. The re-
mainder of Part II describes two important moral traditions that
were concerned with their relationship to the potential or actual
Against this background, one rarely finds examples of particularistic Jewish tradition be-
ing deployed in more universal terms as part of public moral discourse. In our own field,
however, two notable exceptions stand out: Edmond Calm and Robert Cover, both of whom
were lost, tragically, to untimely death. See, e.g., E. CAHN, CONFRONTING INJUSTICE: TiE ED-
MOND CAHN READER (L. Calm ed. 1966) [hereinafter E. CAHN, CONFRONTING INJUSTICE]; E.
CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION: RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN LAW (1955)
[hereinafter E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION]; E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949). See
generally Cover, Bringing the Messiah Through the Law: A Case Study, in RELIGION, MO-
RALrrY & THE LAw: NOMOS XXX 201-17 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1988); Cover,
Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 65-74 (1987);
Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV.
4 (1983); Ledewitz, Edmond Cahn's Sense of Injustice: A Contemporary Reintroduction, 3
J.L. & RELIGION 277 (1985) (analyzing E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE, supra, and its
relation to modern thought). Another such voice, drawing explicit inspiration from Robert
Cover, may be emerging. See Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal
Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2225 n.3 (1989); see also Binder,
Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J.
1321, 1372-83 (1989) (Jewish author discussing Jewish identity); Burt, Constitutional Law
and the Teaching of Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984) (Jewish author discussing New Tes-
tament parables); Jacobson, The Idolatry of Rules: Writing Law According to Moses, With
Reference to Other Jurisprudences, 11 CARDozo L. REV. 1079 (1990).
Finally, we are well aware of and applaud the efforts of Ruth Colker. See Colker, Femi-
nism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CALIF. L. REV.
1011 (1989). Colker placed the abortion issue in a generalized theological setting, with its
sources, for her, in selected Buddhist and Catholic writings, along with one Jewish source,
Martin Buber. Id. at 1011 n.2. Our own effort, which to some extent parallels Colker's, is to
recover a more historically specific theological debate within explicitly Christian tradition,
given both the overwhelming presence of Christianity in American culture and the particu-
lar Christian character inherent in much of the pro-life position.
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threat of Nazism. The first of these is the natural law tradition,
associated primarily with Catholicism, that saw a period of vigor-
ous revival in the post-World War H American legal culture (espe-
cially in a journal called the Natural Law Forum, which will be
referred to interchangeably as the Forum or the Natural Law Fo-
rum). The second is the tradition of Protestant neo-orthodoxy. In-
fluential in the 1950s and 1960s, even in some secular intellectual
circles, that tradition is associated particularly with Karl Barth
and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who were expelled and executed, respec-
tively, by the Nazis, for espousing a theology that formed the only
institutional religious challenge to the Nazis in Germany. Part H
closes with a look at the emergence of the abortion issue in partic-
ular, through the lens of natural law, as it was presented in the
Forum.
Part III surveys the institutional setting of religion and morality
in 1960s America, describing the relationship between the rise of
conservative Protestant evangelicalism, an important source of
pro-life support, and the decline of mainline Protestantism, which
had played an important moral/institutional role in American tra-
dition. Part I also investigates the "secularization" of American
religion, reaching its heyday in the 1960s with the "liberal" Cathol-
icism that followed Vatican H and the Kennedy Era, and an in-
creasingly "liberal" Protestantism, reaching its most extreme ver-
sions in "situation ethics" and "God is Dead" theology.
Part IV focuses on a pair of conferences in 1967 and 1968 deal-
ing with the public debate about abortion by examining the publi-
cations they produced. Through a comparison of these materials,
we will show how an almost entirely secular version of the abortion
debate triumphed, leading to the constitutionalization of abortion
rights under the rubric of privacy. Lost in the process was the con-
tinuing possibility of a genuine and ongoing moral debate about
abortion.
I LIFE AND DEATH/NATURE AND NAZIs
A. Animals and People
In the past few months (Fall/Winter 1990-91), a spate of media
attention has focused on the problem of "political correctness" on
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campus.28 Of particular concern has been the seeming expectation,
fostered by both faculty and students at some of the nation's most
elite liberal arts schools, that students must follow a left/liberal
"party line" on a number of controversial issues to avoid ostracism,
humiliation or even reprisal, academic or otherwise. More striking
than the mere existence of this phenomenon is its substantive con-
tent: we are told that to be "politically correct," one must be mili-
tantly pro-choice on the abortion issue (Catholics, other than
lapsed ones, are regarded as politically "incorrect" almost by defi-
nition), yet display an equal fervor in favor of environmentalism
and animal rights (including, we assume, things such as opposition
to animal experimentation, factory farming, hunting and wearing
of fur).
As teachers of environmental ethics (including issues of animal
rights and welfare), we are perplexed by this juxtaposition, for, de-
spite disavowals from both sides, animal rights supporters have
more in common with their pro-life counterparts than with those
who are pro-choice on abortion. While some of these commonali-
ties, particularly at the superficial level of rhetoric and style, are
unappealing, others, more substantive, prove compelling. In fact,
those who advocate respect and reverence for life, animal or fetal,
may share, more than they realize, a moral and theological com-
mon ground.
Negatively, a singular and selective fanaticism characterizes
some of the activists on behalf of both issues. Many animal rights
activists, for example, are "one-issue" people: middle-class white
women 29 who deviate from class interest only for the sake of ani-
" See, e.g., Adler, Taking Offense, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1990, at 48. For a serious reflec-
tion on the curricular implications of this issue, see Searle, The Storm Over the University,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 6, 1990, at 34-42. However caricatured its media depiction, we are
persuaded by our own anecdotal evidence that there is in fact a problem of "political cor-
rectness" on college campuses. Morever, it is a phenomenon not unrelated to the ascendancy
of an elite, secular world view that came to dominate acceptable public moral discourse for a
time and figured so significantly with respect to the abortion issue. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 574-93 & 680-89.
2 Middle-class white women have traditionally played a disproportionate role in the an-
tivisection movement. See C. LANSBURY, THE OLD BROWN DOG: WOMEN, WORKERS, AND VIVI-
SECTION IN EDWARDIAN ENGLAND 83, 198 n.4 (1985); see also H. RITvo, THE ANIMAL ESTATE:
THE ENGLISH AND OTHER CREATURES IN THE VICTORIAN AGE 157-66 (1987) (discussing history
of antivivisectionist movement during the nineteenth century).
A notable exception to the whiteness of the movement is novelist Alice Walker. See, e.g.,
Walker, Am I Blue? "Ain't Those Tears in Those Eyes Tellin You?", MS., July 1986, at 29
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mals. The combination of fervent concern for the suffering of help-
less animals with an apparent indifference to the suffering of, for
example, people with serious illnesses who might be helped by
animal experimentation, undercuts the moral persuasiveness of
their position. One is reminded of Gordon Gekko's quip in the
movie, Wall Street, that "the thing about WASPs is that they love
animals, but they hate people." 30
To the extent that the right-to-life movement has been infil-
trated or appropriated or exploited by those whose arch-conserva-
tism translates into unwillingness to spend public funds to relieve
human suffering, one is similarly taken aback. One finds it hard to
swallow the admonitions of such writers as Patrick Buchanan when
he tells us in his syndicated column that
[a]bortion is not about money, where compromise is pos-
sible. It is about right and wrong, about who we are. It is
a moral issue[;]
or that
[a]bortion on demand is the great evil of our time, the
ultimate act of selfishness and cruelty, the defining state-
ment of the Me Generation in the Now Decade.31
The problem lies not in singleness of purpose, for any seriously
committed activist must focus energies, nor does it lie in the con-
tent of statements such as Buchanan's, which are certainly within
the bounds of robust public debate on a difficult moral issue. In-
stead, the contradiction arises when pious advocates of "life," like
Buchanan and the Bush administration, oppose even minimally
benevolent social measures. How can one credibly be for "life" yet
oppose programs designed to help children in poverty?
32
(discussing the feelings animals have toward humans).
The animal rights movement is also one of the largest instances of mass political energy in
our culture. Newsweek reported in May 1988 that "Congress had received more mail on the
subject of animal research than any other topic." Adler, Emptying the Cages: Does the
Animal Kingdom Need a Bill of Rights?, NEWSWEEK, May 23, 1988, at 59.
3 (Twentieth Century Fox 1987).
3 Buchanan, No Time for GOP to Cower on Abortion (October 1989 syndicated column
distributed by Tribune Media Services on file with authors).
' As just one example, a panel of Bush administration officials, who studied the problem
of infant mortality, concluded that delivery of routine clinical care and social services to
pregnant women could substantially reduce high infant mortality rates without even tam-
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Fanatic singularity of purpose becomes more explicable when
one turns to the imagery frequently employed to promote the pro-
life and animal rights movements. Animal rights groups graphi-
cally depict the plight of helpless, innocent creatures who are tor-
tured or killed solely for the sake of commercial gain and human
self-indulgence.3 3 Pictures show rabbits being painfully blinded by
the Draize test, a grotesque procedure once routinely used by cos-
metic companies, and an "easy case" compared with the ethically
more complex issue of medical research. The analogous visual por-
trayal of fetuses has been one of the most recurring rhetorical
ploys of the pro-life movement.3 4 The power of these images is un-
deniable. Indeed, any graphic depiction of an innocent sacrificial
victim appeals to Christian themes deeply embedded in our
culture.3 5
To universalize both issues as fully encapsulated by the image of
the sacrificial slaughter of innocents is ultimately too facile. It is
easy to take the side of life as against the side of death, especially
when death claims for its own the helpless and the innocent. Yet
by graphically isolating these issues in their purity and simplicity,
advocates avoid the ethically troubling fact of human responsibil-
ity for both life and death. One suspects that the real opponent is
death itself-as if by building a wall of absolute protection around
fetal or animal life, one could pretend away the reality that the life
pering with income distribution, reducing poverty levels or spending billions of dollars. Yet
even that measured proposal, which could prevent one-quarter to one-third of infant mor-
tality, remains in limbo within the administration, which has no intention of even dissemi.
nating its own findings. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1990, § 4, at 5, col. 1.
For the close link between opposition to abortion and opposition to government spending
on social programs generally, see R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 223. As a more positive
approach, pro-life groups have established homes that provide help for women during preg-
nancy and provide day care and other services for unwed mothers. See N.Y. Times, May 13,
1990, at 1, col. 2.
3 For some graphic examples, see the most recent issue of THE ANIMALS' VoIcE, Dec.
1990, at 7, a slick and elegantly produced magazine intended "to reach mainstream audi-
ences with our message of animal rights." The cover depicts an appaxently still-alive mon-
key staring helplessly at us with a metal hoop circling its skull through which, at frequent
intervals, screws have been driven directly into the monkey's flesh. Inside, with appropriate
warnings in advance, are similarly gruesome pictures. See id. at 10-15, 33-47. P. SINGan,
ANIMAL LIBERATION 140 (paperback ed. 1975) (photo insert) makes use of similar photos to
support his philosophical argument.
3' See C. CONDIT, supra note 4, at 79-92.
3' The appeal is made explicit by pro-life depiction of infant dolls on crosses, as used in
demonstrations. See R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 213.
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of some will inevitably carry with it the death of others, that
"choice" over questions of life and death is part of the human
condition.
Graphic images of helpless victims, nevertheless, do serve as an
effective antidote to a similar ploy of death avoidance by the other
side on both issues. Pictures remind us that a forlorn dog in the
testing laboratory does not become a "thing" merely by being
called the "subject of the test" or assigned a number rather than a
name. So too we are properly reminded by pro-life graphics that a
fetus or embryo is in fact a developing child. We do violence to
that reality (however complex its ethical implications) by denial
through objectifying labels like "mere tissue" or "products of con-
ception." Some will insist that the images appeal to "irrational"
fears and anxieties; yet even philosophers concede that there is no
meaningful line between "emotional" and "logical" arguments on
moral issues such as these."'
Both movements further amplify the rhetorical power of their
visual imagery by deploying what has become the moral close-out
in twentieth-century political discourse-the identification of op-
pressors with Nazis and concomitant association of victims with
the Holocaust: "[T]oday's medical abortionists are doing the same
thing to the unwanted unborn as the Nazis did to their victims
.... -37 Animal rights guru Peter Singer has analogized animal ex-
perimentation to the grotesque practices in Nazi concentration
camps."' Similarly, both movements try to analogize themselves to
" See, e.g., M. MIDGLEY, ANImALS AND WHY THEY MATrE 33-44 (1983) (examining emo-
tions toward animals and seeking to justify those emotions); R. RoRm PmosoGPf" AND THE
MIRROR OF NATURE 188-92 (paperback ed. 1979). Rosalind Hursthouse illustrates the gap
between analytic philosophy and "ordinary morality" with her apt example "We can't take
Laura on holiday, why don't we drown her," to which the ordinary morality response would
be "But that would be killing a baby!" The context is her review of two philosophical tradi-
tions, one of which would regard as irrelevant the fact of "killing," while the other would
regard as equally irrelevant that the victim is a baby. See R. HuRsmiousn, supra note 13, at
179-80.
W. BRENNAN, THE ABORTION HOLocAusT: TODAY'S FINAL SOLUTION 5 (1983).
P. SINGER, supra note 33.
Under the Nazi regime in Germany, nearly 200 doctors, some of them eminent
in the world of medicine, took part in experiments on Jews and Russian and
Polish prisoners. Thousands of other physicians knew of these experiments,
some of which were the subject of lectures at medical academies. Yet the
records show that the doctors sat through medical reports of the infliction of
horrible injuries on these "lesser races" and then proceeded to discuss the
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abolitionism and other movements of human liberation. Hence
"specism" is likened to racism and sexism,3 9 and Roe v. Wade to
Dred Scott v. Sandford.40 By raising these specters, whether fairly
or unfairly, advocates force us to confront again their moral impli-
cations. How do we recognize our responsibility for making deci-
sions about the lives and deaths of others without becoming the
moral equivalent of Nazis or slaveowners? From whence do we de-
rive limits to our power to choose the death of others?
At the level of substantive moral argument, both pro-life and
animal rights positions are characterized by their appeal to a pri-
ori, absolutist categories as constituting the necessary limit to our
power over others. As applied, however, the categories invoked by
each have troubling implications for the other. Two leading ani-
mals rights theorists, Tom Regan and Peter Singer, have taken po-
sitions consistent with permitting not only late abortions but also
infanticide. For Regan, a neo-Kantian, moral rights attach to any
being who fits the category "subject-of-a-life," which in turn de-
medical lessons to be learned from them without anyone making even a mild
protest about the nature of the experiments. The parallels between this atti-
tude and that of experimenters today toward animals are striking.
Id. at 76-77. See also Francione, "Harassment" and "Terrorism," THE ANIMALS' VOICE, Oct.
1990, at 53. "[T]hose who have a reverence for all life may legitimately regard as the real
'terrorists' those who kill, torture, and maim, nonhumans for commercial gain." Id.
One particularly telling incident occurred when we sponsored, for our seminar, a showing
of the Fredrick Wiseman movie, Meat, which is a lengthy, matter-of-fact documentary
about precise activities in a modern slaughterhouse. A militant animals rights activist of our
acquaintance, whom we had invited, watched the slaughterhouse workers on screen for a
while, then stood up and angrily left, proclaiming, "Those people are just like Nazis; they
should be killed."
" See P. SINGER, supra note 33, at 1-26. For a sympathetic yet critical treatment of the
analogy, see M. MIDGLEY, supra note 36, at 98-111; see also T. REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL
RIGHTS 226-28, 312-15 (1983).
,o E.g., J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE, supra note 9, at 81-84. President Ronald Reagan
told us that "this is not the first time our country has been divided by a Supreme Court
decision that denied the value of human lives. The Dred Scott decision of 1857 [Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 19 U.S. (1 How.) 393 (1857)] was not overturned in a day, or a year, or even a
decade." R. REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION 19 (1984) quoted in C.
CONDIT, supra note 4, at 50. For other examples, see ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 13, at 15, 17, 57, 92-93.
The December 1990 issue of The Animals' Voice contains a full-page advertisement for
itself and its related foundation, The Compassion for Animals Foundation, which explicitly
invokes the tradition of militant abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, to the point of quoting
his famous proclamation in the first issue of The Liberator, "I will not equivocate, I will not
excuse, I will not retreat a single inch. And I will be heard." THE ANIMAL'S VOICE, at facing-
page 49 (pull-out insert).
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pends upon whether it has "beliefs, desires, and the like.""4 While
many (but not all) adult animals are included in the category, he
regards inclusion of "newly born or the soon-to-be-born" humans
as "an open and much debated question."4 2 Singer has gone even
further. With his utilitarian emphasis on "capacity to suffer" as
defining the primary relevant category, he has argued for the moral
legitimacy and logical consistency of both abortion and infanti-
cide.43 Utterly predictable is the outraged reaction of pro-lifers to
those who advocate respect for animal life but would deny protec-
tion to fetal and infant life. A leading pro-life philosopher, John
Finnis, observes that "[tihe animal rights publicists, who are gen-
eraUy the same people who defend abortion and infanticide, are
denying humane quality when they accuse 'prolifers' of'speciesism.' They are laying foundations of a new range of dis-
crimination and denial of rights more devastating than racism.""'
41 T. REGAN, supra note 39, at 319.
42 Id.
42 See P. SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 122-26 (1979), prompting Rosalind Hursthouse to ask-
"Would not one expect someone arguing against the way we slaughter animals to be rather'pro-life' in general, and hence against abortion and infanticide?" R. Huas-rousn, supra
note 13, at 155-56. She goes on to criticize Singer's utilitarianism for both its inconsistency
and its failure to give even adequate protection to animals. Id. at 155.58. For a utilitarian
who takes both issues seriously and who is committed to consistency, see L SuurT, supra
note 13. For his specific views on animals, see id. at 139-40, 198-200.
On the other hand, conceding the difficulty of positing absolutist, universally valid ethical
norms may compel hesitation even with respect to practices like infanticide, which seem so
morally repugnant to most of us. Consider two culture-specific examples:
Anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes observed the practice of "selective neglect" (or
"passive infanticide"), whereby mothers in poverty-stricken Northeastern Brazil, with a
great deal of stoicism and equanimity, decide whether particular infants are "thrivers and
survivors" or "born already 'wanting to die."' Scheper-Hughes, Death Without Weeping:
Has Poverty Ravaged Mother Love in the Shantytowns of Brazil?, NATURAL HISTORY, Oct.
1989 at 8, 10. The mothers nurture those perceived as survivors, while "stigmatized, doomed
infants were left to die, as mothers say, a mingua, 'of neglect."' Id. The local Catholic
churches have been at odds with themselves over the practice. The traditional approach was
"patience and resignation" in the face of domestic tragedy, with elaborate funerals for the
deceased infants. Id. at 16. Newer, "liberation theology" priests, however, find themselves
opposed to condoning in any way the cultural accommodation of infanticide. Id.
Families on the verge of starvation among the Inuit people of the Far North would also
sometimes place newborn infants in the snow to die. Yet, according to legend, this could be
done only before the child had been named, for, if named, the child would acquire a soul,and, if killed, become an angiak, a "child of the living dead," who, even as its flesh decayed,
would live on as a spirit, seeking revenge. For a vivid mythological account, see Furies of the
Far North, in TALES OF TERROR 70, 74-76 (Tnha-LiFa ENCHA-ED WORLD SERIES, 1987).
"' Finnis, Natural Law and the Rights of the Unborn, in AnaRTION AND TH CO~sITru-
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In contrast, pro-life advocates support their position by reliance
on the single category "person," with rights, security and protec-
tion attaching by virtue of membership in that category. This ap-
proach draws on a basically theological tradition associated with
Aquinas, Descartes and even Kant, all of whom categorically dis-
tinguished (rational) humans from (irrational) animals, largely on
the basis that only the former have souls.' 5 Novelist Milan
Kundera sums up our Cartesian heritage in this respect:
Man is master and proprietor, says Descartes, whereas
the beast is merely an automaton, an animate machine, a
machina animata. When an animal laments, it is not a
lament; it is merely the rasp of a poorly functioning
mechanism."'
John Finnis, as a natural law theorist, insists on preserving pre-
cisely that rigid human/animal dichotomy:
[T]he injunction "Treat like cases alike" must be taken
in a more than merely formal sense; it must, for example,
implicitly treat all human beings as alike in their human-
ity and in their basic entitlement to be treated differently
from animals .... Those who propose that animals have
rights have a deficient appreciation of the basic forms of
human good.... The basic human goods are not abstract
TION, supra note 13, at 119. Writer John Lofton characterizes "caring for animals more than
people" as "moral insanity." Lofton, "Moral Insanity" Has Turned American Value Sys-
tem Topsy-Turvy, Buffalo News, Sept. 23, 1990, at H-11.
' For a good summary, see J. SERPELL, IN THE COMPANY OF ANIMALS: A STUDY OF HUMAN-
ANIMAL RELATIONSHIPS 122-30 (1986). For a sampling of these views, as well as some of their
critics, see ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 51-169 (T. Regan & P. Singer eds. 1976)
[hereinafter ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS]. On Kant's position with respect to
animals, which denied them the status of "moral agent," but imposed duties of kindness
toward them so as not to stifle human feelings toward one another, see id. at 122-23; see also
R. HURSTIIOUSE, supra note 13, at 94-96 (describing the extension of Kant's "person" to
non-human beings and how this would change the way humans treat non-human "per-
sons"); T. REGAN, supra note 39, at 84-85 (determining the Kantian sense of autonomy does
not apply to animals while the preferential sense of autonomy does); L. SUMNER, supra note
13, at 140 (examining Kant's position and A. MELDON, RIGHTS AND PERSONS 204 (1977),
where Meldon writes that, because only humans are capable of moral agency, these natural
rights belong to humans).
46 M. KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING 288 (1984). For our own critique of
such dualism, see Freeman & Mensch, Scratching the Belly of the Beast, TIIKUN, Sept.-
Oct. 1989, at 34-38, 92-93, 95-96.
[Vol. 25:923
THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE
forms, such as "life" or "conscious life": they are good as
aspects of the flourishing of a person. And if the propo-
nents of animal rights point to very young babies, or very
old and decayed or mentally defective persons (or to
some asleep?), and ask how their state differs empirically
from that of a flourishing, friendly, and clever dog, and
demand to know why the former are accorded the respect
due to rights-holders while the latter is not, we must re-
ply that respect for human good reasonably extends as
far as human being, and is not to be extinguished by the
circumstance that the incidents or "accidents" of affairs
have deprived a particular human being of the opportu-
nity of a full flourishing.
47
The tradition of categorical, hierarchical human self-importance,
with its concomitant domination of nature, led historian Lynn
White in 1968 to blame the entire Judeo-Christian tradition for
our modern ecological crisis insofar as that tradition celebrates and
validates the instrumental exploitation of nature in the service of
human need.48 Thus it would seem, at least on the surface, that the
very same Judeo-Christian religious tradition invoked by pro-life
advocates to oppose abortion serves equally well to rationalize our
indifference to the plight of non-human animals.
Nevertheless, many modern scholars are recognizing that Lynn
White overstated the negative case and that the rigid dualism
mandated by Descartes and echoed by Finnis is not all that our
theological traditions have to offer. The upshot is that animals and
abortion raise similar moral dilemmas, and that both might be bet-
ter served by recognizing overlapping concerns.
For one thing, emotional responses play a key role in both issues.
Although both sides of both issues would have us resolve every-
thing by reference to neat categories ("sentience," "capacity to suf-
fer," "personhood," "viability") that lead to "in" or "out" conclu-
sions, the experiential reality seems more to be one of degree, of
varying levels of affinity rather than clear lines of demarcation. We
47 J. FiNNS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 194-95 (1980). Rosalind Hursthouse,
writing in the same Aristotelian tradition, disagrees. See R. HuRSTHousE, supra note 13, at
237-47.
49 White, The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, in MACHINA Ex DsO- ESSAYS IN
THE DYNAmSM OF WESTRmN CuLTURE 75 (1968).
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respond differently to the suffering of puppies or kittens than we
do to that of baby snakes or insects. Similarly, photos of nineteen-
week fetuses are more compelling than those taken at eight weeks,
which are in turn more compelling than those of two-week em-
bryos. Most of us would save our children from fire before saving
our dogs, and might save our children before those of strangers, or
care more about our immediate neighbors than those at some dis-
tance. As philosopher Richard Rorty puts it, with specific emphasis
on the animals issue, the facts needed to make such difficult moral
judgments are "not discoverable independently of sentiment.' 4
And it may be that issues requiring the guidance of sentiment are
better understood as theological ones.5 0
What, then, of our theological traditions? Is there really such a
divergence with respect to animals and abortion? For one thing,
the unchecked domination of nature denounced by Lynn White
may be more the result of secular, Enlightenment descendants of
Christianity than of a more constrained religious tradition. Reli-
gious tradition, while validating human freedom with respect to
nature, also imposed responsibilities that limited that freedom. 1
The same Jewish tradition that makes abortion a matter of
grave concern52 imposes a strict ethic of stewardship with respect
to animals.5 3 While the notion of "dominion" ("Let him [Adam]
have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air,
49 R. RORTY, supra note 36, at 191. Rorty is talking about the problem of constituting a
moral "community," to which our moral prohibitions will extend, a crucial issue with re-
spect to both animals and fetuses. He concludes that it is "notorious that moral philoso-
phers are of little help in deciding what is to count as a moral agent, as having dignity
rather than value." Id. He concludes:
The emotions we have toward borderline cases depend on the liveliness of our
imagination, and conversely. Only the notion that in philosophy we have a dis-
cipline able to give good reasons for what we believe on instinct lets us think
that "more careful philosophical analysis" will help us draw a line between
coldness of heart and foolish sentimentality.
Id. See also, M. MIDGLEY, supra note 36, at 28-32 (discussing membership/community issue
and focusing on its complexity); L. WEINEB, supra note 15, at 301 n.26 (examining whether
animals "count as significant others").
00 So concludes Kent Greenawalt, with respect to both animals and abortion. See K.
GREENAWALT, supra note 14, at 98-110 (animals), 120-37 (abortion). For a similar conclusion
with respect to animals, see Freeman & Mensch, supra note 46.
81 See, e.g. W. LEIss, THE DOMINATION OF NATURE 29-35, 188-90, 196-97 (1972).
62 See supra note 27.
" See generally E. SCHOCHET, ANIMAL LIFE IN JEWISH TRADITION: ATTITUDES AND RELA-
TIONSHIPS (1984). We recommend especially his "Biblical Portrait." Id. at 9-79.
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and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping
thing that creepeth upon the earth.")5 served to separate Judaism
from more totemistic religions which deified or mythologized ani-
mals, that did not render the world a mere instrumentality for the
satisfaction of every human whim. Ancient Jews included in their
notion of dominion a clear obligation of respect and care, growing
from the recognition that the world had been lovingly created by
God. 5
Genesis 1:26-28.
56 A number of injunctions laid down in the Torah speak specifically to the decent treat-
ment of animals. The obligation to rest upon the Sabbath includes the obligation to provide
a day of rest for all domestic animals and beasts of burden. Deuteronomy 5:14. The muz-
zling of an ox, while he treads grain upon the threshing floor, is forbidden, for the animal is
entitled to enjoy food, as is any human laborer. Deuteronomy 25:9; 23:25-26. An animal
fallen beneath the weight of its burden must be assisted to rise, even if it is the beast of
one's enemy. Deuteronomy 22:4; Exodus 23:4-5.
Beyond enunciating specific prohibitions, scripture also expresses the deep kinship of peo-
ple and animals, who share a common mortality. "For that which befalleth the sons of men
befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other, yea,
they have all one breath; so that man hath no preeminence above a beast: for all is vanity.
All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to the dust again." Ecclesiastes 3:19-
21. Whatever words scripture uses to describe life-a mist, a fleeting breath, a cloud, a
dream, a shadow, a flower or grass-apply to both people and animals. See E. Sciiocimr,
supra note 53, at 52-53.
Similarly, as Schochet points out, Biblical terminology reflects the unity of humans and
beasts. Ruach hayyim ("spirit of life") can refer to both people and animals, as can nefesh
hayyah ("living creature"). The word Basar ("flesh") refers literally to the softer parts of
the body of an organism, or to the body in general, or to humanity;, and the phrase kol
Basar ("all flesh") can denote all living creatures, animal as well as human. While Basor can
refer to food, more generally it connotes "Frailty," the perishable nature of all living entit-
ites. See id. at 53.
Indeed, animals are specifically included in God's covenant with Noah: "Behold, I estab-
lish my covenant with you... and with every living creature that is with you, of the fowl, of
the cattle, and every beast of the earth with you." Genesis 9:9-10. Not surprisingly, then,
the prophetic, messianic vision, depicting the final fulfillment of the covenant, is a vision of
renewed harmony among all members of the animal kingdom:
The wolf shall dwell with the lamb
And the leopard shall lie down with the kid;
And the calf and the young lion and the fatling together,
And a little child shall lead them.
And the cow and the bear shall feed;
Their young one shall lie down together,
And the lion shall eat straw like the ox,
And the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp,
And the weaned child shall put his hand on the adder's den.
Isaiah 11:6-9. In this passage, Isaiah harkens back to the Garden of Eden, which ws, as
described in the first chapter of Genesis, a time of peaceful vegetarianism for both people
and animals; the fulfillment of the covenant means a return to such a state. This message is
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The Christian half of the Judeo-Christian tradition is also far
from unproblematic with respect to animals. It is true that St.
Paul dismissed the idea that God's providence extends toward ani-
mals in the same way that it extends toward persons."' Later,
Aquinas said that "by divine providence they are intended for
man's use in the natural order. ' 57 Even John Calvin, despite his
differences with the Catholic Church, readily agreed that God "cre-
ated all things for man's sake." ' Yet, there is another side to the
story.
Even Aquinas conceded that irrational creatures might be loved
out of charity.59 Meanwhile, his contemporary in thirteenth-cen-
tury Italy, St. Francis of Assisi, drew on the tradition of the Celtic
Saints and desert monasticism, characterized by reciprocity and
harmony among all creatures, to exemplify a love for non-human
as well as human creatures. His teachings gave rise to a still-living
tradition of rich Christian piety.60 America's own greatest Chris-
tian theologian, Jonathan Edwards, with an extraordinary under-
standing of the limits of Enlightenment rationalism, rejected both
the spirit/nature dualism and the separation of human society
from the rest of nature. He quite explicitly saw in our abusive
treatment of animals and the natural world (already apparent to
him in eighteenth-century New England), evidence of sin for which
we would be held accountable; he also saw nature as inseparable
emphasized by Hosea as well, who describes the time when God would once again renew his
loving relationship with the errant Israel:
And I will make for you a covenant on that day with the beasts of the field, the
birds of the air, and the creeping things of the ground; and I will abolish the
bow, the sword, and war from the land; and I will make you lie down in safety.
And ... I will betroth you to me forever; I will betroth you to me in righteous-
ness and in justice, in steadfast love, and in mercy.
Hosea 2:18-19.
" "Is it for the oxen that God is concerned? Does he not speak entirely for our sake?" 1
Corinthians 9:9-10. Later, he explains that the passage is really about the right of preachers,
like Paul himself, to be paid a suitable wage. 1 Timothy 5:17-18.
' Aquinas, Difference Between Rational and Other Creatures, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND
HUMAN OBLIGATIONS, supra note 45, at 58-59.
"8 See J. PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE: ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND WEST-
ERN TRADITIONS 13 (2d ed. 1980) (quoting 1 J. CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF RELIGION, bk. 1, at 182
(F. Battles trans. 1961)).
89 See, e.g., Aquinas, On Killing Living Things and the Duty to Love Irrational Creation,
in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS, supra note 45, at 118-21.
'O See Bratton, The Original Desert Solitaire: Early Christian Monasticism and Wilder-
ness, 10 ENVTL. ETHIcs 31 (1988).
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from the meaning of redemption.
Animal rights proponent and philosopher Stephen Clark, himself
a Christian, repudiates the Cartesian duality that justifies human
instrumentalism, and concludes with respect to "the Christian atti-
tude to the non-human" that, "There isn't one."01 2 His summary:
All educated Christians should agree that they [animals]
do not belong to us. All should agree that there are limits
on what we may properly do with God's creatures. But all
do not agree on the nature or extent of those limits; nor
do all agree on what office God has designed for us. '
Anglican scholar Andrew Linzey, drawing on the work of Paul Til-
lich, has taken up the challenge of reformulating Christian doc-
trine with respect to animals. 4 Returning to what he regards as
the central meaning of Christianity, Linzey argues that the doc-
trines of creation, incarnation, reconcilation and redemption, taken
together, cannot be limited to human beings. When Christ became
"flesh," he became part of what humans share with the animals;
furthermore, reconciliation must logically include all that was pre-
viously unreconciled, a state humans have shared, according to
scripture, with nature. As Tillich writes, "Man cannot claim...
that the infinite has entered the finite to overcome its existential
estrangement in mankind alone."
6 5
In a recently published collection of essays, Catholic theologian
James Burtchaell, author of Rachael Weeping: The Case Against
Abortion, offered these views:
It is not technology itself that is sinister, nor even its
method, which is to restrict its gaze to the problem at
61 See P. Cooey-Nichols, Nature as Divine Communication in the Works of Jonathan Ed-
wards (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1981). See also M. BALL, supra
note 14, at 184 nn.16-17 (comparing Edwards' Trinitarian theology of nature with Karl
Barth's Christocentric views); Kimnach, Jonathan Edwards' Pursuit of Reality, in
JONATHAN EDwARDs AND THE AMmiucAN EXPERIENCE 102-17 (N. Hatch & H. Stout eds. 1988)
(discussing religion as experience and spiritual awareness).
62 S. CLAR., THE MORAL STATUS OF ANxrsirS 195 (1984).
63 Id. Clark is both an avid advocate for animals and an opponent of abortion. On the
latter, see id. at 74-75, 128.
See Linzey, The Place of Animals in Creation: A Christian View, in Amu .AL SAcJUFiCE
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF ANushx.s IN SCIENCE 115-48 (T. Regan ed. 1986)
(citing P. TILLICH, II SYsTEMATIC THEOLOGY pt. 3, at 96 (1978)).
11 Id. at 119 (quoting P. TmLICH, supra note 64, at 96).
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hand. The damage comes when a technologist (or any
professional) acts only on the competence of his or her
discipline, while blind to any wider view of the fuller
human agenda. The technologist goes berserk and be-
comes the sorcerer's apprentice when she devises tactics
in ignorance of what strategy or policy or ethic they are
going to serve.
The ecological movement, now well underway, is the
first effectively persuasive rebuke to a belief that had
grown apace with modern science and technology since
the Enlightenment. The doctrine held that human pur-
pose and choice would encounter no limits in its domin-
ion over nature. Or, to put a finer point on the doctrine:
it held that there was no nature, no creation with an in-
given character and requirements quite beyond what we
could choose to infuse in things or bleach out of them.
But the environmental disillusionment was all to do
with the elements and with plants and animals. We have
yet to be persuaded that there are given, natural forces
and needs in humanity ourselves that may be as aloof
from our willful preferences and choices as are the tides
of the ocean that make sport of our retaining walls and
waterways.
6 6
Also interesting in this regard is a series of ads placed in the local
edition of Newsweek by the Catholic Archdiocese of Buffalo. 7
These pro-life ads depict a mother and infant and ask "What do I
believe in?," answering, in part, "I believe in marigolds, when
they're only a few dry seeds. In butterflies, when they are still grey
cocoons. In the song of birds before their eggs begin to hatch." Is
there perhaps a sense in which a call for respect for potential life
inevitably becomes a call for respect for all life, including non-
human life? An ad seemingly intended to elicit attitudes of rever-
ence, humility and wonderment does so by suggesting the unity of
life rather than the Catholic tradition of human/animal duality.
J. BURTCHAELL, THE GIVING AND TAKING OF LIFE: ESSAYS ETHICAL 123-24 (1989).
Newsweek, Sept. 24, 1990, opposite page 67 (Buffalo regional ed.).
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B. Women, Nature and Nazis
To speak of our relationship to or responsibility for "nature," is
all too often to obscure the contingency of what we choose to label
"natural." Is there anything natural about our millions of pam-
pered pet dogs and cats or the unwanted thousands who die daily
to support our collective affectation? Is there anything natural
about the millions of animals bred specifically by humans for ex-
perimentation or for food? If we grant them their "rights," do we
let them go or kill them painlessly? In fact, environmentalists and
animal rights advocates often disagree about such issues. Ecolo-
gists, concerned with habitats, "ecosystems"' 8 or species survival,
may be indifferent to the suffering or even survival of individual
animals. Is there anything natural about marauding suburban deer
or animals in zoos or wildlife "preserves," often funded by and for
hunters who are permitted to "manage" animal populations?
The great traditional claim of natural law is that we can infer a
morality from observable nature, from the essential reality of the
objective natural order. That requires a nature which reveals itself
to our careful reason, perhaps only with an accompanying faith in
a transcendent God. What, however, if we cannot infer any such
truths, and cannot even know what is out there in the "natural
world"? How do we then fit in? Is it natural for us to eat meat, to
employ technology, to kill our fellow creatures, to kill our fellow
humans?
The question of what is natural becomes especially acute with
respect to gender difference. Are men and women the same, except
for culturally contingent role definitions easily transformed, with
childbearing capacity nothing more than a gender-specific control-
lable variable? Or are there intractable, essential differences in
role, attitude, perception or behavior attributable to some mix
(that cannot be sorted out) of culture, history, tradition and biol-
ogy? For reasons both negative and positive, women have been
identified, and have identified themselves, with nature in our his-
On the serious practical and theoretical differences between animal rights advocates
and those favoring a deeper and more comprehensive environmental ethic, see Calhicott,
Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair, 2 ENvm. Ermucs 311 (1980). On the problem of
even defining what we mean by an objective ecosystem, and the consequent quandary for
environmental ethics, see B. Boyer, Ecosystem, Legal System, and the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
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tory, offering thereby a distinctly feminist outlook.
While, as we noted earlier, most animal rights activists are
women, there had usually been no particular correspondence be-
tween animal rights activism and feminist activism as such. One
significant exception to this usual divergence occurred in turn-of-
the-century England, where for a time feminists and antivivisec-
tionists formed a strong alliance.6 Women at the time could easily
identify their own domination and victimization with cruelty to an-
imals, an identification which accounted for the enormous popular-
ity of Black Beauty.70 This association was particularly acute given
the cruel gynecological procedures of charity hospitals-justified
explicitly by the stereotype of woman as animal-like. (A woman
doctor, horrified by the medical treatment of poor women, ex-
plained that "[p]aupers are thus classed with animals as fitting
subjects for painful experiments, and no regard is shown to the
feelings of either.")71
While poor men also experienced the lower-class fear of charity
hospitals, for women that fear was intensified by the element of
lewd sexual domination. Indeed, Victorian pornography was closely
related to gynecological practices, and both in turn were associated
with the treatment of animals. (Women were "put in stirrups,"
"broken to the bit," made to "show their paces" and "present
themselves.")7 2 Thus, women came to see their own condition "hid-
eously and accurately embodied in the figure of an animal bound
to a table by straps with the vivesector's knife at work on its
flesh. '73 Given that legacy, it is not surprising that some feminists
otherwise committed to reproductive choice are nevertheless hesi-
tant to endorse the rapid advance of objectifying reproductive
technologies; and even simple, painless abortions can be exper-
ienced as technological violence.
A growing body of scholarship has, in fact, been exploring the
deep ideological connection between the domination of women and
the scientific objectification of nature. Carolyn Merchant, for ex-
ample, has traced the emergence of the dualistic imagery which de-
69 For this account, we are indebted to Coral Lansbury's brilliant and persuasive account
of this brief alliance. See generally C. LANSBURY, supra note 29.
10 ANNA SEWELL, BLACK BEAUTY: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A HORSE (1877).
71 C. LANSBURY, supra note 29, at 86-87.
71 Id. at 112-29.
73 Id. at 84.
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scribed nature as a dark, mysterious, feminine force to be subdued
by aggressive rationalist scientific "penetration. 7 As she quotes
Bacon: "For you have but to follow and as it were hound nature in
her wanderings, and you will be able when you like to lead and
drive her afterward .... Neither ought a man to make scruple of
entering and penetrating into these holes and corners." 75 Bacon in-
sisted that direct experimentation should replace the abstract the-
orizing of the scholastics, for nature is a force that must be "bound
into service" and made a "slave," put in "constraint," to be
"molded" by the mechanical arts. "Nature must be taken by the
forelock"; and a science which does not include experimentation
will "permit one only to clutch at nature, never to lay hold of her
and capture her.
76
Merchant is careful not to take an essentialist position on the
relationship between women and nature-while male scientific dis-
course has historically linked the objectification of nature with
domination of women, that male history does not mean that
women are in fact somehow more "natural" than men, as a matter
of inescapable essentialist reality. On the other hand, the history of
identification has provided feminists with a valuable vantage point
from which to assess Baconian dualism, with its inflated claims to
universal, ahistoric validity, as well as Bacon's (now scientifically
74 See C. MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE: WOMEN. ECOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTION 171 (1989). See generally id. at 164-90.
7 Id. at 168.
76 Id. at 169-70. Compare the similar terminology used by noted historian of science
Thomas Kuhn in characterizing Baconian science, in T. KUHN, Mathematical versus Exper-
imental Traditions in the Development of Physical Science, in THE ESSENTIAL TEUsion
SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 31, 41-59 (1977). "[Tjhey vshed to
see how nature would behave under previously unobserved, often previously nonexistent,
circumstances." Id. at 43. Kuhn also uses the phrases "the control of nature," id. at 48; "[tlo
experiment or to constrain nature was to do it violence," id. at 55; and the "impetus toward
power over nature through manipulative and instrumental techniques." Id. at 59. See gener-
ally L. LEIss, supra note 51. For debate about the "ecofeminism" movement emerging from
the perception that women have a peculiar historical, cultural or biological affinity with
"nature," see Cheney, Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology, 9 EvT.. ETHICS 115 (1987); Fox,
The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate and Its Parallels, 11 EmrL. ETHics 5 (1989); War-
ren, Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections, 9 ENvi. ETHICS 3 (1987); Zimmerman,
Feminism, Deep Ecology, and Environmental Ethics, 9 ENvm. ETHICS 21 (1987). The de-
bate is another version of the "essentialism" issue. See E. SPFLLmAN, supra note 22, at 158-
59. For a poetic rendition of the issue that is at once powerful and problematic, see S. GRIF-
FIN, WOMEN AND NATURE: THE ROARING INSIDE HER (1978).
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outdated)77 legacy for modern attitudes toward nature.
The challenge is to make critical use of historic identification,
without allowing it to set the terms of self-identification. The line
between the two is not always easy to draw. By reference to repro-
duction, women have been traditionally associated with their "nat-
ural" capacity for nurturance. At times this has offered an alterna-
tive to a mainstream masculine culture of selfish acquisitiveness.
Faye Ginsburg has described, with much sensitivity, the fear
among pro-life women that pro-choice activists have simply
adopted the values of the mainstream masculine culture.78 Con-
sider, in this regard, the views of Sidney Callahan:
Faced with a choice between men and women, prolife
feminists choose women, and faced with a conflict be-
tween women and the fetus, the choice is made for the
fetus, 'by analogous reasoning. In tragic conflicts and
choices, one must give the benefit of the doubt to the
more powerless and renounce solutions that do harm to
human life. Thus, most feminist prolife advocates are,
like myself, not only for the ERA, but also against capital
punishment, against nuclear arms, against the draft, and
for redistribution of income. Perhaps the most important
feminist prolife demand is for family allowances, health
care, day care, and the end of society's virtual abandon-
ment of women and children, which increases pressure
7 With respect to the study of animals, for example, there has been a gradual but dra-
matic revolution in scientific thought in recent years. Many careful researchers have come to
recognize the need to study animals in their own settings to learn about their own cultures
and ways of life in stark opposition to the presumptuous claims of laboratory experimenters.
Virtually demolished are the twin presuppositions that have been the compelled orthodoxy
of animal scientists: the injunction against anthropomorphism and the insistence that the
principle of parsimony comports with the behaviorist view of animals. The upshot is a rejec-
tion of Baconian science in favor of practices more akin (yet notably careful and painstak-
ing) to Aristotelian scientific tradition. For an excellent overview by a noted scientist, see D.
GRIFFIN, ANIMAL THINKING (1984); see also V. HEARNE, ADAM'S TASK CALLING ANIMALS By
NAME 224-44 (1986). Most people are aware of the breakthroughs in knowledge achieved by
Jane Goodall with respect to chimpanzees, and by Diane Fossey with respect to gorillas
(there was even a movie, Gorillas in the Mist (Warner Brothers Universal Pictures 1989));
there are, in fact, many other examples revealing the reality of animal culture. See, e.g., C.
Moss, ELEPHANT MEMORIES (1988) (elephants); S. STRUM, ALMOST HUMAN (1987) (baboons);
B. Lowaz, OF WOLVES AND MEN (1978) (wolves); Thomas, Reflections: The Old Way, THE
NEW YORKER, Oct. 15, 1990, at 78 (lions).
"' See F. GINSBURG, supra note 13, at 172-93.
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for abortion as the quick, less expensive solution. To be
consistently prolife, we must challenge the status quo
and all the expedient utilitarian values so embedded in a
world indifferent to suffering.
7e
The pro-life movement, suggests Ginsburg, exists in some histor-
ical continuity with a long line of women's movements-including
the temperance movement, the women's suffrage campaign and
progressive-era women's reform groups-which, despite some dif-
ferences, shared similar assumptions about women's natural and
distinct nurturant role.s0 Such movements drew on the values asso-
ciated with motherhood and domesticity to tame and "domesti-
cate" some of the worst aspects of a male-dominated culture. Jane
Addams, for example, talked of extending "household" values into
the broader social/economic arena."' The Women's Christian Tem-
perance Union (WCTU) is now easier to ridicule for its appeal to a
("feminizing") Victorian moral righteousness that was outdated
even in its own time, despite the political success of prohibition;
nevertheless, the WCTU did raise real concerns, not just about the
family abuse and dislocation which came with excessive male
drinking, but with male domination and exploitation generally.s2
" Callahan, supra note 19, at 296-97. Callahan regards her view as "holistic," id. at 291,
and sums up her outlook, in contrast to the "Enlightenment model of a rational, pragmatic
human being":
Feelings of sacrificial love and gifts of self to others are called for. Empathy
and nurturing feelings are focused on the fetus, which is fiercely identified
with, either as a family member or as a powerless, helpless being in need of
protection. Communal memberships and the giving and receiving of love are
seen as the highest emotional fulfillments, and attractions to achievement and
independent autonomy are secondary.
Id. at 300.
80 See F. GINSBURG, supra note 13, at 227-47.
81 Id. at 236.
82 One of the more insightful studies of the culture of domesticity traces its relation to the
religious experience of women in the 19th century. See B. EPsT"N. Tim POLrTICS OF Do',,ss-
TicrrY: WOMEN, EVANGELISM. AND TEMPERANCE IN NINETFENTH-CENTURY AAucA (1981). Ep-
stein compares the First Great Awakening, the Second Great Awakening and the temper-
ance movement specifically from the vantage point of female experience. During the First
Great Awakening, which occurred in Calvinist New England in the mid-18th century, Ep-
stein found little or no relation between the intense experience of conversion and gender
hostility, and in general men's and women's experiences were similar. Id. at 11-44. At that
time, of course, the farm/household still functioned as the primary social and economic unit,
despite some Calvinist fears that an emerging merchant class and acquisitive culture would
destroy the old order. Id. at 24-30.
1991]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:923
Especially as women join the workforce in greater numbers, the
distinct sphere of female domesticity becomes constricted, con-
fined to the "natural," physical process of reproduction itself. It is
hardly surprising that reproduction then becomes an arena of so-
cial conflict. Some women find it painful to surrender this last
source of distinct gender identity to the dominant culture's rheto-
ric of privatism and self-interested "choice": that surrender seems
to entail losing the one remaining source of values at odds with a
selfish, commercialized American culture. For that reason Joan
Responsibility for the farm and household was basically shared, despite some gender-spe-
cific tasks. Notably, too, the shared category "parent" was culturally far more significant
than "mother" or "father" as distinct from each other, and parents were considered deserv-
ing of huge respect. Id. at 33. New England Calvinist theology still assumed female subordi-
nation to males, but all earthly relations of subordination (which were justified as designed
for social cohesion and the exercise of social responsibility) were viewed as contingent and
provisional; the primary concern was one's relationship to God, and in that women were
equal to men. Women were relatively better off in Calvinist New England than were women
elsewhere at the time (better off than under the common law, for example). A man who
abused his wife (or even dared, as in one case, to call her "servant") was both morally and
legally answerable to the whole community. See id. at 23.
By the time of the Second Great Awakening, the emergence of a market economy (with
the most significant economic relations taking place outside the family for many of the mid-
dle class) facilitated the creation of "domesticity" as a female-dominated sphere separate
from market relations. This sphere was in part the creation of women themselves, although
it was also a response to the constraints imposed by the dominant culture, especially limits
on full female participation in economic and political life. Increasingly religion became asso-
ciated with domesticity, although church hierarchy was still male-dominated. Then, Epstein
finds, the conversion experience became an arena in which women acted out gender antago-
nism. By claiming to be answerable to Christ even over and above their husbands, women
were empowered to defy growing male resistance to religion. When women did draw men
into the Awakening, there was some victory in seeing them submit to an authority even
greater than worldly male power-yet the victory could only be partial, since the only avail.
able cultural categories rendered male conversion a (temporary) victory of domesticity as
against a dominant male culture. See id. at 45-87.
In the WCTU middle-class female resentment against the isolation and economic depen-
dency of domesticity was, in a sense, projected onto the single issue of drinking. Id. at 103-
04. Even while that projection limited the scope of feminist analysis within the temperance
movement, appeal to religion and domestic values did empower women to assert themselves.
Under the leadership of Frances Williard, the WCTU took on a broad range of issues relat-
ing to female inequality, including suffrage, labor conditions for both men and women, legal
issues relating to sexual abuse and so forth. While the WCTU never quite lost its middle-
class, Protestant, essentially Victorian perspective, especially in relation to sex, it did push
that frame of reference to its limits, and in some important ways transcended it. Id. at 146.
According to Epstein, there is still some tendency for feminist ideology to draw on the per-
spective of a relatively privileged middle class. In modern times that means an educated,
secular perspective which does not necessarily speak to the concerns of the working class on
issues like family and abortion. Id. at 150.
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Williams asks whether the pro-choice movement might appeal to
the values of domesticity, rather than repudiating them so thor-
oughly with the rhetoric of private choice. 3 Women do, after all,
often choose abortions out of concern for family welfare, not as
pure assertion of self-interest.
Nevertheless, as Williams has also argued,84 an appeal to domes-
ticity is a double-edged sword, for the distinct sphere of domestic-
ity as experienced in American culture was itself a constraining in-
vention of the post-Revolutionary War period.83 Then, the
powerful anti-patrimonial ideology of the Revolution threatened to
upend all established hierarchies, including the household hierar-
chy of man (as father/husband/master/surrogate-king) and depen-
dents (servants, unmarried women, wife and children). This hierar-
chy was conceived as serving economic and political goals as well
as what we now consider "private" familial functions. Implicitly,
political challenge to the English crown entailed challenge to that
whole hierarchical family structure; indeed, for a fleeting period af-
ter the Revolution, some even expected that in the new republic
women would participate as equals with men in politics and eco-
nomic life."6
Instead, the dominant culture constrained that impulse toward
complete equality, transforming it into an assertion of autonomy
within a distinct sphere of household domesticity, a sphere which
was increasingly conceived as existing apart from economic and po-
litical life. 7 Women were in theory free to cultivate their natural
impulses toward nurturance and selflessness (which Victorians
were often to describe, with some self-contradiction, as "higher"
- See Williams, Assuring Success to Passion: Virtue and Oppression in Pragmatic So-
cial Theory (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
See Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 hMicH. L REV. 797 (1989) (arguing that femi-
nists can attack "male norms" without appealing to domesticity).
See generally S. EvANs, BORN FOR LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AuEImCA 45-92
(1989); J. FLiEGELMUN, PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AOAINST PA-
TRiARcHiCAL AUTHORITY 1750-1800 (1982); U GROSSBERG. GOVRNING THE HEARw LAW AND
FAMILY IN NINrEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1985); J. JAMES. CHANGING IDEAS AuoUTr WOMEN
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776-1825 (1981); L KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPuBUc: INrELLEcr
AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1980); S. LsocSC, THE FREE WOMEN OF PETERS-
BURG: STATUS AND CULTURE IN A SOUTHERN TOWN. 1784-1860 (1984); M. NORTON. Lmrsr's
DAUGHTER& THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERINCE OF AmEICAN WOMn. 1750-1800 (1980).
81 E.g., S. EVANS, supra note 85, at 45-66; Ui GROSSBERG, supra note 85, at 3-30; M NOR-
TON, supra note 85, at 170-94, 228-55.
87 E.g., S. EVANS, supra note 85, at 67-92; F. GINSBURG, supra note 13, at 229-31.
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virtues, even though "natural" to women). Of course that new sep-
aration of spheres was no more "natural" than the old hierarchical
unity of family, economy and polity, which had also once been vig-
orously defended as natural. While it provided women a stance
from which to challenge the values of the mainstream culture that
created it, setting in motion a dialectic of simultaneous legitima-
tion and critique, the critical dimension was destined always to be
partial. (Prohibition may have been its greatest victory, and that
turned into an exercise in futility.) In effect, that which was la-
belled by the dominant culture as feminine, and therefore particu-
lar, could never really counter those values that were treated as
universal-that is, male.
It is tempting to conclude that the problem lies, not really with
either side of the abortion debate, but rather with that initial "ar-
tificial" split between economic and domestic,8 8 or between, as is
often said, public and private.89 That artificial split almost forces
one to adopt a self-limiting rhetoric. The language of domesticity
repeats a vocabulary which has particularized and trivialized
women's lives, yet the language of private individual rights used in
defense of abortion replicates acquisitive male culture. We have
yet, it seems, to find a rhetoric that somehow undoes that artificial
split, making possible a "real" moral discourse about abor-
tion-about the processes of life and death and human responsibil-
ity in the face of those mysteries.
If the family/market split is artificial, what then is "natural"?
Ecofeminists claim to have access to that knowledge, not through
the social contrivance of domesticity, but rather through a holistic
appreciation of natural life processes. They celebrate a special fem-
inist sense of connectedness to nature, unshackled by the dualistic
structures which have characterized masculine rationalized
thought.9 0 In our culture the male ego defines itself, some say, by
" See Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
" See, e.g., Freeman & Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and
Life, 36 BUFFALO L. REV. 237 (1988).
1* See generally C. MERCHANT, supra note 74. Rosemary Ruether offers a sympathetic, yet
cautionary account of a similar venture launched at the end of the 19th century, when a
disparate group of "post-Christian" women sought to recover an ancient, pre-Christian, ma-
triarchical worldview and in so doing largely projected their pre-existing Victorian familial
values onto their premodern "discoveries." See Ruether, Radical Victorians: The Quest for
an Alternative Culture, in III WOMEN AND RELIGION IN AMERICA: 1900-1968, at 1-47 (R.
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separating itself simultaneously from nature and woman, a dual-
istic subject/object split women do not require for a mature sense
of identity. Women therefore (at least in our culture) may be bet-
ter able than men to look to nature itself for an understanding of
the human role in the natural order, and our responsibility toward
it.
Any appeal to "nature," however, must be tempered with a great
deal of humility. One must remember, as the great British biolo-
gist, Haldane, is reported to have observed, that, if nature reveals
anything at all to us, it is that "God has an inordinate fondness for
beetles." 9' Less ironic are the tragic observations of those who
wanted to celebrate the beneficence of nature, but discovered in-
stead that nature has a "more hideous face, blighted and polluted
by its own forces," that it may be "bleak, depraved, and hostile, at
least by human standards," a reality of "extinction, conflict, de-
pravity, terror." 92 Even Thoreau was aware of the "maniacal hoot-
ing" of owls.93 The danger lies in forgetting that we live, after all,
in a "fallen world.
914
The risk is greater than just an excess of pride, for the celebra-
tion and romanticization of nature may have serious moral and po-
litical consequences. We might perhaps be wary of seemingly con-
temporary ecological observations:
[T]his planet once moved through the ether for millions
of years without human beings and it can do so again
some day if men forget they owe their highest existence,
not to the ideas of a few crazy ideologists, but to the
knowledge and ruthless application of Nature's stern and
rigid laws.
Ruether & R. Keller eds. 1986) [hereinafter WoMEN AND REUGION].
9' S. CLARK, FROM ATHENS TO JERUSALEM: THe LOVE OF VISDOM AND THE LOVE OF GOD 166
(1985). Clark himself has written with passion and sophistication about moral issues with
respect to animal/human relationships. See S. CLARK. THE NATURE OF THE BEAST (1982); S.
CLARK, THE MORAL STATUS OF ANI ALS, supra note 62; Clark, Animals, Ecosystems, and the
Liberal Ethic, THE MONIST, Jan. 1987, at 114-31.
On the variousness of female experience among non-human animals, see B. KEvLEs. FE-
MALES OF THE SPECIES SEX AND SURVIVAL IN THE ANIMAL KINGDOM (1986).
92 The observers in question are Charles Darwin and Herman Melville. See D. WoRSIan.
NATURE'S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS 118-19, 120-21, 124-25 (paperback ed.
1987).
See id. at 122.
See id. at 115-29.
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... At the end of the last century the progress of sci-
ence and technique led liberalism astray into proclaiming
man's mastery of nature and announcing that he would
soon have dominion over space. But a simple storm is
enough-and everything collapses like a pack of cards.
The author? Adolf Hitler.
9 5
Nazi ideology was premised upon views about nature which were
very much in the mainstream of Western thought at the time, and
which are regaining currency with the modern sense of environ-
mental crisis."s It is well known that Hitler was a vegetarian, and
that top Nazi officials, like Himmler, recognized the rights of ani-
mals. More significantly, Nazi ideology represented an attempt to
transcend the dualities of body and spirit, man and nature, which
pervaded traditional Western science and theology. The new man
brought into being by National Socialism would see himself in and
of nature, not over and above it, finding infinity not in a transcen-
dent God, but in life itself. He could achieve this connectedness in
part by reaching inward to redevelop that "special" affinity of the
pagan Aryan volk for the life spirit.
Jews, of course, were said to have no such affinity. Their reli-
gious traditions and their history as city dwellers closed them off
from nature, and made them "parasites" within the natural or-
der-as were the disabled and the otherwise "unfit." And so these
Nazi celebrators of life, paradoxically employing technical and in-
strumental rationality, became
purveyors of death, and the most idealistic of them wore
01 R. POIs, NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE RELIGION OF NATURE 35, 38 (1986) (quoting
Hitler).
9' Consider the advice of a Nazi scientist:
A new National Socialist science cannot create, as if by sorcery, arbitrary and
amateurish world systems and conceptions-only infinite damage could come
of this. Rather, it must reverentially immerse itself in nature itself, and in the
great Nordic discoverers and interpreters of nature, to find there the essence of
German being in glorious abundance .... "Natural science is not a root, but a
blossom. Let us take care of the roots. The blossom will appear by itself."
Thuring, Nature Presupposes a Spiritual Disposition, in NAZI CULTURE: INTELLECTUAL, CUL-
TURAL AND SOCIAL LIFE IN THE THIRD REICH 208, 214-15 (G. Mosse ed. 1966).
Opponents of "deep ecology" have not hesitated to invoke the Nazi specter. See Book.
chin, Social Ecology Versus Deep Ecology, Soc. REV., July-Sept. 1988, at 9, 15 (1988).
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the death's head as a sort of absolving talisman. Finite
beings can never, of course, "embrace life"; but, they can
fetishise death .... Justifiably, the ultimate expression
of that negativity which was the core of National Social-
ist "life-bound" nationalism, is viewed as policies of ex-
termination. Yet, at all times, it would seem that the
most important of the "life-affirming" bearers of Na-
tional Socialist religious principles were always at their
best in the valley of the shadow.
7
II. SOURCES OF MORAL DISCOURSE SINCE WORLD WAR H
A. The Nazi Shadow
Which of us can claim to celebrate life without also being a pur-
veyor of death? Pro-life literature shows photographs of the dis-
carded bodies of concentration camp victims, and then, next to
those pictures, photographs of fetuses stuffed into plastic garbage
bags for disposal. Some of us who have had abortions have troub-
led doubts. Questions have been raised, of course, about the illegit-
imate appropriation of Jewish experience for Christianizing pur-
poses.98 Does not equating routine early abortions with the horror
of the Holocaust deprive Naziism of moral significance and debase
Jewish history by exploiting it for sectarian Christian goals?
Yet, the West German Constitutional Court drew the same par-
allel in its 1975 decision overturning a 1974 provision for complete
decriminalization of first-trimester abortions:
The priority given to the value of life in the West Ger-
man constitutional order is... a reaction to the taking of
innocent life in the years of the "final solution." Not only
the protection of life... but also the express prohibition
of the death penalty . . . have to be read, against the
background of Germany's experience with a regime which
classified certain forms of human life as worthless.""
All categorical objectification is frightening, in part because of
I 1R Pois, supra note 95, at 59.
" See Binder, supra note 27, at 1345-49.
For the quote and its context, see MA. GLENDON, ABoMON AND D0voRcE iN WESraR
LAW, supra note 12, at 26, 25-33.
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that Nazi history. When, then, are we entitled to treat the other as
a disposable object? Before birth? When the other is part of a sta-
tistically necessary risk? (When B > PL?) 100 When the other is a
murderer? Disabled? Comatose? Severely retarded? A member of
a different class, race, gender or species? An enemy soldier? An
"enemy" civilian? Which of these categories is appropriate, which
obviously illegitimate, and on what grounds?
Again, who is not a purveyor of death? The "French pill" is not
distributed by the World Health Organization for fear of American
"pro-life" outrage: Globally, roughly 500 women a day die from
complications due to abortions which they often try to induce
themselves. Romania's unwanted children, "protected" from abor-
tion by restrictive laws, stare out at us in their suffering from the
pages of the New York Times; but we too, even with our liberal
abortion laws, discard unwanted children, in a. foster care bureau-
cracy which cannot cope, and which too often destroys their
lives.101 Our society has chosen to allow many of its children to
grow up amidst unspeakable violence and dismal pov-
erty-especially, one assumes, because so many of the poor are not
white. Kozol, who has studied the problem of homeless families
and is careful not to indulge in rhetorical excess, draws tentative
parallels to Nazi policies of extermination."0 2
When is the parallel legitimate, when not? When does it merely
trivialize, and when does it make us confront a moral reality we
would rather ignore? In living we all cause death. Vegetarians, if
they consume dairy products, contribute to the production of veal,
the cruelest of mass meat-producing practices. Even growing grain
destroys animal habitats. Yet we are not all Nazis, and we cannot
be ethically immobilized, refusing, for example, to be concerned
about destruction of the environment because the Nazis preached
an ethics of the natural. Ours is a world in which death is bound
100 The familiar "Hand formula" from tort law, derived from Learned Hand's opinion in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See generally C. GREGORY
& H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 76-77 (2d ed. 1969).
On the plight of Romania's children, see Hunt, The Romanian Baby Bazaar, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 24, 1991, § 6 (magazine), at 24. On foster care in America, see N.Y. Times,
Sept. 21, 1990, at 1, col. 5 (describing foster care as a system of "confusion and misdirection,
overwhelmed by a profusion of sick, battered, and emotionally scarred children").
12 See J. KoZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN: HOMELESS FAMILIES IN AMERICA 181.84
(1988).
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up with life, not an idealized world, cleansed from darker realities.
The challenge, both social and individual, is to confront rather
than avoid those realities, and to make the life and death decisions
we must make in a morally responsible way.
One cannot understand the current abortion debate without sit-
uating it in the particular historical context of post-World War IE
American culture. Nazis then represented the ultimate affront to
the presumptuous complacency of Western culture, an affront that
was political, moral and ultimately theological. How, people asked,
could the Enlightenment political tradition produce dictatorship
and hysterical despotism? How could the highest and most refined
members of "high" culture endorse grotesque barbarism, 1as and le-
gality itself be turned into a finely tuned bureaucratic engine of
oppression? And finally, how could a long tradition of serious
Christian theology yield itself institutionally, almost without ex-
ception, to political idolatry?
One could try to pretend that the Nazis were sui generis, a
unique case of tribalism run rampant, produced by the intersection
6f peculiarly decadent German sensibilities and post-World War I
frpstrations. Whatever the element of truth in that account, ap-
peals to utter specificity never work. Genocide in Western culture
could not be dismissed as uniquely German. Americans, after all,
had their own history of ethnic genocide with respect to Native
Americans. Across the Atlantic, the legacy of English barbarism to-
ward the Irish is such that hatred has persisted for over 500 years.
And Freudianism described too many dark impulses lurking within
the human psyche for Americans to be absolutely confident that
"it could never happen here!" Milgram's experiments in the 1960s
only confirmed the worst of earlier fears. 10
For legalists after the war a principal mission was to develop in-
103 This is the question posed, for example, by Thomas Mann in his long and searching
novel, Doctor Faustus, whose lead character, Adrian Leverkuhn, is a bizarre fusion of Bee-
thoven and Nietzsche. T. MANN, DocToR FAUSTUS (1948).
104 Professor Stanley Milgram began in the 1960s a series of experiments in human obedi-
ence to the commands of authority. The experiment was calculated to test the extent to
which an individual would take harmful action against an innocent person in compliance
with the command of an authority figure. In his basic experiment, roughly two-thirds of the
subjects administered what they believed to be extremely serious, painful shocks to the in-
nocent victim, achieving a level of compliance well beyond that predicted by lay and expert
opinion solicited before the experiments were conducted. For the full report, see S. Mu.-
GRAM, OBEDIENCE To AUTHORITY (1974).
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stitutions that would serve to immunize American society and
Western culture generally from resurgent Naziism. In particular, a
central goal was to articulate a jurisprudence supporting the prin-
ciple that no human life could again be legally categorized as un-
suited and unfit, and therefore expendable.
B. Natural Law and Catholic Tradition
Prevailing legal theory had little to offer. For decades American
and English jurisprudence had been dominated by Austinian posi-
tivism, which, in its simplest form, defined law in Hobbesian terms
as no more than sovereign command, devoid of moral content be-
yond the sovereign's power to punish. 10 5 Nothing in legal positiv-
ism repudiated Hitler's version of legalism as "illegal."
Meanwhile, the American legal realists had performed a thor-
ough-going, swash-buckling demolition of all the fixed categories
that gave coherence to American constitutionalism. The realists
showed that legal categories were not pre-existing entities located
somewhere in nature, but were a function of the legal decisionmak-
ing process itself. Sociology, psychology and political science might
be employed usefully to understand why and how legal decisions
were made, but after the realists it was difficult to believe that the
conceptual language which judges employed was about anything
other than judging.1 6
Thus, for those who wanted assurance that "it would never hap-
pen here," American jurisprudence offered nothing better than the
bleakness of moral and jurisprudential relativism. In 1947, a num-
ber of scholars, seriously seeking to shore up traditional Western
values, began a project which, in retrospect, might appear some-
what quaint: a forum and journal dedicated to a reconsideration of
natural law. By the time the first volume of that journal, the Natu-
ral Law Forum, appeared in 1956,07 the move toward natural law
was in fact well within the mainstream of legal and political
thought.
105 See J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED & THE USES OF TIlE
STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE (1954).
100 See Mensch, supra note 24, at 21-29. On the consequent dilemma of moral relativism,
see E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROB-
LEM OF VALUE 197-266 (1973).
107 1 NAT. L.F. (1956).
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One well-publicized example was Walter Lippman.0 8 He consid-
ered joining the Catholic church because it offered communion in a
"moral order above the whims of transient majorities and the dic-
tates of tyrants";"'9 and in The Public Philosophy, in 1955, he ar-
gued that the "decline of the West" could be countered only by
adherence to that "doctrine of natural law" which held that there
was a law "above the ruler and the sovereign people ... above the
whole community of mortals."110 The book received mixed reviews,
given its anti-democratic appeal to a strong executive as well as to
natural law."' Learned Hand for example, responded to Lippman
with his own view that natural law was a poor refuge from the hor-
rors of totalitarianism.' Nonetheless, the book sold well.
Meanwhile, the ABA Journal published a series of articles ex-
ploring the natural law implications of the philosophy of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, as opposed to the Holmes who was known only
for debunking absolutism. 113 In 1955 the same journal published an
article by George Goble,"14 which many scholars considered to be a
sign of reversing trends: Goble's roots were "in the watery sands of
Holmesian skepticism," but he was now searching for a deeper
metaphysics of law.
1 5
Since other law journals had, like the ABA Journal, already
published symposia on natural law,11 by the time the Natural Law
Forum appeared it could with some confidence herald itself as the
standard-bearer of a rising tide. The Forum began under the aus-
pices of Notre Dame Law School, and its associate and advisory
editors included names that are still familiar: Lon Fuller, Friedrich
Kessler, Jerome Frank, Robert Hutchins, Edward Levi, Leo
Strauss, Myres McDougal, F.C.S. Northrop, Edward Corwin, Jac-
' Lippmann told a group of Catholic theologians in 1941 that the people were doomed
to be unsatisfied because they'had lost sight of a higher moral order and had "accepted the
secular image of man." R STEEL, WALTER LIPPMANN AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY 491 (1980).
'09 Id. at 492.
110 Id. (quoting W. LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1955)).
111 Id. at 494-95.
112 Id. at 495.
113 See Constable, The False Natural Law: Professor Goble's Straw Man, 1 NAT. LF. 97
n.1 (1956) (citing series of articles on Holmes' philosophy that appeared in the ABA
Journal).
114 Goble, Nature, Man and Law: The True Natural Law, 41 A.BA J., May 1955, at 403.
11 Constable, supra note 113, at 97.
13 Omo STATE LJ. 121 (1952).
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ques Ellul, William Curran,117 Carl Friedrich" 58 and John Noonan
(the latter not among the original editors, but eventually editor-in-
chief.) I9 A number of editors and contributors were from England
and the continent, and a few from elsewhere, for the goal was to
reestablish a foundation for Western legal thought generally, not
just for American law.120
One would not expect to see some of the foregoing legalists por-
ing through their Thomas Aquinas, but their earnestly stated goal
was to explore, "with all the resources of scholarship and modern
science, the full extent of the contribution natural law can make to
the solution of today's problems. 1' 21 From their perspective, a ju-
risprudence premised on relativism alone posed an intellectual and
political crisis:
Totalitarian excesses ... have made it increasingly diffi-
17 1 NAT. L.F., facing page 1 (1956).
6 NAT. L.F., at vi (1961).
1 7 NAT. L.F., at iii (1962).
120 E.g., A.P. d'Entreves (Turin University and Oxford); Felice Battaglia (University of
Bologna); Guido Fasso (University of Parma); Eustaquio Galan (University of Valladolid,
Spain); Eduardo Garcia Maynez (National University of Mexico); Freiherr von der Heydte
(University of Wurzburg, Germany); Jacques Leclercz (University of Louvain, Belgium);
Luis Legaz y Lacambra (University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain); Luis Cabral do Man-
cada (University of Ciombra, Portugal); Radhabinod Pal (University of Calcutta); Reno
Thery (Ecole Libre du Droit, Facultes Catholiques, Lille, France); Antonio Truyol (Univer-
sities of Lisbon, Portugal and Murcia, Spain); Erik Wolf (University of Freiburg, Germany).
See 1 NAT. L.F., facing page 1 (1956).
M O'Meara, Foreword, 1 NAT. L.F. 1-2 (1956) (O'Meara was then Dean of Notre Dame
Law School). For another entry in the natural law revival, see B. PA'rrSON, THE FORGOT-
TEN NINTH AMENDMENT, A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS
UNDER SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF TODAY (1955). In his introduction, Roscoe Pound hailed the
book for its contribution to the "marked revival of natural law ideas throughout the world."
Pound, Introduction to B. PATTERSON, supra. The author believed that the ninth amend-
ment was the constitutional text through which we could reaffirm that "[ilndividual free-
dom, and the recognition and development of the spiritual nature of mankind are the es-
sence of democracy," id. at 1, and recall the "inherent natural rights" with which
individuals are "endowed by their Creator." Id. at 4. For the author, individual freedom
means the recovery of "the identity of the religious, spiritual, and noble principles upon
which this government was founded." Id. at 58. Moreover, it was clear to Patterson that the
price of individual liberty was acceptance of obligations and duties, such as the "obligation
to maintain a reverent belief in God as the guide of the destiny of this nation, and to en-
courage an attitude of gratitude, humility, and worship of the Supreme Being." Id. at 78-79.
Why the fuss over an obscure book? Because, ironically, ten years later, the Patterson
book would figure prominently as support for the majority in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), the case that announced the privacy doctrine that supplied the basis of Roe
v. Wade. For further discussion of Griswold, see infra text accompanying notes 681-82.
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cult to acquiesce in the positivist conclusion that the ide-
ology of one person or nation is as valid as that of any
other. This is the great jurisprudential issue of our day.
Can natural law resolve it? ... The editors believe that
all aspects of natural law, from its claimed foundation in
human nature to its last implications for concrete prac-
tice, need to be critically examined and rethought in our
time.
122
Perhaps not every aspect of natural law's "foundation" or every
detail of application was covered, but the scholarship was exten-
sive. The first volume alone contained a serious opening review of
arguments for both positivism and natural law by A.P. d'Entreves
of Oxford, eminent natural law scholar and emigr6 from Italian
fascism. 123 In the same first volume the classical and medieval his-
tory of natural law, and its relation to jurisprudence in Europe re-
ceived much attention (with many historical footnotes in German
and French); 24 so too did Edmond Cahn's 1955 book The Moral
Decision,.25 which was also an effort to reintroduce moral (and ex-
plicitly Biblical) discourse into legal decisionmaking. That book
was faulted, however, because it slighted the natural law tradition
of Aquinas and therefore failed adequately to articulate a moral
standard wholly extrinsic to legal case analysis-Cahn's own moral
tradition was, of course, Judaic. 2 '
122 Statement of Policy, 1 NAT. LF. 3 (1956).
12 d'Entreves, The Case for Natural Law Re-Examined, 1 NAT. L.F. 5 (1956).
124 See generally id. at 5-166.
125 R CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION, supra note 27.
128 Cahn was applauded for his resistance to legal positivism, yet chided for contextual-
ism, intuitionism and his rejection of what he saw as the absolutism and authoritarianism of
the natural law tradition. See Witherspoon, Bbok Review, 1 NAT. L.F. 146, 163 (1956) (re-
viewing K CAHN, THE MoRAL DECISION, supra note 27).
Lost in this dismissal of Cahn was a serious Jewish entry in the possibility of genuine
dialogue between the essentialist and rationalist morality of natural law, on the one hand,
and the morality of context and particularity, also rooted in religious tradition. Cahn, for
one, drew upon both the Jewish and Christian Biblical traditions. He bemoaned the decline
of religious discourse in public moral debate; he was hardly a legal positivist:
From ancient times, religion has exalted the value of individual personality
and has summoned men to understand their neighbors as nearly as possible
after the manner of God's understanding, for-we are told-in his eyes all
men, created in his image, are equal and alike, yet every man is distinct,
unique, and filled with the splendor of human dignity. This is religion's own
insight. Applied wholeheartedly in the law, it could help us shape decisions of
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Myres McDougal, the legal realist, rang in with his usual call for
a law school curriculum organized around an understanding of law
as socially constructed reality-"[t]he social and power processes
of a community. ' 127 Even McDougal (whose "science" had little
room for Aquinas) postulated certain values "described as the val-
ues of human dignity in a free and abundant society," but McDou-
gal located those values wholly in the "stream of the rising com-
mon demands and expectations of our time. ' 128 He considered
external validation from religion, natural law, science and meta-
physics unnecessary, since his postulated values were clearly part
of a "general trend" in human history, despite occasional glitches
like "feudal residues and the counter-currents of
totalitarianism."
1 29
The Natural Law Forum's introductory article, by A.P.
d'Entreves, based on four lectures he delivered at Notre Dame, was
apparently selected to represent the spirit and purpose of the new
journal. 30 D'Entreves was internationally respected as a scholar of
political theory and, specifically, of natural law.18 1 The lectures are
striking in their anticipation of issues that would dominate the
individualized and creative justice.
E. CAHN, A Lawyer Looks at Religion, in CONFRONTING INJUSTICE, supra note 27, at 207, 220.
It is time to recognize that the foremost existential question of our era is not
whether one believes in God but whether what one believes about Him is suffi-
ciently worthy.... The highest aim of the religious enterprise is to persuade a
just, righteous, and compassionate God that He can believe in us.
E. CAHN, The Binding of Isaac: A Case Study, in CONFRONTING INJUSTICE, supra note 27, at
232, 240. See also E. CAHN, The Pathology of Organized Religion, in CONFRONTING INJUS-
TICE, supra note 27, at 220.
For a serious and sophisticated attempt by a Protestant theologian to locate Cahn in
moral dialogue about the limits and possibilities of natural law by juxtaposing him with
Catholic theologian Jacques Maritain, see P. RAMSEY, Jacques Maritain and Edmond Cahn:
The Egypt of the Natural Law, in NINE MODERN MORALISTS 209 (1962) [hereinafter P. RAM-
SEY, The Egypt of the Natural Law] (Ramsey's Nine Modern Moralists will hereinafter be
referred to as NINE MODERN MORALISTS): P. RAMSEY, Jacques Maritain and Edmond Cahn:
Man's Exodus from the Natural Law, in NINE MODERN MORALISTS, supra, at 233.
12 McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal
Study, 1 NAT. L.F. 53, 71 (1956).
128 Id. at 67.
129 Id.
130 See d'Entreves, supra note 123.
1-1 His works at the time included, among others, A.P. D'ENTREVES, THE MEDIEVAL CON-
TRIBUTION TO POLITICAL THOUGHT (1939); A.P. D'ENTREVES, DANTE AS A POLITICAL THINKER
(1952); A.P. D'ENTREVES, AQUINAS: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS (1948); and A.P.
D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW (1951).
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American liberal legal scene in the 1970s. D'Entreves carefully
traced and gently refuted the ploys typically invoked by those who
debate the "fundamental rights" jurisprudence so central to the
credibility of Roe v. Wade. Those recurring moves are the appeal
to consensus or "shared values," on the one hand, and the appeal
to process on the other.1 - 2 For d'Entreves, only the natural law tra-
dition, which he presents in its richness and subtlety, offers a se-
cure moral basis for law. The following summary of his argument
should serve to question whether any of us can talk about morality
without in some sense resorting to natural law methodology.
D'Entreves begins by conceding that a relativistic legal positiv-
ism dominated English and American jurisprudence, nowhere more
so than at his own Oxford.133 Nevertheless, he notes, citing both
Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart, some positivists were already in retreat
from the grim purity of Hobbesian extremism. 13' Hart, for exam-
ple, although he had not yet published the Concept of Law"', with
its primary and secondary rules of recognition, had already de-
scribed in his inaugural address at Oxford his "rules of the game"
analogy, which was an approach then current among English phi-
losophers.136 While games of cricket were more complex than mere
commands, so that the analogy could be taken as an analytic ad-
vance over Austin, d'Entreves finds the game analogy more whim-
sical than satisfying. As someone who had experienced totalitarian-
ism firsthand, he gently comments,
[i]f we want at all costs to stick to the analogy between
law and the rules of a game, let us admit that it is a pe-
culiar game which we are asked to play, and one which
has little to do with the placid setting of a sunny English
afternoon.2
37
Game theory, he points out, "leave[s] us entirely indifferent to the
132 For a good review of the different approaches to "fundamental rights" jurisprudence,
see Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Norma-
tive Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1063 (1981).
13 d'Entreves, supra note 123, at 7.
"I Id. at 10-11 (citing Kelsen); HLLA HART, DEFINITION AND THEORY IN JURIsPRUDENcE
(1953) (an inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on May 30, 1953).
25.LA HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961).
16 HLA HART, supra note 134.
13d'Entreves, supra note 123, at 13.
1991]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
kind of game that is played. Nor does it tell us why on earth we
should choose to play it.""' While it answers formal concerns, the
substantive ones remain unsolved (a distinction drawn from scho-
lastic natural law theory) 913-unless, of course, "games" are in-
fused with all the moralistic aura of the English public school
cricket match, which d'Entreves dismisses as mere romanticism.
D'Entreves next points to a set of lectures, Goodhart's English
Law and the Moral Law, which had concluded that law was about
"obligation" rather than mere force. 14 0 Goodhart, however, had
still refused to acknowledge the existence of natural law, even
while noting the "revival of 'natural law' thinking" as an expres-
sion of the legitimate search for law's "moral" underpinnings.
4 1
His main point had been that, even without recourse to natural law
metaphysics, English law, as a kind of self-enclosed social system,
provided a happy combination of positive law and moral obligation
as mediated by precedent.1
42
Goodhart's depiction of harmonious England, where law served
simultaneously as external authority and internalized norm, did
not, for d'Entreves, solve the problem of relativism. Criticizing
Goodhart, d'Entreves insists on the distinction between law, an ex-
ternality involving coercion, and morality, involving the internal
processes of motive. 43 That distinction had emerged most dramat-
ically in the seventeenth century and heralded the modern state:
144
Unlike the church, Leviathan demands obedience, but not inner
conviction; it requires outward conformity, but leaves conscience to
the individual. 45 Indeed, one might blame the Protestant Refor-
mation, with its insistence on the difference between law and
grace, for setting the stage not only for the separation of law and
morality but also for legal positivism and the secular modern state.
D'Entreves, interestingly, did not blame the Reformation, insist-
ing instead that the law/morality distinction was in fact well
known to Aquinas, in more subtle form than one might assume
"' Id. at 16.
1" Id. at 15.
14 Id. at 16 (citing A. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 19 (1953)).
1 Id. at 17 (citing A. GOODHART, supra note 140, at 30).
142 Id. at 18-20.
' Id. at 20-21.
14 Id. at 21.
145 Id.
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from simplistic accounts of Thomist natural law theory. On the
one hand, there are laws, Aquinas says, which are merely "penal,"
which oblige not in conscience, but only in that one must pay a
penalty for non-obedience (precisely Holmes' "bad man" concep-
tion).'46 Conversely, there are also limits on the extent to which
law can make a person virtuous. Thus, while Aquinas insisted that
law should, on the whole, have moral content by being rooted in
natural reason, he was not saying that law can enact morality;
"bad" people will, after all, "conform to the law without ... be-
coming virtuous.'
1 47
The Reformation would, in a sense, use the truth of that last
concession to challenge the whole structure, taking it to be the
core, not peripheral, truth about law. D'Entreves did not pursue
that Reformation point-he wanted to salvage natural law, not de-
molish it. Yet he needed more than Goodhart's complacent
description of English Law: Whatever may be true in England, on
the Continent, people "have not always been very happy in their
political experience." 4 s On the whole, he thought, the English do
obey the law in conscience as well as externally (no matter how
rigorous the positivism of their jurisprudence), but on the Conti-
nent, even in the best of political times "law is never much more
than a necessary nuisance, an external regulation which must be
observed . . . but certainly not for the sake of a joyful con-
146 Id. at 22.
"I Id. Moreover, Aquinas had also been careful to state that civil law could never coin-
cide with the rules of perfect virtue:
Now human law is laid down for the multitude, the major part of which is
composed of men not perfected by virtue. Consequently, all and every vice,
from which virtuous men abstain, is not prohibited by human law, but only the
gravest vicious actions, from which it is possible for the major part of the mul-
titude to abstain, and mainly those-like homicide, theft, etc.-which are
harmful to others, and without the prohibition of which human society could
not be preserved.
T. AQUINAS, SuMiMA THEOLOGICA, at i-ui. 96.2, quoted in J. MARNTMN, MAN AND THE STATE 168
n.24 (1951).
Human law can lead people to virtue, but only "gradually"; if the unvirtuous are required
to abstain from every kind of evil, they will only "plunge into worse evils." Id. One problem
of abortion is, of course, whether its frequency (even when illegal) means that a human law
proscribing it represents an unrealistic and, in Thomistic terms, a morally counterproduc-
tive attempt to legislate "perfect virtue," or whether abortion as "homicide" is the sort of
"vicious action," with victim, which is appropriately made a violation of human law.
"4 d'Entreves, supra note 123, at 23.
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science. ' 149 Significantly, this continental attitude derived not only
from a different political experience but also from the fact of reli-
gious bonds, for on the continent one belongs "as it were by birth-
right, to a society different from the 'State,'" to a church which
"openly proclaims against the State" its authority over both con-
science and behavior. 150
D'Entreves made this complex point, about how the conception
of secular law is influenced by church/state relations, but then, as a
believer in natural law, he also affirmed the necessary connection
between legal and moral obligation: "Law may or may not be
obeyed for the sake of its obligatoriness. But there is only one
ground for the obligation of the law, and this is a moral ground."' 1
The question is how to achieve a "good society," which can in fact
be defined as a situation in which there is no divorce between legal
and moral authority-a condition in which, as Aristotle said, "the
'good man' is also a 'good citizen.' 1152 In that sense the question of
law's relationship to morality is basically a question of politics.
The modern answer to the question is, of course, democracy.
Rousseau outlined the case for democracy as the "good society"
precisely on the ground that only by means of the democratic prin-
ciple can legal and moral obligation be brought to coincide. 
1 3
D'Entreves cited two passages from Rousseau. In the first, Rous-
seau stated that the fundamental problem of politics is to find an
association in which "each, while uniting himself with all, may still
obey himself alone, and remain as free as before."' The second
extraordinary passage reads: "We might, over and above all this,
add.., moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of him-
self; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to
a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty. ' "'5 Here
d'Entreves was explicit in finding the source of Rousseauian de-
mocracy in the Reformation: becoming a true citizen is like a re-
birth, a radical transformation; the new Adam as citizen, obeying
149 Id.
10o Id. at 24.
151 Id.
102 Id.
53 Id. at 25.
154 Id. at 25 (paraphrasing J. ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT 109 (1898)).
155 Id. (paraphrasing J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 154, at 114).
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only himself, reunites moral and legal obligation."'
Rousseau's notion of citizenship is as dangerous as it is stirring.
One moves rather directly, d'Entreves said, from Rousseau through
the Hegelian state to modern totalitarianism. Totalitarianism
works, he wisely reminds us, not by crude coercion or brain-
washing, but by fulfillment of the Rousseauian moral promise:
They claim to be the good society because they maintain
that, by belonging to them, the individual leads the good
life, that, in other words, by finding in the State his "real
self," his true moral nature, man will cease to obey out of
fear, but obey out of conscience and full conviction."",
(In Geneva, too, Calvinists concluded that if the only valuable obe-
dience sprang from freedom, and if true freedom showed itself in
obedience, then the people should, in effect, be forced to be
free.)115 Thus, neither culture (Goodhart) nor democracy (Rous-
seau) serves to reconcile moral and legal obligation. And natural
law cautions us with its lesson that politics (including democratic
politics) is always "a method rather than an end."","
In his last two lectures d'Entreves described two versions of nat-
ural law. The first, practiced by Roman legalists, was a kind of
"technology" or craft. He found in Lon Fuller's work a modern
version of the same natural law technology, given Fuller's reference
to "a natural order" in group life which the sensible lawyer or
judge should try to discover in order to perform tasks well.160
Fuller's apt comparison was to a cook trying to solve the problem
of a flaky piecrust.' 6 '
Drawing on Kant, d'Entreves pointed out that the imperatives
one finds in Fuller are necessarily "technical" rather than "cate-
gorical" 6 2-they fail to bridge the gap between the "is" and the
"ought," between "fact" and "value," between legality and
156 Id.
157 Id. at 26.
"I On the complex role of law in Calvin's theology, see Potter, The "Whole Office of the
Law" in the Theology of John Calvin, 3 J. & RELIGION 117 (1985); see also D. Ln.
RELIGION, ORDER, AND LAW 75 (1969); Mensch, Religion, Revival and the Ruling Class: A
Critical History of Trinity Church, 36 BUFFALO L Rxv. 427, 456-58 (1987).
1,9 d'Entreves, supra note 123, at 26.
160 Id. at 31.
161 Id.




To be serious enough to bridge the fact-value gap, natural law
must start with ontology, with a willingness to "seize the bull by its
horns": 4 "[t]he ontological approach welds together being and
oughtness, and maintains that the very notion of natural law
stands and.falls on that identification."' 6 5 Natural law is first and
foremost a "conception of an order of reality,"' 6 established "in its
essence by God's wisdom"'M6 in which human beings participate
because they are rational creatures. The "real" is the foundation
for the "good"; it is participation through reason in the "order of
reality" that provides a basis for human knowledge of it, and
knowledge of the "order of reality" is the "condition and the
source of all laws pertaining" to human beings.'68 As d'Entreves
emphasized, the whole majestic structure of natural law rests on
that ontological position about reality itself, which allows for an
intimate connection between nature, reason and law, premised on
the existence of a divine benevolent being.6 9 That structure, with
its explicit ontology, was, for d'Entreves, the only antidote to legal
positivism and moral relativism.
That ontology does not require that we look to revelation for the
content of the law. While it is true that d'Entreves' precursors, the
natural law theorists of the middle ages, had devised an intricate
structure of law to mediate the infinite distance between human
and divine, that structure, for the most part, did not depend on
revelation. Thomistic natural law itself represented a fusion of
Christianity with Aristotelian essentialism, and for most affairs of
the world natural reason would suffice: Aquinas had carefully
stated that the divine law, revealed through grace, perfects, but





The question, with respect to such moral issues, is whether there
exists in the world any discernible moral order that reveals itself to
... Id. at 33.
1" Id. at 34.
165 Id.




170 See A.P. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 41-42 (1951).
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us through the application of reason to the nature of humanity.
For example, while a proper understanding of the Trinity would
depend on revelation, as interpreted by the Church and accepted
in faith, a prohibition against genocide can in theory be rooted in
natural law itself, in an understanding of the nature of humanity
that is accessible to natural reason alone.171 Similarly, Catholic
doctrine takes abortion to be a violation of natural law, which
means that understanding it to be a wrong should not require
Christian faith or church authority.1 72 Jacques Maritain, the well-
known modern natural law theorist, made the ontological point ab-
solutely clear. Citing Antigone as "the eternal heroine of natural
law" 173 (although she was no Christian), he then spelled out the
basically Aristotelian assumption:
Since I have not time here to discuss nonsense... I am
taking it for granted that we admit that there is a human
nature, and that this human nature is the same in all
men. I am taking it for granted that we also admit that
man is a being gifted with intelligence, and who, as such,
acts with an understanding of what he is doing, and
therefore with the power to determine for himself the
ends which he pursues. On the other hand, possessed of a
nature, or an ontologic structure which is a locus of intel-
ligible necessities, man possesses ends which necessarily
correspond to his essential constitution and which are the
same for all-as all pianos, for instance, whatever their
particular type and in whatever spot they may be, have
as their end the production of certain attuned sounds. If
they do not produce these sounds they must be tuned, or
discarded as worthless. But since man is endowed with
intelligence and determines his own ends, it is up to him
to put himself in tune with the ends necessarily de-
manded by his nature. This means that there is, by the
very virtue of human nature, an order or a disposition
which human reason can discover and according to which
.j MARrr=mN, supra note 147, at 88-89.
172 E.g., Cardinal John J. O'Connor, Abortion: Questions and Answers (A Special Edition
of Cardinal O'Connor's Newsletter, "From My Viewpoint," Catholic New York, June 14.
1990).
173 J. MARrrAiN, supra note 147, at 85 (citing SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE, at ii, 452-60).
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the human will must act in order to attune itself to the
essential and necessary ends of the human being. The
unwritten law, or natural law, is nothing more than that.
When I said a moment ago that the natural law of all
beings existing in nature is the proper way in which, by
reason of their specific nature and specific ends, they
should achieve fullness of being in their behaviour, this
very word should had only a metaphysical meaning (as
we say that a good or a normal eye "should" be able to
read letters on a blackboard from a given distance). The
same word should starts to have a moral meaning, that
is, to imply moral obligation, when we pass the threshold
of the world of free agents. Natural law for man is moral
law, because man obeys or disobeys it freely, not necessa-
rily, and because human behaviour pertains to a particu-
lar, privileged order which is irreducible to the general
order of the cosmos and tends to a final end superior to
the immanent common good of the cosmos.
Let us say, then, that in its ontological aspect, natural
law is an ideal order relating to human actions, a divide
between the suitable and the unsuitable, the proper and
the improper, which depends on human nature or essence




We have interrupted the description of d'Entreves with the long
Maritain quotation in order to highlight the central dilemma of
essentialism. The familiar issue implicit here is that of freedom
and necessity. As we observe animal cultures, for example, we form
judgments about their intrinsic norms. We can study wolves, ba-
boons or elephants and infer the way such creatures should behave
to be successful ones of their kind. While much traditional learning
had it that the animals behaved the way they were supposed to
because they merely followed instinct (necessity), recent scholar-
ship assigns more weight to notions like thinking and problem-
solving, and pays attention to local differences in species behavior,
validating the use of terms like "culture" to describe animals.
'7 Id. at 85-88.
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The basic claim of natural law is that we can comprehend our
own animality in the same way, that there are better, or more cor-
rect, ways of being human. Even allowing for great diversity across
historical time and geographical space, the assumption is that
there are underlying, even invariant, norms of human behavior, the
violation of which amounts to denial of our essential nature.
On the other hand, whatever the norms we articulate, we must
confront their widespread disregard. Widespread violation of
norms-badness, or sin, as some would have it-is the reality of
people in the world. But that is precisely why, for those like Mari-
tain, the subject is morality, not just sociobiology. Our burden, our
responsibility, which, at least in conventional theory, distinguishes
us from animals, is our freedom. To discover the norms is not to
obey them. We are free to choose, and are therefore placed in an
endless dialectical engagement between duty (necessity) and desire
(freedom).
Thus, the essentialism of natural law is not a surrender to the
necessity side of the freedom/necessity duality. It is merely an as-
sertion that we can talk about whether human beings are behaving
the way such creatures are supposed to behave, and that such con-
versation is relevant to the particular exercise of our freedom. In
that sense, natural law is surely a challenge to the hubristic pre-
sumption of human agency associated with existentialism or, cur-
rently, with the postmodern pose of unlimited contingency, the
claim that we "can do it all," can "be whatever we want to be."
What we can be or do is ultimately constrained by who we are.
The method of natural law, as d'Entreves went on to explain,
sees law as always containing an element of force and an element
of value, even if the only value expressed is the value of force it-
self. 7 5 (As the realists, too, had pointed out, value choice is inher-
ent in every legal decision). For example, the Napoleonic Code's
inheritance law disallows complete disinheritance of children,
thereby preferring the value of family obligation to that of com-
plete testator autonomy.178 The methodology of natural law re-
quires first that one discern those values, rather than pretend them
away, as do the positivists. Once they are discerned, however, the
question of relativism remains. Whose values are to be preferred?
1'7 d'Entreves, supra note 123, at 41-42, 43-44.
178 Id. at 42.
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Should family obligation trump autonomy? Unless one can answer
that question one is still simply describing a cultural "is," albeit
one which properly includes values as part of the culture.
D'Entreves' answer implicates both epistemology and, again, on-
tology. He insisted that one cannot simply retreat into Hobbesian
epistemological subjectivity, but must confront the world as an ob-
jective reality. His example comes from Coleridge via C.S. Lewis:
in describing a natural wonder as "sublime," one is not just saying
"I have feelings associated in my mind with the word 'sublime.' $,17
Rather, one is saying something about the quality of the natural
wonder itself, something not captured by the word "pretty," for
example. Just as some responses to a natural wonder are more
"just," "ordinate" or "appropriate" than others, so in human soci-
ety, and human nature itself,
[t]here are certain ultimate standards or values which de-
termine approval or disapproval, assent or dissent; and I
believe that it is these same values that determine our
judgment as to whether a law is "just" or "unjust": in
other words-to use a very ancient language that seems
perfectly appropriate at this point-whether we are
bound in conscience to obey it or not.178
Moral language, in other words, cannot be dismissed as merely
emotive. As to the content, d'Entreves did not disagree with Mc-
Dougal's articulation of basic values; he insisted only that they are
not mere subjective "preferences," but rather rooted in natural
law, that is, appropriate to an objective reality about the nature of
human beings and human society."'
D'Entreves was a meticulous scholar, but on two points he was
at best evasive, at least as compared to Maritain, whose work he
knew and cited with respect.18 0 First, while d'Entreves mentioned
the issue of historical relativism, he quickly dismissed it-with a
quote from Strauss to the effect that, if natural law is rational, "its
discovery presupposes the cultivation of [natural] reason."8 1 Pre-
sumably not every person or every society will perform the neces-
17 Id. at 45.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 46.
180 Id. at 39 (stating "no lesser authority than Professor Maritain").
181 Id. at 47 (quoting L. STmAUss, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 9 (1953)).
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sary cultivation.
Maritain was more careful and took more interest in the defini-
tion of reason itself. He argued that the Thomistic notion of natu-
ral law is not one of rational knowledge, nor of "concepts and con-
ceptual judgments."'182 For that reason natural law cannot be
expected to be uniform through the ages or across cultures. In-
stead, Maritain insisted that when Aquinas speaks of human rea-
son discovering the regulations of natural law, he does so by refer-
ence to "inclination."' 83  Knowledge through inclination is
"obscure, unsystematic, vital knowledge by connaturality or conge-
niality, in which the intellect, in order to bear judgment, consults
and listens to the inner melody that the vibrating strings of abid-
ing tendencies make present in the subject."
18
It was probably wise of d'Entreves not to lecture his audience of
American law scholars on "vibrating strings" and "the inner mel-
ody"; this was surely an audience more used to "concepts." But
Maritain was making a crucial point about relativism. "Inclina-
tion," unlike the fixed norms one usually associates with natural
law, is in a process of continual refinement. It exists, Maritain said,
in only rudimentary form in "primitive" societies (which is why
their practices may be so varied), but with the advance of civiliza-
tion and the increase in moral knowledge, "inclination" becomes
ever more capable of discerning the specifics of natural law.180
This might be taken as routine Western presumption, but it also
goes to the elusive relation between natural law and Christianity.
By "civilization" Maritain clearly means Christian civilization. By
"inclination" Maritain insists on something that is being refined by
the precepts of a culture with a Christian tradition. Maritain's so-
lution to the problem of relativism is, in effect, to Christianize nat-
ural law-or, at least, natural law as it is understood by a,person in
our culture.1 86 Its full understanding awaits, he said, the fulfillment
of the gospel.1 7 This is, of course, a good deal more forthright than
182 J. MARITAIN, supra note 147, at 91.
183 Id. at 91.
18 Id. at 91-92. See also A. D'ENTREvEs, NATURAL LAw 40-41 (1951) (also stressing
"inclination").
18 J. MARrAIN, supra note 147, at 93-94. He cites as one rudimentary truth that "[tak-
ing] a man's life is not like taking another animal's life." Id. at 93.
18 See P. RAMSEY, The Egypt of the Natural Law, supra note 126, at 215-23.
187 J. MARITAIN, supra note 147, at 90.
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the more typical claim, that one in our culture can do "moral rea-
soning" in a manner that completely transcends the Christian tra-
dition of reason-the claim MacIntyre has exposed as self-deceiv-
ing.188 But it raises afresh the problem of relativism (and,
implicitly, of the social construction of culture), unless one as-
sumes that Western (traditionally Christian) culture is not just one
more culture among many in a world of utterly relativized differ-
ence. But on what basis does one make that latter assumption, ex-
cept by reference to Christian norms?
The Enlightenment concept of "rights" is the second point on
which d'Entreves parallels Maritain while being somewhat evasive.
D'Entreves mentioned that the Enlightenment version of natural
law as a structure of natural rights (as in America's Declaration of
Independence) was probably more familiar to moderns than was
scholastic natural law. "Rights" simply do not appear in antiquity
or Aquinas. He commented that "the time was not ripe," in classi-
cal antiquity or in the Middle Ages, for a conception of rights. He
also made the logical point that there is no "right" without a legal
duty, so that "the very notion of a subjective claim presupposes
that of an objective order."189
For Maritain the problem runs deeper, however. Maritain did
not dispute that the notion of rights, properly understood as an
expression of natural law, represents an advance in political
thought.190 "Properly understood," however, does not mean the ra-
tionalist conceptualism of the Enlightenment. Then, "artificial sys-
tematization" and a prideful "geometrising reason" replaced a true
conception of natural law, which can only be discovered "within
the being of things as their very essence is, and . . . precedes all
formulation." 9 (Here he is, in effect, criticizing not only the En-
lightenment formulation of rights, but also the parallel and aggres-
sive Baconian approach to nature, which had displaced the Aristo-
telian respect for beings in their essence with a Reason which
conquers and subdues.)
192
, See A. MACINT E, supra note 1, at 51-78.
d'Entreves, supra note 123, at 39.
,90 J. MARITAIN, supra note 147, at 82.
191 Id.
92 d'Entreves draws the analogy explicitly in Natural Law. Grotius is cited as the first
promulgator of a natural law wholly premised on Enlightenment rationalism-na secular nat-
ural law that would remain true "even if God did not exist," so great was the capacity of
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Inevitably, Maritain argues, this aggressive and self-sufficient
Enlightenment conception of Reason resulted in a philosophy of
rights which ended, as in Kant, "by treating the individual as a
god and making all the rights ascribed to him the absolute and
unlimited rights of a god."""3 Finally, "human Will or human Free-
dom..., was to replace God... as supreme source and origin of
Natural Law[,] ... [which] was to be deduced from the so-called
autonomy of the Will.
194
D'Entreves was, again, probably wise not to raise with his audi-
ence the deep conflict between traditional natural law and "rights"
as conceived during the Enlightenment. If American post-war
scholars had wanted a rousing call for fixed legal norms rooted in
reason, they had already received a far more subtle and complex
configuration than they had expected. The appeal of natural law
was in its offer of moral security, civility and a baseline of decency
as against the encroachments of anarchy, chaos and amorality; yet
its acceptance demanded a surrender to commands rooted in Aris-
unaided natural reason. A.P. D'ENTREVEs, NATURAL LAW 53 (1951). This was clearly a depar-
ture from medieval natural law theorists, who would never have so completely separated
natural law from theology, thereby separating what Aquinas and the later Schoolmen had
taken pains to join, id. at 52, when they reconciled Aristotle with Christianity. Enlighten-
ment natural law, moreover, was so determined to celebrate the capacity of human "geome-
trising" reason that it also rejected the Aristotelian attention to the historical world of ac-
tual, factual reality. Hence,
[i]f natural law consists in a set of rules which are absolutely valid, its treat-
ment must be based upon an internal coherence of necessity. In order to be a
science, law must not depend on experience, but on definitions, not on facts,
but on logical deductions.... Such a science must be constructed by leaving
aside all that undergoes change and varies from place to place.
Id. at 53.
The specifically Enlightenment version of natural law formed the basis of Langdell's as-
sertion that law was a science; when Holmes asserted the role of "experience," he was not
necessarily rejecting the medieval (Aristotelian) conception of natural law, but only the par-
ticular, arguably distorted, form it took during the Enlightenment. On Langdell, Holmes
and law as "science," see S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, LAw AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY: CASES AND MATERALS 712-34 (2d ed. 1989).
193 J. MA rAn , supra note 147, at 83.
194 Id. D'Entreves made essentially the same point in his book, emphasizing the con-
tractarian nature of the political theory that thereby evolved, its basic features shared by
Hobbes, Locke and Kant-Hobbes simply drove the notion, relentlessly, to its logical end-
point. A. D'EN EVES, NATURAL LAW 55-57 (1951). On Hobbes, see Mensch & Freeman, A
Republican Agenda for Hobbesian America?, 41 U. FLA. L. REv. 581, 585-600 (1989).
D'Entreves also pointed to the implicit radicalism of the Enlightenment rights formula-
tion. See A.T. D'ENTREvEs, supra, at 57-61. Moreover, d'Entreves is less unequivocally criti-
cal of the Enlightenment than is Maritain. See generally id. at 48-62.
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totelian essentialism and in pre-Enlightenment epistemology.
Complete rejection of natural law implies', however, a bleak and
incontestable relativism. Celebrating that relativism by locating it
in the subjective freedom of post-Enlightenment selves who exer-
cise autonomy and choice is satisfactory only so long as that free-
dom is exercised in a manner at least minimally consistent with
the demands of traditional religiously rooted morality. Yet if the
very theory of freedom displaces the authority of tradition, the
substantive content of tradition will eventually be relegated to
irrelevance.
Thus the ultimate irony of the natural law revival: faced with
the moral monstrosity of Naziism, post-war intellectuals who were
otherwise epistemological agnostics or skeptics scurried to seek sol-
ace in the anticipated moral certainty of the natural law tradition.
Soon those secular intellectuals would forget their flirtation with
natural law, losing themselves in the heady liberalism of the 1960s.
Then, that same natural law tradition would offer the most author-
itative philosophical source of opposition to abortion, while the in-
tellectual heirs of those earlier, anxious liberals would now close
ranks in support of their Enlightenment, secular, individualistic
world view.
The Natural Law Forum continued as such until the late 1960s.
Meanwhile, however, most of mainstream legal thought turned
away from the hard questions of natural law (although there may
be a current rerevival-as Maritain once commented, "[e]very fair
and every war brings forth a new natural law)."190 Throughout the
1970s, thoroughly secular and non-Aristotelian legal philosophy
achieved its hegemonic hold on American legal thought-the uni-
verse was composed of utilitarians 9 8 and deontological liberals19 7
and the ambitious few who might try to reconcile those two tradi-
"'5 J. MARITAIN, supra note 147, at 83. There is clearly a revival of interest in the natural
law tradition in moral philosophy, see, e.g., J. FINNIS, supra note 47; R. HITrIN ER, A Cn-
TIQUE OF THE NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY (1987); A. MACINTYRE, supra note 1; and even in
mainstream legal thought, see L. WEINREB, supra note 15.
Joe The utilitarian side is realized most fully, in legal thought, in the "law and economics"
school of thought. See Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980). See generally R. POSNERt, Eco-
NOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
192 E.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). At the extreme, however, they
become (conservative?) libertarians. E.g., R. NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
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tions.198 It is perhaps a fitting symbol that in 1969 the Natural
Law Forum changed its name to the American Journal of Juris-
prudence, having published in its last Forum volume articles by
both John Rawls'99 and Robert Nozick. 00
The same last issue of the Forum also featured a very different
kind of essay, Karl Barth and Natural Law, by Louis Midgley.20'
The essay raised a troubling point that seemed, oddly, not to have
occurred to the earlier enthusiastic revivers of natural law, al-
though it is well-known to theologians: the only serious Christian
institutional opposition to Hitler in Germany arose, not on the ba-
sis of natural law, but rather quite explicitly and emphatically in
the context of rejecting natural law. That extraordinary irony was
not mentioned in the pages of the Forum until the 1968 volume,
and then only in a half-hearted effort to claim that the rejection
was not so emphatic after all.202
C. Neo-Orthodox Protestantism
That rejection of natural law in Germany was rooted in the Ref-
ormation. Legal scholars often find Reformation theology less con-
genial than the stately and familiar principles of natural law. Nev-
ertheless, an uncompromising reaffirmation of the Reformation
inspired the German Confessing Church to refuse to compromise
with Naziism and formed the basis for the Barmen Declaration of
1934, a declaration of opposition to Hitler.0 3
198 The most celebrated of such in the 1970s was J. RAwLs. A THEORY OF JUSTIcE (1971),
which sought to combine Kantianism with the contractrarian tradition to defeat utilitarian-
ism. Rawls' initial and ambitious aim was the alchemical one of turning procedure (con-
tracting) into substance (morality), but he gradually yielded to the fuzzy reality of intuition-
ism. For a good critique, see R. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS (1977).
199 Rawls, Distributive Justice: Some Addenda, 13 NAT. LF. 51 (1968).
Zoo Nozick, Moral Complications and Moral Structures, 13 NAT. L.F. 1 (1968).
201 Midgley, Karl Barth and Moral Natural Law: The Anatomy of a Debate, 13 NAT. L.F.
108 (1968).
202 Id. at 123-26.
202 See E. JUNGEL, KARL BARTH: A THEOLOGICAL LEGACY 25-26 (1986) (describing the state
of Karl Barth's theology when he took part in drafting the Barmen Declaration). Meeting in
Barmen on May 31, 1934, the first synod of the "Confessing Church" adopted the Barmen
Theological Declaration written principally by Barth. Barth refused to take the uncondi-
tional oath ofloyalty to the Fuhrer, which led to his dismissal from the Chair of Systematic
Theology at Bonn; although he successfully appealed the dismissal, he was "pensioned off"
and German publication of his works was thereafter prohibited. Following his June 1935
expulsion from Germany he returned to Basel, where he continued to oppose Hitler and
produce, as well, his monumental works in theology, which included the multivolume
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At a time when Hitler was seeking, with great success, both loy-
alty and submission to civil authority from the German Lutheran
Church, the dissenters unequivocally rejected
the false doctrine that the Church, as the source of its
proclamation, could and should, over and above God's
one Word, acknowledge other events, powers, images and
truths as divine revelation ....
... the false doctrine that the form of her order and
mission can be left to the discretion of the Church or to
the ideological and political views that happen to prevail
.. or that she can set up, or allow herself to be given,
special leaders with sovereign powers. 04
The Declaration was a theological rather than a political state-
ment, but when it proclaimed, in 1934 Germany, that "[w]e repu-
diate the false teaching that there are areas of our life in which we
belong not to Jesus Christ but another lord, areas in which we do
not need justification and sanctification through him,"210 its politi-
cal implications were inescapable. At the end of the Barmen synod,
some ten thousand persons gathered for a worship service. As they
departed, they sang Luther's hymn, A Mighty Fortress is Our God,
which became a symbol of resistance throughout the Nazi
period. °6
Karl Barth, the great "neo-orthodox" Protestant theologian, was
the principal author of the Barmen Declaration, at a time when
many more "liberal" German Lutherans were using a modernized
version of natural law (one more "imprudent," Barth said, than
real Thomism) 07 to justify embracing Hitler. Catholics, often he-
Church Dogmatics. Id. at 26.
104 E. BETHGE, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER. MAN OF VISION, MAN OF COURAGE 296-97 (Mos-
bacher et al. transl. 1970) (quoting Barmen Declaration).
205 E. ROBERTSON, THE SHAME AND THE SACRIFICE: THE LIFE AND MARTYRDOM OF DIETRICHi
BONHOEFFER 117 (1988) (quoting Barmen Declaration).
20 See Bonkovsky, The German State and Protestant Elites, in THE GERMAN CHURCIH
STRUGGLE AND THE HOLOCAUST 124, 138-39 (F. Littell & H. Locke eds. 1974). On Barmen,
see also Bethge, Troubled Self-Interpretation and Uncertain Reception in the Church
Struggle, in id. at 167, and Cochrane, The Message of Barmen for Contemporary Church
History, in id. at 185.
207 See Barth, NO!: Answer to Emil Brunner, in NATURAL THEOLOGY 65, 96 (P. Fraenkel
transl. 1946); see also K. BARTH, THE CHURCH AND THE POLITICAL PROBLEM OF TODAY (1939);
K. BARTH, THE GERMAN CHURCH CONFLICT (1965); Glenthoj, Karl Barth and the German
Salute, 32 J. CHURCH & ST. 309 (1990).
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roic in their individual efforts to thwart Hitler and help Jews,
found their church, for the most part, silent on what natural law
required. 20 8 The Confessing Church stood out in frank and utter
opposition. Karl Barth was expelled from Germany; he returned to
his native Basel.2 09 His theological and political ally, Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, chose to remain in Germany and eventually joined the
secret resistance; he was imprisoned in Berlin in 1943, transferred
to Buchenwald following the failed attempt to kill Hitler, and sum-
marily executed on April 9, 1945.21
Given that history, which would seem to suggest at least an ini-
208 On the institutional failure of the German churches, both Protestant and Catholic, see
S. GORDON, HITLER, GERMANS AND THE "JEwisH" QUESTION 246-62 (1984); Conay, The
Churches, in THE HOLOCAUST. IDEOLOGY, BUREAUCRACY. AND GENOCIDE 199 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter THE HOLOCAUST]; Von Oppen, The Intellectual Resistance, in THE HOLOCAUST, supra, at
207; Wolf, Political and Moral Motives Behind the Resistance, in THE GmmA RESISTANCE
TO HITLER 193, 196-227 (1970). For more encyclopedic coverage, see J. CONWAY. THE NAZI
PERSECUTION OF THE CHURCHES 1933-45 (1968); THE GRL N CHURCH STRUGGLE AND THE
HOLOCAUST (F. Littell & H. Locke eds. 1974); see also R. GUrTERIDGE. THE GERIAN EVAN-
GELICAL CHURCH AND THE JEWS 1879-1950 (1976).
209 See supra note 205.
210 A singular resource available to those who wish to learn about Bonhoeffer is the 836-
page biography by his friend, E. BETHGE, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER. MAN OF VISION-MAN OF
COURAGE (1970). For an introduction to Bonhoeffer himself, see D. BONHOEFFR, THE COST
OF DISCIPLESHIP (2d ed., R. Fuller trans. 1959) [hereinafter D. BONHOFFFER TIHE COST OF
DISCIPLESHIP], through which one can glimpse the intensity and commitment of his faith.
See also D. BONHOEFFER. LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON (3d ed. 1967), which speak for
themselves, and his posthumous D. BONHOEFFER, ETHICS (1955). For an uncanny call for
Americans to look to Bonhoeffer and Albert Camus for inspiration once the religious boom
of the 1950s had subsided, see Berger, Camus, Bonhoeffer and the World Come of Age, 76
CHRISTIAN CENTURY 450 (1959). Sociologist Berger is the co-author of the often-cited P. BER-
GER & T. LUCKMAIN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALrrY (1966).
For a sampling of the vast literature on Bonhoeffer and the ethical implications of his life
and thought, see A BONHOEFFER LEGACY. ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING (A. Klassen ed. 1981); J.
BuRTNEss, SHAPING THE FUTURE THE ETHICS OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER (1985); ETHICAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY: BONHOEFFER'S LEGACY TO THE CHURCHES (J. Godsey & G. Kelly eds. 1981); E.
FEL, THE THEOLOGY OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER (1985); R. LovIN, CHISTIAN FAIT AND PUB-
LIC CHOICES: THE SOCIAL ETHICS OF BARTH, BRUNNER AND BONHOEFFER 126-78 (1984); NEW
STUDIES IN BONHOEFFER'S ETHICS (IV. Peck ed. 1987).
There is reason to believe that the legacy of Dietrich Bonhoeffer played a significant role
in sustaining the religious resistance in East Germany that led to the dramatic collapse of
the Communist regime in 1989. It is more than fortuitous that the round table discussions
that paved the way for new government began at a recently constructed Protestant confer-
ence center in East Berlin called the Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Haus. See Pierard, Religion and
the East German Revolution, 32 J. CHURCH & ST. 501, 505 (1990). On the political role of
the East German Evangelical Church, see generally Burgess, Church-State Relations in
East Germany: The Church as a "Religious" and "Political" Force, 32 J. CHURCH & STATE
17 (1990).
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tial claim to ethical credibility, and also given the profound influ-
ence of both theologians in modern theology (including Catholic
theology), it may be surprising that they were ignored by the post-
War legal world-even at a time when the legal world was taking
theology seriously. In part, the explanation is an odd quirk of mis-
interpretation. When Barth's work was first becoming known in
America, Reinhold Niebuhr was the leading American Protestant
theologian, whom legal scholars were most likely to associate with
Protestantism. Niebuhr's own powerful work had seemed to reach
a dead end at a time when Protestantism generally was also found-
ering.2 11 George Kelly has characterized the Protestantism of the
period as a cacophony of frustrations, a motley collection com-
posed of: fundamentalism's "defensive suspicion of all treatments
of Scripture . . . [except] literal inerrancy; sugar-coated liberal
modernism that forsook dogmatics for a soft and safe bourgeois
ethic; self-righteous pacifism and quietism; sectarian extravagance;
and Social Gospel extremism that reduced Christianity to a kind of
idealistic case work. 21 12 Moreover, Niebuhr himself unaccountably
failed to understand Barth, attributing to him positions which
were almost precisely the opposite of the ones he actually had
taken.213 Meanwhile, even Paul Tillich, who read Barth more care-
fully, objected to his extreme anti-essentialism and his strong
stand against natural law.21 4
By the 1960s, when Bonhoeffer's Prison Letters were becoming
almost faddishly well known even in secular America and Barth's
work had been more thoughtfully interpreted, the law world was
shifting its attention away from theology altogether-it had been,
at most, a brief flirtation. To the extent that Naziism was
remembered as raising metaphysical questions, "these were," as
Peter Berger writes, "typically anthropological rather than theolog-
ical in character: 'How could men act this way?' rather than 'How
could God permit this?' ,,215 Yet the appearance of Midgley's essay
1' See G. KELLY, supra note 24, at 156-57. For a similarly critical account of 19503 Amer-
ican Protestantism and its consequent unreadiness for Bonhoeffer's thought, see Marty, In-
troduction, in THE PLACE OF BONHOEFFERL PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES IN His THOUGHT 9,
18-20 (M. Marty ed. 1962).
212 G. KELLY, supra note 24, at 156-67.
21 See Midgley, supra note 201, at 113-16.
214 Id. at 116-21.
I' P. BERGER, THE SOCIAL REALITY OF RELIGION 79 (1967), quoted in G. KELLY, supra note
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in the Natural Law Forum does remind us-as did the best of le-
gal realism in relation to law-that theology need not rely on nor-
mative, essentialist categories to be serious about ethical
responsibility.
Bonhoeffer, when later popularized, was often treated as a secu-
lar existentialist or a utilitarian rather than as a devout Chris-
tian.216 Serious theological study of Barth and Bonhoeffer was con-
fined to the realm of academic theology,217 where once-influential
departments had become intellectual backwaters, curiosities in a
secular age. The two points are related, for Bonhoeffer was surely
in some sense an authentic existential hero, yet secular intellectu-
als, however impressed by Bonhoeffer, could no longer take theol-
ogy seriously on its own terms, as being something that might be
real or important, rather than just another cultural of political
phenomenon to be studied and dissected for its functional value,
like labor unions, television shows or zoological societies. For secu-
lar elite intellectuals, religion was simply not visible, almost too
embarrassing to take seriously. As Gary Wills describes them,
these intellectuals "have a serene provincialism, dismissive of the




2 1 See infra notes 501-07 and accompanying text.
217 Id.
218 See G. WIu.Ls. UNDER Go. RELIGION AND AmERICAN POLrTCS 89 (1990). Wills' particu-
lar, yet representative, examples are historians Henry Steele Commager and Arthur Schles-
inger, Jr. See id. at 86-93.
A striking example of such "serene provincialism" is the treatment of religion in that
bastion of literary sensibility, the New York Times Book Review. The Dec. 2, 1990, issue
offers us the "best" (14) and most "notable" (309) books of 1990. Of the 323 titles listed.
only six of the "notable" ones (and none of the "best") were in the category "Religion," the
same number as "Science Fiction" or "Spies and Thrillers." By way of comparison, the cate-
gory "Autobiograpy and Biography" contains 51 entries, many of which are so obscure in
subject matter as to offer a literal definition of the word "esoteric" ("known only to a chosen
few"). N.Y. Times Book Rev., Dec. 2, 1990, at 3, 48-70. Of the six titles actually listed under
"Religion," none is a theological work. Two are about the politics of the Catholic church,
one offers a sociological profile of American Catholics and another is from the "Bible as
literature" school, coming with the imprimatur of elite literary critic Harold Bloom. Id. at
69. Two of the books, while not works of theology, share our perspective about the impor-
tance of religion as such in American life. One is G. WILLS, supra; the other is R. CoLs. Tim
SpnirruAL Li s OF CHILDREN (1990).
For Coles, our "cosmological yearnings" may actually offer "a little help in knowing what
this life is about," for "the issue is the nature of our predicament as human beings, young or
old-and the way our minds deal with that predicament, from the earliest years to the final
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Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer were concerned with those
"ordinary torments," basic issues of life and death, of pain and suf-
fering, the realities that serve constantly as antidotes to our pride
and arrogance, as reminders of our ignorance and inability to
master our own fate. We will therefore offer a survey of their moral
landscape, knowing full well that we are inviting most of our read-
ers into a territory that will seem strange and alien to them. Their
discourse is starkly theological, with lots of "God-talk," and we will
take it seriously as such. Yet the issues are familiar to contempo-
rary purveyors of critical theory-freedom and necessity, subject
and object, fact and value, contingency and timelessness. In fact,
such issues, treated with far more sophistication than our recent
forays, have been the stuff of Reformation thought for over 400
years. Perhaps we still have something to learn about morality and
human agency from Martin Luther, John Calvin or Jonathan Ed-
wards, as well as their latter-day expositors and interpreters-just
as we have more to learn from the subtlety of real Thomist natural
law thought than we usually suppose.
Many have credited (or blamed) the Reformation for making
modern scientific and liberal moral/political thought possible. Its
insistence that salvation comes only from faith had the unintended
but perhaps inevitable effect of relegating theology to the realm of
private, subjective desire. If faith and grace alone led one to God,
then reason was "freed," as it were, to master the objective "facts"
of nature or outline rational principles of secular governance and
morality. 19 By the time of the Enlightenment, God had become, as
Barth said, an " 'old Lord,' to whom regard must occasionally be
breath." R. COLES, supra, at 7. He therefore regards it as "particularly ironic to find both
Freudian and Marxist thought so arrogantly abusive when the subject of religion comes up."
Id. at 7-8.
And arrogance and abuse are just what one finds in the same New York Times Book
Review when it offers a secular liberal review of the "fundamentalist" publishing scene,
which lumps together all manner of various strands of religious belief to take a lot of cheap
shots. See Lifton & Strozier, Waiting for Armageddon, N.Y. Times Book Rev., Aug. 12,
1990, at 1, 24-25. For a sampling of the critical response elicited, see Letters, N.Y. Times
Book Review, Sept. 9, 1990, at 46. Ironically, if the thousands of books sold in "religious"
stores were counted in the weekly tabulations, they would probably dominate the Times
Best Seller List.
219 See Mensch & Freeman, supra note 194, at 581, 587-88, 587 n.14. Again, note the link
between Baconian rationalism and the rationalism of Enlightenment versions of natural law,
as in Grotius. See A.P. D'ENTREvEs. NATURAL LAW 50 (1951).
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had, but who is not normally considered." 220
At their best, however, Protestant theologians have a maddening
knack for toppling and upending ostensibly comfortable and seem-
ingly stable structures of thought. Scholastic natural law theory,
for example, created an elaborate hierarchical structure that
seemed to mediate the supposedly infinite distance between
human beings and God, and between nature and grace. Thus, it
was said, grace "perfects" nature, but does not overturn it. It al-
most seemed as if, through natural reason, people could ascend the
hierarchical ladder of speculation which led from the earthly to the
divine.
The Reformation seized upon that point of perfecting, but not
overturning, as one of infinite distance, beyond the capacity of
human mediation. Hence, the elaborate scholastic structure, which,
exactly at that point had seemed to reconcile Aristotle and Christi-
anity, began to crumble.221 Perhaps the most easily accessible legal
analogy to the critical edge of Protestant theology is to the realists,
with their knack for taking the dilemma of the "hard case" and
showing it to be, not peculiar and peripheral to an otherwise intact
structure, but rather, at the core of the whole structure, the prob-
lem of legal reasoning itself.
222
22 III K. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, pt. 3, at 124 (1960) [hereinafter Il K. BARmi.
CHURCH DOGOATICS].
221 See Mensch & Freeman, supra note 194, at 587-88, 587 n.14. More specifically, Aqui-
nas had sought to reconcile notions of natural law, drawn largely from the Romans, and the
Aristotelian conception of both politics and nature, with the Augustinian perception that
human sin renders the Earthly City naught but illusion and vanity. See A.P. D'_.%'E s.
NATURAL LAw 36-37 (1951).
Aquinas himself insisted that "[i]f 'Grace does not abolish Nature,' neither does nature
abolish grace"-the law of nature is "only a step, although a necessary step, towards perfec-
tion." D'Entreves observes that the "proud spirit of modern rationalism is lacking." Id. at
45. Nevertheless, the harmony Aquinas sought to establish between human and Christian
values was bound to be unstable; and the Reformation was a reassertion of the Augustinian
side of that unstable medieval "harmony." See, e.g., P. MUXL. THF Nnw ENGLAND MINI 3-
34 (1939).
Karl Llewellyn, for one, became acutely aware of this correspondence:
I am therefore driven back upon faith, as conditioned by temperament. The
important factors of temperament seem to be: a rebelliousness; an optimism
and interest in underdogs; an insistence on seeing clean.
... But it promptly appears that the rebelliousness does have something to
work on. I can meet the Lord without reservation, and just merge into the
work He seems to want; and do it for us and Him. But I don't want any in-
termediaries. It has taken me thirty years to get here. And the Lord under-
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Barth was a master of that critical technique, by which he af-
firmed the central Reformation teaching that, as he said often by
tautology, "God is God"-hence, "we humans may not speak of
God by speaking of ourselves in a loud voice,"223 which is what he
stands the stiff neck quite as well as He understands the drive for craftsman-
ship and the fact that only by driving for technique could I have reached the
deeper things.
... Yet the whole job is a sort of rebel job. It is like appeal[ing] to Jesus
before there was Paul. It is essential heresy, in that I am trying to do a Paul
my way. Because what Paul did was to put structure, carrying-power, under
Jesus' teachings. I find I feel about Paul the same way I feel about great law-
yers whom I think to have gone sometimes off the track. He over-intellectual-
ized, so far as he wrote.
... Let me then stay as close as I may to Jesus and to Paul's living rather
than-or better, together with-his writing. With this, "rebel" and "non-rebel"
begin to line up. I observe with amusement that I am duplicating in religion a
twenty-year road in legal work. But I think the Lord is equally amused. He
never let me meet Him until I had cut under "authoritative" hogwash in law,
and then gone on and sweated into contact with the real tradition. He was out
of sight and hearing while I was merely fighting authoritative nonsense, or try-
ing to "construct" nonsense of my own. It was only when I began to feel for the
real underneathness, as vouched in the tradition, and then to work toward giv-
ing workable form to that, that the Lord let me meet Him. As if He had left
some jobs of creation over for His creatures to do, and watched to say "Good
kid;" "Now go on and do the next one better."
- . "I don't trust any intermediary machinery. My whole contact with the
Lord depends on having gotten down under machinery, and on finding that
when I managed to start working the real juice of human need into more effec-
tive machinery, the Lord stepped in and took over. But direct.
So I can't go through any Church that won't leave me that direct contact,
even if I do have to join up.
K. LLEWELLYN, POSITION RE. RELIGION (1943) (Karl Llewellyn Papers, University of Chicago
Law School). We are grateful to Michael McConnell for providing us with a transcription of
the document.
On the importance of religion in Llewellyn's life, see W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND
THE REALIST MOVEMENT 87-90, 123-24, 423-24 (1985).
223 For a clear statement of the centrality of that message, see III K. BARTH. CHURCi
DOGMATICS, supra nQte 220, pt. 3, at 124; Rumscheidt, The First Commandment as Axiom
for Theology: A Model for the Unity of Dogmatics and Ethics, in THEOLOGY BEYOND CHRIS-
TENDOM: ESSAYS ON THE CENTENARY OF THE BIRTH OF KARL BARTH, MAY 10, 1886, at 143
(1986) [hereinafter THEOLOGY BEYOND CHRISTENDOM].
The relation between the critical mode and the affirmation of "God is God" is clarified in
such Barthian passages as:
In announcing the limitation of the known world by another that is unknown,
the Gospel does not enter into competition with the many attempts to disclose
within the known world some more or less unknown and higher form of exis-
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took natural law theorists to be doing. Barth was therefore not sur-
prised when natural law theorists offered so little resistance to the
idolatry of Naziism.2
Given its emphasis on the frailty of over-confident human struc-
tures of thought, Protestant theology depicts a reality that is both
paradoxical and dialectical, one that cannot be captured by ana-
lytic, conceptual categories. Thus, the gospel is described as the
overcoming of a series of completely contradictory categories:
"nothing new, but the oldest; not particular, but the most univer-
sal; not historical, but the presupposition of all history," while si-
multaneously "not an old acquaintance, but a new one; not univer-
sal, but the most particular; not a mere presupposition, but history
itself. ' 225 Similarly, being faithful to Kierkegaard's insistence on
the " 'infinite qualitative distinction' between time and eter-
nity,"226 Barth described divine encounter with the world as the
"impossible possibility," as "a moment with no before and no
after.)
227
As metaphor for such formulations, Barth drew, not on Aristotle,
for whom our existing reality was self-contained, but rather on
Plato, for whom the reality we name was never more than provi-
sional. 228 For example, the metaphor for the moment of "no before
tence and to make it accessible to men. The Gospel is not a truth among other
truths. Rather, it sets a question-mark against all truths. The Gospel is not the
door but the hinge. The man who apprehends its meaning is removed from all
strife, because he is engaged in a strife with the whole, even with existence
itself. Anxiety concerning the victory of the Gospel-that is, Christian Apolo-
getics-is meaningless, because the Gospel is the victory by which the world is
overcome. By the Gospel the whole concrete world is dissolved and established.
K. BARTH, THE EPISTLE To THE Ror, s 35 (6th ed. 1933) [hereinafter K BARTH. THE Epts-
TLE To THE ROmANs].
Rumscheidt, supra note 223, at 150-51.
EK JUNGEL, supra note 203, at 32 (quoting K. BArH, DER ROWaERsmiu 7 (1919)).
Barth's later work could be described to some extent as a move from dialectics to assertion,
yet it never became undialectical. See generally id. at 33-51.
Id. at 66 (quoting KL BARTH, THE EPISTLE TO THE RoamAs 10 (2d ed. 1922)).
Id. at 50. In The Epistle to the Romans, Barth, citing Kierkegaard, said that "Jesus as
the Christ... can be comprehended only as Paradox." K. BARTH, TiE EPmTLE To TrE
RomA's, supra note 223, at 29 (citing Kierkegaard) (emphasis added). Thus, "[als Christ,
Jesus is the plane which lies beyond our comprehension. The plane which is knon to us, he
intersects vertically, from above." Id. This is a somewhat different "geometrising" than that
associated with Enlightenment rationalism and Enlightenment versions of natural law. See
supra note 192.
1 See E. JUNGEL, supra note 203, at 67.
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and no after" can be found in Plato's description of rest and mo-
tion. Rest and motion, as we conceive them, by definition exclude
each other, yet the reality of the world is constituted by transition
from one to the other, by a moment which can only be defined
negatively, the essence which is in no place, or as Schleiermacher
translated it "this incomprehensible essence, the moment.12 2  With
no place and occupying no time, this moment nevertheless consti-
tutes both space and time: "That which cannot be identified spa-
tially or temporally in this world is that which holds the world to-
gether at its core.
23 0
Barth's favorite among his own works was a study of St.
Anselm's proof of the existence of God, which, for Barth, turned an
absolute prohibition on thought into an affirmation that made
human thought possible. 231 Anselm's proof was rooted in a formu-
lation, a name, for God: "That than which nothing greater can be
conceived. '232 Notably, states Barth, this name is not "that which
is the greatest of all things," as it had been misinterpreted.3 3 That
would be an affirmative claim, which would amount to placing God
in the realm of the ontic.
229 Id. at 68.
230 Id. at 67-68. For the continued difficulty of describing the relation between motion
and rest, compare M. KLINE, MATHEMATICS IN WESTERN CULTURE 404-05 (1964) with G.
ZuKAv, THE DANCING Wu Li MASTERS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW PHYSICS 122-29 (1979). See
also K. BARTH, EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS, supra note 223, at 46 for the Platonic assertion that
"behind the visible there lies the invisible universe which is the Origin of all concrete
things." For Barth, however, that recognition never becomes simple idealism. For example,
referring to the "irony of intelligence," Barth states,
We know that God is He whom we do not know, and that our ignorance is
precisely the problem and the source of our knowledge. We know that God is
the Personality which we are not, and [that] this lack of Personality is pre-
cisely what dissolves and establishes our personality. The recognition of the
absolute heteronomy under which we stand is itself an autonomous recogni-
tion; and this is precisely that which may be known of God. When we rebel, we
are in rebellion not against what is foreign to us but against that which is most
intimately ours, not against what is removed from us but against that which
lies at our hands.
Id. at 45-46.
221 For the following discussion we are indebted to C. Rasmussen, Karl Barth on St.
Anselm: A Theological Response to the Dilemma of Liberal Theory (unpublished manu-
script on file with author). On Barth and Anselm, see also Nebelsick, Karl Barth's Under-
standing of Science, in THEOLOGY BEYOND CHRISTENDOM: ESSAYS ON THE CENTENARY OF THE
BIRTH OF KARL BARTH 165, 193-205 (J. Thompson ed. 1986).
232 C. Rasmussen, supra note 231, at 17.
222 Id. at 20.
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Instead, Anselm had located that point of radical and complete
disjuncture analagous to the gap between finite number and infin-
ity (Anselm had in effect defined infinity many years before math-
ematicians had done so).231 By naming God only through prohibi-
tion and negation, Anselm affirmed our inability to name God at
all, giving us knowledge of our finitude. Again, the perhaps too
slick analogy is to numbers-we have knowledge of finite numbers
as such only with reference to infinity, which we can name but can-
not comprehend.235
Similarly, in discussing human attempts to formulate laws of na-
ture, Barth zeroed, in on the inevitable gap between human predic-
tion and the actual occurrence of events, which he called the gap
between the noetic and the ontic-the lack of necessary connection
between what is apprehended by mere thought and what actually
occurs:
No high measure of noetic certainty or clarity can give to
laws known to us, i.e., discovered and guaranteed by us,
the character of ontic laws ....
... Concerning the actuality of the laws known to us
we will already think rather more modestly because we
will be aware that they cannot in any case originate or
effect the event itself and as such, that even presuppos-
ing their validity they must still be referred to the fact
that the event takes place at all only on the basis of a
completely different operation [which, for Barth, was
"foreordination"].236
Humility, a sense of the finitude and contingency of human
I" This particular analogy is ours. For a discussion of the definition of "infinity," see P.
WOLFF, BREAKTHROUGHS IN MATHEMATICS 129-30 (1963):
An infinite quantity is not enumerable-it cannot be counted. And conversely,
anything which can be counted-any quantity, no matter how large, to which a
number can be assigned-is by that token not infinite. No number can ever be
said to be infinite, for every number always has a next one; hence the former
number cannot be called infinite, since there is at least one number greater
than it. In fact, a good definition of infinity states that infinity is larger than
any number you may name and that consequently, infinity itself is not a
number.
See also M. KLwEn, supra note 230, at 395-409.
Compare: "God is He Whom we do not know," an "ignorance" which is then both "the
problem" and the "source of our knowledge." See supra note 230 (quoting Barth).
23m 11 BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, supra note 220, pt. 3 at 127.
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thought in the face of what can really be known only from the (im-
possible) vantage point of infinity, makes, as Barth points out, for
better science. We should
leave the laws known to us open to the revision of con-
tent and formulation which may become necessary as a
result of our encounter and their confrontation with new
and actual occurrence. These laws are as it were arrows
pointing in the direction of real order and form, i.e., of
the order and form which are objectively immanent in
and proper to actual occurrence itself. But for this reason
they can never become absolute dogmas, nor assume the
character of ontic law.23 7
Barth, in fact, did not reject science, but audaciously reclaimed
theology as a science. As against skeptics, he argued that all scien-
tific knowledge is necessarily contingent, with its particular meth-
odology suited to its own specific object of study; and that all sci-
237 Id. Barth was not denying the existence of order in the natural world. He affirmed: "It
is not chance which rules but constancy, not caprice but faithfulness. All occurence, inas-
much as it takes place at all, takes place within the framework of a definite rule." Id. at 128.
Nevertheless, he insisted,
[w]e will acknowledge this the more seriously and proclaim it the more effec-
tively, the more scrupulously we cease trying to equate even one of the laws
known to us, even the law which we perceive with what we imagine to be the
greatest clarity and certainty, with the order and form or constancy and faith-
fulness which rule in that causal nexus, with the rule to which all occurrence
within it is subject. Only as we cease doing that do we give evidence that in the
laws perceived and described and formulated by us we are aiming at real law;
at the ordering and forming which takes place in the occurrence itself and not
simply in our experience and thinking, which is not merely an ordering and
forming but also an effecting and calling forth of the actual occurrence itself. It
is remarkable enough that the less we believe that the laws known to us have
anything at all to do with the real foreordination of creaturely occurrence, the
more they really have to do with it, the more clearly they testify by their own
particular, that is, noetic, clarity and certainty that there are indeed valid laws,
that in the causal nexus in which each individual activity has its place and by
which it is conditioned there does rule a unitary and-we can now legitimately
use the description of Goethe and say-an "eternal" law ....
Id.
Barth's insights about the subject/object problem in Enlightenment science bear a close
resemblance to those of America's greatest theologian, Jonathan Edwards, whose analysis of
Newtonian physics and Lockean epistemology was more sophisticated and "modern" than
that of any of his eighteenth-century contemporaries. As both Barth and Edwards under-
stood, the world is more relentlessly "objective" than any human statement of its laws can
describe. See P. MILLER, JONATHAN EDWARDs 43-99 (1949).
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ence is rooted in a faith that the object of study will reveal itself,
at least provisionally, through the method fashioned by scientists
within their traditions.238 Thus understood, science was actually
much more akin to theology than to its own presumptuous and
complacent nineteenth-century positivism:
In realizing the tentativeness, the transitoriness, the
dependence of every science upon an object that is too
large for its own comprehension, along with the knowl-
edge that no science is complete in itself but depends
upon a meta-science that itself is incomplete, modern sci-
ence resembles proper theology much more than it re-
sembles the classical seventeenth-century Newtonian sci-
ence and even less Aristotelian science.239
In a criticism of positivism strikingly similar to that of Barth,
physicist Werner Heisenberg noted that both science and theology
are compelled to speak in "images and parables," that "Truth
dwells in the deeps."240
For Barth, then, to do theology as a scientist meant that one
must be "fully cognizant of his presuppositions, his method, the
time-boundedness or temporality of his thought, and hence the
23 For a full discussion of Barth's notion of theology as science see Nebelsick, supra note
231, at 165-214.
29 Id. at 197.
240 See W. HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND BEYOND. ENCOUNTER AND CONVRSATIONS 205, 210-
12 (A. Pomerans transL 1971). Barth had not realized the parallels between his theology and
modem physics, assuming natural science remained struck in its "pre-modem" positivist
mode. Barth, after all, was still battling the tendency of "liberal" religion to humble itself
before the arrogant rationalism of post-Enlightenment scientific rationalism. Given that
misunderstanding, he declined to join the Gottingen Theologian-Physicists conversations
(1949-61), despite the efforts of his friend Gunter Howe, and lost the opportunity to engage
Heisenberg, who was a member of the group. See Nebelsick, supra note 231, at 199-200.
Heisenberg himself saw in the variety of religious formulations "the clear impression that
all such formulations try to express man's relatedness to a central order." W. HwIMsEER ,
supra, at 214. With respect to ethics, moreover, the meaning of that "central order" was
clear. Secular "pragmatism' offered little on its own:
If we ask Western man what is good and what is evil, what is worth striving for
and what has to be rejected, we shall find time and again that his answers
reflect the ethical norms of Christianity even when he has long since lost all
touch with Christian images and parables. If the magnetic force that has
guided this particular compass-and what else was its source but the central
order?-should ever become extinguished, terrible things may happen to man-
kind, far more terrible even than concentration camps and atom bombs."
Id. at 217.
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transient and provisional nature of his own theology. '' 241 Theology,
being "entirely dependent upon God's decision rather than upon
any independent decision of its own," knowing "only the actuality
of being bound (Bindung) to its object, the object of its faith,...
knows itself to rest on sheer contingency. 2 42 Thus Barth, in taking
a "scientific" approach to theology, repudiated not only the self-
deluding claims of Baconian positivism, but also the certainty peo-
ple invented for themselves in the name of "religion." In fact, both
Barth and Bonhoeffer were known for advocating "religionless
Christianity," for "Religion forgets that it has a right to exist only
when it constantly does away with itself.
243
Barth's greatest concern was not to expose the fallacies of posi-
tivist science, but to combat instead a Protestant return to a natu-
ral law theology that tended to elevate contingent human projects
to the status of natural or essential reality. This tendency was be-
coming a theological excuse for alliance with Naziism, to the extent
that it suggested a correspondence between the natural order and
the political order of the German state. When a former friend,
Emil Brunner, wrote in support of a doctrine of "orders of crea-
tion," by which he meant a return to a form of natural theology,
24'
Barth's famous answer was entitled, simply and dramatically,
,,Nein !,,245
Brunner had argued that even the Reformers taught that the
world was the creation of God, that humans were endowed with
conscience and that God graciously preserves both natural life and
241 Nebelsick, supra note 231, at 174.
242 Id. at 182-83. No science could be more dialectical, since God is both its object and
subject: "God may be known only as he reveals himself. He is both the object of knowledge
and the means by which knowledge of himself may be gained." Id. at 199. See also id, at
203.
243 E. JUNGEL, supra note 203, at 59 (quoting K. BARTH, Biblical Questions, Insights and
Vistas, in THE WORD OF GOD AND THE WORD OF MAN 66 (1928)). Thus Barth read the Bible
as self-demythologizing: "The biblical piety is not really pious; one must rather characterize
it as a well-considered, qualified worldliness." Id. In addition, Barth believed
Jesus simply ha[d] nothing to do'with religion. The meaning of his life is the
actuality of that which is not actually present in any religion-the actuality of
the unapproachable, the unreachable, the incomprehensible, the realization of
the possibility, which is not a matter of speculation: "Behold, I make all things
new!"
Id. (quoting K. BARTH, supra, at 88).
214 See Brunner, Nature and Grace, in NATURAL THEOLOGY 15 (1946).
24' See Barth, supra note 207, at 65.
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the "ordinances" of historical and cultural life, such as marriage
and the state, and the civil and secular functions and offices.24
These ordinances can be recognized as good and necessary by "ra-
tional man" alone, through the exercise of natural reason. It is "pe-
culiar to the preserving grace of God that he does his preserving
work both by nature acting unconsciously and by the reason of
man.22 47 If this sounds like St. Thomas, Brunner had announced,
then so too did Calvin, who used the term "lex naturae," and also
"order of creation."24 Brunner had conceded that both lex
naturae (the will of God implanted on creation) and the ordi-
nances of creation were "somewhat obscured" by sin and must be
made known afresh by Christ; but the original order still "clearly
shows through" despite sin, and can be recognized by the light of
natural reason.249 Brunner was in effect suggesting the possibility
of discovering a self-sufficient rational system, "with which sin 'has
... nothing to do.' "250
Barth answered with scorn. Even St. Thomas, he said, by incor-
porating Augustine, had rejected so brazen a claim for natural rea-
son. As he reminded Brunner, Catholics had a doctrine of preve-
nient and preparatory grace, which made the correct operation of
reason in nature possible: "[R]eason, if left entirely without grace,
is incurably sick and incapable of any serious theological activity.
Only when it has been illumined, or at least provisionally shone
upon by faith" can it produce statements of truth about the
human and natural world that can be considered truths of reason
rather than revelation.251 In other words, within Catholicism
"[t]here can be no question of separating nature and grace 'neatly
...by a horizontal line.' ",252 (This point is often obscured both by
Protestant critics of natural law and by Thomists who want to
make it more accessible to non-Christians.)
Thus, according to Barth, Brunner oversimplified the question of
nature and grace, and was so confident about the unsullied capac-
ity of reason, as to offend any "Roman Catholic theologian who
246 Brunner, supra note 244, at 28-30.
247 Id. at 31.
248 Id. at 36-37.
249 Id. at 39-40.
250 Id.
251 Barth, supra note 207, at 96.
22 Id. See also Maritain, supra note 147.
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knows his subject at all."2 53 But even more offensive was the claim
that the ordinances of creation (described by Brunner as repre-
senting Reformation thought) were really consistent with the mes-
sage of God's absolute transcendence. Brunner had blunted and
tamed the critical existential Reformation claim, leaving the way
open for Protestants who called themselves "German Christians"
to argue a correspondence between God's will, natural law and the
"ordinances" of German nationalism-German culture, the Ger-
man state, the German race. Barth was unforgiving, saying that
Brunner had
gone and calmly claimed Calvin for his own; ... he has
confronted me together with his "Calvin" and has patted
me on the shoulder and told me to be a good boy; he has
seen to it that the "German Christians" can, if they wish
*. . quote now not only Luther but also Calvin in their
support. It is the fact that he managed to do all these
things which I am so far unable to forgive Brunner.
2
4
Barth thus insisted that natural law offers no basis for real ethi-
cal judgment-instead, it opens the way for oppressive ideology by
pretending that what is contingent, provisional and merely human
is really "natural," as part of the divinely sanctioned nature of cre-
ation, its essential reality. What then, can be the basis for ethical
decision, if not natural law? Barth and Bonhoeffer forged an an-
swer to that question in the pressing moral and political context of
Naziism-ethics was not an abstract question, but one upon which
a person could be called upon to stake his or her life, as did
Bonhoeffer. Barth's critical methodology had been sharpened by
Overbeck, a friend of Nietzsche and an utter religious skeptic; it
was Overbeck who had inspired Barth to attack the arrogant pre-
tension of conventional religious thought and, especially, the com-
placent claims of liberal Protestants.255 Bonhoeffer, too, viewed the
problem of ethics as the problem posed by Nietzsche: after criti-
cism, what remains except the Nietzschian claim that power is its
own excuse for being?25
6
M Barth, supra note 207, at 95.
251 Id. at 105.
211 See E. JUNGEL, supra note 203, at 54-61; see also E. FELL, THE THEOLOGY OF DIETRICH
BONHOEFFER 161-64 (M. Rumscheidt trans. 1985) (surveying Barth's concept of religion).
"I' On Bonhoeffer's response to Nietzsche, see E. BETHGE, supra note 204, at 84-86, 772-
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Could one reject abstract normative categories, whether derived
from natural law or the secularized rationalism of Kant, and never-
theless fashion an ethics that would demand responsible action in
the world? The answer for Barth and Bonhoeffer lay not in ethics
itself (based on a supposed knowledge of the world and the opera-
tion of human reason), but rather in theology: in the dialectical
process of looking first "upward," as it were, to the command of
God, which is a divinely initiated claim, the call to the covenant
"I-Thou" relationship, and then downward, to a particular person
in a particular context. The content of the command is known only
by virtue of another dialectic-that of incarnation and redemp-
tion-so that the (impossible) command is always accompanied by
the promise of grace, of the "giving" which is its meaning. (Those
are, to put it mildly, unfamiliar terms in modern secular
thought-sin and redemption have almost dropped out of the vo-
cabulary, but for Barth and Bonhoeffer they were still central.)
Hence, the gospel was the core of ethics-the command that is ful-
filled by the life lived wholly for the neighbor.
25 7
73. On Nietzsche, see A. MAcIlr, supra note 1, at 110-20, 256-59.
Nietzschian criticism was effective in overcoming the constraints of Enlightenment ration-
alist complacency, which would otherwise engulf Christianity. The challenge remained, how-
ever, to reclaim Christianity from Nietzschian criticism. For Bonhoeffer this necessarily
meant affirming the "this-worldliness" of Christianity:.
The Christian is not a "homo religiousus" but simply a man, as Jesus was a
man ... I don't mean the shallow and banal this-worldiness of the enlightened,
the busy, the comfortable, or the lascivious, but the profound this-worldiness
characterized by discipline, and the constant knowledge of death and
resurrection.
D. BONHOEFFER, L-rraRS AND PAPRS FRobi PiusoN 201 (1953).
See also J. BuRTr-.ss, supra note 210, at 106-07, 146; R. LovIN, supra note 210, at 126-27,
139-43; J. Woau'_L, BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGY. CLASSICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY 68-71 (1970).
"I See, e.g., J. BURTNESS, supra note 210, at 43-51, 54-59; E. JUNGEL, supra note 204, at
45. Similarly:
Who is my neighbour? Does this question admit of any answer? Is it my kins-
man, my compatriot, my brother Christian, or my enemy" .... The answer is:
"You are the neighbor. Go along and try to be obedient by loving others."
Neighbourliness is not a quality in other people, it is simply their claim on
ourselves. Every moment and every situation challenges us to action and to
obedience. We have literally no time to sit down and ask ourselves whether so-
and-so is our neighbour or not. We must get into action and obey-w,.e must
behave like a neighbour to him.
D. BONHOEFFER, THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP, supra note 211, at 67-68 (the context is that of
the lawyer who insists on a preliminary fuss about membership in the "neighbor" category
before he can obey the commandment See Luke 10:25-29). Likewise:
This concept of correspondence to reality certainly needs to be defined more
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Barth's ethical method always retained a critical edge-a
method designed to undercut ethical categories for the purpose of
forcing direct confrontation with the "command." Usually, Barth
said, the ethicist produces a prescriptive legal text-by drawing
from the Bible, from natural law perceptible to reason or from
"particular norms which have been handed down historically in the
tradition of Western Christianity and which lay claim to universal
validity. ' 25  Then this text, with its carefully defined categories, is
applied to particular cases by the method of casuistry, the working
out of detailed exceptions and distinctions. This is a method with
much to recommend it, Barth observes, in no small part because it
eliminates the "often very oppressive task of making [one's] own
orientations and decisions"-for which "everyone will be grateful
to the moralist for the superior knowledge" that is thereby brought
to the situation.259
As always, however, Barth points to the gap which makes this
whole elaborate ethical enterprise impossible-here precisely the
legal realist point that there simply is no "method or technique of
applying this text to the plenitude of conditions and possibili-
ties. '260 That means the legalist model for ethics as premised on
exactly. It would be a complete and a dangerous misunderstanding if it were to
be taken in the sense of that "servile conviction in the face of the fact" that
Nietzsche speaks of, a conviction which yields to every powerful pressure,
which on principle justifies success, and which on every occasion chooses what
is opportune as "corresponding to reality." "Correspondence with reality" in
this sense would be the contrary of responsibility; it would be irresponsibility.
But the true meaning of correspondence with reality lies neither in this servil-
ity towards the factual nor yet in a principle of opposition to the factual, a
principle of revolt against the factual in the name of some higher reality. Both
extremes alike are very far removed from the essence of the matter. In action
which is genuinely in accordance with reality there is an indissoluble link be-
tween the acknowledgement and the contradiction of the factual. The reason
for this is that reality is first and last not lifeless; but it is the real man, the
incarnate God. It is from the real man, whose name is Jesus Christ, that all
factual reality derives its ultimate foundation and its ultimate annulment, its
justification and its ultimate contradiction, its ultimate affirmation and its ulti-
mate negation. To attempt to understand reality without the real man is to
live in an abstraction to which the responsible man must never fall victim; it is
to fail to make contact with reality in life; it is to vacillate endlessly between
the extremes of servility and revolt in relation to the factual.
D. BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 228 (1955) (footnote omitted).
2I III K. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, supra note 220, pt. 4, at 9.
259 Id. at 7.
260 Id. at 9-10.
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objective categories simply cannot work. Quoting Bonhoeffer,
Barth explains that "[a]n ethics cannot be a book in which there is
set out how everything in the world actually ought to be but unfor-
tunately is not,"261 for it is the "unfortunately is not" which is the
whole point: it is precisely in the real, creaturely world, the world
as it is, a fallen world, that decisions must be made.
Legalist ethics thus makes the "objectively untenable assump-
tion" that command comes in the form of "a universal rule, an
empty form, or rather a tissue of such rules and forms. '"262 Instead,
"[i]t is always an individual command for the conduct of this man,
at this moment and in this situation; a prescription for this case of
his; a prescription for the choice of a definite possibility of human
intention, decision and action."263 The failure to understand this
leads, for example, both Jews and Christians to seek timeless com-
mands in the Biblical texts, rather than to see Biblical injunction
as command within a particular historical reality, and therefore, in
the covenant sense, as a "witness to God's special commanding
here and now.' 2' Barth observes:
No wonder, then, that wherever it is treated as a timeless
truth, it can only be made applicable and usable with the
help of some interpretation which is more or less arbi-
trary even in relation to the texts, and of all kinds of am-
plifications and additions drawn from the treasures of
natural law and tradition.6 5
Those efforts to amplify, explain and interpret simply reveal the
self-contradiction inherent in the ethical method itself.
Legalist ethics are false, Barth argues, not only because they are
logically impossible but also because they lead to two paradoxically
related problems. First, unwarranted arrogance: the moralist seeks
to "set himself on God's throne, to distinguish good and evil"
through claims that in a "summa of ethical statements compiled
by him and his like from the Bible, natural law and tradition, he
can know the command of God, see through it and past it, and
261 Id. at 10 (quoting Bonhoeffer).
282 Id. at 11.
263 Id.




thus master and handle it... like a possession or domain" 2 6 -the
precise opposite of true obedience. At the same time, however,
even in this arrogance, casuistical ethics also destroys human free-
dom. On this point Barth always insists, following Dostoevsky, that
the command of God is an appeal to freedom-not a freedom of
"choice, preference, or selection" but (again paradoxically) the
freedom of obedience.
26 7
Thus casuist ethics calls a person away from real responsibility;
it "conceals from him the character of his conduct as his own, di-
rect responsibility. 2' s An absolutist, categorial ethics does not en-
croach too much on people, but "too little."269 As Bonhoeffer said,
The commandment of God is permission. It . .. com-
mands freedom. It is by overcoming this contradiction
that it shows itself to be God's commandment; the im-
possible becomes possible, and that which lies beyond the
range of what can be commanded, liberty, is the true ob-
ject of this commandment. That is the high price of
God's commandment; it is no cheaper than that.270
266 Id. at 10-11. Barth explains that,
At a safe distance from the ethical battlefield-like a staff officer of the
Lord-he manipulates for himself and others a method of correct deci-
sions-correct in the sense of the law .... He has in fact made God's will and
command the prisoner of this law and his application of it. Casuistry is a mas-
tering of the command and therefore of God Himself, which is certainly con.
ceivable in every kind of philosophical and religious paganism, but is quite
impossible in Christianity. Since this is incompatible with the knowledge of
grace which God shows to men even in His command, it is a mastering of
which a man who knows that he lives by God's grace will not make himself
guilty. Casuistry is a violation of the divine mystery in the ethical event.
Id. at 11.
267 Id. at 13. What is required is not "external conformity" but "genuine agreement." Id.
Compare d'Entreves, supra note 123, on the relation between outward conformity and inner
conviction.
2166 III K. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, supra note 220, pt. 4, at 14.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 14-15 (quoting Bonhoeffer). Compare the legend of the Grand Inquisitor in Dos-
toevsky's, The Brothers Karamazov. The Inquisitor, an aged Cardinal of the Church, con-
fronts the Prisoner, who is Christ:
For fifteen centuries [the Cardinal declares] we have been wrestling with thy
freedom
... Instead of taking men's freedom from them, Thou didst make it greater
than ever! Didst Thou forget that man prefers peace, and even death, to free-
dom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil? Nothing is more seductive
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Bonhoeffer is well-known for phrases that capture the form of
that command-the real "cost of discipleship," which he demon-
strated most fully not by words, but by living it, contrasted to the
"cheap grace" of the liberal Protestants.27 '1 Discipleship means be-
ing responsible "to and for the neighbor, in his concrete possibil-
ity." A given situation is not "material on which to impress an idea
or program"; rather the responsible person may have to prefer
what is "relatively better to what is relatively worse, and ... per-
ceive that the 'absolute good' may sometimes be the very worst."
2 72
One may, in fact, have to incur guilt in order to act responsibly;
the neighbor and the future, for which we are responsible, do not
exist in some ideal world, but in a real world of sin.
Confronted with his insistence on notions like "discipleship" or
"sin," those of us who are not theologically predisposed are likely
to dismiss Bonhoeffer as an anachronism, offering little in the way
of contemporary moral guidance. We, after all, are so very modem
(or even post-modern), complacent in the embrace of secularism
and the rejection of foolish "supernatural" world views. Bonhoeffer
was just a Lutheran pastor, albeit a brave one, who died almost
for man than his freedom of conscience, but nothing is a greater cause of suf-
fering. And behold, instead of giving a firm foundation for setting the con-
science of man at rest forever, Thou didst choose all that is exceptional, vague
and enigmatic; Thou didst choose what was utterly beyond the strength of
men, acting as though Thou didst not love them at all-Thou who didst come
to give Thy life for them! Instead of taking possession of men's freedom. Thou
didst increase it, and burdened the spiritual kingdom of mankind with its suf-
ferings forever. Thou didst desire man's free love, that he should follow Thee
freely, enticed and taken captive by Thee. In place of the rigid ancient law,
man must hereafter with free heart decide for himself what is good and what is
evil, having only Thy image before him as his guide. But didst Thou not know
that he would at last reject even Thy image and Thy truth, if he is weighed
down with the fearful burden of free choice? They will cry aloud at last that
the truth is not in Thee, for they could not have been left in greater confusion
and suffering than Thou has caused, laying upon them so many unanswerable
cares and unanswerable problems. So that, in truth, Thou didst Thyself lay the
foundation for the destruction of Thy kingdom.
P. LEHMANN, ETmIcs m A CHRuSI CONTEXT 326-27 (1963) (quoting F. DosToEvsKY. THE
BROTHERS KARAMAzov 276-80 (1956)). This captures the dilemma of the Reformation. Leh-
mann's contrast is between an ethics of rationalist prescription and hoinonia, the fellow-
ship-creating presence of Christ- "The ethical reality of the church is the building up of
itself in love .... " Id. at 54. See generally id. at 45-73.
27 See D. BONHOEFFER, THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP, supra note 210, at 43-47; see also R
ROBERTSON, supra note 205, at 143-48 (1988).
272 See D. BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 197-98 (1955).
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fifty years ago, as did many others who resisted Hitler. Or, out of
sheer admiration for his moral courage, we may be tempted, as
were many in the 1960s, not to dismiss Bonhoeffer, but to appro-
priate him to the pantheon of existential heroes, lonely individuals
who affirm for the rest of us the very possibility and nobility of
human agency. Both of these reactions, however, are simply off the
mark.
Bonhoeffer the existential hero cannot be understood apart from
Bonhoeffer the theologian; and Bonhoeffer the theologian was no
less the modern for his effort to comprehend the world in theologi-
cal terms. He grew up in a starkly secular intellectual environment,
and was the beneficiary of as sophisticated an education as twenti-
eth-century Europe had to offer. When he chose theology, the pro-
fession of his grandfather, over the science more prevalent in his
immediate family, he did so initially out of intellectual curiosity,
not faith. He had a thorough mastery of and appreciation for not
only the legacy of Enlightenment rationalism but also the critical
insights of Kierkegaard, Heidigger and, especially, Nietzsche. As
an intellectual matter, Bonhoeffer saw the necessity of confronting,
not evading, both the tradition of Kant and the criticism of
Neitzsche.
With respect to ethics, Bonhoeffer set himself "self-consciously
and explicitly" against the tradition of Kant. Like Barth, he did
not believe that "ethical formalism" or the "transcendent charac-
ter of the universal" could reach actual persons in their real histor-
ical situations: "Kant seeks to rise above time and history through
the principle of universalizability. Bonhoeffer seeks to embrace
time and history by insisting on responsible action in concrete
times and concrete places. '27 4 Bonhoeffer thus responded to Kant's
ethics with an insistence on the concrete here-and-now instead of
ethereal absolute or formal categories: "The ethical, in this sense of
the formal, the universally valid, and the rational contained no ele-
ment of concretion, and it therefore inevitably ended in the total
atomization of human society and of the life of the individual, in
unlimited subjectivism and individualism.
'27 5
27 For an account of Bonhoeffer's family background and education, see E. BETiiGE,
supra note 204, at 3-64.
24 See J. BURTNESS, supra note 210, at 149-56.
175 D. BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 240 (1955). See id. at 231-44; R. LOVIN, supra note 210, at 5; J.
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From an intellectual standpoint, Bonhoeffer, like Barth, took the
teachings of Nietzsche more seriously than those of Kant, for while
the latter might merely be opposed, the former had to be assimi-
lated. Bonhoeffer's affirmation of "concrete times and concrete
places" meant, as it did for Nietzche, an affirmation of the earthly
"this-worldliness" of our existence.276 In fact, one of Bonhoeffer's
favorite stories was the Greek myth of Antaeus, the giant wrestler
and son of Mother Earth, who could not be defeated so long as he
remained in contact with the earth, from which he gained constant
renewal. Only the shrewd and powerful Hercules knew enough to
hold the giant in the air, apart from the earth, until the life had
been squeezed out of him.2 "
Despite his fascination with Nietzsche, Bonhoeffer did not em-
brace "life" as an absolute end in itself. Such "vitalism" "cannot
but end in nihilism": "Life in itself, in the strict sense of the word,
is a void, a plunge into the abyss; it is movement without end and
without purpose, movement into nothing. It does not rest until it
has involved everything in this movement of destruction.
278
Bonhoeffer saw such vitalism "running wild in the race, blood, and
soil ideology of the Nazis.
27 9
Bonhoeffer's descriptions of earthly reality do resonate strikingly
with the existential accounts to which we have become accustomed
since Nietzsche. Fundamental to our experience in a fallen world is
alienation, which Bonhoeffer calls "disunion":
Man knows good and evil, against God, against his origin,
godlessly and of his own choice, understanding himself
according to his own contrary possibilities; and he is cut
off from the unifying, reconciling life in God, and is deliv-
ered over to death....
Man's life is now disunion with God, with men, with
things, and with himself.
WoELFEL, supra note 256, at 153-54. For a good example of Bonhoeffer's disagreement with
Kant, see his essay, What is Meant By "Telling the Truth'?, in D. BONHOEFF. . ETHIcs,
supra, at 326-34.
27 See D. BONHOEFFER, LETrERs AND PAPERS FROM PRISON 202 (1953); J. WOELPEL, supra
note 256, at 68-71.
" See J. WOELFEL, supra note 256, at 70-71. For a version of the myth, see L D'AWAm
& EP. D'AuLAIRE BOOK OF GREEK MYTHS 140 (paperback ed. 1962).
278 D. BONHOEFFER. ETHICS 106 (1955).
271 J. BURTNESS, supra note 210, at 106-07.
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... The peculiar fact that we lower our eyes when a
stranger's eye meets our gaze is not a sign of remorse for
a fault, but a sign of that shame which, when it knows
that it is seen, is reminded of something that it lacks,
namely the lost wholeness of life, its own nakedness. To
meet a stranger's gaze directly, as is required, for exam-
ple, in making a declaration of personal loyalty, is a kind
of act of violence, and in love, when the gaze of the other
is sought, it is a kind of yearning.
8 0
Also fundamental is ambiguity, best captured for Bonhoeffer by
the simultaneous existence of sin and grace:
Sin is a word that describes the whole creation as dis-
torted and grace is a word that claims this distorted crea-
tion as the object of God's redemptive work in Christ.
The ambiguity arises in the fact that these two condi-
tions exist at the same time and that both conditions
penetrate the total reality .... Sin and grace therefore
mean that there is no place (church authority, civil law,
moral expert) to which to go, no part of one's own person
(conscience, intuition, reason) to which to go, to find sim-
ple guidance for pure behavior.2 81
One can hardly imagine a more dialectical account than
Bonhoeffer's portrayal of the paradox of God in a "world come of
age." Conceding that "God as a working hypothesis in morals,
politcs, or science, has been surmounted and abolished," and that
"the same thing has happened in philosophy and religion,"
Bonhoeffer concludes that, "for the sake of intellectual honesty,
that working hypothesis should be dropped, or as far as possible
eliminated." Sounds very Nietzschean, so far? Where does one go?
Not back, but instead,
our coming of age leads us to a true recognition of our
situation before God. God would have us know that we
must live as men who manage our lives without him. The
God who is with us is the God who forsakes us (Mark
280 D. BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 143-46 (1955).
251 See J. BURTNESS, supra note 210, at 70-71.
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15:34). The God who lets us live in the world without the
working hypothesis of God is the God before whom we
stand continually. Before God and with God we live with-
out God. God lets himself be pushed out of the world
onto the cross. He is weak and powerless in the world,
and that is precisely the way, the only way, in which he is
with us and helps us. Matthew 8:17 makes it quite clear
that Christ helps us, not by virtue of his omnipotence,
but by virtue of his weakness and suffering.
282
Ethical choice, for Bonhoeffer, is a "venture of responsibility. 283
That responsibility means both freedom and obedience:
In responsibility both obedience and freedom are real-
ized. Responsibility implies tension between obedience
and freedom. There would be no more responsibility if
either were made independent of the other. Responsible
action is subject to obligation, and yet it is creative. To
make obedience independent of freedom leads only to the
Kantian ethic of duty, and to make freedom independent
of obedience leads only to the ethic of irresponsible
genius.
284
Bonhoeffer's own "venture of responsibility" took its final form
in the summer of 1939, when he was safely in the United States,
and had received four different job offers through American
friends who wanted him to stay. Fully aware of the implications of
his choice, he decided on June 20, 1939, to return to Germany. The
reason "was simply his readiness to recognize that he now was and
would have to remain a German in full acceptance of guilt and re-
sponsibility. '28 5 As Bonhoeffer later explained in a letter to Rein-
hold Niehbur:
I have made a mistake in coming to America. I must live
through this difficult period of our national history with
the Christian people of Germany. I will have no right to
participate in the reconstruction of Christian life in Ger-
29 D. BONHOEFFER, LETRS AND PAPERS FROM PIsoN 195-96 (1953).
See R LovIN, supra note 210, at 138-39.
1 D. BONHOEFFER, ETHiCS 221 (1955).
E. BETHGE, supra note 204, at 559.
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many after the war if I do not share the trials of this time
with my people .... Christians in Germany will face the
terrible alternative of either willing the defeat of their
nation in order that Christian civilization may survive, or
willing the victory of their nation and thereby destroying
our civilization. I know which of these alternatives I must
choose; but I cannot make that choice in security.2"'
He returned to become an active participant in the secret German
resistance, including the conspiracy to kill Adolf Hitler.2 87 After
the failed attempt in July 1944, when Bonhoeffer had already been
in prison for more than a year, he knew that he faced the certainty
of death.
Bonhoeffer's death is best understood, from his own perspective,
not as the predictable consequence of heroic action against evil,
but as a redemptive act of love. For central to the world view of
Bonhoeffer as theologian and Christian was a God who had become
flesh, taken on the sufferings of his people and in so doing offered
the promise of redemption. Thus, for Bonhoeffer,
[t]o be a Christian does not mean to be religious in a par-
ticular way, to make something of oneself (a sinner, a
penitent, or a saint) on the basis of some method or
other, but to be a man-not a type of man, but the man
that Christ creates in us. It is not the religious act that
makes the Christian, but participation in the sufferings
of God in the secular life.
2 88
Or,
It is evident that the only appropriate conduct of men
before God is the doing of His will. The sermon on the
mount is there for the purpose of being done. Only in
doing can there be submission to the will of God. In do-
ing God's will man renounces every right and every justi-
fication of his own; he delivers himself humbly into the
288 Id. (quoting Bonhoeffer's letter).
287 For a summary of Bonhoeffer's involvement in the "conspiratorial resistance," see E.
BETHGE, supra note 204, at 696-702. For the detail, see id. at 626-696; see also E. ROBERT-
SON, supra note 205, at 156-58, 161, 199-201, 210-13, 218-20, 263-65.
288 D. BONHOEFFER, LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON 198 (1953).
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hands of the merciful judge.28 9
From within this starkly Christian context comes the elemental
message that "our relation to God is a new life in 'existence for
others,' through participation in the being of Jesus. The transcen-
dental is not infinite and unattainable tasks, but the neighbor who
is within reach in any given situation.
' '2 0
In its emphasis on "living" and "doing," along with its refusal to
seek refuge in the transcendent, absolute or categorical as guides
for action, Bonhoeffer's outlook bears ostensible similarity to exis-
tentialism. In fact, both Bonhoeffer and Barth were greatly influ-
enced by Kierkegaard, and both found the modern existential
description of nothingness close to the Christian conception of evil.
The Sartrean social world in which people are constantly objecti-
fying others is, after all, a description of a fallen world, a world
without grace.29' Confronting that nothingness, Barth and
Bonhoeffer both believed in a theology that was also existential
praxis. Their quarrel with Sartre lay in Sartre's continued Enlight-
enment presumption that ego cogito, unaided human agency, could
successfully confront sin. "Real nothingness," Barth says, "mocks"
this "manliness" of spirit.29 2 Speaking as a modern existential per-
"' D. BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 166 (1955).
290 D. BONHOEFFER, LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON 210 (1953). This leads to Bonhoef-
fer's notion of the "church for others," which is basic to his ethical world view.
The Church is the Church only when it exists for others. To make a start, it
should give away all its property to those in need. The clergy must live solely
on the free-will offerings of their congregations, or possibly engage in some
secular calling. The Church must share in the secular problems of ordinary
human life, not dominating, but helping and serving. It must tell men of every
calling what it means to live in Christ, to exist for others. In particular, our
own Church will have to take the field against the vices of hubris, power-wor-
ship, envy, and humbug, as the roots of all evil. It will have to speak of moder-
ation, purity, trust, loyalty, constancy, patience, discipline, humility, content-
ment, and modesty. It must not underestimate the importance of human
example (which has its origin in the humanity of Jesus and is so important in
Paul's teaching); it is not abstract argument, but example, that gives its word
emphasis and power.
Id. at 211. For an excellent and thorough account of Bonhoeffer's theology as developed in
his prison writings, see . BETHGE, supra note 204, at 757-795.
291 See P. RAMSEY, Jean-Paul Sartre: Sex in Being, in NINE MODERN MORALISTS, supra
note 126, at 71-109.
2921 1 Y. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, supra note 220, pL 3, at 346. Similarly, Barth says
sarcastically, "[w]e cannot but admire the virile address and resolution" with which Sartre




Might it not be that in real nothingness I have an adver-
sary who is quite unimpressed by my vaunted sense of
responsibility for myself and mankind... ? Might it not
be that I have to do with a refutation and abolition of the
very existence which I boldly assert to precede all es-
sence? This ... one who refutes and abolishes my exis-
tence, this No which strikes and brackets the Yes with
which I try to overcome it, might well be real nothing-
ness. And Sartre does not have the slightest inkling of it
* .. . [T]he dragon envisaged by him is comparatively
innocuous.... It may be made a subject of literary ele-
gance. It may be continually presented and represented
as a spectacle which affords the public enraptured dread
or dreadful rapture .. . [but] the sickness unto death,
real nothingness, is . . .unknown to him ....
D. Abortion and Natural Law
Had Barth and the real dilemmas of essentialism appeared ear-
lier in the pages of the Natural Law Forum, the stage might have
been set for a more far-reaching debate within the legal commu-
nity about the moral implications of abortion-and, not inciden-
tally, about the relation between the essentialism of classical legal
thought and the anti-essentialism of legal realism. That debate
did, in fact, almost occur. In 1967, John Noonan published in the
Natural Law Forum an early version of his controversial history of
Catholic teaching on abortion.9 4 This was preceded by his brilliant
description of natural law approaches to both usury and contracep-
tion, also published in the Natural Law Forum.290 Noonan's goal,
especially in describing the latter two issues, was less to stake out a
position than to reinsert into legal discourse a particular mode of
tialists." Id. at 339.
I'l Id. at 346-47; see also D. BONHOEFFER, LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON 188-89
(1953).
"1' Noonan, Abortion and the Catholic Church: A Summary History, 12 NAT. LF. 85
(1967) [hereinafter Noonan, Abortion and the Catholic Church].
11' Noonan, Tokos and Atokior: An Examination of Natural Law Reasoning Against
Usury and Against Contraception, 10 NAT. L.F. 215 (1965) [hereinafter Noonan, Tokos and
Atokion].
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analysis, the mode described by d'Entrves.298 Noonan's approach
was subtle and legally sophisticated-a careful mediation between
divine command and the human social condition. Instead of plac-
ing the individual always on the razor-sharp Barthian edge of para-
dox and existential encounter, Noonan provided an explicitly "rea-
soned" approach to ascertaining values and proscribing moral
conduct.
Noonan makes the case for natural law by purposely selecting
the legal history of two of the church's most problematic and con-
troversial prohibitions, those directed at usury and contraception.
He concedes with respect to both that the very concept of "nature"
or "natural" was manipulated rhetorically and adjusted or recon-
structed to suit human conceptions of "function" or "purpose.
' '2
0
He also concedes that the absolute prohibitions initiated in both
cases would and did, in time, yield exceptions in response to
changes in culture, technology or environment.8 8 In short, the ab-
solute was sure to be mediated by the contingent. Nevertheless
Noonan, proceeding in the manner laid out by d'Entreves, names
with passion the underlying values, themselves ordained by divine
command, sought to be realized through the absolute rules: charity
and love for usury;2 9 and dignity and sanctity of life for contracep-
tion. 00 For Noonan, such values are best preserved by prescriptive
moral absolutes rooted in an appeal to nature that invites reasoned
discourse within, and only within, that particularized rhetorical
framework.30 1 Noonan rejects the notion that life itself, in any of
its instances, might be "purposeless, measureless, uncontrollable,
or arbitrary." 02 The best protection against surrender to purpose-
lessness lies in a structure of absolutes as expressive of values, with
exceptions carved out by rational argument; and rational argument
is facilitated by an analysis of the "natural," even though our con-
ception of what is natural may, in any given instance, itself be so-
cially constructed, based on the values or purposes we ascribe to
191 See supra notes 130-72 and accompanying text.
297 See Noonan, Tokos and Atokion, supra note 295, at 224, 229-31.
299 Id. at 224.
299 Id. at 222-23.
300 Id. at 233.
30- Id. at 224-25, 234-35.




Applying the same method to the question of abortion, Noonan
finds obscure theological questions like "ensoulment" to be
equivalent to the basic question of when a person should be
treated as "human. 3 0 4 He describes the value being articulated by
the traditional anti-abortion Church prohibition as "a refusal to
discriminate among human beings on the basis of their varying po-
tentialities. ' 30 5 Attempts to limit humanity by denying the status
"human" to any creature conceived by humans parallels other
forms of invidious exclusion. The fact, for example, that we may
not "think of" a month-old embryo as human should not be deci-
sive; social groups have all too often been known not to "think of"
some sub-group (for instance, a particular race) as being quite
human.306
In defending the line between conception and preconception,
Noonan carefully argues from nature and probabilities. He con-
cedes that the formation of life is a continuous process, without
sharp, absolute dividing lines. Nevertheless, as between conceptus
and sperm or egg, the line is rationally defensible because only
twenty percent of fertilized eggs will spontaneously abort, whereas
each spermatozoa must compete with 200,000,000 others to fertil-
ize an egg.30 7 Noonan rejects a distinction based on physical viabil-
ity or nonviablity as too variable and arbitrary given the facts of
nature, especially, for example, the fact that infants remain "de-
pendent" well after birth and that some can survive with artificial
incubation earlier than others.303
The reasoning technique he is illustrating proceeds, then, from a
particularized legal history during which rules are developed, not
always with absolute consistency or uniformity. He then moves to
an elucidation of the values those rules were instituted to protect,
and he states a uniform rule-category designed to give effect to
that value (no taking of life after conception). Finally, alternative
formulations are carefully considered by reference both to the
value being discussed and to the facts of natural life.
303 Id.
30, Noonan, Abortion and the Catholic Church, supra note 294, at 125.
3o5 Id. at 126.
306 Id. at 128-29.
307 Id. at 129.
308 Id. at 126.
1014 [Vol. 25:923
THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE
On the complex question of preference for the mother's life over
the fetus, in cases of conflict, he describes the traditional direct/
indirect distinction. That distinction allowed for a cancerous
uterus, for example, to be removed from a pregnant mother even if
removal resulted in the death of a fetus. The doctor's purpose in
such a case was not to kill the fetus; rather, the purpose was to
remove the cancerous organ, the death of the fetus being only an
unintended, indirect consequence."0 9 That exception does not de-
stroy the validity of the general rule, Noonan claims. The excep-
tion was limited to cases of ectopic pregnancies and cancerous
uteruses, so that the widest protection possible for fetal life was
still retained.310 No rule can be absolute-values must be weighed,
even the value of innocent life, and the direct/indirect casuist ex-
ception is just a spatial metaphor for the careful weighing of values
which constitutes the work of rational moral analysis.3 11 The value
that ultimately animates this abstract moral analysis, Noonan says,
is the scriptural command to "love your neighbor as yourself, 312
which means that the fetus must be treated as having full value as
a human life, even in this process that is concededly one of
weighing.
313
In another, wholly different context, Noonan had similarly ob-
served in the Forum that human life was not an absolute.31 4 Ob-
jecting to H.L.A. Hart's view that one could find "survival" a suffi-
cient basis for the moral content of a legal order, he observed that
individual survival alone can never be an absolute value, noting
not only the sacrifice of soldiers in war but also the
ordinary laws of domestic society [which] normally are
cast on the assumption that individual lives are not our
highest value. The whole of automobile tort law rests on
the foundation that.., one does not have a primary obli-
gation not to use a car; compensation for lives taken is
309 Id. at 121-125. There was vigorous debate even about such a limited exception and
about whether "intention" was really a proper basis for distinction. Id.
310 Id. at 124-25.
I"1 But see George, Human Flourishing as a Criterion of Morality: A Critique of Perry's
Naturalism, 63 Tui. L REv. 1455, 1464-74 (1989).
3" Noonan, Abortion and the Catholic Church, supra note 294, at 131.
313 Id. at 130-31.




preferred to banning of vehicles which assure the exis-
tence of other values more highly prized by the society. 15
Noonan is too sophisticated, in other words, to argue that we do
not weigh values other than life (the facilitation of transportation,
for instance) against the value even of life itself; nor does he, to his
credit, retreat behind the casuistry of direct/indirect to evade re-
sponsibility for the taking of human life. Why, then, is the objecti-
fication and depersonalization that takes place whenever one does
a statistical analysis to justify killing for the sake of traffic speed a
lesser wrong than the depersonalization of the fetus?
Challenging Noonan's moral assumptions, John O'Connor, a phi-
losopher from Case Western Reserve, wrote a response in the Nat-
ural Law Forum disputing Noonan's insistence that humanity is
an attribute that must be acquired at some definite time. 10 This
assumption, O'Connor argues, tilted Noonan's analysis of alterna-
tives unduly toward the uniform rule of "human being at concep-
tion.'3 17 O'Connor emphasizes the relativist point that an attribute
is a function of social decisionmaking 18 (a point which Noonan
had been too sophisticated to try to deny, but had not exactly
highlighted either). In fact, in an earlier Forum article Margaret
Mead had pointed out that while all societies develop criteria for
determining humanity, the criteria are quite various-sometimes
infants are not included, so that infanticide is allowed. 19 O'Connor
reads Noonan as assuming that, even if the attribute "humanity"
is a function of social decisionmaking, not a quality "in" a person,
there are some criteria which are objectively better than others,
even objectively "right" or "wrong," for defining the category.$2 0
O'Connor sees no such objective baseline. The correct criteria
can never be "discovered," he says, but are themselves a function
of social decisionmaking. For that reason one can look only to the
moral assumptions of the particular culture. In modern societies it
would be considered reprehensible to kill a baby, and quite possi-
31 Id. at 175.
310 O'Connor, On Humanity and Abortion, 13 NAT. L.F. 127 (1968).
317 Id. at 130-31.
"18 Id. at 131.
319 Mead, Some Anthropological Considerations Concerning Natural Law, 6 NAT. L.F. 51,
52 (1961).
313 O'Connor, supra note 316, at 131.
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bly a seven-month fetus, but probably not reprehensible to kill a
two-month fetus-or a tree. Such views can change, however, de-
pending upon whether people respond to the fetus (or tree) as a
creature very like themselves. All societies draw a circle of "alike"
somewhere, including some, excluding others. They may change
the degree of inclusiveness based on new information or percep-
tion, but they cannot "discover" the proper placement of the circle,
the boundary that defines the category; they can only decide where
to draw it.-
21
The realist challenge to classical legal conceptualism was, of
course, once again playing itself out. As Noonan conceded in his
reply to O'Connor:322 "After all, one of the principal insights of
modern jurisprudence has been that judges do not 'discover' the
law. I have always supposed that there was an analogous insight to
be followed in moral discourse."'3 23 Unlike classical conceptualism,
however, Noonan's natural law approach was more explicitly and
honestly rooted in moral values, which he seriously sought to artic-
ulate in a final reference to divine injunction-the obligation to
love thy neighbor.3 24 Without that reference, Noonan's categories
had no moral content, despite the supposed rationality and objec-
tivity of his methodology.
The realists, like Protestants and O'Connor, were impatient with
fixed categories and eager to sweep them away and to demand di-
rect confrontation between the concrete situation and the moral
requirement. The content of the moral requirement in law, how-
ever, had never been articulated: there had been no realist version
of the gospel. With Naziism in the past and abortion on the moral/
legal agenda, Noonan had no confidence that legal realism as mere
negation could provide moral guidance. To deconstruct the cate-
gory "humanity," to treat it as having no objective content whatso-
ever, as just a function of cultural decisionmaking, meant a world
of complete moral relativism. Noonan argued that before claiming,
as did O'Connor, that we can only look to the "feelings" of people
in a given culture for our membership criteria, we need to recall
that "[i]f feelings are the key, many slave owners have felt it per-
32 Id. at 131-33.
312 Noonan, Deciding Who Is Human, 13 NAT. LF. 134 (1968).
3" Id. at 137.
-' Noonan, Abortion and the Catholic Church, supra note 294, at 131.
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fectly moral to abuse and even kill their slaves ... many Nazis felt
no twinge of guilt in exterminating Jews and Poles whom they be-
lieved not to belong to the human species .... 6325 Noonan ends
with the explicit comparison of fetuses to Jews: "The embryo, too,
if he could speak, might say like Shylock, 'If you prick us, do we
not bleed?' "326
Noonan's arguments against abortion, especially his earlier ones,
deserve to be taken seriously by liberals, precisely because they
raise the problem with which the Natural Law Forum had begun
its mission: to articulate a legal methodology which would provide
a hedge against totalitarianism, whose worst aspect was the treat-
ment of people as expendable objects. Noonan was too sophisti-
cated to suggest a return to simple classicism in legal thought, and
he was more honest even than d'Entr~ves in frankly acknowledging
that inevitably the source of moral value in Western culture, in-
cluding legal culture, has been religion. His method was a delicate
interweaving of category as premised on value, rational argument
about distinctions based on the objective realities of the natural
world, and calculated exceptions based on the values that gave rise
to the initial category, along with careful consideration of compet-
ing values. Legal argument has not offered a more well-considered
methodology.
Nor did Noonan dodge moral responsibility for the exceptions he
acknowledged, in the way legalist casuistry often seems to al-
low-as if a killing is less a killing when it is labeled "indirect." He
was willing to use the word "balance" instead-but only with the
pretense that nothing could be allowed to outweigh an individual
life except another individual life. That pretense is utterly wrong,
as Noonan knows perfectly well from torts-from his own automo-
bile example. Facilitation of traffic speed routinely outweighs
human life in our society, as do many other "values." As his analy-
sis of Palsgra27 shows, Noonan is morally troubled by that real-
321 Noonan, Deciding Who Is Human, supra note 322, at 138.
320 Id. at 140.
327 J. NooNAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 111 (1976) (analyzing Palsgraf v. Long
Island RR, 248 N.Y. 839, 162 N.E. 99 (1928)). The essay is an elegant depiction of the
process by which the legal system depersonalizes the plaintiff in the famous Palsgra/ case.
Noonan also describes the number of deaths and injuries which occurred each year from the
operation of the ralroads-a statistically necessary sacrifice if the railroads were to keep
running. Id. at 129-30.
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ity, and by his accurate perception that we have not developed,
culturally, a moral vocabulary with which to deal with it. Yet it
cannot be dealt with by the creation of pseudo-categories of abso-
lute protection ("uniform" protection, to be more true to Noonan).
It almost seems that Noonan, a person of very real moral sensibil-
ity, seeks to avoid the troubling moral reality he sees around him
by building a wall of special protectiveness around the fetus. Femi-
nists, of course, are not surprised that women are expected to bear
the burden of his need for the comforting category. Yet what does
our culture have to offer in its place?
The answer, at least in terms of acceptable public discourse, was
rapidly becoming other than traditional and religiously rooted mo-
rality. This was surely evident by the late 1960s. Abortion, which
had in the 1950s been regarded by dominant cultural norm as mor-
ally reprehensible (despite a reality of hypocritical practice) would
by the 1970s, despite a sizeable minority of holdouts, be officially
assimilated to the generality of "scientific," "medical" decisions
and assigned to an autonomy whose subjectivity was to be insu-
lated from public moral rebuke.
I. SCHISM AND SEPARATION: RELIGION AND MORALITY IN THE
1960s
The emphasis of Part H was largely intellectual and theoretical,
exploring the traditional modes of moral inquiry that offer alterna-
tives to the various versions of secular autonomous individualism
to which we have become accustomed. But there is an inevitable
gap between the6retical moral discourse and its translation into
the lives of people who are making both individual and social
moral decisions. In Part HI our emphasis switches somewhat, from
philosophy, theology and intellectual history to sociology, and so-
cial and institutional history.
For Americans, the key institutional setting for realization of
public moral values has been their churches (we use "church" ge-
nerically to describe more or less institutionalized religion).
Churches have served as "mediating structures 32 between the
11 On churches as "mediating structures," see P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS. To Ewo ER
PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBuC POLICY 1-8, 26-34 (1977); Wo-gaman,
The Church as Mediating Institution: Theological and Philosophical Perspective and The
Church as Mediating Institution" Contemporary American Challenge, in D4oc,"ny AND
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privatized self and the public realm of government. The late 1960s,
in particular, marked a seeming triumph of secular liberal morality
with a concomitant repudiation of religious tradition, and thereby
of mainline churches in their role as mediating structures. How
that triumph of secular morality occurred, and why it was no more
than "seeming," is the subject of Part III. Inevitably, Roe v. Wade
was taken to be a powerful symbol of that triumph-not because it
allowed for moral compromise on the abortion issue, but rather be-
cause its "rights" formulation of the issue effectively secularized it,
rendering moral/religious debate irrelevant for purposes of public
policy.
A. Background: Post-War Dilemmas
The post-War period had been one of both optimism and aridity
in denominational religion. On the optimistic side, American
churches thrived in terms of numbers and finances, and many her-
alded a religious revival. During this period of economic prosperity,
contributions to churches grew at a pace even greater than con-
sumption expenditures generally;32 church construction, long
delayed by the depression and war, expanded dramatically and the
number of seminary students doubled by 1950.330 Shortly after the
War, ninety-four percent of Americans believed in God,331 and for
most this belief was not simply a matter of personal piety, but was
linked to association with a church as a social institution.2
Churches, in turn, were assumed to have an easy "taken-for-
granted" alliance with the state,333 an alliance which transcended
denominational boundaries. While anti-Catholicism and anti-Semi-
tism lingered among Protestants, whose values still dominated the
culture, all three major faiths saw themselves as transmitters of
values that were simultaneously "religious" and self-consciously
"American."
On the other hand, as Will Herberg argued in his much-dis-
MEDIATING STRUCTURES: A THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY 69-105 (1980).
329 See R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 26 (noting that church contributions increased by
64% while personal consumption increased by only 50%).
330 Id. at 36.
33 Id. at 17.
"'s Id. at 15. In 1946, 66% of Americans attended services at least once a month, and 42%
attended every week. Id. at 16.
3 Id. at 66.
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cussed book of 1955, Protestant-Catholic-Jew, to be Catholic,
Protestant or Jewish had become little more than "alternative
ways to be American."""s While sociologist Talcott Parsons saw a
unified American religion as functioning positively, to provide an
integrating value system, 35 Herberg's depiction of its shallow com-
placency rang true for many. Subsequent books, like Peter Berger's
The Noise of Solemn Assemblies 31 and Gibson Winter's The Sub-
urban Captivity of the Churches337 raised similar complaints:
churches seemed content to supply a cosmetic window dressing to
the American way of life, without nerve or spirit to do more than
"baptize all that was wrong with society."338 Well-publicized events
during the Eisenhower years symbolized what was worst about a
religion that had become only bland Americanism: the post-war re-
ligious revival ushered in a time of " 'piety on the Potomac,' of
presidential prayer breakfasts, Billy Graham's 'engineering of mass
consent,' Norman Vincent Peale's 'Let the churches stand up for
capitalism,' Msgr. Fulton J. Sheen's equation of Christianity with
Americanism," and the aligning of Christianity with the anti-com-
munist crusades of the McCarthy period.339
33, W. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEw 274 (1955). See McLoughlin, Is There a
Third Force in Christendom?, in RELIGION IN AhlsucA 47-48 (1968).
1 See M. HUGHEY. CIVIL RELIGION AND MORAL ORDER THEORTICAL AND HSToIcAL
DnMNSIONS 143 (1983). "Parsons echo[ed] Herberg ... in arguing that the Three dominant
'faiths' of American society ...have come to be integrated into a single socio-religious
system [and that] ... the basic value pattern common to all three faiths has been at least
partially institutionalized at a higher level of generality." Id. (quoting Parsons, Introduction
to Max Weber, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION (1964)). The core value matrix was the Prot-
estant one of responsibility for positive action in the world, the instrumental activism of
ascetic Protestantism. Hughey's book explores the extent to which this was always the value
system of some in American life (largely the successful WASPs of Main Street America and
also of Parsons himself), but not others. See, for example, his critique of Warner's more
celebratory sociological description of the Memorial Day Parade in Newburyport. Id. at 109-
23.
3 P. BERGER, THE NOISE OF SOLEMN ASSEMBLIES (1961).
-7 G. WINTER, THE SUBURBAN CAPTIVITY OF THE CHURCHES: AN ANALYSIS OF PRoTEsTAr
REsPONsmILrrY IN THE EXPANDING METROPOLIS (1962).
33 See Sweet, The 1960's: The Crises of Liberal Christianity and the Public Emergence
of Evangelism, in EVANGELICALISM AND MODERN AbwRucA 36 (1984).
39 This vividly assembled list is taken from McLoughlin, How is America Religious?," in
RELIGION IN AMERICA, at ix (1968).
With respect to Billy Graham, his seeming blandness was deceptive, however, the same
Graham who lined his platforms with celebrities, and was even scorned by his mentors for
selling out to popularity, liberalism and compromise, believed as fervently as one could in
an errorless Bible, the Virgin Birth of Jesus, His death and resurrection and the Second
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The 1950s, in other words, represented the taming effect that
America's "toleration" but "separation" model of church/state re-
lations can have on American religion, as described by Gary Wills:
Thus is religion trapped, frozen, in its perpetual de facto
accommodation of power. It becomes a social ornament
and buttress, not changing men's lives, only blessing
them; not telling men to do this or omit that, just con-
gratulating them for whatever they do or do not do. Reli-
gion is invited in on sufferance, to praise our country, our
rulers, our past and present, our goals and pretensions,
under the polite fiction of praying for them all. The di-
vine is subordinated to the human-God serves Caesar.
This is what Americans quaintly call "freedom of reli-
gion," and what the bible calls idolatry.3 40
In fact, however, beneath this public veneer of shallow compla-
cency were both real institutional strengths and complex inner di-
lemmas. The War had been a chastening experience for American
religious leaders: neither religious traditionalism, with its emphasis
on sin, nor the particular experience of Naziism provided grounds
for complacency, and most religious discourse was in fact a mixture
of optimism and apprehension,3 4 1 of promise and peril. 2 Jews se-
riously struggled to find the right mix between despair (the Holo-
caust) and optimism (Israel);343 so, too, Christians urged a "sober
serenity"34 4 in a discourse that linked "threat" with "opportu-
nity. 3 4 5 If this reflected some measure of self-importance, 346 it also
Coming. The lesson to be learned from Graham was skillful packaging. See M. MARTY, PIL-
GRIMS IN THEIR OWN LAND: 500 YEARS OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 410-14 (1984). See also, on
Graham's "sophistication," "obvious sincerity, his charismatic appeal, and his adroit sales-
manship," McLoughlin, Is There a Third Force in Christendom? in RELIGION IN AMERICA,
supra, at 45, 60-61.
340 G. WILLS, BARE RUINED CHOIRS: DOUBT, PROPHECY, AND RADICAL RELIGION 260 (1972)
[hereinafter G. WILLS. BARE RUINED CHOIRS]. Paradoxically, G. WILLS, UNDER GOD' RELIGION
AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1990) [hereinafter G. WILLS, UNDER GOD], celebrates both the vital-
ity of religion in American public life and the way in which the tradition of separation
contributes to that vitality.
341 R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 44.
342 Id. at 46.
313 Id. at 48.
"I Id. at 49.
314 Id. at 50.
340 These themes resonate with religious discourse at the turn of the century, when reli-
1022 [Vol. 25:923
THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE
represented a positive sense of social responsibility. Most secular
leaders, along with sociologists like Parsons, saw a decent society
as dependent upon sound, broadly based cultural values, with reli-
gion providing both the capstone347 and the crucial mediating
structures348 within which those values could be nurtured in a plu-
ralist democracy.
Many clergy were willing to carry out that responsibility even
while carefully distinguishing any single worldly social or political
accomplishment (including American culture) from divine will.
Thus, both liberal Protestants and fundamentalists warned against
the tendency to equate particular institutions (even the church)
with the true Zion "which cannot be located in any part of
earth.349 If the churches were critical of communist totalitarian-
ism, many clergy in the 1950s were also critical of America's over-
celebration of material well-being; some recognized that possession
and pleasure, when taken as the embodiment of the ultimate good,
were, no less than totalitarianism, a form of idolatry.5 0 The King-
dom of God, after all, existed over and against any concrete
manifestation.351
Most church leaders, however, did not question the universality
of the basic "values" they taught from the pulpit. They did not see
values as relative, as socially constructed or as a function of power,
but rather as self-evidently applicable to the whole culture. This
was apparently no less so for Protestants than for Catholics,52 who
could in theory draw more confidently on natural law for their tra-
dition of universal values. Nor did they question the direct rela-
tionship between good individual values and a decent society. Al-
though there was some expansion of social service programs, the
basic religious assumption was that if clergy did their job at the
local level, instilling sound (internal) values, then overall (external)
social decency would prevail.353 Later, the intractability of racism
gious leaders were describing their social role in relation to impending class warfare. See
Mensch, supra note 158, at 533.
1,7 See R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 58-60, 66-67. This was, of course, also the assump-
tion of legal academics who also turned to religion after the War.
348 See supra note 328.
.R WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 53.
350 Id. at 52.
3151 Id. at 50.




in American society would challenge that naive assumption, but
clergy during the post-War period were simply reflecting the view
then dominating secular thought as well-for example, in Gunnar
Myrdal's assumption that racism was basically a problem of atti-
tude, a gap between America's core creed and its behavior which
could be remedied by correcting the attitudes of white
Americans. 54
Two other dilemmas, both of which would play a key role in the
unfolding abortion debate, were already closer to the surface of
American religious consciousness in the post-War period: the un-
settled role of women and the paradoxical character of religious
pluralism.
Based on our experience, secular liberal pro-choice advocates
tend to perceive religion as a monolithic "other" that exists over
and against the lives of women in America, as an oppressive force
to be held at bay by the powers of legalistic, secular neutrality. It
is as if "religion" and "women" were seperate categories, with reli-
gion representing either all men or some vague notion of "societal"
domination. These perceptions, or assumptions, are flatly contra-
dicted by historical and contemporary American experiential
reality.
Religion is not only of paramount significance to the lives of
many, if not most, American women, but there is also a long and
continuing record of active involvement of women in churches,
probably more than in any other American institution. This is not
to suggest a clear record of progress toward equality; many strug-
gles continue. What is clear, however, is the variousness of
women's experience with religion, and a continuing commitment,
evidenced by the sheer numerosity of participation in church life,
to personal fulfillment through religious experience.
Female church membership in America has always exceeded
male membership; in the nineteenth century, women comprised
31' G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(1944). See Freeman, Racism, Rights, and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Criti-
cal Legal Essay, 23 H~Av. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295, 349-50 (1988). According to David South-
ern, close acquaintances of Myrdal could not talk him out of "his optimistic perception of
social reform propelled by the 'American Creed.'.. . Myrdal asserted that if the discrepancy
between the creed and the deed were exposed, it would die like a germ in powerful sun-
light." D. SOUTHERN, GUNNER MYRDAL AND BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
An American Dilemma, 1944-1969, at 32-34 (1987).
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twb-thirds to three-fourths of the members of Protestant denomi-
nations. While that gap has narrowed, women have consistently re-
tained their numerical majority."" Given the cultural link between
religion and family values, the proper role of women in the church
has tended to be a charged issue for men, especially given the as-
sumption that churches function to safeguard the values of the na-
tion.3 56 At the same time, women within the churches have often
created important and empowering roles for themselves.
The relation of women to their churches has varied according to
faith and according to their experience of the dominant American
culture. Jewish immigrant women, for example, often initially
found American society less restrictive than the Jewish traditional-
ism of their native cultures. That experience led some to reject
their Judaism altogether and to embrace a secularized version of
American culture. This tendency was often encouraged by the pub-
lic schools and the press, where Jewish attitudes toward women
were ridiculed. In effect, "America offered [Jewish] women oppor-
tunities for self-fulfillment clothed in anti-Semitism."3 7 Jewish
women played key roles in social work, labor and socialist move-
ments, even while being denied a full religious institutional role.
Later, with the growth of Conservative and Reform Judaism, Jew-
ish women demanded a greater level of participation in the syna-
gogue as well.358
Almost the reverse process can be found in the various branches
of evangelical, holiness and pentecostal traditions. There, the em-
phasis on personal conversion and lay involvement created an early
thrust in the direction of male/female equality, even in the
home.3 59 Male evangelical church leaders before the -turn of the
century were speaking in favor of a female public ministry. In the
Moody Bible Institute, for example, which grew out of the work of
Emma Dryer's School of Bible Work (established in 1873), women
u5 Bendroth, The Search for "Women's Role" in American Evangelicalism, 1930-1930, in
EVANGELICALISM AND MODERN AmERICA 123 (1984).
3" See W. RooF AND ,V. McKINNEY, supra note 26, at 205.
"7 Braude, Jewish Women in the Twentieth Century: Building a Life in America, in
WOMEN AND RELIGIoN, supra note 90, at 135.
3" See id. at 137-40.
"' Scanzoni & Setta, Women in Evangelical, Holiness, and Pentacostal Traditions, in
WOMEN AND RELIGION, supra note 90, at 226.
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generally worked with men as full equals, 80 and women were often
extraordinarily effective as evangelical preachers38 1 even at a time
when female ordination was unheard of in the mainline churches.
Some men, of course, were ambivalent about this egalitarianism,
which was never wholly without restrictions, but the real turn to-
ward entrenched male hierarchy did not occur until the World War
II era. In part that turn was due to evangelicalism's move into the
mainstream of American culture. The "professionalization" of the
ministry, along with the "bureaucratization" and concern with ev-
angelical "respectability" within general ecclesiastical circles, led
evangelicals to the adoption of the male-dominated forms that
characterized the mainstream churches.
362
Later, with a growing penchant for order in the face of modern
social instability, feared even as early as the 1950s (mounting di-
vorce rates, juvenile delinquency and consumerist hedonism),
many evangelicals, starting with the influential and conservative
Missouri Synod Lutherans, adopted a rigid form of male hierarchy
based on the old "orders of creation" doctrine.36 3 This doctrine was
imported from Germany through a translation of Fritz Zerbst's
The Office of Women in the Church.6 Evangelical publishing
houses began widely distributing marriage advice that made em-
phatic use of the doctrine-that because women were created after
men, they ranked below men in a divinely ordained hierarchy, a
hierarchy that reached back before the fall and was therefore
neither of human origin nor transformed by Christ. "As long as...
men are men and women are women, then women are to be subject
to their husbands as unto the head. 3 65 The doctrine mandated fe-
male subordination in both church and family life. Nevertheless,
360 Id. at 227.
3"1 Id. at 224-25, 227. Scanzoni and Setta describe, for example, Lena Shoffner preaching
in Alabama on a text from Ephesians. "For he is our peace, who hath made one, and hath
broken down the middle wall of partition." Ephesians 2:14. At the time blacks and whites in
the congregation were separated by a thick rope. As Shoffner preached on the evil of segre-
gation in a Christian community, the congregation broke down the rope and "women and
men of both races wept and prayed together." Scanzoni & Setta, supra note 359, at 225.
363 Id. at 233.
... Id. at 233-34; cf. Bendroth, supra note 355, at 133-34. As Bendroth notes, the question
is far from resolved within evangelicalism.
F. ZERBST, THE OFFICE OF WOMEN IN THE CHURCH (1955).
360 Bendroth, supra note 355, at 132 (quoting RYRa, THE PLACE OF WOMEN IN TE
CHURCH 68 (1968)).
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some evangelical women powerfully resisted that move, drawing in
part on modern feminism but also on the egalitarianism which has
always been part of the evangelical spirit.366
While more women have become involved in the ecclesiastical
structures of traditional mainstream American Protestantism than
in any other institution in America,' 6 women were, for the most
part, traditionally excluded from the major demoniations' church
hierarchies. As Frances Willard said in 1892, the men "keep the
dimes and distinctions to themselves" and expect women to be
mere "hewers of wood and drawers of water."368 As a result, many
women chose to form independent societies for missionary, relief
and evangelical work.369 These were extraordinarily spirited and
successful groups. Especially in the more liberal northern churches,
separatist societies were pragmatically accepted by churchmen de-
spite qualms about a woman's more proper "auxiliary" role in the
church structure.37 0 Perhaps the most powerful model for a separa-
tist female organization within American Protestantism was the in-
dependent Women's Auxiliary of The National Baptist Conven-
tion, the largest black denomination. Formed in 1900 under the
leadership of Nannie Burroughs, an outspoken feminist and advo-
cate for black Americans, the group insisted on retaining its inde-
pendent status despite much male pressure, and became an impor-
tant source of strength for black Baptists and Protestant women
generaly.371 In particular, the Women's Auxiliary operated as a
counterweight to the restrictive, wooden role many conservative
white Southern Baptists began to carve out for women. 72
In contrast to the Nannie Burroughs model, during the 1920s
many of the most vigorous leaders of separatist women's societies
3 See Zikmund, Winning Ordination for Women in Mainstream Protestant Churches,
in WomEN AND RELIGION, supra note 90, at 368-70.
11 Keller, Patterns of Laywomen's Leadership in Twentieth-Century Protestantism, in
WOMEN AND REUGION, supra note 90, at 266.
I Bendroth, supra note 355, at 124 (quoting Frances Willard's 1892 annual speech to
National W.C.T.U. Convention).
I" For a thorough history, see B. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS or DoMEScrIT WoMEN. EvAN-
GELISM, AND TEMPERANCE 1 NINETEENTH-CENTURY AmERICA (1981).
3 Bendroth, supra note 355, at 124-25.
I'l See Dodson & Gilkes, Something Within: Social Change and Collective Endurance in
the Sacred World of Black Christian Women, in WoMEN AND RIGIO10, supra note 90, at
88; see also Bendroth, supra note 355, at 129.
-11 Bendroth, supra note 355, at 130.
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became, as it were, victims of their own success. Usually under
considerable pressure from men, they began to merge with the gen-
eral denominational church structures, receiving in return, at least
in theory, a greater role in church governing bodies. Belle Bennett
of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, for example, presided
over two strong and autonomous women's Methodist missionary
societies. In 1906 she was pressured to allow these societies to fall
under the direct jurisdiction of the General Conference, to be gov-
erned by a general missionary board on which women would then
have one-third representation. She then effectively used her posi-
tion to battle for laity rights for women in the general legislative
body of the church as well, linking grass-roots organizing for
women's Methodist laity rights to women's suffrage generally. In
that process, however, she sacrificed the autonomy that had come
with separatism.7
Similar developments took place within other denominations
with respect to women's laity rights, often following merger of orig-
inally separatist organizations. It was only after women had gained
significant power as laity that progress was made toward female
ordination, and that progress came slowly; Presbyterians, for ex-
ample, ordained female elders in the 1920s, but women did not for-
mally achieve full equal status until the 1950s.3
7 4
The abandonment of separatist societies and the move toward
merger did gradually lead toward greater female equality within
the denominational structures. Nevertheless, that move came at a
cost, especially apparent in the post-War period and still in evi-
dence when the abortion debate unfolded. Women were often ef-
fectively excluded from leadership roles in organizations tradition-
ally dominated by men. Most churchwomen in that period were
not seeking ordination, and by the 1960s the number of women
373 Keller, supra note 367, at 269-70. Bennett knew she had compromised female auton-
omy in accepting the merger. One-third was better than no representation, but it still meant
subordination.
374 See Zikmund, supra note 366, at 347. For a summary of progress in the various main-
stream denominations, see id. at 340-48. The Catholic Church has, of course, continued to
insist on ordination for celibate males only. For a dissenting view, see G. WILLS, BARE Ru-
INED CHOIRS, supra note 340, at 329-37. For a good historical overview of the roles of Catho-
lic women, both in religious orders in the service of education and health care, and as lay
social activists, epitomized by Dorothy Day and her Catholic Worker movement, which
found in the preaching of the Gospel an alternative to atheistic socialism, see Getz, Women
Struggle for an American Catholic Identity, in WOMEN AND RLIGION, supra note 90, at 176.
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ministers, always small, was actually declining. Female ordination
removed a powerful symbol of inequality, but left most women
within the laity adrift in a still male-directed structure; and impor-
tant church groups, no longer distinctly female, lost much of their
old zeal and sense of direction. Nevertheless, the push for female
ordination did not abate, finding gradual lay acceptance in many
denominations, to the point where by 1980 the percentage of
women in the American clergy would be slightly higher than their
representation in either law or medicine.
375
The second dilemma, which highlights the paradoxical character
of religious pluralism, is that of religious versus scientific "truth,"
and, ultimately, of religious versus secular morality. As religions, in
the name of unity, seek to minimize their sectarian and doctrinal
differences, as they did during the 1950s, they inevitably yield on
the sureness and certainty of their particular beliefs. Unity suc-
ceeds, paradoxically, by reaffirming pluralism; each religious de-
nomination gets to choose particular beliefs or doctrines or prac-
tices, but only in the manner of consumer preference, never as
"truth." Each religion becomes a fungible package of belief, availa-
ble for "religious choice" under the common umbrella of
"America's faith." Paradoxically, religion, in the ironic name of
unity, becomes nothing more than a personal preference to be
freely selected, like one's favorite color or bird, and ceases to serve
as a persuasive and constitutive source of truth.
As religions, in their zeal not to offend one another, minimize
their claims to truth and allow religious faith to be reduced to a
matter of personal preference, or mere "emotion," they facilitate
their own surrender to physical, and then, social science, as the
only acceptable modern sources of objective truth, accompanied by
an ethical relativism that hears moral assertions as nothing more
than expressions of emotionM6 To those for whom religion is the
basis of a coherent, integrated life, this surrender represents a sel-
lout. The result is an ever-widening gap between religion and sci-
ence, between the religious and the secular. Efforts to celebrate
pluralism as unity masked these underlying differences for a time,
and may have contributed to the consciousness that saw Roe v.
Wade as mandated by triumphant secularism.
3H I. WurTHNOw, supra note 21, at 226-28.
37' See A. MAcINTYRE, supra note 1, at 11-14, 16-35.
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Put somewhat differently, the centripetal move toward unity in
American religion, which was especially strong in the Americanism
of the 1950s, inevitably produces a centrifugal counterforce, oper-
ating simultaneously at institutional, epistemological and norma-
tive levels. Efforts to hail a new religious unity obscured this di-
lemma for a time, creating the impression of a core, conventional
American denominationalism that could mediate the conflict be-
tween religious freedom and moral authority. In the late 1960s that
inherently unstable denominational center broke asunder. By the
1970s a secular celebration of fragmented lifestyle "freedom"
stared, as if across any empty chasm, at a resurgence of religious
particularism which was both utterly alien to it, yet also its own
mirror image.
During the post-War period, the move toward a unified religious
spirit was surprisingly successful. There was much talk about end-
ing petty denominational and interfaith rivalries. Within Protes-
tantism, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. donated more than one million
dollars to promote the ecumenical spirit of The World Council of
Churches,377 a kind of religious United Nations, and was a strong
force behind The National Council of Churches-which in 1950
opened under a banner with 10-foot letters proclaiming "This Na-
tion Under God" and which included Dean Acheson and Harry
Truman as scheduled speakers. 8
Evangelicals seeking mainstream acceptance and influence were
determined to put old controversies behind them for the sake of
theological unity.3 7 9 In 1943 the National Association of Evangeli-
cals (NAE) was formed, not for the purpose of challenging the ma-
jor denominations, but rather to promote cooperation. The NAE
encouraged continued activity in the mainstream churches,3 80 up-
to-date scholarship, north-south unity and a constructive approach
to social ethics. For example, Carl Henry, an influential evangelical
' R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 15.
's Id. at 81-82. Dean Acheson and President Truman were unable to speak at the open-
ing due to a snowstorm that day. Id.
... Id. at 140-41. The older strict fundamentalism was viewed as lacking in "brotherli-
ness." Id. at 173.
"o Such churches, however, were still sometimes viewed as too "bureaucratic" and too
given to emphasizing "science, literature, and philsophy, rather than salvation." Id. at 176
(quoting New York lawyer who was active in these evangelical movements). On the NAE,
see also M MARTY. A NATION OF BEHAVERS 86-88 (1976).
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writer and leader, said evangelicals should cooperate with other
groups in opposing war and racial injustice.381 Interdenominational
colleges and seminaries, like Wheaton and Fuller, encouraged so-
phisticated theology and a concern with social ethics, not just a
literalist counting of the Biblical days of prophesy;38 2 and evangeli-
cal groups-centered in northern cities as well as the rural south
and midwest-created important ties to business and community
leaders.38 3 While some conservative southern groups, like the Mis-
souri Synod Lutherans, were becoming more restrictive in their
views toward women and critical of "hedonistic" modern culture,""
evangelicals were not generally more conservative than mainstream
churchgoers, and in the 1950s may even have moved somewhat to
the left, rather than right of center,38 5 during a period of quiet but
steady growth.
Meanwhile, mainstream churches generally welcomed the vigor
of evangelical preachers-Billy Graham was, of course, the most
publicized-and agreed that the churches should move in a more
evangelical direction, stressing the individual experience of faith
and redemption. This evangelical emphasis meant rejection of the
older social gospel movement, which had located the fulfillment of
the Kingdom of God too optimistically in liberal progressive polit-
ics;3 88 it was also consistent with the emphasis on sound personal
values as the key to maintaining a decent society. As testament to
the general unanimity on this core centrist theological message,
Carl Henry, a leading evangelical, and William Sloane Coffin, later
notorious for his left/liberal politics, agreed during this period on
the correctness of the Protestant move toward the center.
3 87
This ecumenical spirit within Protestantism did not automati-
cally translate into interfaith tolerance. Paul Blanchard published
American Freedom and Catholic Power in 1949,3 " a book which
raised the specter of a Catholic Church trying to take over the
R. VUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 178.
Id. at 180; see also Marsden, Evangelicals and the Scientific Culture: An Overview, in
RELIGION AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERIcAN INTELLEcTuAL LIFE, supra note 26, at 45-47
[hereinafter Marsden, Evangelicals and the Scientific Culture].
R WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 180.
3" See supra note 363-64 and accompanying text
R WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 185-87.
"' Id. at 56-57, 140-41.
3" Id. at 140-41.
P. BLACHAD, AMERICAN FRREEDoz AND CATHOLIC POWER (1949).
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country; and serious anti-Semitism was often not far from the sur-
face.3 89 Nevertheless, Herberg's tripartite Protestant-Catholic-Jew
did describe at least part of the religious reality. Unity was facili-
tated by the fact that Catholics were entering the mainstream of
American economic and social life-moving toward "average" in
terms of both education and attitude.3 90 As Gary Wills comments,
Paul Blanchard may have described priests as sinister foreign
agents, but the everyday Catholic church of the 1950s was thor-
oughly American-its "spirit more easily aroused by a Father
Coughlin or Senator Joe McCarthy than by papal encyclicals."39'
Indeed, given the combined pressure of no public support for pa-
rochial schools, on the one hand, and Catholic commitment to
Catholic education on the other, parish priests were in large part
fund raisers, a role which demanded practicality and a convivial
relationship with local business leaders.9 2 When Catholics vied
with Protestants over which faith did the best job of instilling
American values, Protestants would base their claim on the trans-
formative power of personal faith, while Catholics would base
theirs on the soundness of a solid Catholic education.3 93 Neither
doubted the appropriateness of the goal, nor did either seriously
doubt that the goal was common to both faiths, despite lingering
suspicions.
This greater ecumenicalism, however, was achieved in part by
distancing church members from their own denominational histo-
ries. Especially within mainstream Protestantism the tendency was
to make only passing references to the past, and then in vague ro-
mantic images drawn from more distant times, or from the Bible,
without specific denominational content. One Presbyterian pastor
explained that dwelling on the past showed a "lack of progress in
spiritual things."39 Thus, distinct religious traditions lost their
power as cultural models. People were less inclined to identify, for
example, with being specifically Methodist or Presbyterian, since
theological and historical differences among denominations were
381 See generally id.; R WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 74-77.
39 Catholics were solidly in the mainstream by 1976. R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 86-
87.
"I G. WILLS, BARE RUINED CHOiRs, supra note 340, at 42.
392 Id. at 24.
11 R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 61.
... Id. at 31.
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treated as only minimally important. Thus, church members were,
so to speak, culturally severed from their past, and left more open
to other cultural influences.39 5
At the same time, however, differences did continue. Despite the
public mainstream stance of basic centrist uniformity, Americans
continued to practice widely different religions. While John D.
Rockefeller, Jr. was, with much fanfare, promoting world ecumeni-
calism, a moderate-sized congregation in Dolly Pond, Tennessee,
routinely opened services with hymns and poison snakes.39 0 Even
by the 1980s four percent of the American population still claimed
to speak in tongues, a fairly exotic religious practice. By way of
comparison, fewer than that number worked for any party or can-
didate in the 1980 election.3 97 America's disestablishment, and the
privatized, personalist "choice" model of religion that was thereby
mandated, created conditions for rich religious diversity, but a di-
versity ultimately disciplined only by consumerist preference.393
395 Id. at 33-34.
3" Id. at 15.
37 K WALD, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1987).
"' Peter Berger has written with special perceptiveness on this subject, employing essen-
tially an antitrust modeL The move from "monopoly" (establishment) to a competitive
"market" in religion creates conditions for a vigorous religious life, which is one reason why
America is more "religious" than Europe. There, the old forms of establishment led to an-
ticlericalism during the enlightment, and a general sapping of religious spirit. The danger of
the competitive model lies in a kind of consumerist "taste" mentality in religion-anything
goes, so long as it sells, and churches will engage in intense efforts to do sucezsful product
differentiation, within a still essentially stabilized, standardized market. See P. Bnosn. TH
SACRED CANOPY 137-48 (1967).
Berger, writing in 1967, was perhaps too pessimistic, or even cynical, in this respect. The
current vitality of American religion is not just an expression of rampant individualism or
consumer preference, but a complex interaction of individual and community, of personal
choice and established tradition. To run the consumer model too far is to assimilate religion
to the range of styles or experiences selected in the marketplace. This is what Lawrence
Friedman does to describe the only form of religion that fits with his "republic of choice,"
with religion as no more than just another expression of personal autonomy and individual
experience. See L FRmDmAN, supra note 20, at 164-69. While there are validating examples,
like the young nurse, Sheila Larson, described in the book Habits of the Heart, who has
fashioned for herself a religion she calls "Sheilaism," (her "own little voice"), the actual
context is more complicated. R. BELLAH, IL MADSEN. W. SuLLivAN, A. SwmLER & S. TxroWN.
HABITS OF THE HEART 219-49 (1985).
While choice and freedom are certainly part of the American religious scene, one must not
lose sight of the distinctive character of religion, as opposed to other objects of choice (cars,
clothes, music, movies and other things), especially insofar as that character represents a
quest for shared meaning that is ultimately at odds with secular autonomous individualism.
On the varieties of flourishing American religious experience in this regard, see G. WisS.
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
The strength of denominationalism had once served as a coun-
terweight to that unchecked freedom of personal choice: as tradi-
tional denominational identity weakened, that counterweight was
lifted. Also lessened was the ability of denominationalism to con-
tain controversy, both theological and cultural. And despite the
general post-War move toward uniformity, unresolved tensions and
potential sources of cleavage remained.
While American religion found new unity in the 1950s by or-
ganizing itself around a conception of shared values, it left open,
most significantly, the nagging question of objective truth-just as
the law left unanswered the realist assault on legal objectivity, pre-
tending the problem away by embracing ethical relativism and a
more flexible and process-oriented jurisprudence.399 The greatest
potential for religious discord lay not in the simple pluralism of
disparate traditions, but rather in the unresolved, underlying chal-
lenge to religious "truth" as objective reality, issued by the ascen-
dant realm of secular "science."
Conventional wisdom tells us that the fundamentalists waged
war on science because science challenged the objectivity of reli-
gious truth; and, in particular, because evolution challenged the
Biblical account of creation. As modern scholars have shown, how-
ever, that history is more complex than once assumed. For most of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in America, Enlighten-
ment science and Christianity were viewed as compatible. The Ref-
ormation had sufficiently severed the old medieval sacral order 00
as to allow for unabashed examination of the natural world, an ex-
amination that was welcomed by Calvinist Puritans and by
UNDER GOD, supra note 340, passim. For a recent journalistic account, which is sensitive to
the problem of consumer orientation, and striking for its placement, see Woodward, A Time
to Seek: With Babes in Arms and Doubts in Mind, A Generation Looks to Religion, NEws-
WEEK, Dec. 17, 1991, at 50.
39 See Mensch, History of Mainstream Legal Thought, supra note 24, at 24-31.
400 See P. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY, supra note 398, at 105-25. The process of secular-
ization could be said to have started with the Old Testament emphasis on an utterly trans-
cendant God whose relationship with human beings is historical, not manifested within nat-
ural forces or located in particular places. Medieval Catholicism was more "sacral" than
Protestantism, which represented a return to a more Biblical faith, but even during the
medieval period, the rivalry of Pope and King represented a refusal to subsume the tempo-
ral world within a single, all-embracing sacral order. The "sacral"/"secular" dichotomy,
while probably useful and on the surface plausible, might also be too slick. See H. Cox, TitE
SECULAR CITY: SECULARIZATION AND URBANIZATION IN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1965) [here-
inafter H. Cox. THE SECULAR CITY]; see also infra note 475 and accompanying text.
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evangelicals in America as heartily as it was by more religiously
skeptical (or indifferent) rationalists. The typical American as-
sumption was that the laws of nature "below," discoverable
through the methods of Baconian science, would support belief in
the existence of a transcendent God "above." This two-tier formu-
lation dominated American thought. At times, of course, the rela-
tion between the details of natural science and religious faith
seemed somewhat attenuated, but a "common way of relating
Christianity to science was the 'doxological': One should emerge
from one's scientific inqulries into nature praising God for the
marvels of His creation."40' 1 Even if some scientists might fail to
express sufficient praise, most Christians were nevertheless firmly
wedded to a scientific culture.
For that reason, Christian, including evangelical, reaction to
Darwin was by no means uniformly negative. Indeed, many of the
most committed Bible-believers had already decided that Genesis
should be reinterpreted in light of modern geological discoveries.
When Origin of the Species appeared, a commonplace view among
biblicists was that the six days of creation represented eons. 2
Thus, initial reaction to Darwin did not break down along lines of
religious conservatism/liberalism, or even lines of evangelical/ra-
tionalist.403 Indeed, the most serious concern voiced by Charles
401 Marsden, Evangelicals and the Scientific Culture, supra note 382, at 32. George
Marsden has been a consistently knowledgeable and insightful interpreter of the fundamen-
talist controversies. See also Marsden, Evangelicals, History, and Modernity, in EVANGELI-
CALISM IN MODERN AMERICA 94-102 (1984).
402 Marsden, Evangelicals and the Scientific Culture, supra note 382, at 34 (citing C.
DARWIn. ON THE OmGIN OF THE SPECIES (London 1859)).
40' "The most formidable American scientific opponent of Darwin was Harvard's Louis
Agassiz, a Unitarian. The most formidable supporter was Agassiz's colleague, Asa Gray, an
evangelical." Id. at 35.
In fact, Gray was something of an animal rights proponent, reading Darwin, who himself
abhored cruelty to animals, as emphasizing our kinship with non-human animals, and
thereby extending our ethical community:.
We are sharers not only of animal but of vegetable life, sharers with the higher
brute animals in common instincts and feelings and affections. It seems to me
that there is a sort of meanness in the wish to ignore the tie. I fancy that
human beings may be more human6 when they realize that, as their dependent
associates live a life in which man has a share, so they have rights which man is
bound to respect.
70 MONIST 98, 103 (1987) (quoting A. GRAY. NATURAL SCIENCE AND RELION. Two LEcruFns
DELPERED TO THE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL OF YALE COLLEGE 54 (1880)). See generally J.
RACHEL%, CREATED FROM ANImAL& THE MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF DARIwNISM 83-86, 98-113
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Hodge of Princeton Theological Seminary, the most influential
bastion of Biblical conservatism, was not with evolution as such, or
with natural selection, but rather with Darwin's rejection of design
or final causes. Harvard's Asa Gray, America's foremost botanist,
was both a staunch Darwinian and a committed evangelical. He
corresponded at length with Darwin on the question of whether
Darwin's evidence necessarily led to rejection of all divine design.
Gray thought not and also argued that Darwinism should lead to a
new, less prideful and, therefore, decidedly evangelical recognition
of the interconnection between human life and animal and plant
life. Gray asserted that through Darwin's work people could also
come to understand that other creatures have a moral claim which
humans are obliged to respect. Charles Hodge notwithstanding,
conservative evangelicals generally favored Gray's view with re-
spect to divine design, and thereby allowed for reconciliation be-
tween Darwin and the Bible. Even at Princeton, where Hodge and
the doctrine of Biblical inerrancy reigned, some (including Hodge's
son and successor) thought reconciliation possible.04
Some defenders of the Christian faith, especially in the South,
did hold out against Darwinism, but the real move in the direction
of fierce warfare came not from the ranks of the Christians, but
rather from an emerging scientific-academic elite at the universi-
ties. For example, Andrew Dixon White, the young president of
Cornell University, lectured on "The Battle-Fields of Science," an
address which later became the two-volume A History of the War-
fare of Science with Theology in Christendom. 405 A favorite
spokesman of the scientific cause was T.H. Huxley, who rallied the
intellectual "agnostics" proudly to affirm Comte's view that the ob-
jectivity of positivist science should replace outmoded religious
traditionalism as civilization's single mode for discovering the
truth:'the perceived need to cleanse science of left-over religious
traces led Huxley to declare that "Warfare has been my business
and duty."406 Notably, Huxley, unlike Gray, found in Darwin no
new need for humility in relation to animals, but only confirmation
(1990).
Marsden, Evangelicals and the Scientific Culture, supra note 382, at 36.
40 A. WHITE, A HISTORY OF THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE WITH THEOLOGY IN CHRISTENDOM
(1965).
'I Id. at 38 (quoting Huxley).
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of our exalted view of ourselves. 07
As George Marsden has argued, among the educated elite so-
called fundamentalists actually lost their war with "science" before
they ever quite realized they were fighting it. 4 8 The triumphant
cultural champion of the new secularism was John Dewey, who
abandoned his study of religious philosophy and his Calvinist
background to become a spokesman for experimental social sci-
ence. He urged the intrinsic significance of experience and the
human capacity to uncover meaning by use of the scientific
method, believing that science, freed from outmoded religious sup-
positions about the supernatural, would progressively increase
human harmony and tranquility.409 Properly understood, ethical
judgment required, Dewey insisted, not command issued by a tran-
scendent God, but a clear sociological knowledge of consequences,
combined with knowledge drawn from psychology as to what it was
that humans actually wanted. Morality could thus be verified by
experience, through the social sciences. 10
Bruce Kuklick has recently shown that Dewey's claims on behalf
of social science cannot be separated from his earlier Calvinism.' 11
The "common faith" in democratic values and in science that
Dewey thought should be promoted through the schools could be
"viewed as a secular version of the ideals of the New England
standing order."4 2 If Jonathan Edwards insisted on the possibility
of redemption through grace, Dewey too preached the possibility of
human redemption, although only through the human and, osten-
sibly, nonreligious instrumentality of science-science "came to
serve, for Dewey, what in the nineteenth century was plainly a di-
vine purpose." 418
Rationalist social scientists, following Dewey, could claim neu-
trality, but only because they confidently believed in an essentially
good and orderly universe-no less than did the "two-tier" thought
of the nineteenth century. Unconsciously, they assumed certain
407 See J. RACHELS, supra note 403, at 83.
408 Id. at 39, 41.
409 Kuklick, John Dewey, American Theology, and Scientific Politics, in REIGION AND
TWENTIETH CENTURY AhmICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE, supra note 26, at 82.
410 Id. at 85.
411 Id.
412 Marsden, Evangelicals and the Scientific Culture, supra .note 382, at 42.
4" Kuklick, supra note 409, at 83.
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values, and could not imagine their rejection. 14 Those values in
turn became basic to the pragmatic managerial politics of the New
Deal period-the politics of professional technicians and efficiency
rather than the democratic participation Dewey had urged-and
those politics are with us still.
Dewey did not go unchallenged. In fact, the most bracing con-
frontation between "science" and religion was not the one between
Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan,415 but between
John Dewey and Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr, who came from
within the ranks of liberal modernist theologians, consistently
challenged the myopia and complacency of Dewey's progressive op-
timism-insisting that Dewey's secularized faith in unaided human
agency ignored the reality of sin, paradox and tragedy in social life,
a reality which theology elucidated far better than did social sci-
ence. 1" Niebuhr feared that a politics guided only by social sci-
ence, without religion, would degenerate into mere self-interest. He
conceded that religiously motivated politics could become intoler-
ant and absolutist: decent politics required recognition of a God
who judged "not only social injustice but the self-righteousness
even of those who [fought] against it.' 1 7 Sin, pride and imperfec-
tion were part of all human beings, who remained "creatures as
414 Id. at 87-88. David Hollinger, similarly, has described the essentially religious vocabu-
lary and assumptions which were used to celebrate ostensibily nonreligious science early in
the century. He calls this the "intellectual gospel." Modern scholars have come to appreciate
the complexity of the interplay between scientific and religious thought: now only embit-
tered fundamentalists and, at the other extreme, only "a few die-hard village atheists ...
[fail to] realize how anachronistically Victorian is the vision of a triumphant science eventu-
ally replacing religion." Hollinger, Justification By Verification: The Scientific Challenge to
the Moral Authority of Christianity in Modern America, in RELIGION AND TWENTIETH-CEN-
TURY AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE, supra note 26, at 116. Hollinger points out that in theo-
logical terms, the notion of justification by verification, the basic premise of scientific posi-
tivism, is a form of Arminianism-in contrast to the doctrine of justification by faith. Id. at
118. In that sense, it was more Methodist than Calvinist. For the importance of Methodist
Arminianism, with its optimism about human possibility, in American culture, see G. KELLY,
supra note 24, at 84-85.
'1" For a perceptive account of that confrontation, see G. WILLS, UNDER GOD, supra note
340, at 97-114 (arguing persuasively that Bryan's real opponent was not "science," but the
amoral nihilism of those who had misappropriated Darwin, such as H.L. Mencken in his
publicizing of Neitzsche).
416 Id. at 104.
417 Fox, The Niebuhr Brothers and the Liberal Protestant Heritage, in RELIGION AND
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE, supra note 26.
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well as creators."'4 18 According to Niebuhr, nothing in Dewey's so-
cial science provided access to that reality, a reality no less "true,"
Niebuhr insisted, than the data of the sciences.
Niebuhr did not, however, challenge the value of science itself,
although he tried to discredit its claims to ultimate truth. Indeed
his brother, H. Richard Niebuhr, who was more Barthian than
Reinhold but a strong influence on Reinhold's thought, actually
praised the scientific spirit for its capacity for humility and self-
criticism and for its recognition of the unrelenting, objective deter-
minativeness of existence.419 Science, both social and natural, re-
vealed the provisionality of all human knowledge, and the fragile,
shifting, nature of human perception. That understanding, Niebuhr
argued, in fact provided a foundation for recapturing evangelical
faith in the sovereignty of God. Science and religion were not at
odds, but rather joined in continual, dialectical interplay, having to
do with the meaning of ("internal") freedom and ("external")
necessity.42 0
B. Protestant Fundamentalism
It is a commonplace of intellectual history that Dewey won the
battle. It was a battle between intellectuals known mainly to the
intelligensia.421 Dewey forced intellectuals to choose between the
(admittedly imperfect) notions of social science and what Dewey
claimed to be a groundless faith in religion; Niebuhr could not con-
vince an emerging academic and managerial class that its own so-
cial scientific rationality was also something of a fiction or a meta-
phor, useful in mobilizing support for the intellectual class, but
less able than theology to grapple with the paradoxes of
418 Id. at 107.
419 Id. at 108-09.
420 Moreover, scientific reason, no less than theology, depended on communal "faith" in
inquiry, a commitment that could not be verified on purely scientific grounds. Id. at 109.
Fox's perceptive essay also explores more fully the differences between Reinhold Niebuhr's
thought and that of H. Richard Niebuhr. Reinhold, in his earlier years, was drawn to Marx-
ism, whereas H. Richard was more influenced by Barth. See also Gilkey, Social and Intel-
lectual Sources of Contemporary Protestant Theology, in RELIGION IN AAEmcA 156-57
(1968) for a brief account of Reinhold Niebuhr's importance. For a more complete account,
see R. Fox, REINHOLD NEEnuin (1985). For more on Reinhold Niebuhr, see C. LAscH. TnE
TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITs Cmics 369-93 (1991) [hereinafter C. LASci. THE
ThuE AN ONLY HEAVEN].
"2" See Gilkey, supra note 420, at 157.
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existence.422
Increasingly, American divinity schools, once central to the edu-
cational enterprise, became marginal to the modern university.
The great private universities allowed them to survive, relegated,
however, to a backwater, where Christians were free to do their
own thing, without credible academic influence. Meanwhile,
Dewey's philosophy dominated the American public school system,
a fact that is well-known and still a point of controversy among
those Christians who resent the takeover of the public schools by
Deweyan "secular humanists.)
4 23
Parallel controversies were replicated within Protestantism it-
self. Disputes at Princeton, whose divinity school had traditionally
been a major base of American evangelicalism, illustrated the split,
not only between religious "liberals" and "conservatives," which is
now a commonly held distinction,424 but also between evangelical-
422 See Kuklick, supra note 409, at 92.
422 See Mensch & Freeman, Religion as Science/Science as Religion: Constitutional Law
and the Fundamentalist Challenge, TIKKUN, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 64.
424 The distinction is made much too flippantly. Today, for example, three in ten Ameri-
cans count themselves as evangelicals, but many evangelicals are not fundamentalists.
Pentecostals, for example, are not, nor are many black Baptists. Many evangelicals are also
not political conservatives-probably roughly one in four white evangelicals see themselves
as on the "left" of the political spectrum, as do most black evangelicals as well. See Wacker,
Uneasy in Zion: Evangelicals in Postmodern Society, in EVANGELICALISM AND MODERN
AMERICA 18 (1984). Indeed, white southern Baptists, the largest evangelical denomination,
were largely Democratic in the earlier part of the 20th century; they strongly favored the
New Deal programs that attacked poverty, and that commitment to social welfare programs
was still strong in the 1940s and 1950s. See K. WALD, supra note 397, at 185. The Democrats
began to lose favor among evangelicals only in the 1960s, probably partly in response to
Kennedy's Catholicism. Id. Even in the 1980s evangelical support for the Falwell New Right
agenda was far more mixed than is commonly supposed, suggesting the inadequacy of labels
like "conservative" or "liberal." Pro-family issues are the ones that have gained the most
support, but even then support is surprisingly mixed. Careful interviews in 1983 showed
majorities among evangelicals supporting school prayer, a pro-Israel policy and tuition tax
credits for parochial schools. On the other hand, majorities also, contrary to common per-
ceptions, supported the distribution of birth control information in the schools, favored pas-
sage of the Equal Rights Amendment and rejected the view that AIDS was a form of divine
retribution. On issues of increased defense spending, the nuclear freeze and abortion, evan-
gelical opinion was split, with no single view prevailing. Notably, Reverend Falwell was less
popular among respondents, than the National Organization for Women. See id. at 192-93.
Common groupings within Protestantism, however, are usually made as follows:
Liberal Protestants-Episcopalians, Presbyterians and United Church of Christ (com-
prised of Congregationalists). These were once the "big three" dominating American cul-
ture. They emerged from the fundamentalist controversies with modernists firmly in con-
trol, and generally have been "liberal" both in Biblical interpretation and commitment to
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ism as rationalist fundamentalism and evangelicalism as personal-
ist "experience." The Princeton disputes affected non-intellectuals
political action. Now this grouping represents slightly less than 10% of the American popu-
lation, although it remains influential because its members are represented disproportion-
ately among civic and business leaders, despite its waning membership in the population
generally.
Moderate Protestants-Methodists, Disciples of Christ, Northern Baptists, Lutherans and
Reformed. This grouping accounts for about one-fourth of the religious population, and is
the largest Protestant grouping. Traditionally it has not had the same access to power as did
the "old-line" group above; it has tended to be middle class in status and outlook; in some
senses the Methodists, with their Arminian theology, stressing good works and optimism,
along with sound organizational structures and a practical rather than theoretical approach
to theology, are the most "American" denomination. Diversity within this grouping is wide
in both theology and politics, but cultural influences are strong.
Black Protestants-Black Americans have been primarily Methodist or Baptist in back-
ground, but their churches took distinct form, and were not subsumed within the broader
denominational structures. Churches were a vital part of the Black American experience,
second only to family life as a source of identity, strength and solidarity. Blacks have a high
level of religious commitment relative to other groups. When compared with other groups,
they tend to be evangelical and "conservative" on family issues, while more politically "lib-
eral" in other respects.
Conservative Protestants-The largest denomination is the Southern Baptist; others in-
clude Churches of Christ, Church of the Nazarene, the Assemblies of God, Seventh-Day
Adventists and many independent fundamentalist, Pentecostal and Holiness groups. The
grouping accounts for 16% of the American population. Many are members of the National
Association of Evangelicals. Despite a good deal of diversity, most emphasize the conversion
experience, Biblical authority and the importance of morality in personal life. They are
more inclined than most to see the forces of good and evil, God and the Devil, played out in
the world of concrete events.
Taken altogether, Protestants still make up the majority religious faith. Nevetheless,
roughly one-fourth of the American population is now Catholic-slightly larger than the
"Moderate Protestant" grouping. Like black and conservative Protestants, they have a high
level of religious commitment. As Protestantism became more fragmented after the 1960,
Catholicism entered the mainstream. After Vatican II, Catholic churches seemed more Prot-
estant and therefore typically more American than they had in the past. Catholics had en-
tered the socio-economic mainstream as well. Importantly, Catholics have been able to artic-
ulate a unified and coherent moral position on a number of issues, in a way that Protestants
have not.
Jews represent two to three percent of the American population, in three groups, Reform,
Conservative and Orthodox. Jews have relatively low rates of attendance at services, and
synagogue and temple involvement are weak, but communal ethnic bonds are strong. No
other major group has had to struggle so hard with the conflict between commitment to
faith and assimilation into the American mainstream.
Other faiths include Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, Christian Scientists, Unitarian-Uni-
versalists and Muslims (the latter now approximate Episcopalians in numbers), which have
been important in American life despite low percentages of the population. Non-affiliates
comprise about seven percent; most are more indifferent to religion than hostile to it. For a
succinct summary of these groupings, see generally W. RooF & IV. McKINNE', supra note
26, at 85-99.
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more directly than is commonly the case with elite intellectual con-
troversy; recent events have only served to highlight their
importance.425
For many years Princeton was dominated by the Biblical iner-
rancy school, which held that the Holy Spirit dictated, or at least
suggested, the very words of scripture. Some took this notion more
literally than others, but the basic view was that the Bible, as
God's word, must be as accurate in its precise accounts of science
and history as in its more explicitly theological passages. Missouri
Synod Lutherans have probably been the most extreme modern
defenders of Biblical inerrancy; they were important both in or-
ganizing the Creation Research Society and in promoting the "or-
ders of creation" view of woman's appointed role.
Despite common misconception, Biblical inerrancy, or funda-
mentalism, does not represent a retreat from science to blind irra-
tionalism. When Charles Hodge at (Presbyterian) Princeton de-
fended Biblical inerrancy as against Darwinism in the nineteenth
century, he was also defending it against too much emphasis on
Edwardian "internal evidences," or personal religious feeling. The
goal of theology was to gain the "assent to the truth, or the persua-
sion of the mind. ' 426 J. Gresham Machen, the last great Princeton
defender of the "Princeton theology" of inerrancy, explained that
the problem with allowing any deviation, even a "limited" or "me-
diated" view of inerrancy, was that it was "logically untenable":
one could not simultaneously think that the Bible was "the truth"
and at the same time think that it contained factual errors. As em-
phatically as Hodge, he objected to religion as personal feeling or
experience. The goal was not blind faith, but theology as a science:
Theology... is just as much a science as is chemistry...
the two sciences, it is true, differ widely in their subject
matter; they differ widely in the character of the evidence
upon which these conclusions are based; in particular
they differ widely in the qualifications required of the in-
vestigator: but they are both sciences, because they are
"' See Marsden, Evangelicals and the Scientific Culture, supra note 382, at 25-26. Mars-
den points out that "Princeton theology" has had more influence in the 20th century than In
the 19th century.
421 See Baird, Schaeffer's Intellectual Roots, in REFLECTIONS ON FRANCIS SCHAEFFER 47
(1986).
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both concerned with the acquisition and orderly arrange-
ment of a body of truth.
427
By the 1920s, however, the method of higher criticism was gain-
ing ground in mainstream Presbyterianism and Protestantism gen-
erally, undercutting the inerrancy position. Karl Barth's sophisti-
cated hermeneutics managed to affirm the rigorous "truth" of
revelation (as against the theological liberals in Germany), while
simultaneously rejecting literalism, incorporating critical historical
knowledge,428 and reminding us that "at the moment" when the
"Word of God" has "left its source, it has become the word of
man. '429 The Princetonians were incapable of that prodigious her-
meneutic feat, however, and the Presbyterian church of the 1920s
was, not atypically, in a state of schism. In 1927 the Presbyterian
Assembly effectively repudiated Princeton theology.
Machen and his fellow conservative teachers and students left
Princeton in protest and formed the Westminster Seminary in
Philadelphia; after quarrels about the Presbyterian Missionary
Board, Machen was actually removed from the ministry. 30 In ret-
rospect, that Presbyterian move was dramatically significant for
the abortion debate, for Francis Schaeffer, who probably more
than any other single person inspired fundamentalists to focus on
the abortion issue, became a student of Machen, who continued to
teach despite his disaffection. Throughout his life, Schaeffer was a
defender of Machen's Princeton theology and of the rational char-
acter of Christian belief.
Fundamentalism's appeal lies precisely in this offer of a rational
basis for Christianity, replicating the "two-tier" nineteenth-cen-
tury technique of finding in nature itself evidence of scriptural
claims, using Baconian induction as the preferred method. Modern
"creation science" represents, in effect, an effort to restore the lost
harmony between evidence from nature and evidence from scrip-
ture. Both sources of truth, scripture and nature, are approached
in a spirit of "common sense" (probably a legacy of Scottish philo-
sophical realism) which fundamentalists find lacking in modern
scientific theory as well as in modern Biblical interpretation. The
42 Id. at 53.
42 See E JUNGEL, supra note 205, at 70-82.
4 K BARTH, THE EPISTLE TO THE RoMAsS, supra note 223, at 447-48.
"' Baird, supra note 426, at 53-55.
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symbolic and the metaphorical are rejected; the goal is to be
straightforward and factual. This approach has had considerable
appeal for engineers. For example, Henry Morris, a widely read
creation scientist writing during the 1960s, was an engineer and
claimed to apply engineering methods of common sense and reason
to his reading of the Bible:431 if the Bible states God created the
world in six days, then it means exactly what it says, not what
some fancy literary scholar claims it "symbolizes."
Young Francis Schaeffer started studying under Machen in 1935.
By 1947 he was headed for Europe on an unlikely mission to con-
front and interpret all of European culture from the fundamental-
ist perspective. His L'Abri (Switzerland) Fellowship opened in
1955 and, with its loving, communitarian commitment to dialogue,
rapidly gained an international following, despite fundamental-
ism's distinctly American character.432 Meanwhile, Schaeffer was
starting to write the books and, later, to make the films that
quickly found their way into church groups and the curricula of
evangelical colleges throughout the United States. Schaeffer be-
came a powerful influence (on, for example, both Jerry Falwell
114 3
and pro-life activist Randall Terry43 4) in part because, true to his
Machen heritage, he recognized the central dilemma of modern
Christianity: if it were not "true" and "real" in some sense that
could be taken as objective, then no amount of talk about values,
spirituality, Americanism, love, human needs and feelings would
rescue Christian theology.
Barth, like Schaeffer, had also recognized the objective "truth"
point, but Schaeffer dismissed Barth and other neo-orthodox Eu-
ropean Protestants with the disdain of the practical, common sense
American: he accused them of "mental gymnastics" and "black
magic in logic," so that "contradictions and changes are accepted
with complacency, and paradoxes with joy. 43 5 Like Machen,
Schaeffer continued to affirm the literal inerrancy of the Bible as
43 See Numbers, The Dilemma of Evangelical Scientists, in EVANGELICALISM AND MOD-
ERN AMERICA 156 (1984); see also Marsden, A Case of the Excluded Middle, in UNCIVIL
RELIGION 132-56 (1987).
432 Baird, supra note 426, at 61-63.
411 Pinnock, Schaeffer on Modern Theology, in REFLECTIONS ON FRANCIS SCIAEFFER 179
(1986).
3"4 See G. WILLS, UNDER GOD, supra note 340, at 318-28 (on both Schaeffer and Terry).
"' Baird, supra note 426, at 81.
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the only grounding for an objective Christian truth, although
under the influence of Reformed Calvinists who taught with
Machen, Schaeffer modified Machen's simplistic Baconianism with
a "presuppositionalism" which, as with Barth, understood, in Kuh-nian fashion, that nature itself will be viewed differently depend-
ing on the presuppositions one brings to its study. (On this impor-
tant doctrinal point Schaeffer tended to waffle, for fundamentalists
prefer to believe in a wooden consistency between the objectivity
of natural fact and the objectivity of scripture; serious Calvinists
are more skeptical about the ultimate reliability of the "evidences"
a fallen natural world can ever present to a fallen reason.)43
0
Schaeffer's peculiar gift, however, lay not only in reaffirming the
"truth" of Christianity but also in realizing its critical potential as
against modern secular culture. He understood that a fundamen-
talism which defensively insulated itself from modern culture, re-
treating into purist doctrinal squabbling, would simply dig itself
into the ground. He thus became "culture reclaiming" rather than
"culture denying," a move which in turn helped induce Falwell's
willingness to enter the public "moral" arena, despite the tradi-
tional Baptist aversion to church involvement in political action.
Schaeffer's goal was not to reestablish literal Biblical rules as secu-
lar law (although, more recently his son has moved in that direc-
tion). Rather, he wanted to show that a culture without Christian-
ity as the central truth of its worldview was doomed to moral
floundering-in effect, a crudely simplistic version of MacIntyre.
He demonstrated his cultural thesis in part by long descriptions of
the history of Western culture (on film as well as print) which were
just accurate enough to seem plausible, but were also oddly
skewed: untangling the truth from the falsehoods is a mind-numb-
ing task.4 37 Nevertheless, he did succeed in bringing European
"culture" to the brittle world of fundamentalism. As Gary Wills
describes the effect on Randall Terry, "[iut was a heady experience,
to be dealing with the world's great thinkers in a confident and
urbane way, giving grades to Aristotle and Picasso in terms of their
Biblical acceptability. At last American evangelicals had their own
'13 Id. at 55-58; see also Marsden, Evangelicals and The Scientic Culture, supra note
382, at 23-25 (discussing Kuyper, a presuppositionalist).




C.S. Lewis. '43 8
In Whatever Happened to the Human Race, a book and movie
about biomedical issues that Schaeffer later co-authored with C.
Everett Koop, Schaeffer was to depict abortion as the single most
compelling symptom of a modern culture fallen into a non-Chris-
tian world view, and he is well-known for the accuracy of his pre-
diction that Christians could be mobilized on the single issue of
abortion in order to start reclaiming a culture of decay, one he lik-
ened emphatically to the culture of Nazi Germany.43 9 Elsewhere,
however, he had also addressed destruction of the environment
(actually the first ethical issue he raised specifically), racism and
unbridled economic exploitation as symptomatic of the same cul-
tural malaise. However reductionist and simplistic his work may
be, with its extravagant slippery-slope claims, Schaeffer was never-
theless starting to rouse conservative Christian ethics away from a
preoccupation with sin as personal (usually sexual) immorality (to
be remedied as fast as possible by personal conversion) toward a
greater understanding of social responsibility and the meaning of
culture.440 In so doing he raised difficult questions about church/
state relations that he seems never to have comprehended-as a
somewhat chastened Jerry Falwell was to learn by the end of the
1980s.
C. Secular Liberalism/Religious Conservatism
The 1960s were a period of both continuity and radical disconti-
nuity for religion in America. Today's abortion debate represents
yet unhealed cleavages in American religion that are traceable to
the cultural turbulence of those times. The centrist religion of the
1950s, smugly allied with conventional American culture, lacked
the strength to contain fragmentation. Churches had achieved a
vague ecumenical unity, but only by losing their strong denomina-
"' See Wills, Evangels of Abortion, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, June 15, 1989, at 18-21. See also G.
WILLS, UNDER GOD, supra note 340, at 322-24.
"I F.A. SCHAEFFER & C.E. Koop, WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE HUMAN RACE? (1979).
440 Hollinger, Schaeffer on Ethics, in REFLECTIONS ON FRANCIS SCHAEFFER 245-66 (1986).
On the problematic character of making a literal, Biblical case against abortion, to the point
where some of the passages relied upon might support reverence for "all life" (i.e., even
animal?), see G. WLLS, UNDER GOD, supra note 340, at 318-20. Wills notes that even St.
Augustine could not find a text in Scripture that answered the question of the soul's origin.
Id. at 318.
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tional and doctrinal identity. Values had largely replaced theology
in church life; when those values became contested rather than
shared, unity dissolved. Thus, cultural divisions that might once
have been contained within denominational structures instead di-
vided the country across denominational boundaries. The center
broke, so to speak, as churches lost their capacity to play a unify-
ing cultural role.
For a time, within the zany 1960s youth culture, pluralism ran
rampant and religious experimentation ranged from Eastern reli-
gions to cults to Satanism to drugs.44 1 The lasting cleavage that
emerged, however, was between "secular liberalism" on the one
hand and "religious conservatism" on the other. However mislead-
ing the labels, along with the caricatured images each side has of
the other, that particular division has become more important than
any doctrinal or denominational issue within American religious
life. While this cleavage may be regarded as a specific legacy of the
1960s, its roots were in the past.
Dewey's victory over Niebuhr in the 1930s had already symbol-
ized the ascendancy of pragmatic, progressive secularism. It also
entailed, probably contrary to Dewey's intent, the political domi-
nance of managerial experts, a development which social scientists
(and many legal realists) for the most part hailed: pragmatism in
philosophy translated into pragmatic liberalism in politics. Power
in the modern world, intellectuals came to believe, should be exer-
cised "dispassionately, impartially, and objectively,"' 4 2 which
would occur only if those who exercised authority were trained in a
political morality secured not by religious truth, but by rationality
and efficiency. As has been commented, "[a] more self-interested
theory cannot be imagined, '4 4 3 but it probably reflected naive opti-
mism more than cynical self-interest.
4 For sympathetic accounts, based largely on careful personal observation, see Tiu NEw
RELIGIOUS CoNscIousNEss, supra note 26, which includes descriptions of groups located
mainly near Berkeley, including the 3HO, the Hare Krishna, the Human Potential Move-
ment, the Divine Light Mission, the Church of Satan and others.
41 Kuklich, supra note 409, at 88-89 (quoting J. PHnIUus. JOHN DEwEY AND IE TRANS-
FORtATION OF AsanucAN INTELLEcTuAL LiFE. 1859-1904, at 309 (1978) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University)).
41 Id. As Kuklick points out, it is by no means clear that Dewey himself advocated gov-
ernment by expertise. Id. His views were sufficiently vague, however, that those who were
doing so could take Dewey as a spokesman. Eventually, secular pragmatism simply pre-
vailed, without requiring reference to its intellectual roots.
1991] 1047
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
The growth of an educated, largely secular class of "experts" was
closely linked to professionalization and specialization within the
universities. Nineteenth-century higher education, largely in cleri-
cal hands, sought to preserve sound learning and religious moral-
ity. After the 1870s, both expansion and specialization began to
occur which made possible a "social faith in merit, competence,
discipline, and control that were basic to accepted [American] con-
ceptions of achievement and success. '44  The universities, by
"screening, formalizing, and standardizing, and, above all, by certi-
fying with credentials, legitimated and determined competence in
American life.
445
While universities (especially graduate and professional schools)
expanded generally after the 1870s, the 1960s saw especially dra-
matic increases. In 1870 there were only forty-four students en-
rolled in graduate schools in the United States. By 1930, there
were 47,255; by 1972, the number had increased to 908,000. In
1876, forty-four Ph.D.s were conferred; in 1970, this number
reached 29,872.446 Increased government aid to higher education
during this period meant vast enlargement, with special emphasis
on science and technology. A primary function of this professional-
ized university system, B.J. Bledstein has argued, was to "render
universal scientific standards credible to the public"44 7 and also to
reduce potentially divisive issues to scientific and even technical
terms, thereby containing the controversies.448 Ideas became the
subject matter of academic experts, who managed them with the
tools of a universal, scientific reason.449
These changes, which intensified dramatically during the 1960s,
affected the study of theology itself, especially within Protestant-
ism. Training for the clergy became professionalized and special-
ized. Study was compartmentalized, with academic expertise re-
quired for the mastery of any one of the specialties, in the manner
444 Harvey, On the Intellectual Marginality of American Theology, in RELIGION AND
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE, supra note 26, at 180 (quoting B, BLED-
STEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE DEVELOIPMENT OF
HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1978)).
415 Id. at 181.
446 Id.
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typical of academic disciplines.4 50 As a result, theology became not
only marginal to general education and irrelevant to one's basic
understanding of the world but also fragmented within its own al-
ready isolated sphere. Abandoning its once powerful integrative
function, academic theology was also effectively distanced from the
laity and was expected to make scant contribution to public dis-
course. Excellent theologians would continue to write, but the reli-
gious voices reaching the public were, increasingly, those of Schaef-
fer and, later, of television preachers who learned, shrewdly, to
manipulate the media instead of surrendering to its secularity.
The dramatic expansion of universities was accompanied by a
time of general economic expansion, development of an increas-
ingly important mass media, increased mobility and a growing
population of young people; meanwhile, jobs funded directly or in-
directly by government provided employment for a larger and
larger percentage of the population. In both universities and gov-
ernment bureaucracies, the basic assumptions of (Deweyan) secu-
lar pragmatism prevailed and became what has been called, not
without caricature, a "new class" ideology of the educated
elite-an elite that spoke authoritatively on behalf of the public
interest in schools, government agencies and the media.5 Their
ideology of knowledge and expertise served not only to validate
their own credentials, but also carried with it a new emphasis on
lifestyle choices-with toleration for sexual freedom and di-
vorce-not just among 1960s rebels, but also among "two-career
housholds in the technological fast lane," 2 whose jobs increasingly
depended on government spending."
3
By the early 1970s, surveys showed that education and profes-
sional employment clearly corresponded with tolerance for abor-
tion, homosexuality and gender equality; it also corresponded with
support for government spending in education, space, medicine,
4'0 Id. at 185-86. Harvey describes the four-fold compartmentalization of theology school-
ing, which originated in Germany. He gives special stress to the expertise now required for
Biblical studies, arguing that the effect has been to rob public discourse of the language of
moral and communal commitment, which once was the special integrative province of theol-
ogy. Id. at 186-92.
4H See C. LAsCH, supra note 420, at 509-29.
452 1L WuTHNow, supra note 21, at 155.
453 Id. at 158.
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environment and urban improvement.,4 In turn, these attitude
changes, avowedly secular, also corresponded with a decline in reli-
gious involvement. Contributions and membership began to de-
cline in the 1960s for the first time in a century and a half.
4
When feminism was given full media attention in the 1970s, its
appeal seemed strongest to those among whom religious commit-
ment was weak. Feminism became associated, fairly or unfairly,
with the "new class" ideology of secularism and permissive lifestyle
freedom. 4"6 This was so despite the fact that women's ordination
had begun to take hold in churches by the 1970s; in fact, as noted
earlier, by 1980 the proportion of professional women in the clergy
was actually higher than in either law or medicine."7
For a time, in the early 1960s, the divisive and dispiriting effects
of those changes were not apparent. For many intellectuals who
remained religious, the period seemed to usher in a time of reli-
gious hope and possibility, not division. One source of possibility
was the civil rights movement. In his famous letter from the Bir-
mingham, Alabama, jailhouse, first published in its entirety in a
Christian newsletter, Martin Luther King, Jr. had issued a chal-
lenge to white churches. King wrote that white churches had too
often "remained silent and secure behind stained glass windows '' 4,1
in the midst of racial injustice. If the church did not "recapture
the sacrificial spirit of the early church, it [would] lose its authen-
ticity, . . . and be dismissed as an irrelevant social club with no
meaning for the twentieth century."
459
This was a challenge, not just to complacency, but to an assump-
tion that had been basic to American churches in the 1950s-the
presumed relation between good personal values and social justice.
Churches had assumed that by shaping sound individual values
within the church congregation, they could insure that decency
4" Government employees, in fact, manifested these "new class" lifestyle attitudes even
irrespective of educational level. Harvey, supra note 444, at 186.
4"' In 1955, approximately $4.50 was donated to religion for every dollar given to educa-
tion; by 1970, the ratio declined to $2.90 for religion for every dollar given to education. Id.
at 159.
411 Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 227-28.
, A.J. REICHLEY, supra note 26, at 242.
411 Id.; see also, Findlay, Religion and Politics in the Sixties: The Churches and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 77 J. Am. HIsT. 66, 69-70 (1990). The complete letter was first published
in the ecumenical Christian weekly Christian Century. Id. at 69.
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would prevail in social life. The problem of race highlighted the
extent to which social evil was structural, not merely personal-a
point Reinhold Niebuhr had made in response to Dewey's social
optimism.46 0
Many within the clergy were finally willing to recognize that,
with respect to racism, the good values churches supposedly had
been teaching were leading neither to good behavior nor to a just
society. Therefore, they concluded, on the question of civil rights,
they needed to put their values on the line in their own behavior
through direct political action. Merely preaching values was no
longer sufficient.461
By then, Bonhoeffer's Letters and Papers from Prison"2 were
being widely read, and the connection seemed obvious: Bonhoeffer
put his life on the line in opposition to Hitler; opposition to Ameri-
can racism formed a seemingly unambiguous parallel.' 3 As King
(and Bonhoeffer) understood, however, this meant a direct chal-
lenge, not just to the sufficiency of personal values, but also to the
supposed separation between the sacred and the secular. As King's
411 See Fox, supra note 417, at 100.
461 See R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 145-47.
462 D. BONHOEFFER, LErrRS AND PAPERS FRoi PRISON (1953); see also supra note 210.
46 For the importance of this book during the period, see Fackenheim, On the Sell-Expo-
sure of Faith, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 205 (1968). On the connection made to civil rights,
see W. STRINGFELLOW. DISSENTER IN A GREAT SociETY: A CHRISTIAN VIEW OF AMERICA IN
CRIsis 94-95 (1966). For Bonhoeffer's own direct understanding of American racism's chal-
lenge to American religion, see Shriver, Faith, Politics, and Secular Society: The Legacy of
Bonheoffer for Americans, in ETHICAL REsPONSmILrrY: BONHOEFFER'S LEGACY TO THE
CHURCHES, supra note 210, at 205; see also E. BETHGE, supra note 210, at 109-10. The racial
issue was, in fact, the one American social issue with which Bonhoeffer allowed himself to
become involved during his stay in New York in 1930-1931. Id. His subsequent description
of the American race problem to his brother, Karl-Friedrich, in Germany, was so powerful
as to elicit the following in reply:.
I am delighted you have the opportunity of studying the Negro question so
thoroughly. I had the impression when I was over there that it is really the
problem, at any rate for people with a conscience and, when I was offered an
appointment at Harvard, it was a quite basic reason for my disinclination to go
to America for good, because I did not want either to enter upon that heritage
myself or to hand it on to my hypothetical children. It seems impossible to see
the right way to tackle the problem.
Id. at 110 (quoting a letter from Karl-Friedrich to Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Jan. 24, 1931)).
Moreover, according to Bethge, "[n]ot suspecting the heritage he would have to enter upon
in his own country, Karl-Friedrich continued: 'At all events, our Jewish question is a joke in
comparison; there cannot be many people left [in 1931] who maintain they are oppressed
here. At any rate, not in Frankfurt .... ' "Id.
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letter stated clearly and forcefully:
In the midst of a mighty struggle to rid our nation of ra-
cial and economic injustice I have heard many ministers
say, "Those are social issues with which the gospel has no
real concern," and I have watched many churches com-
mit themselves to a completely other worldly religion
which makes a strange, unbiblical distinction between
body and soul, between the sacred and the secular.404
That sharp distinction between the sacred and secular spheres,
which is stronger in Christian than Jewish theology, had not been
made traditionally by black churches in America, given their his-
tory of struggle and community building.4 5 It had also been
largely rejected by the social gospel movement earlier in the cen-
tury,466 which influenced King;4 7 and it has also, more recently,
been challenged by liberation theologians. 46 8 In the context of the
1960s struggle against the unambiguous evil of racism, quibbles
over the precise "boundary" between the "sacred" and "secular"
seemed excessively and inappropriately legalistic.
Given their 1950s record of complacent conventionality, Ameri-
can churches responded impressively to King's direct challenge.
Many clergy became involved in civil rights demonstrations. 4 "
Moreover, finally galvanized to take action, the National Council of
Churches (NCC) dropped its earlier ban of activity on behalf of
specific legislation and formed a Commission on Religion and Race
414 Findlay, supra note 459, at 69.
40' See generally C. LINCOLN & L. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE (1990); Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARv. L. REV. 985, 1015-23 (1990).
41' For a recent sympathetic reanalysis of the social gospel movement, see King, An En-
thusiasm for Humanity: The Social Emphasis in Religion and Its Accommodation in Prot-
estant Theology, in RELIGION AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE, supra
note 26, at 49.
4" King sought a middle ground between the excessive optimism of social gospel and
evangelical liberalism and what he perceived as the despair implicit in Barth's neo.ortho.
doxy, given its emphasis on "the intractable nature of sin and evil and the relative futility of
utopian aspirations." Cook, supra note 465, at 1028. For a discussion of King's theology, see
id. at 1012-44.
" On the importance of Latin American liberation theology in American religious
thought, including feminist thought, during the 1970s, see A.J. REICHLEY, supra note 26, at
256-67.
48W In California in 1968, for example, one-quarter of the Protestant clergy took active
part in civil rights demonstrations. R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 146.
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(NCC-CORR), which led an ecumenical drive to enact civil rights
legislation. Jewish and Catholic leaders gave full support, but en-
couraged the (Protestant) NCC to take the lead, a leadership role
that was recognized by President Kennedy.470 The NCC-CORR
quickly organized church participation in the March on Washing-
ton and then directed extensive lobbying and grass-roots letter-
writing campaigns.' 7'
Working with the NAACP and the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights, both more experienced lobbyists, the NCC drew on
church organizations across the country and used its access to the
structures of political and economic power to insure enactment of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Examples: B'nai B'rith gathered all its
lawyer members in Iowa to pressure Senator Bourke Hickenlooper;
Quaker professors from Earlham College lobbied the senators from
Indiana; James Hamilton, a leader of the NCC, contacted a busi-
nessman in Omaha to ask a Methodist minister to encourage the
president of the largest state bank to apply pressure on a reluctant
Nebraska senator.1 2 Meanwhile, church groups, joined even by
conservative congregations such as the Missouri Synod (which was
not even an NCC member), orchestrated campaigns that flooded
Congress with letters supporting the Civil Rights Act.
473
Such sophisticated politicking was probably not necessary once
President Kennedy was killed, but prior to his assasination passage
of the Act was by no means certain, underscoring the significance
of those efforts. The same church leaders then went on to press for
enactment of the Voting Rights Act, and the NCC shortly thereaf-
ter became involved in organizing and distributing funds to the
Head-Start Program.474
Suddenly, American religion, once the bastion of 1950s conven-
tionality, found itself on the cutting edge of political action and
social change. Then, in 1965, only one year after passage of the
4" Findlay, supra note 459, at 71.
411 Id. at 71-73. Quickly appointed to the staff was Dr. Anna Hedgeman, a savvy and
shrewd African-American woman who knew how to do effective political organizing. Id.
472 Id. at 78-79.
473 Id. at 84-85. An executive from that group wrote. "The God of the Gospel is also the
God of justice, and holds society and government responsible for equality under the law."
Id. at 85.
4' G. WiLs, BARE RUINED CHOIRS, supra note 340, at 148-149. Wills is critical of the




Civil Rights Act, Harvey Cox published The Secular City,47 5 which
defended the social relevance of religion symbolized by the Civil
Rights Act. Drawing specifically on Bonhoeffer's expression,
"man's coming of age," and on his questions, "[h]ow do we speak
of God without religion [and] ... [h]ow do we speak in a secular
fashion of God, 41 7 6 Cox suggested that the secularization process in
American life was a positive one, and that a secular world view
could in fact be traced to Biblical origins. The Exodus from Egypt
represented release from a cosmology of nature and place, and also
from the idolatry that linked any given political ruler with an over-
arching sacral order.
47 7
Cox argued that modern Christians should not regret the deper-
sonalization and alienated mobility of the modern, bureaucratic,
secularized world. Much time was wasted, he said, longing for a
lost period that was more religious, while the real freedom of the
Judeo-Christian message lay in freedom from religion, and in the
consequent possibility of human action in a truly "profane"
world.47 8 This meant a release from ontology to pragmatism, and
from a closed (natural law) view of what the world was to an open
examination of how the world functions. That shift allowed for
new possibilities of action in the world.7 9
Similarly, Cox insisted that the Gospel was not concerned with
objective truth, but rather with doing.480 This meant frankly ac-
knowledging that "truth" and "value" were socially constructed,
human creations.481 People are not limited by the natural order,
but create, in fact, the meaning of nature itself-a point which the
Bible symbolizes with Adam's naming of the animals.482 People are
thus invited to be partners in God's creative work in a secular
world. The gospel is the summoning to seize the forever new pos-
sibilities of the world. 83 We are, Cox said, always in a "catalytic
gap"-that point where the new is suddenly revealed within the
411 H. Cox, THE SECULAR Crry, supra note 400.
411 Id. at 241 (quoting Bonhoeffer).
. Id. at 15-26.
"" Id. at 58.
479 Id. at 64.
480 Id. at 65.
4181 Id. at 64.
482 Id. at 73-74.
483 Id. at 83.
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old-and are free to act responsibly in the world if we can only
wake up to our responsibilities. 8'
For his models of men "come of age" Cox chose both Camus and
Kennedy-the latter, of course, had just been killed, a fact which
seemed not to dampen Cox's optimism. 48 5 Cox's description of
Kennedy is revealing. He was the "technopolitan man" as pragma-
tist, which means he "discipline[d] himself to give up certain
things. 48 6 In particular, he wasted little time thinking about "ulti-
mate" or "religious" questions. Instead, he was satisfied with
"highly provisional solutions," which were arrived at by "bringing
to bear the knowledge of different specialists."'87
He sees the world not so much as an awesome enigma,
evoking a sense of hushed reverence, as a series of com-
plex and interrelated projects requiring the application of
competence. He does not ask religious questions because
he fully believes he can handle this world without
them.488
Some of Cox's phrases were unnecessarily flippant. He enthusi-
astically borrowed, for example, the description of God's work in
the world as a "floating crap game," so that the Christian's obliga-
tion is to "know where the [catalytic] action is" and "dig it.'4
8
Nevertheless, despite such excess, Cox's book was a serious effort
to explain the link between the Judeo-Christian tradition and the
capacity to think in secular terms. It also captured the heady opti-
mism of the early 1960s when all the world's problems seemed
solvable by unaided human agency, drawing solely on its own pro-
fessional competence. If Dewey's secular pragmatism, in its tri-
umph, threatened the relevance of theology, the answer, Cox sug-
gested, for theology, was to claim secular pragmatism as its
own-as the true spirit of both Jewish and Christian scripture. In
using the vocabulary of Dewey, theology was really speaking its
own language after all.
Cox's book was widely read; Cox and discussions of The Secular
48 Id. at 114.
485 Id. at 62.
486 Id. at 63.
487 Id.
48 Id.
489 Id. at 125-26.
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City became a mainstay on the lecture circuits and in the media.
Meanwhile, Cox's basic theological optimism was shared by many
Catholics as well. In a different sense, they, too, had "come of age"
in modern American culture. No longer a defensive immigrant en-
clave in an alien society, they were now in the mainstream of so-
cial, economic and academic life. For many, Kennedy's presidency
represented the full-fledged Americanization of Catholicism.
The background had been laid in the 1950s by the Jesuit theolo-
gian John Courtney Murray, who had argued that Catholicism was
in fact consistent with the long American tradition of church/state
separation. He elaborated, in the manner of classical legal
thought,49 0 a magnificent series of further compartmentalizations:
state/society, natural law/revealed law, temporal/spiritual and
others. Within that structure, Catholics had a duty to participate
in political life and could do so in a manner that was both consci-
entiously Catholic and utterly secular. Vatican II later incorpo-
rated Murray's formulation and Kennedy drew on it for his famous
Houston statement.
491
There were, of course, differences between the Cox and the Mur-
ray approaches, despite the fact that both so fully embraced the
pragmatic Kennedy approach to governance. Murray was a natural
law theologian, whereas Cox rejected arguments based on ontology.
Murray was a careful compartmentalizer, especially of the sacred
and secular, whereas Cox was eager to label the secular as the only
"true" (gospel) interpretation of the sacred. Cox embraced plural-
ism, while Murray accommodated himself to it.
Despite those differences, Vatican II and the new secular direc-
tion of Protestantism were similar phenomena. Both represented a
self-conscious shift from the sacral to the secular. As Murray
stated with extraordinary candor, "The notion of the sacral society
is dismissed into history, beyond recall. The free society of today is
recognized to be secular. '49 2 Similarly, Robert Cushman, a dele-
gate-observer to the Council, stated that, "[i]n principle, the era of
Constantine-sixteen hundred years of it-passed away. ' '493 While
110 See Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, supra note 24, at 18-21.
491 See O'Brien, Catholic Contentiousness: The Public Consequences of Denominational
Disputes, in UNCivL RELIGION 163-64 (1987) [hereinafter O'Brien, Catholic
Contentiousness].
419 A.J. REICHLEY, supra note 26, at 288.
493 Id.
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this did not change the Church's claim to be the one true church,
it did signify a new openness to the pluralist, secular world.4 " The
two main focuses of Vatican II, Sister Marie Augusta Neal wrote,
were "openness to the world and ... recognition of the laity as a
partner,"49 5 in marked contrast to the view of the church as a spiri-
tual oasis in a sinful world, with the religious life clearly superior
to life in the world.
Sister Neal even saw Vatican H as embracing an American,
Deweyan pragmatism as well as an American separation of church
and state. Norms were to be established, not just by a bishop's
pronouncement, but rather by experience and common sense judg-
ment, in a joint effort in which "pursuit of science and the devel-
opment of political and economic institutions for the enrichment
of mankind are good. '496 Natural law would no longer be the sole
basis for moral theology; instead, new emphasis would be given to
people as viewed from the perspective of the social sciences.
41
Harvey Cox was cited as "the first American theologian [thus] to
emphasize the spiritual potential of the secular city."'9 3 Actual
Council documents, of course, not only treated the question of reli-
gious liberty (Murray's chief concern) but also opened an entire
range of Catholic subjects to reappraisal, including creed, liturgy,
Canon Law, cult, education, institutional hierarchy, laity, role of
women (who were given more responsibility and personal choice)
and the like.499
Not surprisingly, therefore, during this hopeful time, when all
'" The state was relinquished to the merely human and provisional, and social pluralism
was acknowledged, but only as a fact of a fallen world. See id.
4" Neal, Catholicism in America, in RELIGION iN AMiRICA 326 (1968).
4H Id. at 323-24.
49 Id. at 324.
S98 Id. Catholic theologians were, in fact, writing on similar themes. For example, Johan-
nes Metz wrote "to Christianize the world means in its basic sense to make the world more
worldly, to bring it to its own.... [Grace] calls and guides the world into its perfect secular-
ism." Cox, Afterword, in THE SECULAR CrTy DEBATE 191-92 (1966) [hereinafter Cox,
Afterword] (quoting Metz, A Believer's Look at the World: A Christian Standpoint in the
Secularized World, in THa CHRISTIAN AND THE WORLD 93 (1965)). Similarly, the Jesuit theo-
logian Karl Ralner wrote: "If the world of the future is a world of rational planning, a
demythologized world, a world secularized by the creature in order that it may serve as the
raw material for man's activity, then this whole modem attitude ... is basically a Christian
one." Id. at 192 (quoting Rahner, Christianity and New Man, in THE CHRnSTAN AND THE
WORLD, supra, at 228).
49 Neal, supra note 495, at 313.
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things seemed possible and all change was for the better, liberal,
educated Catholics embraced Cox's secular city-symbolized by
Washington, still in the afterglow of its young, pragmatic Catholic
President-as eagerly as did liberal, educated Protestants. Cox ap-
peared on the lecture circuits with Sister Corita, the artist-nun
who celebrated The Secular City by composing advertisements for
big corporations in a happy "Warholism of the supermarket"; her
"hymn to the Virgin (as the juiciest tomato of them all)" was su-
perimposed on a soup can design.500 Meanwhile, Cox's work was
printed in the Catholic press, used in Catholic schools and end-
lessly quoted.5 0 1 Bonhoeffer, meanwhile, became nothing short of
faddish, subject of a photo essay in Life and an article in Time.102
He was so popularized that serious divinity school professors as-
signed his work almost sheepishly. As one theologian said, "[w]e
have to continue studying Bonhoeffer even though he is a fad." 0 3
But what did "studying Bonhoeffer" mean? Some seemed too
ready to adopt startling phrases like "religionless Christianity"
while also forgetting the more somber ones, such as the "cost of
discipleship." Those who found in Bonhoeffer some relief from the
heavy learning and complex paradoxes of Barth's many-volumed
Church Dogmatics too quickly forgot that Bonhoeffer viewed him-
self as in that same tradition.50 4 Moreover, as Cox was later to
point out, with more care than was evident in The Secular City,
Bonhoeffer was writing within a very particular context5 0°-a long
tradition of "two sphere" Lutheranism which so separated the
church from the world, the sacred from the secular, that it was
immobilized even in the face of extraordinary evil. It was this
"world-despising" aspect of Lutheranism which required a hearty
new dose of maturity. That did not mean, however, that Bonhoef-
fer believed one could suddenly step forth to confront a God who
somehow, magically, had nothing to do with the religious tradition
that had been interpreting God's word for centuries.
000 G. WILLS. BARE RUINED CHOIRS, supra note 340, at 90-91.
501 Id. at 90.
002 Cox, Beyond Bonhoeffer? The Future of Religionless Christianity, in TIHE SECULAR
CITY DEBATE 206 (1966) [hereinafter Cox, Beyond Bonhoeffer?]; Novak, Christianity: Re-
newed or Slowly Abandoned?, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 385 (1968).
002 Cox, Beyond Bonhoeffer?, supra note 502, at 206.
o See Novak, supra note 502, at 385.
10 See Cox, Beyond Bonhoefler?, supra note 502, at 207.
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For that reason, Barth's multivolume Church Dogmatics is in
large part an extended conversation with precisely that tradition.
As Barth and Bonhoeffer both knew, there is an idolatry that says
one can capture and contain God within any single (human) tradi-
tion, yet there is also an idolatry that claims any single moment of
history, any particular modern insight, to be the new truth taking
us to an Archimedean point that transcends history, including the
history of religious tradition. Who was the "God" we confronted
anew and areligiously in Cox's The Secular City, except the God of
Jewish and Christian religions? Put in Christian terms, even the
gospel does not remove us from history, but rather sets in motion
the dialectic Barth described in paradoxical phrases like "nothing
new, but the oldest.., not an old acquaintance, but a new one."8100
Like the Enlightenment (including enlightenment legalism) in
relation to religion, and also like many Protestants in relation to
Catholics (and many Christians in relation to Jews), those who
were part of the Bonhoeffer fad in the 1960s forgot the first part of
the paradox. Cox, however, reflecting on his own work, made the
point persuasively, both about Bonhoeffer and also about an Amer-
ican theology that was prone to adopt the latest novelties of the
secular culture at the expense of theology itself:
Bonhoeffer's vaunted radicalism grew out of a tradition
which was so much a part of him he rarely felt the need
to affirm it. His genius was that he could deal with fron-
tier issues, but was able to do so in the light of a theologi-
cal heritage which he loved and cherished. This is why
our American theological enterprise, which often tends to
be ahistorical as well as anarchic, can still learn much
from him. Too often our traditionalists have no interest
in emerging issues and our pioneers feel they must exude
a lusty disrespect for anything that happened before
1961. This is why so many new movements in theology
end up in old blind alleys. Bonhoeffer knew the revolu-
tionary power of a tradition understood and applied.
5
07
See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
Cox, Beyond Bonhoeffer?, supra note 502, at 207-08. Cox noted Bonhoeffer's dismay
when he visited the United States and found students at Union Seminary laughing out loud
at passages from Luther on sin and forgiveness. Id. at 207.
On the other hand, this does not mean, of course, that there is no point in trying to rid
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Meanwhile, however, other faddish "secular" theologies were
gaining as much publicity as Cox, chiefly by asserting, as the new
gospel message, that "God is dead." This was taken, ironically, not
as a rejection of Barthian neo-orthodoxy, but rather as the culmi-
nation of both Hegelian and Barthian dialectics, and as the real
meaning of Bonhoeffer. In The Gospel of Christian Atheism, for
example, Thomas Altizer "literally affirms and indeed wills the
death of the Biblical God." 08 No less than a new "third testa-
ment" is required:
The Old Testament knew only the alien, transcendent,
externally commanding Father. He became the Son, in-
carnate and immanent, in the New Testament. It will be
left for the third testament to come dialectically to deny
the Son's resurrection to transcendence, and along with it
the Father who makes this resurrection possible.
Thus would the final stage of the dialectic be achieved, revealing
the "full and actual presence of the Christ who is a totally incar-
nate love." 509. Akin to Altizer was Anglican bishop John A.T. Robinson. In
Honest to God, which sold over 500,000 copies in the United
States, he announced that Christianity was formulated at a time
when mythology still dominated human consciousness. On the ba-
sis of Bonhoeffer and others, he argued that theologians should
give up such relics of the past as transcendence.510 And Paul Van
Buren, in The Secular Meaning of the Gospel,511 argued on the
theology of dead myths and excessive dependence on philosophical modes of thought. Calla-
han, from the Cdtholic perspective, wrote that God "reveals Himself in history rather than
in the philosopher's study, [and] ... speaks through the language of events rather than that
of timeless essences." Callahan, Toward a Theology of Secularity, in THE SECULAR CITY
DEBATE 95 (1966) [hereinafter Callahan, Toward a Theology of Secularity] (pointing out
that few Catholic theologians would dissent).
508 T. ALTIZER, THE GOSPEL OF CHRISTIAN ATHEISM (1966). Altizer's work is described well
in Fackenheim, supra note 463, at 216-18.
509 Fackenheim, supra note 463, at 217 (quoting T. ALTiZER & W. HAMILTON, RADICAL
THEOLOGY AND THE DEATH OF GOD 157 (1966)). Fackenheim argues that Altizer was untrue
to Hegel, whom Barth had understood more accurately than modern death-of-God Hege-
lians. Fackenheim, supra note 463, at 228 n.41.
510 J. ROBINSON, HONEST TO GOD 51-54 (1963). See also Callahan, The Quest for Social
Relevance, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 339-40 (1968) [hereinafter Callahan, The Quest for So-
cial Relevance].
521 P. VAN BUREN, THE SECULAR MEANING OF THE GOSPEL (1963).
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basis of linguistic philosophy that the language used to describe
God is empirically meaningless; the gospel, to be made meaningful,
must be translated into empirical terms-the terms of science and
technology.5 21 Van Buren took "faith language" to be merely emo-
tive, as opposed to the objectively "true" world of empirical sci-
ence-thereby ignoring the very Kuhnian insight of both Barth
and the presuppositionalists, that "validity" itself depended on
one's initial presuppositions. 513
The "God-is-dead" theologians were, of course, featured in the
media-how could journalists resist so catching a phrase? The
dawn of the new secular era was heralded as if the end of history
had arrived. As Wills described it:
If the world were to be truly secular, God must die to it,
release his claim on it. The God-is-dead theologians even
congratulated. God on his sacrifice, on his death traded
for secularity's life. We should rejoice, not be sad, at his
demise, said Thomas Altizer: "All things will dance when
we greet them with affirmation."51 4
Jesus could still be praised as a moral example, but such emphasis
on Jesus operated as a kind of "theological chaser, making it all go
512 Id. at 81-106. See also Callahan, The Quest for Social Relevance, supra note 510, at
340.
51 See supra note 436 and accompanying text; see also Fackenheim, supra note 463, at
214-16. Fackenheim describes two different standpoints-the one within and the one
outside the circle of faith. Empiricism accepts as objective data only what is accessible to
one outside the circle; "thus the objective realm is confined to 'the world,' which in turn is
empirical data and the hypotheses needed to explain them." Id. at 215. With that stance
taken as one's basic presupposition, then faith does reduce itself to attitude. From the van-
tage point of faith, however, in its own self-understanding,
faith is a committed confrontation of the world... and in this confrontation of
the world .... it takes itself as receptive of an objective truth accessible only in
the believing attitude and inaccessible otherwise. Linguistic empiricism poses
as a refutation of faith; in fact, it merely takes its stand outside the circle of
faith, in a circle of its own in which the world of God is not heard and only
"data" are given.
Id.
In the face of the various God-is-dead celebrators of secularism, Fackenheim argued that
the Jewish response should be wary. Traditionally, Jews had found in secular liberalism
freedom from the oppression of a Christianizing culture-Fackenheim is urging reappraisal
of that Jewish position. Id. at 220, 223.




Cox, despite the optimism of The Secular City, was never quite
part of the exuberant pride that dared to proclaim the final stage
of the dialectic. Slightly chastened even by the mid-1960s, he ac-
knowledged the limitations of his own book. His enthusiastic em-
phasis on human possibility, on people as God's pragmatic "part-
ners," had threatened to overwhelm his own (avowedly Barthian)
understanding both of God's transcendence and of human sin.510
According to Daniel Callahan, Cox's pragmatic insistence on
context rather than false universals sought to have it both ways.
Could the pragmatic Christian be "unreservedly contextual" in
both ethics and evangelism, yet still employ categories like "bibli-
cal perspective" or "Kingdom of God," which, after all, "cut across
time and through history?" Such categories "illuminate the con-
textual without themselves being wholly contextual."5 117
For many people, moreover, the most pressing context is not the
context of enhanced possibility in a sophisticated urban environ-
ment, but of death, a fact Cox acknowledged ignoring in the secu-
lar city reality.518 As Callahan stated:
Some people are going to die tomorrow. That is their
context, and they want to know why. This is a very per-
sonal question, not something that [Deweyan] history or
sociology or politics can throw much light on. A question
like this is wretchedly ultimate, direct and noncontex-
tual. It just will not go away.
519
Neither would other "contextual" realities. The Holocaust,
which had taken place only twenty years earlier, was for Cox only
an atavistic resurgence of pre-modern tribalism. Yet its grim effi-
ciency depended on the modern, rational technology so admired by
Cox.5 0 Hence:
"' Sweet, supra note 338, at 35. Cox's Christo-centrism was more authentic, but he was
not part of the God-is-dead movement.
"' See Younger, Does the Secular City Revisit the Social Gospel?, in THE SECULAR CITY
DEBATE 78-79 (1966).
M" Callahan, Toward a Theology of Secularity, supra note 507, at 98. Hence, the inner
contradiction in Cox, which Wills points to. If one truly embraces secularization, then why
refer to Biblical categories at all? See G. WILLS, BARE RUINED CHOIRS, supra note 340, at 92.
Cox, Cox on His Critics, in THE SECULAR CITY DEBATE 87 (1966).
51 Callahan, Toward a Theology of Secularity, supra note 507, at 99.
520 Rubenstein, Cox's Vision of the Secular City, in THE SECULAR CITY DEBATE 132, 142.
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Cox sees the action of the God of history in technopolis.
If there is such a God, He has also manifested himself in
Auschwitz....
... Our problem is not how we shall think of God in a
secular way. It is how men can best share the decisive
crises of life, given the cold, unfeeling, indifferent cosmos
that surrounds us and given the fact that God the Holy
Nothingness offers us only dissolution and death as the
way out of the dilemmas of earthly existence. "21
Of course, the particular urban context of enhanced possibility
Cox celebrated was more available to some than others: "The
Playboy bachelor can make the most of urban anonymity; not ev-
eryone else can. Mobility is grand if one has brains and a future;
not everyone does. And so on. The urban-secular coin has two
sides and so does man. ' 522 This meant a reality more complex than
the linear one Cox had described. In fact, as some argued, the
world Cox both described and represented was the intellectual one
of a university trained elite. In the actual cities of America, accord-
ing to Andrew Greeley, ethnic and religious traditionalism were
more the rule than the outmoded exception. As Greeley stated,
My problem is not whether religion can live with secular
man, but whether he exists; and I will contend that save
in senior faculty positions in some universities and in cer-
tain places in the communications industry, secular man
is not common in the United States and does not seem to
be growing more common. On the contrary, secular man
43 (1966).
s21 Id. at 142-43.
Callahan, Toward a Theology of Secularity, supra note 507, at 99. Similarly, from
Richard Rubenstein:
There is something very success-oriented about his theology. He approves the
mobility and anonymity of the city, but says hardly enough about the hideous
price the poor have had to pay in rootlessness, disorientation and suffering as a
result of these phenomena. Anonymity and mobility can be enormously helpful
to successful, highly educated young men who are part of what Life magazine
recently called the "take-over" generation. They constitute an impossible bur-
den for the millions of Americans who lack the personal, social or psychological
resources with which to take advantage of the new freedom.
Rubenstein, gupra note 474, at 139.
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is a theologian's romanticized version of mass man-and
he doesn't exist either.
52 3
As a matter of sociological fact, Greeley's observations were ac-
curate. The particular world view of The Secular City and the
God-is-dead theologians was just that-a very particular world
view, one possibility among many, and one most easily embraced,
as Rabbi Rubenstein pointed out, by successful young men (and
soon, women) who could delight in their own competence.52 4 It was
also, as Rubenstein noted, for the most part peculiarly Protestant,
despite Vatican II, and most represented those very traditional
WASP enclaves of "tribal" power, the corporation and the univer-
sity-precisely those arenas within the modern secular city which
Cox praised for having progressed beyond tradition and tribalism
into the new era of secular pragmatism. 25
Rubenstein, in other words, quite brilliantly made the point we
now associate with Geertzian anthropological relativism. In effect,
we are all "natives" now, even including sophisticated, proudly sec-
ular and pragmatic WASP Harvard professors like Cox:
I fail to understand why one man's religious life must be
regarded as tribal while Cox, Protestant to his very core,
can insist that his theology has transcended the tribal-
isms and traditionalisms of the "earlier," "immature" re-
ligious postures .... I can only ask that he refrain from
turning men of other religions into primitive anticipa-
tions of what he has become.
526
The criticism was not only prophetic, but had already been real-
ized in emerging cultural divisions. Even in the early 1960s, when
there was relative religious unanimity supporting civil rights, there
was increasing disharmony in response to Supreme Court decisions
banning school prayer and school Bible reading. In 1962, the Court
123 Greeley, An Exchange of Views, in THE SECULAR CITY DEBATE 101 (1966).
52' Rubenstein, supra note 520, at 140.
525 Id. at 138.
121 Id. at 137. Cox, who did not quite agree with Greeley as a matter of sociology, ac-
knowledged Rubenstein's critique fully. See Cox, Afterword, supra note 498, at 181. He
admitted it was not the mark of the mature person to flippantly jettison the past. He has
also spent years, since then, studying other religious traditions at a very particular level. See
H. Cox, MANY MANSIONS (1989).
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in Engel v. Vitale52 7 held that reciting a nondenominational prayer
("Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and
we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
country") composed for school use by the New York Board of Re-
gents, violated the Establishment Clause despite provisions al-
lowing nonparticipants to remain silent or leave the room. The
prayer was not saved by the excuse provisions, the Court held, be-
cause unlike the Free Exercise Clause, under the Establishment
Clause neither compulsion nor coercion is the basis of the viola-
tion. Rather, it is the mere fact of public (governmental) religious
expression that triggers the ban. Only Justice Stewart dissented,
chiding the Court for its indifference to the "history of the reli-
gious traditions of our people," and citing the frequent instances of
religious expression in American public life, such as the "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance.82
A year later, in School District of Abington v. Schempp, 20 the
Court extended the doctrine to prohibit reading of the Bible (with-
out commentary) as part of daily opening exercises in schools, even
if student readers could choose the passages to be read. Justice
Stewart again dissented, viewing the decision "not as the realiza-
tion of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a reli-
gion of secularism, or at the least as government support for the
beliefs of those who think that religious exercises should be con-
ducted only in private."5 30 While Stewart was the lone dissenter,
the view that the Court was imposing a "religion of secularism" on
the country was widespread. After those decisions were announced,
condemnation came in waves, from both Catholics and Protestants.
Billy Graham, as just one example, said Engel was "another step
towards the secularization of the United States.6 3 1 Consistently,
roughly seventy-five percent of the American public has favored
5-7 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
a Id. at 446, 449 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Gary Wills suggests that a singular failure of
the Dukakis presidential campaign was its failure to understand that the Pledge of Alle-
giance issue worked so well for George Bush because the pledge is the only remaining in-
stance where the words "under God" may be invoked ceremonially in a public school. G.
WmLS, UNDER GOD supra note 340, at 80-82.
529 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
"0 Id. at 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
531 AJ. RFxcHLEY, supra note 26, at 147. In contrast, Graham did support civil rights on
religious grounds. See I. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 188.
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voluntary organized prayer in the schools. 532 In many areas, of
course, the Court decisions are simply ignored. A 1966 study of
Tennessee showed that in all but one school district, Bible reading
was continued despite Schempp.5 33 Polls indicate that no other
Court rulings have elicited so much criticism. 3 4
Americans already outraged 35 over Engel and Schempp were
hardly pleased to learn from the media that their supposedly most
sophisticated theologians were preaching "God-is-dead" theology
while praising the delights of secularism.5 3 1 Increasingly, the image
of the "new class" liberal secularists emerged: an educated elite
that was contemptuous of the religious beliefs of the majority and
was able to use access to the government and to the media to im-
pose a secularist culture on American society.5 37 When many "old
line" Protestant churches (mainly Episcopalian, Presbyterian and
Congregationalist), along with liberal Catholics, seemed to side
with the secularists, they too were viewed as having abandoned the
faith.
This divisiveness was compounded when the moral/political is-
sues of the late 1960s failed to arouse the relative unanimity that
had marked the campaign for the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In fact,
moral consensus in the country as a whole broke down. In the late
1960s, unlike the brief Camelot period, the correct course of action
for churches in the world became unclear. In the face of that un-
certainty, the shallowness of the liberal presumption that all tradi-
tion could be discarded had its most corrosive effect.
532 A.J. REICHLEY, supra note 26, at 149.
113 K. WALD, supra note 397, at 129. In 1984, Reagan supported an amendment to permit
prayer in public institutions, including schools. It was supported by 56 senators, but not by
the 67 needed for passage. Id. at 130.
1 Id. at 132.
"' Wald points out that survey results are not unambiguous, however. Id. Given wide.
spread political support for allowing prayer and Bible reading, it is surprising that political
action has not led to results. That may be due to de facto tolerance for the practice in areas
where feelings run especially strong, combined with the fact that support is stronger among
the less educated and, therefore, less powerful voters.
M Cox had favored neutrality but distinguished that from an "intolerant religion of secu-
larism." H. Cox, THE SECULAR CiTY, supra note 400, at 100. He opposed prayer in the
schools, but praised the California State Board of Education for stating that a "point of
view denying God" would be as inappropriate as to "promote a particular religious sect." Id.
Whether those distinctions are workable is highly debatable, but central to the American
church/state dilemma.
" See infra notes 680-789.
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It was, after all, the pragmatic experts in Washington, so cele-
brated by Cox, who started the Vietnam War, revealing the poten-
tially tragic dimension of action in the world. Sorting out the ethi-
cal meaning of Vietnam required more than the categories of
Deweyan pragmatism-when action is taken by the powerful,
Langdon Gilkey commented, one begins to find relevant "some of
the older theological categories descriptive of sin and guilt within
all active social involvement, categories expressing the need for
communal repentance, forgiveness, reconciliation, and meaning be-
yond the ambiguity that is consequent to everything that man
does." 538 Even the apparently unambiguous morality of racial jus-
tice was revealing its own fateful ambiguity with struggles over the
legitimacy of violence rather than nonviolence and black power
and separatism rather than integration. 3 '
Similar breakdowns were occurring within Catholicism. Murray's
carefully formulated categories seemed to collapse in the absence
of consensus. Under Vatican II, the church was not supposed to
have a particular political agenda, but it did have a responsibility
to help shape society's moral consensus. As American bishops, fol-
lowing the Vatican II mandate, have explained, public policy deci-
sions necessarily involve moral judgments, and the church must
share (indeed, cannot avoid sharing) in the development of a pub-
lic moral consensus on the basis of which such decisions can be
made. In theory, since the church premises its positions on human
rights, to which both the church and the American polity are com-
mitted, the Church cannot be said to violate the Constitution when
addressing specific moral issues.
In that spirit, American bishops in the 1970s issued statements
critically evaluating the morality of the Vietnam War (1971) and
the American economy (1975). More recently, they issued their
dramatic pastoral letter condemning nuclear weapons (1983), in
which they explicitly appealed to that natural law which is "writ-
ten on the human heart by God" and from which "reason draws
moral norms." Joseph Cardinal Bernardin has insisted on a consis-
tent pro-life philosophy, a "seamless garment" encompassing the
church's position on nuclear armaments, abortion and the death
penalty. The goal has been to help define a set of principles that
Gilkey, supra note 420, at 163-64.
3" Id. at 163.
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would structure public debate and policy but not to enter into de-
tailed disputes over, for example, specific weapons proposals.
40
That Vatican II goal remained uncontroversial only so long as
there was some public consensus on the meaning of human rights
(and natural law). By the mid-1960s, consensus over basic Ameri-
can values had dissolved. Was the Vietnam War a "just war" or a
violation of natural law? Was the right to economic well-being a
fundamental human right, as Vatican II proclaimed, or did it run
counter to the priority American constitutionalism gave to "nega-
tive," libertarian rights? In other words, as the church tried to play
a responsible role in the public debate, it found itself unable sim-
ply to stake out a high ground of moral guidance; instead, it was
taking a stand on issues that aroused resentment even within the
church itself.54'
The breakdown of moral consensus raised hard questions about
the proper role of the Catholic Church, questions which were just
coming to the fore as the abortion debate began. Conservatives
were generally urging the church to draw back from the expansive-
ness of Vatican II and to retreat into its sacramental role-to facil-
itate personal salvation, not set the terms for public debate. At the
other extreme were the Berrigans, who, in their radical opposition
to the war, exemplified an activist ministry of gospel-oriented
Christian witness. The Berrigans were part of the long, morally
compelling church tradition of prophetic witness, which some now
think is the proper role of the church in an increasingly secular
world, but that tradition was bound to run counter to the church's
institutional goal of broad-based inclusiveness and accommodation
to state power.542 Many, however, continued to strive for the Vati-
can II ideal of a church that could play a responsible, but not divi-
sive, role in public life without surrendering its special Christian
mission and becoming just another player in the secular field.
Those efforts were undercut in 1968 when Pope Paul issued
"0 See O'Brien, Catholic Contentiousness, supra note 491, at 158-59 (analyzing various
public statements of American Catholic bishops); see also G. WILLS, UNDER GOD, supra note
340, at 324-25.
5' See Cahill, The Catholic Tradition: Religion, Morality, and the Common Good, 5 J.L,
& RELIGION, 75, 77-82 (1987); see also Callahan, The Quest for Social Relevance, supra note
510, at 356.
"l2 See G. WILLS, BARE RUINED CHOIRS, supra note 340, at 241-50.
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Humanae Vitae,4 3 the encyclical that announced his decision to
continue condemning "artificial" contraception. The Pope had as-
sembled a commission to study the question of birth control, and a
majority of the commission had actually decided that the church
should change its position. Noonan, who was a member of that
commission and a determined advocate of reform, carefully
showed, as in his Natural Law Forum article, that the church
could both adhere to its natural law methodology and change its
position on a particular rule. By tracing the subtle dialectic of con-
tinuity and change in church teaching on both usury and birth
control, Noonan demonstrated that such a reversal was not a sur-
render to relativism but was in the best tradition of Catholic ethi-
cal thought."'
The issue of birth control was a charged one, however, and the
extremists on both sides of the debate ignored Noonan's careful
approach. People on the left and on the right insisted that the
whole tradition somehow depended on this weakest link in the
Catholic moral chain. If the Pope admitted "error" on this point,
conservatives argued, then how could the church continue to hold
that its natural law teachings were authoritative? Moreover, de-
spite the peculiar inconsistencies that had developed in the
church's prior arguments, the distinction between "artificial" and
"natural" means still held powerful appeal.
Secular liberals, in turn, mockingly adopted the conservative
line-if the church pragmatically changed its mind on this point,
that just showed the emptiness of its claims to moral authority
and, implicitly, the absurdity of the whole Aristotelian, natural law
tradition on which the birth control teachings had been based." 5
The Pope's decision to maintain tradition then convinced skeptics
that the church had rejected the spirit of Vatican H, retreating in-
stead into rigid moral absolutism and inordinate preoccupation
with channeling sexuality. The church's opposition to abortion
would later be dismissed by many outside the church as simply an
extension of the Catholic stand on birth control.
In fact, however, by the end of the 1960s, one's position with
543 POPE PAUL VL Hu uN, VrrA ACTS APoSToLIcAE SErns (1968) reprinted in TitE
PAPAL EVA GELICALS, 1958-1981, at 223 (1981).
14, Noonan, Tokos and Atokion, supra note 295.
5 See G. WILLS, BARE RmNE.D CHOIRS, supra note 340, at 176-87.
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respect to tradition itself became the principal measure of one's
location in the American religious landscape. Familiar denomina-
tional squabbles (even Protestant against Catholic) became dis-
placed, as the recurring and insistent dividing line for American
religion became "Old" (Traditionalist) versus "New" (Secularist).
To be sure, denominational difference did not disappear, but the
Old/New line became the sharpest one-and on no issue was that
line so starkly evident as with abortion. 46
There was considerable caricature in the conservative image of
the "new" secularist Christians: morally loose, compromised by
secular humanism, hung up on faddish social issues with a shallow
knowledge about what religion is really about, a shallow knowledge
about the Bible, and having an "anything goes" attitude, with
"marshmallow" convictions. 47 Nevertheless, institutional realities
exacerbated the tension and fed suspicions produced by the 1960s.
After the dramatic success of the effort on behalf of the Civil
Rights Act, many national church-affiliated groups began to de-
scend on Washington (and New York City), perfecting the tech-
niques of expertise that seemed to be required for effective deploy-
ment of power in the modern secular state. 4 Most of the special
purpose religious groups concerned specifically with influencing
government date from no earlier than the 1960s. Some were still
"I See Noll, Catholics and Protestants Since Vatican H, in UNCIVIL RELIGION 99-101
(1987).
50 See R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 132-33. These stereotypes were based on a 1984
Gallup survey and a report of a church official. This is, of course, matched by an equally
caricatured version of traditionalists-intolerant, morally rigid, fanatical, unsophisticated,
close-minded, simplistic, smug, self-righteous, having a loveless, dogmatic faith, etc. Id.
'5 This is not, of course, to say that religious groups did not, in the past, try to influence
legislation, and succeed. Those that proliferated after the 1960s were those that were specifi-
cally concerned with dealing with government. See R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 115-16.
The number of specific purpose religious groups-those representing workers within ecclesi-
astical institutions (managers, secretaries, etc.) as well as those representing various
women's concerns (both pro- and anti-feminist) also increased significantly. Id. at 107-12.
Prior to 1960, some denominations had already located themselves in Washington. As
early as 1946 Baptists had appointed a lobbyist to "watch the Catholics." See A.J. REICIILEY,
supra note 26, at 244. A 1951 study by Ray Ebersole found 16 church offices located in
Washington. Id. at 245. Even the NCC's Washington office, however, was originally directed
"not to engage in efforts to influence legislation," a prohibition dropped specifically for the
purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. For an account of church activity on behalf of
the Act, see id. at 246-50. Catholics were less inclined to use direct lobbying and more in-
clined to work through parish constituents, but that difference was not considered divi-
sive-only complementary. Id. at 248.
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involved with civil rights, some arose in response to specific gov-
ernmental rulings and some were advocates on behalf of groups
about whose welfare there was special concern-children, the hun-
gry, gays, women, handicapped, single parents and others.
These church groups have dealt with Congress, government
agencies and sometimes involved themselves with litigation. They
are typically labeled the "National" or the "American," rather
than by reference to denomination or to religion at all. This is per-
haps a symbol of the extent to which they draw on the modern,
secular techniques of politicking rather than on distinct religious
heritages. 9 Most have professional staffs and complex budgets;
they hire specialists, consultants, researchers and news writers. In-
tricate bureaucratic chains link groups to each other and to church
institutional structures.550
This "move to Washington,"5 1 which occurred in the 1960s
chiefly among denominations who were members of the active
NCC, was also accompanied by organizational restructuring within
the denominations themselves. With the accumulated resources of
the 1950s, churches already had extensive bureaucracies, but a
newer tendency was for those who were more secular in outlook to
exert a more powerful influence. One Presbyterian minister de-
scribed the process as follows: "[P]erhaps because they are by in-
clination more alert to the new, open to the secular world, and in-
dined to respect science in any form-[they] have become the
skilled process managers, strategy planners, and agents of
change. 552 Denominational representative bodies increasingly fell
into the hands of the church bureaucracies: the new managers,
those who understood pragmatic politics, knew how to control
agendas, control the sources of expert opinion and ultimately to
control denominational decisions.5 s Later, of course, conservative
Christians, especially evangelicals, would try to reseize the ter-
rain-with marked success in Washington, under the manipulative
9 R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 123-24.
550 Id. at 125-30.
"" See A.J. RMCHLEY, supra note 26, at 244 ("The Churches Come to Washington"). For
a serious Catholic justification of the impact churches could have on social reform, see Calla-
han, The Quest for Social Relevance, supra note 510, at 358-63.
552 AJ. REOcHLEY, supra note 26, at 277.
1 Id. at 277-78.
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guidance of skilled conservative political activists.5 54
The "new breed" clergy of the 1960s elicited resentment, less for
the specific causes they advanced than for their almost contemptu-
ous failure to relate those causes to the denominational traditions
they were representing. Cox had set the tone by dismissing most
churches as so stifling and conventional that they usually failed to
represent the "real church," which is, he said, the reconciling act of
God in the world, wherever it may be occurring., That "real"
work was more likely to occur, it was often claimed, during a civil
rights march than during an ordinary church service.
Notably, the freedom of the new-breed clergy to involve them-
selves in direct social action overtly aimed at challenging existing
social structures-which they did in growing numbers during the
1960s and 1970s-arose from their ability to separate themselves,
institutionally, from the laity. The so-called managerial revolution
in church organization produced a number of well-educated spe-
cialist clergy, trained in universities as well as major divinity
schools and serving, not as pastors, but rather as staff persons in
church social action bureaucracies or university ministries.t'5 0 Stud-
ies showed that the clergy who were most likely to be involved with
direct social action were precisely those who were not working as
pastor to -a congregation and were not directly subject to lay
control.557
Social action by the clergy became more visible and radical as
public consensus broke down. Often, lay resentment was directed
specifically at the highly visible new-breed "tactics," and did not
represent, for example, pure racist opposition to advancing civil
rights for African-Americans. Yet, from the vantage point of those
involved in direct action, if the problem were structural, only tac-
tics directed at the structure could be effective.55 8 Clergy not only
"' Id. at 314-27.
615 H. Cox, THE SECULAR CITY, supra note 400, at 225-26. The church is the "eventful
moment" in which barriers are being struck down, and a radically new community beyond
the divisiveness of inherited labels and stereotypes is emerging. Id. at 226.
' ' Cox, The "New Breed" in American Churches: Sources of Social Activism in Ameri-
can Religion, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 374-75 (1968) [hereinafter Cox, The "New Breed").
On the dilemma of professionalization and specialization, see Wilson, Religion and the
Churches in Contemporary America, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 99-102 (1968).
1" R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 145-46; see also K. WALD, supra note 397, at 246; Cox,
The "New Breed", supra note 556, at 374-75.
" R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 146-49.
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took visible part in civil rights and anti-war demonstrations, but
also led rent strikes, organized pickets, served in community action
projects, financed low-cost housing projects and organized welfare
recipient unions. 9 Some were so determined to break with the
church tradition of "charity," as opposed to real empowerment of
the poor, that they advocated noncooperation even with the war on
poverty, unless real provisions were made for power and participa-
tion of the poor. Thus, the Presbyterian Division of Church Strat-
egy and Development warned:
There are serious dangers in the way current community
action programs are being structured. Lines of control are
being drawn tightly to a central bureaucracy. Vital dy-
namic elements in the city are in danger of being
smothered by the kinds of control of the local citizens
which are built into.., the poverty operation.56°
The point was, of course, accurate in its depiction of government
bureaucracy. The irony was the extent to which the same defects
characterized the new breed themselves, in relation to their own
"communities," the churches.56 1 Disdainful of their own frumpy
denominational traditions and communities, and not able (or will-
ing) to awaken those communities by reference to theology, they
offered no explanation for their actions except by reference to an
increasingly secular political vocabulary. Resentment grew, and
counter-groups formed, even within the mainline churches, to op-
pose the most activist stances of the clergy, even as the most con-
servative evangelical churches grew in numbers. 62
Saul Alinsky, the 1960s political activist, described the special
51 I. WALD, supra note 397, at 242; Cox, The "New Breed", supra note 556, at 371-72.
Saul Alinsky said that the churches were "now taking the leadership in social change." Id.
at 371.
Cox, The "New Breed," supra note 556, at 381.
" There is some surprise in this, given the importance of Paul Lehmann's work, a so-
phisticated examination of philosophy which stressed the importance of "koinonia," or
Christian community, as the basis of ethics. P. LEHLAN, supra note 270. For a time koi-
nonia was a trendy term, until, it was said, the churches had "koinonitis," but too little
attention was devoted to sustained communities over time, as part of an historic religious
tradition. See Sweet, supra note 338, at 4243. Sweets work is an excellent summary of the
1960s. Churches tried to meet the needs of congregations but not bring them into an historic
tradition, which is part of the task of theology.
112 See, e.g., R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 186.
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contribution new breed clergy were making to radical politics. He
had never before seen, he said, the "pure flame of passion for jus-
tice you find in these young ministers today. 5 63 As Cox pointed
out, there was good theological basis for that passion in the special
gospel status assigned to the poor and also in the notion- of the
"blessed community," of equal participants. 64 Yet, there was also
theological reason for caution. Karl Barth, with his own leanings
toward socialism, nevertheless warned of the dangers of a too arro-
gant (and too idolatrous) commitment to political opposition.05
"The revolutionary Titan," Barth wrote, "is far more godless, far
more dangerous, than his reactionary counterpart-because he is
so much nearer to the truth."5 6 As Barth explains, the Biblical
message does, indeed, expose the injustice and the arrogance of all
worldly authority:
Rulers! What are rulers but men? What are they but men
hypocritically engaged in setting things in order, in order
that they may-cowards that they are-ensure them-
selves securely against the riddle of their own existence?
• . . That men should, as a matter of course, claim to
possess a higher right over their fellow men, . . . this
whole pseudo-transcendence of an altogether immanent
order is the wound that is inflicted by every existing gov-
ernment-even by the best-upon those who are most
delicately conscious of what is good and right. . . . Men
have no right to possess objective right against other
men. And so, the more they surround themselves with
objectivity, the greater is the wrong they inflict upon
others. . . Is there anywhere legality which is not fun-
damentally illegal? Is there anywhere authority which is
not ultimately based upon tyranny? There is a certain
imperfection in the existing ordinances by which we are
enabled to detect that their existence is, as such, evil.
• . . There is a certain strange and penetrating percep-
tion which sees through the fiction that lies behind our
"I Cox, The "New Breed," supra note 556, at 371-72 (quoting Alinsky).
064 Id. at 375-76.
"' K. BARTH, THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS (1933).
"' Id. at 478.
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bondage. 67
The critical impulse is thus born of gospel truth, and of accurate
perception-a perception that sees through the "fiction" of ideol-
ogy, rightly detecting the "imperfection in the existing ordi-
nances." (Hence, for example, critical legal studies). Too easily,
however, the revolutionary, as well, falls into idolatry, forgetting
that he is not the One, that he is not the subject of the
freedom which he so earnestly desires, that, for all the
strange brightness of his eyes, he is not the Christ who
stands before the Grand Inquisitor, but is, contrariwise,
the Grand Inquisitor encountered by the Christ. He too
is claiming what no man can claim. He too is making of
the right a thing. He too confronts other men with his
supposed right. He too usurps a position which is not due
to him, a legality which is fundamentally illegal, an au-
thority which . . . soon displays its essential tyranny.
What man has the right to propound and represent the
New, whether it be a new age, or a new world, or even a
new spirit? Is not every new thing, insofar as it can be
schemed by men, born of what already exists? The mo-
ment it becomes a human proposition, must it not be
numbered among the things that are? What man is there
who, having proposed a novelty, has not proposed an evil
thing? Far more than the conservative, the revolutionary
is overcome of evil, because with his "No" he stands so
strangely near to God.5
68
The popular disaffection from the "liberal" political action direc-
tion of mainstream churches in the 1960s and 1970s can be over-
stated. Sometimes it is assumed that people left those churches in
droves and switched to evangelical churches instead. The story is
more complex. Even in what came to be called the liberal denomi-
nations,569 ministers tended to be less politically liberal than staff,
although more liberal than their congregations. Moreover, they
continued to perform their pastoral functions, concerning them-
selves with issues like death, where the ordinary and the ultimate
667 Id. at 478-80.
Id. at 480.
'8 See supra note 424.
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intersect to place our temporal concerns in appropriate perspec-
tive.7 In churches where the education level was highest, the gap
between the laity and "new breed" church leadership was narrow-
est, as in, especially, Episcopalian churches,7 1 which became
among the most liberal. And in many ways those denominations at
the forefront of social action were successful, both in bringing
American religion out of the complacency of the 1950s and in pro-
viding social services whose value few have seriously questioned.
During the 1980s, when there was too little American concern, in
Washington or elsewhere, about the ethical dimension of social re-
sponsibility, liberal mainline churches kept that concern alive.
Those churches still represent a vital tradition in American life,
which may regain some of its lost force.
Yet, the mainline churches did dramatically decline in member-
ship numbers, losing members for the most part to the "nonaf-
filiates." Most affected by the decline were the "old line" denomi-
nations, once the mainstay of American religion-Episcopalian,
Presbyterian and Congregational. Those denominations, which had
always been comprised of the best-educated, saw their youth, espe-
cially, defecting to the secular culture, losing interest in religion
altogether. 72 The increasingly secular vocabulary of clergy, while
not necessarily offensive, hardly differentiated itself from that
same secular culture. Meanwhile, the birth rate among the old line
membership declined, and the population shift away from the
northeast also drew members away from the old line churches
whose base had been there.
Traditionally, the Presbyterians and Episcopalians had gained
members from the upwardly mobile, who "switched" as they
achieved higher social status. If one began life as a poor evangelical
Baptist, wealth might eventually lead one to become Episcopa-
lian.57 3 Such switching did not disappear, but its rate declined as
evangelicals entered the mainstream in terms of education and so-
cial status. More significantly, evangelicals (whether "conserva-
570 On the continuing need for ministers to concern themselves with such matters, see
Clebsch, American Religion and the Cure of Souls, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 249-68 (1968).
571 P. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 161-62.
572 One of the most important changes is that religious participation used to increase with
education; by the end of the 1960s that was no longer true. See id.
673 On changing patterns generally, see W. ROOF & W.'McKINNEY, supra note 26, at 161-
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tive" or not) were able to keep their younger members committed
to their churches-and those members had larger families. By
1976, one-third of Americans said they were "born again.1
7 4
With the possible exception of school prayer, no aspect of "new
breed" secularized theology alienated traditionalists so much as its
failure to offer any basis for personal, moral decisionmaking. Even
as it stood resolute on morally grounded social issues, like racism,
the new theology failed to address basic questions of personal and
family responsibility.57 5 One could conclude that theology, in be-
coming secularized, had simply surrendered to the "do your own
thing" lifestyle culture of the 1960s. No theologian fulfilled this
characterization as much as Joseph Fletcher, an Episcopalian theo-
logian from Cambridge, Massachusetts, whose well-publicized Sit-
uation Ethics: The New Morality,5 6 was published in 1966 and
taken to represent the erosion of all traditional, external sources of
moral authority.7
Fletcher emphatically rejected all legalism, all appeal to scrip-
tural law. Nothing remained, he said, but love;176 he rejected the
complex Barthian dialectic of law and moral freedom. On the other
hand, he also rejected love as antinomian intuitionalism 79 or pie-
tistic sentimentality."' Love, he said, represents concern for the
other, which can basically be reduced to a utilitarian calculus of
consequences. 51 Nothing was wrong "in itself" but only if it led to
greater harm than benefit. Ends did, therefore, justify means.82
He urged a de-emphasis on sexual morality, 83 and a more utilita-
rian concern with responsible (pragmatic) decisionmaking. Absolu-
tist abortion restriction was one of his examples of an outmoded
moral authoritarianism.8 4
5R IL WuTHNow, supra note 21, at 192.
55 Cox is an exception. His critique of consumerist sexuality-the idols of the Playboy
and the American Girl of Miss America-is one of the most insightful parts of The Secular
City. See H. Cox, THE SECULAR CrrY, supra note 400, at 192-216.
576 J. FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS: THE NEW MORALITY (1966) [hereinafter J. FLErcatn
SITUATION ETHICS].
57 See XV. RooF AND W. McKINNEY, supra note 26, at 62.
578 See, e.g., J. FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS, supra note 576, at 64.67, 77.
570 Id. at 18-21.
580 Id. at 91.
58! Id. at 189.
Id. at 133.
11s Id. at 139.
-- Id. at 33, 37, 62. Fletcher criticizes Barth's disapproving attitude.
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Fletcher's offensiveness lay in openly and wholeheartedly em-
bracing what others recognized as a danger-the reduction of Prot-
estant ethics to mere act utilitarianism, distinctively Christian only
in that its underlying motivation was a vaguely conceived "love."
Fletcher was controversial in part because, to avoid the Protestant
danger of ungrounded intuitionism, he made ihe utilitarian
calculus so explicit, even quantifiable, while fetishizing technol-
ogy.5s5 Writing at some length about medical ethics, he actually
stated, for example, the precise number one should score on an I.Q.
test before sensibly being treated as "human" for medical policy
purposes.5 88 Schaeffer's outraged "absolutism" on the question of
medical ethics, including abortion (as in the movie and book co-
authored by Koop),87 was in part a response to that "situational"
approach to the subject.
Fletcher even tried to appropriate both Barth and Bonheoffer as
complete situationalists, in each instance through oversimplifica-
tion.58 8 He regarded abortion as just another means of fertility con-
trol, perhaps the least desirable one, but nevertheless "good if the
good to be gained is great enough to justify the means." 89 He dis-
missed the "natural-law ethic" as "self-contradictory, problemati-
cal, and dead as Queen Anne."' s0 On euthanasia, Fletcher sug-
gested that in "this day of existential outlook," we might "think
twice on Nietzsche's observation, 'In certain cases it is indecent to
go on living.'-51 Ironically, in view of subsequent history, and
probably because Fletcher thought he had history on his side, he
proclaimed that "Without a consensus, a democratic agreement
about what is immoral, there can be no true civil law. ' 9 2 In fact,
sounding much like his liberal legal counterparts, Fletcher offered
his situationist baseline that, "In the end there is nothing but
888 For critical responses to Fletcher in this regard, see R. McCoRMIcK, How BRAVE A NEW
WORLD?: DILEMMAS IN BIOETHIcS 45-46, 334-35 (1981); P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF
LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL INTERSECTIONS 204 (1978) ("Fletcher is simply a sign of our
times"); see also J. GUSTAFSON, PROTESTANT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC ETHICS 38-40 (1978).
886 See J. Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man, THE HASTINUS
CENTER RPT. 2, No. 5 (November 1972).
887 FA: SCHAEFFER & C.E. Koop, supra note 439.
8 See J. FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS, supra note 576, at 33.
58 J. FLETCHER, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: SITUATION ETHICS AT WORK 123 (1967).
890 Id.
888 Id. at 145.
882 Id. at 124.
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To his credit, Fletcher forced modern Christians to face a tech-
nological world in which they could not avoid ethical responsibility
for calculating life and death decisions. Everyday social decision-
making involves choosing death-Noonan's own traffic speed ex-
ample or the introduction of factory procedures which pose "ac-
ceptable" risks to workers-as well as the less prosaic examples of
going to war or ending a patient's life. We are all purveyors of
death. As Fletcher insisted, that reality does not disappear because
we refuse to acknowledge it, and pretend to an absolutism we can-
not carry off. Utilitarianism forces us to acknowledge the reality of
cost in a world of scarcity, and to recognize that calculations must
be made.
Inevitably, however, Fletcher fell into the standard utilitarian
version of the fact/value dilemma: he made value judgments about
facts and then used the facts to substantiate the value judgments.
A calculus of consequences can never be value-free; nor can it ever
be a true calculus, for many consequences are elusive, intangible
and unpredictable.
IV. THE MORAL STATUS OF THE ABORTION ISSUE: A TALE OF
Two CONFERENCES
A. Abortion as Morally Debatable
Despite the sterility of late 1960s mainstream religion, some
holdouts, even in the face of the seeming triumph of secularism
and fully aware of proceeding against the current, sought to con-
tinue to address the abortion issue as one of debatable public mo-
rality, in both its general and particular aspects. Appeals to theo-
logical sources were regarded as central to the ethical debate. That
debate included both the morality of abortion and the separate is-
sue of the legitimacy of state intervention into the decisionmaking
process. A striking example of such debate was a conference held
in Washington, D.C., in September 1967, sponsored by both the
Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation and the Harvard Divinity
School.
An outcome of that conference was the publication of The Mo-
511 Fletcher, Reflection and Reply, in THE SrrUATION ETHICS DmATE, 249, 263 (H. Cox ed.
1968).
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rality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, edited and
introduced by John T. Noonan, Jr.594 Based on the published vol-
59 THE MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (J. Noonan ed.
1970) [hereinafter THE MORALITY OF ABORTION] included contributions by John Noonan,
Paul Ramsey, James Gustafson, Bernard Hiring, George Williams, John Finnis and David
Louisell.
The same conference produced an earlier volume published as THE TERRIBLE CHOICE: THE
ABORTION DILEMMA (1968) [hereinafter THE TERRIBLE CHOICE], edited and written with the
help of Robert Cooke, M.D., Andre E. Hellegers, M.D., Robert G. Hoyt, and Herbert W.
Richardson, Ph.D. The book contains: a foreword by Pearl Buck; a list of participants (sev-
enty-two in all); five "case studies" presented dramatically at the conference as occasions for
discussion; transcripts of some of that discussion following each presentation; and summary
chapters, first on the then-current law with respect to abortion, followed by chapters deal-
ing, respectively, with the perspectives offered by social scientists, physicians, ethicists and
lawyers.
The brief epilogue leads off with the observation that "[i]f there is anything that is clear
about the issue of abortion, it is that it is complicated, delicate, and difficult," because "peo-
ple who come at it with honest, humane convictions have differences which are not easily
composed." Id. at 105. The authors/editors expect that public policy decisions with respect
to abortion "will continue to be made in the social-political process." Id. at 106. They con-
clude with the observation that "[tihe International Conference on Abortion was held, and
this book was written, in the hope that as the decisions are made there will be responsible
public debate, based on the facts and issues as we understand them, and regard for our
values of compassion, freedom, and reverence for life." Id.
From the perspective of the current abortion debate, The Terrible Choice is an unusual
book. Contemporary pro-choice advocates would probably view it as a pro-life tract, since it
recognizes "reverence" for fetal life as an issue for public policy decisionmaking, id,, while
their pro-life counterparts today would probably regard the book as a sellout, since abortion
is presented as morally ambiguous and not necessarily to be regulated or criminalized even
if regarded as morally wrong. What is particularly striking is that theologians, speaking from
within their diverse moral traditions, are taken seriously as having an important role in the
debate.
Of the 72 participants, 15 are listed under "Medical," 12 under "Social Sciences," 16
under "Ethics," 15 under "Law" and 15 under "Representatives-at-Large." Twenty-three of
the participants (not even including Noonan) are identifiable as religiously affiliated, mem-
bers of the clergy, teachers of religion or in divinity schools, or representatives of religious
organizations. Eight of the participants are women (identifiable by name). With respect to
race, one can identify both Dorothy Height, then-president of the National Council of Negro
Women, and Whitney Young, then-executive director of the Urban League. The group also
included three college presidents (Mary Bunting, Arthur Flemming and Rev. Theodore Hes-
burg), two Supreme Court Justices (Abe Fortas and Potter Stewart) and a United States
Senator (Mark Hatfield). Id. at xiii-xvi.
Preceding the title page of The Terrible Choice is a statement of the "Purpose and Origin
of the First International Conference on Abortion," which offers an accurate overview of
what follows in the published volume:
The first International Conference on Abortion that was interdisciplinary in
nature was convened in Washington, D.C., in the fall of 1967 under sponsor-
ship of the Harvard Divinity School and the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr.
Foundation.
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ume, the participants were all wary of accelerating reform, yet not
necessarily resolute in opposition, and hardly spoke with one voice.
Of the seven essays, five are explicitly theological, °51 one is ostensi-
bly rooted in a secular natural law tradition ("the universal respect
for the value of human life"), 5 6 and the last essay is a legal brief in
the nature of an attempted preemptive strike against the yet-to-
be-decided Roe v. Wade.
97
Noonan's introduction, while unsurprisingly strident, grudgingly
acknowledges a changing social reality. 98 Noonan saw three forces
combining to change the rules with respect to abortion: first, pro-
fessional autonomy in the name of science and expertise; second,
the urgency of world population control; and third, an agenda of
reproductive freedom, which, for Noonan, meant the combination
of sexual freedom and rational control of consequences. The third
force he perceived as a subset of a larger, across-the-board resis-
tance to the intrusion of traditional moralities into lifestyle
issues.599
Conference planners for both organizations agreed-
-that abortion is a moral, social and cultural matter, as well as a medical
and legal problem; and that it should not be decided for all society by doctors
or lawyers acting alone;
-that abortion is not an issue which divides Catholics, Jews and Protestants
along denominational lines, for some leading religious authorities from all
groups oppose abortion while others justify it, albeit in limited cases;
-that abortion is an issue of vital importance to all, for it involves delicate
questions that are basic to concepts of life, responsibility for retarded or other-
wise disadvantaged children, and morality,
- and finally, both groups agreed it was time to substitute thoughtful discus-
sion among responsible experts for the emotional publicity given to those abor-
tion cases involving rape, mental retardation, incest or physical defects of the
fetus like those caused by thalidomide poisoning, all of which taken together
account for much less than five per cent of all abortions.
Id. at unnumbered introductory page.
"" Haring, A Theological Evaluation, in THE MORALrrY OF ABORTION, supra note 594, at
123; Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALrrY OF ABnORION, supra
note 594, at 1; Ramsey, Reference Points in Deciding about Abortion, in TnE MORALrTY OF
ABORTION, supra note 594, at 60; Gustafson, A Protestant Ethical Approach, in TnE Mo-
nALrlY OF ABORTION, supra note 594, at 101; and Williams, The Sacred Condominium, in
THE MORALITY OF ABORTION, supra note 594, at 146.
1" Finnis, Three Schemes of Regulation, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION, supra note 594.
197 Louisell & Noonan, Constitutional Balance, in THE MORAITY OF ABORTION, supra
note 594.
THE MORALITY OF ABORTION, supra note 594, at ix-xvii.
8" See id. at xv-xviL Lawrence Friedman's recent The Republic of Choice may be seen as
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The actual theological essays, three Protestant and two Catholic,
share the assumption that abortion is an issue of public morality,
to be discussed as such. The collection offers a variety of positions,
from categorical moral absolutism 00 to post-Vatican II Catholic
pragmatic flexibility601 and even a version of Protestant contextual
ethics. 02 Few of the essays offer easy answers; the common thread
is treating the issue as a hard one, and calling for the application
of ethical insight derived from theological tradition.
The essay by James Gustafson, A Protestant Ethical Ap-
proach,s as illustrated the potential for a Protestant ethical ap-
an extended elaboration of Noonan's cultural observation. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 20.
Noonan, writing in 1970, described the promoters of this new culture as "[c]ollege students,
journalists, lawyers, physicians, professors, and opinion-makers." Introduction to THE Mo-
RALrrY OF ABORTION, supra note 594, at xvii.
00 E.g., Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION,
supra note 594, at 1 (Catholic); Ramsey, Reference Points in Deciding About Abortion, in
THE MORALITY OF ABORTION, supra note 594, at 60 (Protestant). Ramsey's position is a bit
more complicated, however. Ramsey is quoted in The Terrible Choice as distinguishing
abortion as a moral issue from its legal status:
[T]he churches and anyone else concerned with the moral ethos of this civiliza-
tion ought to know that even now it is the morality of acts of abortion with
which they should be chiefly concerned-not with proposed public policies that
would use abortion law as an interim solution. I suggest ... that those among
us who believe that morally abortion is, or sometimes is, a species of the sin of
murder might be able to distinguish this from any conclusion to the question
whether such abortion ought to be defined as a crime in the penal code.
THE TERRIBLE CHOICE, supra note 594, at 92 (quoting Ramsey, Reference Points in Decid-
ing about Abortion, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION, supra note 594, at 63).
Moreover, there is basis in Ramsey's own essay for differential, more relaxed treatment of
early abortiion. On the other hand, Ramsey reacted to sweeping cultural change by becom-
ing much more extreme in his opposition to abortion, even before Roe v. Wade. See Ramsey,
The Morality of Abortion, in THE ETHICS OF ABORTION, supra note 13, at 61 (this Ramsey
essay was a reprint of one originally published in 1971).
001 Hiring, A Theological Evaluation, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION, supra note 596, at
123-45 [hereinafter, Hiring, A Theological Evaluation]. The essay is striking because the
same Bernard Hiring had written some years earlier that "[tihe appeal to the Christian law
of brotherly love as justification for the taking of innocent life and the killing of genuine
motherliness is probably the lowest depth of error attainable and the sorry fruit of the vic-
tory of the birth control campaign." D. CALLAHAN, supra note 13, at 4 (quoting B. HXRINO,
MARRIAGE IN THE MODERN WORLD (1965)). On the Catholic position generally, see D. CALLA-
HAN, supra note 13, at 409-47.
002 Gustafson, A Protestant Ethical Approach, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION, supra note
594, at 101-22. Gustafson's presentation at the 1967 conference was regarded as a "critique
of the Roman Catholic approach" and a particular case study as well. THE TERRIBLE CHOICE,
supra note 594, at 89.
"I Gustafson, supra note 602. Gustafson is a leading Protestant theologian, currently
teaching at the University of Chicago Divinity School, who has written extensively and
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proach to abortion that neither surrendered to secular liberal indi-
vidualism nor sought refuge in simplistic fundamentalism.
Gustafson begins by rejecting the perspective from which the
"traditional Catholic arguments about abortion" are made.'" He
sees that perspective as formal, deductive, abstract and physical
(life viewed as "biological" fact, without encompassing "concern
for the emotional and spiritual well-being of the mother or the in-
fant") and too indifferent to social and historical reality ("this par-
ticular mother, her particular relationships, and her past spiritual
as well as physical history").,0 5
While Gustafson rejects what he sees as the excessively categori-
cal rationalism of the natural law tradition as applied to the issue
of abortion, he does not claim that one can abandon principle alto-
gether. He rejects only the rationalism that serves "to reduce spiri-
tual and personal individuality to abstract cases." 60 With such an
approach, "[t]he sense of human compassion for suffering and the
profound tragedy which is built into any situation in which the
taking of life is morally plausible are gone."' 0 7 On the other hand,
Gustafson makes clear that the "alternative" to overly abstracted
rationalism is "not to wallow in feeling and visceral responses."'0 8
To illustrate his approach, Gustafson offers a hypothetical case
of a woman who became pregnant after being raped by her former
husband and three other men in an act he characterizes as one of
"sadistic vengeance."60 9 A careful and deliberate analysis leads
Gustafson to conclude that, as a moral counselor (he was a pastor
and a preacher before he became an academic theologian), he
would affirm the moral propriety of an abortion for this particular
woman. Despite his choice of that extreme hypothetical (probably
thoughtfully about ethics. See, e.g., J. GUSTAFSON, PROTESTANr AND ROMAN CATHOLIC ETHIcS
(1978); J. GUSTAFSON, 1 ETHICS FROM A THEOCENTRIC PERSPECrivE THEOLOGY AND ETHICS
(1981) [hereinafter J. GUSTAFSON, 1 ETHICS FROM A THEOCENTRIC PRSPECTIVE]; J. GusTA-
SON, 2 ETHICS FROM A THEOCENTRIC PERSPECTiVE ETHICS AND THEOLOGY (1984) [hereinafter
J. GUSTAFSON, 2 ETHICS FROM A THEOCENTRIC RSPECrVE]. For a brief sociological and per-
sonal portrait of Gustafson (written by his brother), see P. Gustafson, A Sociological and
Fraternal Perspective on James M. Gustafson's Ethics, in RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY' INTER-
FACES AND BOUNDARIES 57 (W. Swatos ed. 1987).
'I" See Gustafson, supra note 602, at 101-06.
6'5 Id. at 104.
606 Id. at 105.
6o7 Id.
608 Id.
609 Id. at 107.
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chosen because the standard Catholic position would be no abor-
tion), he also notes that his approach could be made applicable to
other cases, such as "unwed girls, or older married women with
large families, etc." 1 0 He is less certain, but not closed-minded,
about situations where "the social and emotional conditions do not
appear to be beneficial for the well-being of the mother and the
child."
611
On the other hand, Gustafson is clear about his "moral biases:
life is to be preserved, the weak and the helpless are to be cared
for especially, the moral requisite of trust, hope, love, freedom, jus-
tice, and others are to be met so that human life can be meaning-
ful. 6 1 2 His approach to the particular problem affirms that "[l]ife
is to be preserved rather than destroyed," that "[t]hose who can-
not assert their own rights to life are especially to be protected,"
but that "[t]here are exceptions to these rules. 6 1 3 At the core of
Gustafson's theological world view are both the "sense of a power-
ful Other," understood as the "sovereignty of God," and the "cen-
trality of piety," an "attitude of reverence, awe, and respect which
implies a sense of devotion and of duties and responsibilities as
well.M31
4
810 Id. at 117 & n.4.
611 Id. at 116.
612 Id. at 114.
613 Id. at 116.
I1" For a fuller account of his theological world view, see J. GUSTAFSON, I ETHICS FROM A
THEOCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 603, at 163-78. In 1984, Gustafson briefly summa-
rized his views on abortion:
The choice is always a morally serious one because fetal life has the possibility
of developing into a unique human being with capacities for self-fulfillment
and for contributions to the human community. There are circumstances in
which it is morally justifiable, though it is always a tragic choice. Among those
circumstances might be a familial situation in which the birth of another child
and the resources needed for its care would severely jeopardize the survival
and well-being of the family and its other members. Other courses of action for
relieving such dire straits, however, ought to be taken by the family and by the
community of which it is a part.
J. GUSTAFSON, 2 ETHICS FROM A THEOCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 603, at 245-46.
Consider the views of Paul Lehmann, another important Protestant contextual ethicist,
who was a student of Barth and a close friend of Bonhoeffer. The following was reported to
us in a letter from Milner Ball:
[I]t was reported to me that, in the question-answer period following a public
lecture of his, Paul Lehmann was asked what he thought about abortion. He
gave a long, complicated answer that mystified the audience. Frustrated, the
questioner asked: "Dr. Lehmann, are you against abortion-yes or no?" To
1084 (Vol. 25:923
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Gustafson's approach surely offered a basis for rethinking the
abortion issue in a moral/theological context that might have sup-
ported significant liberalization of restrictive laws. This is not to
suggest that Gustafson represented the "correct" Protestant line;
the point is more that serious debate was possible. Dramatically
opposed to Gustafson in the same volume, for example, stood Paul
Ramsey, a Protestant theologian who had for years been battling
"ethical relativism," favoring a deontological approach more akin
to the Catholic natural law tradition.6 15 Ramsey's absolute opposi-
tion to abortion resembles that of the Catholic traditionalists, al-
though his detailed reflections on embryonic and fetal develop-
ment seem to concede a potential moral basis for differential
treatment of first trimester abortions. 18 Ramsey deploys not only
the Catholic rational/scientific case for fetal personhood, but also
the Protestant ethical tradition of Karl Barth. Given Ramsey's
zeal, his effort to appropriate the neo-orthodox Barthian tradition
is understandable; yet, in so doing he distorts and manipulates
Barth's own position. 17
which he responded: "Yes ... and no. In that order."
Letter from Milner Ball to Elizabeth Mensch and Alan Freeman (October 1990).
Gustafson regards Lehmann as too "polemical" in his opposition to "absolutist ethics."
See Gustafson, supra note 602, at 122. For an introduction to Lehmann, see P. LmimAN,
supra note 270.
"I' See generally Ramsey, supra note 592, at 60-100. The principal mission of P. RAasy,
NiNE MonRN MoRALmS, supra note 126, is to show how the supposed moral relativists
cannot evade some absolutism (or natural law), while neither can their absolutist counter-
parts evade the relativistic reality of context. Ramsey, at the time, was Chairman of the
Religion Department at Princeton University.
6" See Ramsey, Reference Points in Deciding About Abortion, supra note 541, at 78.
Ramsey carefully distinguishes the moral issue of abortion from the legal one. Citing Aqui-
nas for the proposition that "[h]uman law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of every
virtue: but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the common good." Id. at 63 n.7
(citing T. ArUINAS, SubiA THEOLOGICA, supra note 147, pts. 2 & 3. Ramsey follows Norman
St. John-Stevas in offering three tests for telling when wrongful practices become fit sub-
jects for legislation: "(1) the practice injures the common good substantially, (2) the law can
be enforced equitably in its incidence, and (3) its enforcement does not cause greater evils
than those it represses." Id. at 63 & n.7. He concludes that "[these criteria... would give
us pause in passing from sin or wrong to crime." Id. at 63.
"I See id. at 91-95. Both Barth and Bonhoeffer have been distorted in the service of both
sides of the abortion debate. Noonan, for example, appropriates them for his own categori-
cal opposition to abortion. See J. NOONAN. A PmivATE CHOICE, supra note 9, at 60-61, 169.
Similarly ignoring the dialectical reality of both Barth's and Bonhoeffer's ethics, Joseph
Fletcher dismisses them both as Protestants who "take the Catholic position." See Fletcher,
A Protestant Minister's Position, in 1 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WoRLD 25, 26 (1990). (This
took place at the 1968 Conference. See infra text accompanying notes 685-718.
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Ramsey enlists Barth's support by quickly eliding Barth's actual
treatment of the abortion issue and turning instead to Barth's ada-
mant opposition to euthanasia. The latter was hardly surprising,
given Barth's experience with Nazi Germany. Barth does not offer
much support for the sort of liberal situation ethics that would
support abortion on demand; neither does he, when closely read,
provide much help for moral absolutists. If one takes into account
that he was writing on the subject more than forty years ago, Barth
seems to provide a solid basis, in Protestant tradition, for the con-
textual and deliberate approach of Gustafson.
To be sure, Barth's context is "respect for life," which means
"astonishment, humility, awe, modesty, circumspection and care-
fulness .. .What matters is that everyone should treat his exis-
tence and that of every other human being with respect. For it be-
longs to God. It is His loan and blessing." 1 " Indeed, for Barth this
"respect for life" extended to non-humans as well. In the "Free-
dom for Life" section of Church Dogmatics, he devoted as many
pages to the taking of animal life as he did to abortion, insisting
that killing an animal is very like "homicide." If there is freedom
to take animal life, it is a freedom we exercise only in relation to
the "prior command to desist," and that carries with it an en-
hanced responsibility of stewardship. 19
When it comes to the difficult subject of abortion (and capital
punishment as well), his position is far from absolute. He chal-
618 III K. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, supra note 220, pt. 4, at 340.
"19 Compare id. at 348-56 (animals) with id. at 415-23 (abortion). With respect to ani-
mals, as is usually the case with Barth, the moral responsibility is a grave one:
And the nearness of the animal to man irrevocably means that when man kills
a beast he does something which is at least very similar to homicide. We must
be very clear about this if we maintain that the lordship of man over animals
carries with it the freedom to slaughter them. Those who do not hear the prior
command to desist have certainly no right to affirm this freedom or cross the
frontier disclosed at this point.
Id. at 352-53. Thus, for Barth,
If there is a freedom of man to kill animals, this signifies in any case the adop-
tion of a qualified and in some sense enhanced responsibility .... The slaying
of animals is really possible only as an appeal to God's reconciling grace, as its
representation and proclamation. It undoubtedly means making use of the of-
fering of an alien and innocent victim and claiming its life for ours. Man must
have good reasons for seriously making such a claim.
Id. at 354-55. See also J. GUSTAPSON, supra note 585, at 35-36 (discussing Barth's treatment
of relationship between God, man and nature).
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lenges the Catholic tradition of absolutism, calling it "horribly re-
spectable" and "[n]ever sparing in its extreme demands on
women."'620 According to Barth, "even Roman Catholic nuns raped
when the Russians invaded Germany in 1945 were not allowed to
free themselves from the consequences" with abortions. 21 Yet
Barth insists on noting "the wicked violation of the sanctity of
human life which is always seriously at issue in abortion, and
which is always present when it is carried out thoughtlessly and
callously. '6 22 But he is convinced that the Roman Catholic "ab-
stract prohibition ... is far too forbidding and sterile to promise
any effective help.
'623
For Barth, the ultimate answer must be a "wholly new and radi-
cal feeling of awe at the mystery of all human life. '"0 21 Barth has
little faith in the efficacy of legal prohibition, sees abortion to be as
much a social as an individual problem, and recognizes that
"[h]uman life, and therefore the life of the unborn child, is not an
absolute.61 2 5 While God's commandment with respect to abortion
is, for Barth, a resolute "No," it is a "No" to be engaged dialecti-
cally by human freedom and conscience. 26 He reminds us that
"there is a forgiveness which can be appropriated even for this sin"
and refuses to spell out categorical exceptions to the "No," leaving
us with the typically paradoxical message that with respect to a
decision to have an abortion, "[t]here is always required the most
620 I1 K. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, supra note 220, pt. 4, at 417.
621 Id.
"2 Id. at 417-18.
623 Id. at 417.
624 Id. at 418.
621 Id. at 420. See also J. GusTAFsoN, supra note 585, at 30-31.
626 See IHI K. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, supra note 220, pt. 4, at 417-21. On the dialec-
tic of freedom and obedience in Barth's theological ethics, see P. LovrN, supra note 210, at
18-44.
As to the particular freedom of women, Barth approved of feminist impatience with "ty-
pologies" of gender role that defined for women their special "nature." Barth ridiculed the
way in which "contingent, schematic, conventional, literary and half-true indicatives" are
turned into false "imperatives." Both men and women "will justifiably refuse to be ad-
dressed in this way." IH K. BAr, CHURCH DOGMATICS, supra note 220, pt. 4, at 153. To
that extent he fully agreed with Simone de Beauvoir, although he rejected the view that one
could transcend sexual difference altogether, id. at 162, asserting that the difference was a
constant question, and riddle; male and female should always be learning from one another.
Id. at 167. He insisted on retaining a sequential ordering of male before female, but not as
male "privilege or advantage" or "any kind of self-glorification," but as a special male obli-
gation to, in humility, create conditions of freedom. Id. at 170.
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scrupulous calculation and yet also a resolute venture with a con-
science which is bound and therefore free.
6 27
For Bonhoeffer as well, the question of abortion was more com-
plex than the simple categorical prohibition. What little he wrote
on the subject appears in his Ethics 2s a posthumous work based
on fragments he wrote in Berlin from 1940 through 1943. On the
blunt side, he offers 'no relief from the conclusion that an abortion
means that a "nascent human being has been deliberately deprived
of his life," which is "nothing but murder."621 9 Yet the question of
guilt is not so quickly resolved: "A great many different motives
may lead to an action of this kind; indeed in cases where it is an
act of despair, performed in circumstances of extreme human or
economic destitution and misery, the guilt may often lie rather
with the community than with the individual. 63 0 He also notes
that under legal prohibition, the poor who transgress, however re-
luctantly, will be more likely to be held accountable, than the
wealthy, for "money may conceal many a wanton deed. 031 Despite
the ',fact of murder," for Bonhoeffer, these other considerations
''must no doubt have a quite decisive influence on our personal
and pastoral attitude towards the person concerned.
6 32
627 11 K BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, supra note 220, pt. 4, at 419, 422-23.
628 D. BONHOEFFER, ETHICS (1955). Central to Bonhoeffer's ethics was his simultaneous
rejection of (Kantian) rational moral absolutism and what he saw as its "existential" coun-
terpart, radical individual subjectivized atomism:
The ethical, in this sense of the formal, the universally valid and the rational,
contained no element of concretion, and it therefore inevitably ended in the
total atomization of human society and of the life of the individual, in unlim-
ited subjectivism and individualism. When the ethical is conceived without ref-
erence to any local or temporal relation, without reference to the question of
its warrant or authority, without reference to the concrete, then life falls apart
into an infinite number of unconnected atoms of time, and human society re-
solves itself into individual atoms of reason. It makes no practical difference
whether one interprets the ethical as a purely formal universally valid principle
or whether one refers it to the "existential" decision which the individual takes
completely anew at every separate "moment." The underlying factor is always
that the ethical is destroyed by its being detached from its concrete relations.
- [S]ociety consists solely in the concrete and infinitely manifold relation-
ships of responsibility of men one for another.
Id. at 272. On Bonhoeffer's notion of "responsibility," see R. LovIN, supra note 210, at 139-
47.
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This is hardly to suggest that had Bonhoeffer shown up in the
1960s he would have joined the pro-choice movement. One cannot
extrapolate with much certainty from his content, especially given
his particular historical situation. The more significant point is
that the Protestant tradition of contextual theological ethics, rep-
resented at the 1967 conference by Gustafson and rooted in the
legacy of Barth and Bonhoeffer, offers an alternative to the stark
and uncompromising contemporary approach now taken by both
sides on this issue. That such a voice became more and more un-
heard is a testament not only to the ostensible triumph of secular
liberalism as the only legitimate basis of public moral discussion
but also to the self-destruction of mainstream American churches
as an independent mediating structure for the serious theological
consideration of moral issues.
Not only Protestants but Catholics as well, though perhaps more
tentatively, were willing to engage in moral and theological debate
about the abortion issue in the late 1960s.13 3 Such debate might be
Reviewing the 1967 conference, the authors of The Terrible Choice concluded that,
The official Catholic position is not so simple, so rigid, or so monolithic as is
commonly thought. Cultural relativism was accepted as morally relevant to the
abortion question by at least one Catholic theologian. One ought not to suggest
that the Catholic Church's teaching is about to change in a substantive way; it
is clear, however, that the teaching is susceptible of gradual development
through a process of refinement. In discussion of a case history presented at
the Conference, Father Johann [Rev. Robert 0. Johann, S.J., Fordham Univer-
sity (Philosophy)] remarked in passing: "The question I pose very seriously for
the Catholic moralist is that we consider and... try to understand at least
what is behind the perception of so many people ... where dealing in particu-
lar with the fetus is felt, experienced, perceived as being something different
from dealing with an infant" Father Johann was here calling for theological
reflection on the social facts.
THE TmuRmLE CHocE, supra note 594, at 87-88. Some at the conference, such as Noonan
and his colleague, David Louisell, took the extreme pro-life position with which we are to-
day familiar. Other Catholics, however, took a variety of positions. Reverend Robert Drinan
of Boston College Law School advocated that "criminal law withdraw entirely from abortion
control," yet he also expressed his fear that legalization of abortion would lead us to "insti-
tutionalize abortion as the contraception of the poor." Id. at 102. "If abortion were given on
request, would this not in effect lead to the proposition that the poor can have the number
of their children limited by the wishes of a white suburban affluent society?" Id. at 24.
Father Richard McCormick, a noted Catholic medical ethicist, reminded the participants
that there was a" 'tenable and respectable theory' preferred by a notable number of [Cath-
olic] philosophers and theologians which holds that the soul is not infused at conception but
rather at some later point, perhaps when the body develops recognizably human characteris-
tics." Id. at 86. On this notion of "delayed ensouliment," see infra text accompanying note
694.
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attributed to acknowledgment of the inevitable reality of pressure
for abortion reform, combined with the ecumenical spirit associ-
ated with the years immediately following Vatican II. Yet the con-
tent of the discussion again reveals possibilities not apparent in
the contemporary setting.
The eminent Catholic theologian Bernard Haring contributed to
the Noonan volume an essay called A Theological Evaluation.03'
Haring, a self-styled "Catholic of the post-Vatican II era," ob-
served that "the characteristic note in Catholic theology today is
one of critical searching," and while reaffirming the Church's ad-
herence to its traditional teaching on abortion, Haring nevertheless
pointed out that there are "those who think that the teaching of
the Catholic Church might be 'susceptible to gradual development
though a process of refinement.' "I3M The remainder of the essay
seeks to explore such possible "refinements.
' s3 s
More striking than the careful and tentative content of Haring's
essay is its tone. He noted, for example, that the position of Gus-
tafson is "at least not very far from the position of Catholic think-
ers of the past which we have reviewed. 63 7 Haring's ecumenical
mission is clear:
The official position of the Catholic Church, which in
most respects is well grounded, will be weakened in the
eyes of Protestants and of many critical Catholics unless
we give a clear account of the different degrees of cer-
tainty of our general presuppositions, and acknowledge
the intellectual difficulties regarding some hard cases
which are now falling under the official condemnation of
the Church, although they were freely discussed in earlier
centuries.
638
Implicitly critical of the Church's intransigence with respect to
It has even been suggested that Catholic tradition itself offers a contextual ethics which
might serve a quest for compromise with respect to the abortion issue. That tradition is the
legal one of casuistry. See A. JONSEN & S. TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY O
MORAL REASONING 333-38 (1988).
H§ring, A Theological Evaluation, supra note 601, at 123.
6" Id. at 123-24.
Id. at 124-45.
Id. at 131-32.
038 Id. at 132.
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contraception, Hdring chided his Church: "[t]he Church's condem-
nation of abortion is only fully credible if at the same time all pos-
sible effort is made to eliminate the chief causes of abortion."' "
His suggested "refinements" include reconsideration of "mechani-
cal" lines, such as that between "direct" (impermissible) and "indi-
rect" (allowable) abortion. 40
Showing his solidarity with Gustafson, Hdring reminded the
reader that there is a distinction between the level of moral theol-
ogy and that of pastoral counseling." 1 On the second level, of
counseling, "a Catholic moralist might come to almost the same
conclusion and even to almost the same way of friendly discourse
as Gustafson. Pastoral prudence looks not only to the general prin-
ciples but also to the art of the possible."16 2 While Hdring con-
ceded that he would not actually recommend the course of abor-
tion, he also affirms that he might well "refrain from all rigid
judgment.""'
While the movement within Catholic theology was incremental
at best, within the more general Catholic culture of the post-Vati-
can H era, there was ferment in progress. In 1970, the same year
the Noonan volume was published, Daniel Callahan wrote Abor-
tion: Law, Choice and Morality,8 4 which is perhaps still the best
single book on the subject. Callahan, who had been an editor at
Commonweal magazine, conceded that he set out to defend the
traditional Catholic position and changed his view in the course of
the project, which took him four years.
Callahan, while affirming the basic principle of the "sanctity of
39 Id. at 135.
60 Id. at 124, 135-38.
141 See id. at 139-42.
642 See id. at 140. It must be conceded that Hiring's spirit of exploration and "refine-
ment" is not entirely welcome today. Archbishop Rembert G. Weakland of Milwaukee was
recently disciplined by the Vatican (mandatory withdrawal of an honorary degree) for hav-
ing criticized the tactics of anti-abortion activists and for suggesting, not unlike Haring, that
moral principles could not be a matter of law unless they enjoyed a "consensus of the popu-
lation." Steinfels, Vatican Bars Swiss University from Honoring Archbishop of Ailwau-
kee," N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1990, §1, at 20. Similarly, on the difficulties facing. contemporary
dissenters within the Church on the abortion issue, see B. FERRARo, P. Hussny & J.
O'Rni.LY. No TURNING BACM Two NUNS' BATrLE wrrH THE VATICAN ovEa WOEN's RIGHT
TO CHOOSE (1990).
Hdring, supra note 601, at 142.
D. CALLAHAN, supra note 13.
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life, ' '645 nevertheless calls for the repeal of prohibitory abortion
laws in favor of permissive regulatory ones.6 40 He does not favor
complete repeal of legislation, nor does he favor an absolute right
to abortion on demand; he believes that a public moral debate
should be sustained.64 7 His firm conviction that abortion does raise
serious moral issues leads him to reject the extremes we are accus-
tomed to today:
The Catholic position says that the only moral question
of importance is when human life begins. Once that has
been determined (or believed determined), then all other
possible questions and considerations become irrelevant.
The "woman's right" position proceeds in the same way,
the difference being that it locates the critical moral fac-
tor in the desire of the woman. Thus in neither position
is room left for an integration of other possibly relevant
data or for a balancing of rights.64 8
Callahan's position might best be characterized as "constrained'
choice." He believes there are serious "social" interests in pursuing
such goals as "[a] desire to limit an excessively large number of
repeated abortions to forestall a primary reliance on abortion for
birth-control purposes rather than contraception," "to lead women
to consider abortion a serious and not a trivial choice," and also a
"desire to maximize female freedom."6 49 He does not accept a ver-
sion of personal autonomy that leads to the rampant subjectivity
of all value, with the consequent abandonment of public moral dis-
course: "Abortion does not seem to me the kind of moral issue
which is just 'solved' once and for all; it can only be coped with."0
Even though Callahan's position placed him in sharp disagree-
ment with traditional Catholics, his book was nevertheless a valid
entry in the debate that marked out a boundary of legitimate dis-
course. In the early 1970s, Stanley Hauerwas, a Protestant theolo-
gian who taught theology at Notre Dame, and who now teaches at
Duke, wrote a pair of review essays, covering Callahan's book, his
Id. at 308.
66 See id. at 307-48, 448-83.
Id. at 448-83.
68 Id. at 467.
'"" Id. at 477-78.
150 Id. at 486.
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traditionalist counterpart Germain Grisez and the essays in the
Noonan volume. While his own position is closer to the tradi-
tional Catholic one than to Callahan's, Hauerwas finds serious
flaws in the arguments at both extremes. And despite his own af-
finity for the more traditional view, Hauerwas is sensitive to the
dangers of rhetorical excess that we have come to know so well:
I wish to make clear I do not agree with those who argue
that once possible exceptions to the taking of life are ad-
mitted in connection with abortion then Auschwitz is
somehow right around the corner. There is clearly no log-
ical relation between these, nor is it clear that there is
even a psychological relation. I must admit I have always
found rather unconvincing the argument that suggests
that the granting of possible exceptions for certain kinds
of abortion would be to undermine the value of "sanctity
of life" in the face of our nation's military spending
alone, not to mention the degradation of life we are will-
ing to tolerate in our ghettos. If what we have now is
sanctity of life, then perhaps it could stand to be
undermined.652
Along with debate over the substantive morality of abortion, a
somewhat independent issue of church-state relations was being
discussed. Not every religiously rooted moral position translates,
even from a theological perspective, into a demand for secular en-
forcement through legislation. On the other hand, the mere fact
51 S. HAuERwAs, Abortion and Normative Ethics, in VISION AND VIRUE ESSAYS IN CuRs-
T'N ETmIcAL REFLECTION 127 (1974) [hereinafter VISION AND VIRTUE]; S. HAUERWAS, Abor-
tion: The Agent's Perspective, in VISION AND VI'rTU, supra, at 147-65.
651 S. HAuERwAs, Abortion: The Agent's Perspective, in VIsION AND VIarTU, supra note
651, at 155-56. While seemingly not agreeing with Callahan's moderate pro-choice position,
Hauerwas sees no easy answer.
It may be that issues such as abortion are finally not susceptible to intellectual
"solution." I do not mean to suggest that we cease trying to formulate the
problem in the most responsible manner possible, but rather that our best re-
course may be to watch how good men and women handle the tragic alterna-
tives we often confront in abortion situations.... For no amount of ethical
reflection will ever change the basic fact that tragedy is a reality of our lives. A
point is reached where we must have the wisdom to cease ethical reflection and
affirm that certain issues indicate a reality more profound than the ethical.




that a moral position is deeply rooted in religious belief does not
preclude the assertion of that position in the secular public realm,
as many liberals would assert later.
The role of religion in public life is a serious moral and political
issue. Haring, for example, acknowledges the constraints of plural-
ism, even as he affirms that "in a pluralistic society one of the most
urgent duties of the churches and of humanist ethicists is to con-
tribute to the formation of a mature conscience. "653 Hiring recom-
mends that the Church reduce its "undue emphasis on [the] battle
for penal legislation" and that it remember that it is only within
the Church that the mere existence of a teaching is. an argument
for its validity; for others, real dialogue will be necessary.0 5 4 And
Haring recognizes that "[iut cannot be the task of a pluralistic state
to protect the religious teaching of a church where this does not
coincide with the common good of the respective society."655 If it is
going to participate in the public debate, the Church must provide
"reasons and motives that could be convincing to sincere and intel-
ligent people who are not under Church authority.$
656
Haring's seemingly prudential analysis of the church-state issues
with respect to the looming abortion debate is best understood as
firmly rooted in the Catholic tradition of debate about the rela-
tionship between religious and secular morality. At stake in this
debate is the theological position on the respective roles of spiri-
tual and temporal authority. For American Catholics in particular,
the issue was heightened by its appearance in a concededly plural-
istic society.
The tradition of John Courtney Murray, who died before the on-
set of the public abortion debate, cautioned against imposing par-
ticularistic religious faith on the secular political pro-
cesse---although Murray's commitment to secularism was
"' Hiring, A Theological Evaluation, supra note 601, at 143. One need not believe in
pluralism to accept it as a reality constraint. As A. James Reichley, reports with respect to
the great American Catholic theologian, John Courtney Murray: "Murray doubted no more
than Cardinal Ottaviani or Monsignor Ryan that 'religious pluralism is against the will of
God.' But pluralism, he had decided, 'is the human condition; it is written into the script of
history.'" A.J. REICHLEY, supra note 26, at 287.
Hdring, A Theological Evaluation, supra note 601, at 143.
Id. at 144.
6 Id.
See, e.g., Murray, Religious Freedom, in FREEDOM AND MAN 131 (1965); Murray, The
Declaration of Religious Freedom: A Moment in Its Legislative History, in RELiGIous Li.
[Vol. 25:9231094
THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE
problematic because he simultaneously attempted to find tradi-
tional Catholic moral positions on freedom and dignity already re-
alized in a shared American secular morality. As Hliring implies,
Catholics had traditionally distinguished between particular reli-
gious doctrines (compliance with which was demanded of the faith-
ful only) and generalized appeals to the "common good" (the
moral baselines to be insisted upon in any just society).6sa
The abortion debate, like others emerging from the chaos of the
1960s-the Vietnam War, nuclear weapons and capital punishment
are examples-served to unhinge Murray's fragile solution. Instead
of the facile equivalence of common good and Catholic tradition as
realized by American shared secular morality, the reality was a
fragmented American public morality, with a dominant secularism
standing in opposition to religious moral traditionalism,""' not
serving as its realization.
There were many legislative options facing would-be abortion re-
formers in the late 1960s, ranging from liberalization of criminal
laws, to decriminalization in favor of a substantive "indications"
policy, with or without procedural delegation, to total repeal of re-
strictive legislation. In the context of that debate, many responsive
options not necessarily amounting to an all-out campaign to retain
harsh penal laws were available to the Catholic Church and its
theologians. At one extreme the Church might simply have served
the privatized role of "bearing witness," or trying to instruct and
guide the faithful to serve as an exemplary moral community on
the issue. Further options included general appeals to the common
good rather than the pursuit of specific legislative goals (for exam-
ple, Cardinal Joseph Bernardin's consistent ethic of life) 0 or a
ERTY: AN END AND A BEGINNING 15 (1966). This is not to say that Murray was a liberal,
however.
The issue is drawn. Which is the myth and which is the reality? Is the myth in
Nietzsche or in the New Testament? Is it in Marx or in Moses? Is it in Sartre
of Paris or in Paul of Tarsus? Is God dead, as the prophet of the post-moder
age proclaimed, or is he still the living God of more ancient prophecy, immor-
tal in his being as He Who Is, deathlessly faithful to his promise to be with us
all the days, even to the end of the epoch within which both the modern and
the post-modern ages represent only moments in a longer dialectic of history?
J. MuRRAY. THE PROBLEM OF GOD: YESTERDAY AND TODAY 120 (1964) (presented as the inau-
gural series of St. Thomas More Lectures at Yale University in 1962).
See Hdring, A Theological Evaluation, supra note 601, at 144-45.
See supra text accompanying note 577.
"O See Cardinal Bernardin's Call for a Consistent Ethic of Life, 13 ORIGINs 491-94
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secular morality that insisted on something less than the most ex-
treme Catholic position. Father Drinan represents another availa-
ble role, that of moral advocate in the public realm without insis-
tence on legal implementation of that position for those in
disagreement.6 1 Common to all these positions was the assumption
that the Church has a role in the formation of a public moral posi-
tion on the question of abortion, as should other religious commu-
nities whose traditions have also Spoken to that issue.
Protestant tradition in America offers a diversity of roles for the
church in relation to the legal order. Baptists, for example, at one
time disavowed all church involvement with the coercive powers of
the state.es Roger Williams was singularly extreme on this point,
drawing a line between state and church not out of love for democ-
racy and civil liberty, but to maintain the purity of the church. For
Williams, to link the state to religion would make the church a
(1983) (text of Dec. 6, 1983, address by Bernardin at Fordham University in New York),
Cardinal Bernardin's St. Louis Address: Enlarging the Dialogue on a Consistent Ethic of
Life, 13 ORIGINS 705 (1984) (text of Mar. 11, 1984, address by Bernardin at St. Louis Uni-
versity). Cardinal Bernardin has insisted on "a consistent, prolife philosophy, a 'seamless
garment,' encompassing the church's positions on armaments, abortion, and the death pen-
alty. Prolife activists are furious at this seeming surrender to the liberals, allowing abortion
to be swallowed up in a range of issues incapable together of mobilizing any considerable
'clout.'" O'Brien, Catholic Contentiousness, supra note 491, at 156, 159. For expressions of
such an ethic of life by pro-life feminists, see Callahan, A Moral Obligation, SOJOURNERS,
Nov. 1989, at 18; Hayes, Fully Pro-Life, SOJOURNERS, Nov. 1989, at 22. For discussion of
economic rights and Catholic tradition, see Cahill, The Catholic Tradition: Religion, Moral-
ity and the Common Good, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 75 (1987).
661 Drinan apparently changed his mind on this issue sometime between 1965 and 1967,
when, at the 1967 conference, he took the position that th state should withdraw from
abortion control through criminal law. Compare Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right To
Be Born, in ABORTION AND THE LAW 107 (D. Smith ed. 1967) (papers originally solicited for a
law review symposium in 1965-66), with THE TERRIBLE CHOICE, supra note 594, at 102,
David O'Brien, of Holy Cross College, believes that Drinan, who later served as a United
States Congressman from Massachusetts, was "driven from office ... by right-to-life agita-
tion." O'Brien, Catholic Contentiousness, supra note 491, at 156. On the Drinan matter, see
also G. WILLS, UNDER GOD, supra note 340, at 241. The evolution of Drinan's views on abor-
tion and law is described in D. CALLAHAN, supra note 13, at 436-38.
66 See, e.g., J. BUTLER, AwASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
257-62 (1990); M. MARTY, supra note 26, at 150-54. For an excellent and sensitive anthropo-
logical account of a contemporary Baptist community, focusing specifically on its relation to
law and dispute resolution, see C. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE. FAITH, ORDER, AND
COMMUNITY IN AN AMERICAN TOWN (1986)
For a reprint of a "liberal" Baptist sermon endorsing the pro-choice position on abortion,
on theological grounds, see Paynter, Life in the Tragic Dimension: A Sermon on Abortion,
in THE ETHICS OF ABORTION, supra note 13, at 143-50.
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"filthy dunghill and whorehouse of rotten and stinking whores and
hypocrites. 6 6 3 Luther and Calvin had been less purist, but separa-
tion of spheres was basic to Reformation thought, deemed crucial
to protect religious freedom and liberty of conscience. CG4 Epis-
copalians, with their history rooted in England's established
Anglican church, have probably been more open to a close church/
state connection than other American denominations, but even for
Quoted in M. MARTY, supra note 26, at 78. On Williams as the unlikely sponsor of
religious toleration, see id. at 75-78; G. WILLS. UNDER GOD, supra note 340, at 341-53.
For a good overview, see Collinson, The Late Medieval Church and its Reformation:
1400-1600, in THE OxFoRD ILLusTRATOm HISTORY OF CHRITNrr 257-63 (J. McManners ed.
1990). On the challenge to the legitimacy of law posed by Reformation thought, see gener-
ally D. LrrrILF RELIGION, ORDER AND LAw (1969); see also Mensch, Religion, Revival, and
the Ruling Class: A Critical History of Trinity Church, 36 BUFFALO L. Rnv. 427, 456-57
(1988).
If God saves through grace, not good works, then of what value are the external forms of
order, whether in church or state? As St. Paul himself had asked, "Do we then overthrow
the law by this faith?" Romans 3:31. If the true community could be founded only on the
free assent of the redeemed, was not law an empty shell, to be rightly discarded?
Nevertheless, most Protestants believed that the true voluntarism of the moment of re-
demption-to be protected at all costs from state authority-must be distinguished from
"mad men acting according to their frantick passions, who should be restrained with
chaines, when they can not be restrained otherwise." See P. MILLEn, TnE NEw ENGOAND
MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 392 (1967). In a fallen world, the state, unlike the
churches, must preserve order through law's coercive power, rather than abandon the world
to its own "Satanic devices." See Berman, Conscience and Law: The Lutheran Reformation
and the Western Legal Tradition, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 177, 190 (1987).
In that sense, law was not illegitimate, and the way was open for the Christian prince to
do much good in the world. Nevertheless, the church order of pure voluntarism, where the
sword should not be wielded, was inevitably a "better" order than that enforced by law.
Moreover, while neither Luther nor Calvin wholly rejected the notion of natural law, the
sharp distinction between noncoercive church order and the legal order of the state ren-
dered problematic the older, all-embracing scholastic identification of civil order with a di-
vinely ordained natural harmony. In that sense, political order could be more utilitarian and
positivist, although not necessarily un-Christian. See generally id.
On law as serving a subordinate, "functional" rather than "ethical" role, of exposing "cru-
cial danger spots" or "boundary" situations, and thereby becoming "instrumental to the
divine activity," see P. LEHMAN, ETHICS IN A CHRISTIAN CONTEXT 146-47 (1963). For the com-
plexity of Calvin's approach to civil law, see Potter, The "Whole Office of the Law" in the
Theology of John Calvin, 3 J.L & RELIGION 117 (1985). For Barth's reformulation of the
relation between law and gospel, see E. JUNGEL, supra note 203, at 105-26. On the problem-
atic character of law in Lutheran theology, see M. LuTHER, 0f the Double Use of the Law, in
MARTIN LuTHER SELECTIONS FROM His WIrrNGS 139-45 (J. Dillenberger ed. 1961); M. Lu-
THER, Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed, in id. at 363-402.
For Milner Ball's effort, drawing on the theology of Calvin, Barth and Bonhoeffer, to
reformulate the metaphor of law as "medium" instead of the traditionally dominant one of
"bulwark" against "chaos," see M. BALL, LYING DowN TOGErHER. LAW. METAPHoR. AND THE-
OLOGY 119-36 (1985).
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Episcopalians the right relation is not easily defined.'" 0
It is increasingly clear that there is no neat, categorical answer to
the "right" relation between religion and secular law. Ironically,
the question is answered best only when it does not arise. When
churches function vigorously, providing the community with moral
guidance, penal law will be required only as a last resort, to which,
ideally, one need have recourse only rarely. In such a setting it may
be a matter of indifference whether or not, for example, law ad-
dresses an issue like abortion, since one could trust to churches to
uphold, in diverse ways, an underlying spirit of respect for life,
even while, in pastoral counseling, providing necessary contextual
judgments along with a community of support for those in need of
help. That, of course, would be the model of the church as an ide-
ally functioning "mediating structure," which not only lessens the
need for a state-coerced morality, but also insures that the mini-
mal morality embodied in the law will be widely shared and there-
fore relatively uncontroversial.
Conversely, as churches fall short of that ideal, secular law be-
comes more necessary to the social order, as the main expression of
the culture's moral norms; yet, at the same time, the norms re-
flected in the law become more controversial and arguably secta-
rian, for there is no shared moral culture to draw upon. In the face
of the resulting controversy, it is tempting to leap to the supposed
neutrality of the "secular" soltion-that is, to cleanse law of all
vestiges of sectarian religious traditionalism, and appeal instead to
the authority of, for example, the Constitution.
In so doing one forgets the coercive character of such "cleans-
ing," that it is a nonneutral substitution of one morality for an-
other,"66 which will (as it did in the case of both school prayer and
abortion) lead to further conflict in the form of fresh efforts to con-
test the moral arena through law. In turn, those efforts may be
destructive to the very religious groups who undertake them. It has
often been noted that the United States has remained so religious
precisely because it lacks a history of official establishment. While
605 See generally Menscb, Religion, Revival, and the Ruling Class: A Cultural History of
Trinity Church, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 427 (1987).
"" For the complexity of the relationship between government action and religion, show-
ing that politics cannot be "inconsequential" to religion, even when calling itself "neutral,"
see R. WUTHNOW, supra note 21, at 319.
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it is always tempting to seek aid from the coercive arm of the state,
the effect on religious life is disspiriting 67
The correct relation between religion and American law, in other
words, does not lend itself to easy categorical boundary definition,
but instead is one of subtle, nuanced dialectic. In the 1830s, Toc-
queville observed a close "affinity ' 'aca between American religion
and American democracy. In the face of death, he said, religion is a
form of "hope." Unbelief he termed an "accident," and faith "the
only permanent state of mankind." 669 If that faith becomes too
troubled, it resolves itself in bursts of anarchy or, especially, servil-
ity. 67 0 Indeed, said Tocqueville, "I am inclined to think that if faith
be wanting [in a person], he must be subject; and if he be free, he
"7 See, e.g., Hauerwas, A Christian Critique of Christian America, in NOMOS =-
RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE LAw 110-33 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1988); Littell. The
Churches and the Body Politic, in RELIGION IN AtimcA 24-44 (1968).
The central, and somewhat paradoxical, argument of Gary Wills' recent Under Gad is
that American religion owes its continuing vitality and visible presence in public life to the
American tradition of insistent church/state separation. G. W,,LS, UNDER GOD, supra note
340.
663 See G. KELLY, POLITICS AND RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNEss IN AMERICA 42 (1984). Kelly's
book is, in effect, an extended and complex meditation on the meaning of the "affinity"
Tocqueville pointed to, as well as one of the most sophisticated analyses of American
church/state relations in the literature.
Tocqueville also termed religion "first" among American political institutions; even
though there was no direct connection between church and state, religion was of primary
importance to American political freedom. Id. at 46. To the extent Tocqueville overempha-
sized New England Calvinism as the model of American religion, his observations have been
challenged. See generally, J. BUTLER, supra note 662 (contending that the historical reality
was one of lively variousness and great sectarian diversity).
On the importance of religion to those historic Americans, there is agreement. Of great
contemporary significance is the debate over whether there was, is or should be an American
"civic" religion, derived more or less from Protestant tradition, and supplying Americans
with a shared public basis for moral understanding. For an introduction to this debate, see
1R BELLAH, THE BROKEN CovENAN', AM EmcAN Cvn. RELIGION IN TIME OF TIAL (1975); R.
BELLAR & P. HARmoND, VARIErIES OF CIVIL RELIGION (1980); R. BELIAH. . MA SN, W. SUL-
LIVAN. A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART. INDIVIDUALISM AND CommrrmEN-r IN
AmRICAN LIn 219-96 (1985); UNcivL RELIGION: INTERRELIGIOUS HosT-uT IN AmEmCA (R.
Bellah & F. Greenspahn eds. 1987); M. HUGHEY. CiVIL RELIGION AND MORAL ORDER THEo-
RETICAL AND HIsTORIcAL DIMENSIONS (1983); M. MARTY. THE PUBLIC CHURCH: MAINLInE-Ev-
ANGELICAL-CATHOLIC (1981); R. NEUHAUS. THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE. RELIGION AND D&Joc-
RACY IN AMERIcA (1984); NOMOS XXX- RELIGION. MORALrrY. AND THE LAW (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds. 1988); see also, Lovin, Perry, Naturalism, and Religion in Public 63 TUL. L.
REv. 1517 (1989).
" G. KELLY, supra note 668, at 41.
670 Id. at 41.
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must believe. '8 71
In part, religion promotes civil liberty simply by promoting the
moral self-governance that makes coercive political regulations un-
necessary. Freedom does not become unbridled selfishness, but
self-interest "rightly understood. 6 72 Tocqueville's point, however,
was not simply that churches provide a valuable civic function by
training people to conform to conventional morality. An estab-
lished church does that much, without having a special "affinity"
for democracy. Nor did he mean that religion provides ideological
legitimation for the social/political order, although American
churches have all too often played that bland and servient role.
Instead, as George Kelly has argued, Tocqueville was describing
a religious spirit which he quite specifically associated with Calvin-
ist Protestantism-one which insisted on clear separation of"
church and state, but at the same time fostered a "structured
politics of involvement"' 73 in which religious conviction and politi-
cal organization reinforced each other. As Kelly explains, Toc-
queville argued that religion provided people with both "hope and
pause, 6 74 for it is an "unknown providence" that "liberates them
for cooperative satisfactions in the res publica.67 5 Religion pro-
vides a reference point, the "unknown providence" which provides
both an incentive to act responsibly in the world and that "pause"
which makes complete allegiance to any political order impossible.
This is why religion provides a counter-force to totalizing secular
ideologies, whether of the right or left-so long, that is, as
churches resist the temptation to identify themselves with the
state.
Peter Berger, insightful sociologist of religion, writes:
Death radically challenges all socially objectified defini-
tions of reality-of the world, of others and the self.
Death radically puts in question the taken-for-granted,
"business-as-usual" attitude in which one exists in every-
17 Id. at 24.
072 Id. at 48. On the inverse relation between religious and political control, see id. at 25-
26 (quoting Montesquieu): "He who has no religion at all is that terrible animal who can
only feel his freedom when he is destroying or devouring." Id. at 26.
073 Id. at 27.
"' Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
075 Id.
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day life.... Insofar as the knowledge of death cannot be
avoided in any society, legitimations of the reality of the
social world in the face of death are decisive require-
ments in any society. The importance of religion in such
legitimation is obvious.7 8
Death may be the one "essential" reality of the natural world, a
reality that is simultaneously mundane and ultimate, a profane oc-
curence that forces us to confront the possibility of the sacred. Na-
zis, identifying themselves with nature and rejecting the sacred al-
together, became, not suprisingly, purveyors of death. If it is
difficult to legitimate our reality at all in the face of death, then it
is all the more difficult to acknowledge in uncompromising terms
our pervasive social responsibility for death. That abortion is such
a case can neither be deemed not so by semantics nor successfully
hidden from view by secularizing and "privatizing" it.
The traditional role of religion has been to facilitate the contact
between the sacred and the profane. It would thereby provide,
Tocqueville said, the "hope" in the face of death that would make
possible a politics of responsible freedom. Yet that "hope," no less
than death itself, "radically challenges" our socially objectified def-
initions of reality. In the face of death, Barth wrote, "[w]e are in
captivity to be sure .... Here is the kingdom of death, the brutal
tyranny of fate which became the fate of nature."'07" Yet, a "person
should not lie in the chains of the cosmos .... The Kingdom of
God is a kingdom of the freed and the free .... ,,78
It is precisely this freedom, this "hope" in the face of death,
which makes total allegiance to any human political order at best
'6 Id. at 12 (quoting Berger). As Berger also writes,
Human life has always had a day-side and a night-side, and, inevitably, be-
cause of the practical requirements of man's being in the world, it has always
been the day-side that has received the strongest "accent of reality." But the
night-side, even if exorcised, was rarely denied. One of the most astonishing
consequences of secularization has been just this denial Modem society has
banished the night from consciousness, as far as this is possible. The treatment
of death in modem society, especially in America, is the sharpest manifestation
of this.
P. BERGFi. A RUMOR OF ANGELS 93 (1969). Meanwhile, ultimate questions of life and death
are not only suppressed in practice, but are "theoretically liquidated by relegating them to
meaninglessness" in modem philosophy. Id.
E JUNGEL, supra note 203, at 98 (quoting Barth).
078 Id. at 99.
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provisional. Christians "freely" fulfill their civic duties, in utmost,
earnest responsibility, precisely because they alienate themselves
from any existing political order: if the state were "someday to rec-
ognize the threat posed by this resolutionary method, then there
will be sufficient time to prove outselves as martyrs.11
7 9
The relation between religion and politics is, in other words, a
dialectic of freedom and responsibility in which the relation of
church and state is linked to the meaning of life and death itself.
Religion cannot dictate civil law; and justice is not Christian love.
It is not the business of coercive state power to achieve a Schaef-
ferite moral reclamation. Yet, Tocqueville warned us, without an
independent religious culture to shape the political and legal cul-
ture, there was only the coercive power of the state, and abject
servility before it.
Legal decisionmaking thus calls for a delicately nuanced sensi-
tivity to that complexity of church/state relations, one that appre-
ciates not only the importance of the state's freedom from religion,
but also the importance of religion's contribution to freedom. But
in relation to the abortion issue, genuine debate and sensitivity to
nuance were'not to prevail. By way of recapturing a lost moment,
consider the cautionary words of Alan Guttmacher, then-President
of Planned Parenthood-World Population and active advocate of
abortion reform:
I am opposed to [abortion on demand] for the U.S. in
1967. I believe that social progress is better made by
evolution than revolution. Today, complete abortion li-
cense would do great violence to the beliefs and senti-
Id. at 101. For Barth's own essentially Augustinian formulation of church/state rela-
tions, see G. KELLY, supra note 24, at 174-75. Kelly views Barth's formulation as similar to
the practice adopted by the New England Calvinists.
Notably, in a rerun of the Milgram experiment, see supra note 104, those with either a
high or low degree of religious commitment were significantly less likely to be obedient than
those with a "moderate" commitment. The researchers explained:
In the 'Judeo-Christian tradition, a high value is placed on a strong, well-
defined response to "the will of God." In fact, a decisive response even if nega-
tive is to be preferred over neutrality. The Biblical position is that the man
who is undecided about basic religious issues is unable to be decisive when
confronted by an ethical dilemma. His tendency is to forfeit his choice to any
impinging power. On the other hand, having taken a definite religious stance,
one is in a position to act in accord with conscience.
K. WALD, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 283 (1987).
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ments of most Americans. Therefore I doubt that the
U.S. is as yet ready to legalize abortion on demand, and I
am therefore reluctant to advocate it in the face of all the
bitter dissension such a proposal would create.08 0
B. The Seeming Triumph of Secularism
Neither Guttmacher himself, nor his fellow reformers, would
heed his 1967 warning. Indeed, by 1968, reformers would be calling
for medicalization, secularization and legalization of abortion. The
impetus for that movement came in part from an unlikely
source-the United States Supreme Court. The Court, despite its
traditionally conservative role, was reaching in the late 1960s its
all-time historical peak of activism on behalf of equality and per-
sonal liberty interests. In 1965, in fact, it had initiated the move
that would, within less than a decade, lift the abortion debate out
of the legislative arena. In a problematic and puzzling six-two deci-
sion containing six opinions, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut
struck down Connecticut's archaic law forbidding the use of con-
traception."" It did so by explicitly announcing the existence of a
"0 Guttmacher, Abortion-Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, in Tim CASE FOR LEGAL-
irD ABORTION Now 1, 12-13 (A. Guttmacber ed. 1967).
"1 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Given the dependence of Roe v. Wade on Griswold for its privacy
rationale, it is important to recall just how problematic a decision Griswold was. Every Jus-
tice but one (Tom Clark) wrote separately. Clark and three others (Goldberg, Warren and
Brennan) also jointly wrote a concurring opinion. Harlan and White wrote separate opin-
ions, concurring with Douglas' majority only in the judgment Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring). Black and Stewart wrote separate
dissents.
Douglas was so desperate to avoid the charge of "substantive" due process that he en-
gaged in some amazing verbal legerdemain to prove that "privacy" was actually protected
by the Bill of Rights, as incorporated through the fourteenth amendment, and therefore
consistent with post-New Deal judicial review theory. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-85. Thus,
privacy as physical security (fourth amendment) and privacy as confidentiality (fifth
amendment) became privacy as privacy, which therefore protected something new, privacy
as autonomy. See id. at 484-85. There was also the play on the word "association," which
took a first amendment doctrine that protected membership confidentiality and transposed
it through sheer formalism to protect marital "association." See id. at 482-84. And of course
there was the frightening imagery of alien intruders in the marital bedroom, id. at 485-86,
(remember how poor Bork got roasted on that one), which had nothing to do with the case,
since the sanctity of the marital bedroom as a place was neither at issue nor secured by the
decision. For an excellent and insightful critique of the Douglas opinion, drawing on linguis-
tic philosophy, that was unfortunately lost in the liberal euphoria of the times, see Gross,
The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 34 (1967). For a summary of the judicial review
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constitutional right to "privacy. 682
By that time, few outside the Catholic Church supported such
restrictions, but officially the Church still advocated their enforce-
ment, thereby deeply associating itself with what many took to be
an oppressive intrusiveness. The Church's historic tendency to fo-
cus on personal sexual behavior as the single most important moral
issue-a peculiar obsession many American Protestants
shared-only intensified the public perception that an increasingly
secular society should be protected from an authoritarian and out-
moded church-based moralism. Whereas Noonan was genuinely
advancing an ethic grounded on loving regard for human life, many
dilemma, see Mensch, supra note 24, at 29.
Even more problematic was the concurring opinion of Justices Goldberg, Warren and
Brennan, which relied explicitly on the ninth amendment's reservation of "rights. . .re-
tained by the people." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487-88 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Just how
problematic is evident if one looks at the major interpretive secondary source cited by the
concurring justices, id. at 490 n.6 (citing B. PATMRSON, supra note 121). As Justice Black
realized, the Patterson book is an explicit call for a "revival of natural law" through the
medium of the ninth amendment. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 518 n.12 (Black, J., dissenting). And
the natural law sought by Patterson is one that is firmly rooted in theology. See supra note
121.
The other four opinions, two of which were dissents, all agreed that this was a substantive
due process case, inasmuch as the Court was defining the content of the word "liberty" in
the fourteenth amendmeuit. Justice Harlan, while concurring, was cautionary:
Judicial self-restraint ... will be achieved in this area, as in other constitu-
tional areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of his-
tory, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise
appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation
of powers have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms,
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring).
None of this is to say that Griswold was wrongly decided. But when the Court ventures to
define the meaning of "liberty" as it did in Griswold, it is doing the same thing it did in the
infamous Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), offering the public a particularized ver-
sion of natural law and freedom. On the normative implications of judicial review, including
a brief discussion of Griswold, see Hiers, Normative Analysis in Judicial Determination of
Public Policy, 3 J.L. & RELIGiON 77 (1985) (on Griswold, in particular, see id. at 99-102).
Whether Griswold's particular vision accords with consensus, with publicly shared values, is
an inescapable element in the constitutional calculus. Griswold was easy in that regard,
since Connecticut stood alone in 1965 in banning the use of contraceptives by married
people.
In other areas of modem substantive due process, the Court has been careful not to stray
too far from values rooted in consensus. Compare, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974) (groups of more than two unrelated persons not constitutionally entitled to
live together), with Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (right of "extended
family" to live together protected by substantive due process).
"'2 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
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took the Church simply to be insisting on one strict, unrealistic
prohibition after another. That liberals saw only negativity in the
Church's position resulted in part from the Church's own past mis-
takes, and also, of course, from the "lifestyle" emphasis of the
1960s.
By the late 1960s some "liberal" theologians were ready to dis-
card entirely any theological concern with the issue of abortion, in
favor of rational secular individualism. The striking contrast be-
tween these "liberal" theologians and their more "conservative"
and troubled colleagues becomes evident by comparing the treat-
ment of abortion as an ethical issue in the Noonan volume, The
Morality of Abortion,83 with the treatment of the same issue at a
conference held one year later. In a manner reminiscent of the Car-
negie Foundation's support of Gunnar Myrdal's An American Di-
lemma,6  which helped retool liberal consciousness to support civil
rights reform, 8 5 the 1968 abortion conference represents an estab-
lishment-backed call for liberalization and eventual repeal of re-
strictive abortion laws in furtherance of medical professionalism,
population control and the rationalization and secularization of
ethics in the name of freedom.6 8 6 The sponsor of the conferefice
THE MoRALrry OF ABoRTioN, supra note 594.
G. MYRDAL, supra note 354.
"' See D. SOUTHERN, GUNNAR MYRDAL AND BLACK-WHrrE RELATIONs. THE USE AND ABUSE
OF AN AMERCAN DnmnmA, 1944-1969, at 127-50 (1987).
" The 1968 conference was held at Hot Springs, Virginia, from November 17-20, 1968. It
resulted in a two-volume publication, ADoRrIoN IN A CHANGING WORLD (R. Hall ed. 1970)
[hereinafter ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD]. For a list of conference participants see 2
ABORTION IN A CHANGING WoRLD, supra, at 213-18.
Of the 93 participants, more than half (56) are identifiable as physicians or health profes-
sionals, as compared with 15 out of 72 at the 1967 conference. On the other hand, only 11 of
the 93 are religiously affiliated, as compared with 23 out of 72 for the 1967 conference.
Eleven of the participants were women, virtually the same percentage as the 1967 confer-
ence with 2 female physician/medical school teachers (Sophia Kleegman and Natalie Shai-
ness) being the only two participants listed for both conferences (which certainly amounts to
a tiny overlap for two conferences ostensibly on the same subject held in the same area of
the same country within a year of one another). Id.
Racially identifiable as nonwhite is Percy Sutton, then-Borough President of Manhattan.
The 1968 conference was, however, much more genuinely international in representation
than the prior one. Whereas the 1967 conference listed participants from Canada and West-
ern Europe (England, France, Netherlands, Sweden), the 1968 Conference drew participants
not only from Western Europe (England, Sweden, Belgium, Greece) but also from Eastern
Europe (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Yugoslavia, USSR), Africa (Nigeria), Asia




was the Association For the Study of Abortion. Its president, Rob-
ert Hall of the Columbia University Medical School, believed that
"[c]ountries with stringent abortion laws have buried their heads
in the sands of time.
'6 87
The introduction to the conference, entitled "Abortion Law Re-
form-The Moral Basis" was a clarion call issued by none other
than John D. Rockefeller 111. s88 His talk evidenced genuine con-
cern for the fate of children born into adverse circumstances:
The New York Times recently reported that cases of
child abuse are steadily increasing in the United States.
Child abandonment and infanticide are serious problems
in some countries. All over the world, unwanted children
are being permanently harmed both physically and psy-
chologically through hunger, neglect, and abuse. Is this
not a moral issue of the first order? 89
Nor did he fail to mention, albeit briefly, that liberalized abortion
laws should be combined with concern for the "most fundamental
rights of children-to be wanted, loved, and given a reasonable
start in this world." 90 Nevertheless, there was a disquieting tone
to the proposed solution-put crudely, to eliminate the unborn
children rather than the conditions that would make their child-
hood so bleak. His conclusion was to call first for liberalization of
abortion laws, leading as soon as possible to repeal, leaving the de-
cision "with the conscience and need of the patient and the profes-
sional experience and guidance of the physician."'6 91 He also advo-
cated promotion of family planning and contraception, for he did
Noonan's account of the 1968 conference is characteristically sarcastic but not inaccurate:
The conference was under the auspices of the Association for the Study of
Abortion, that imperfectly disguised committee for the promotion of the abor-
tion liberty. It was organized by Alan Guttmacher, Louis Hellman, and
Planned Parenthood's chief lawyer, Harriet Pilpel. Announced as a meeting to
"discuss" abortion, the conference had the kind of ratio of proponents to oppo-
nents not uncharacteristic of pro-choice symposia-twenty of the pro-choice
side to one of the other.
J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE, supra note 9, at 44 (footnotes omitted).
687Hall, Commentary, in ABORTION AND THE LAW 224, 234 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
"s Rockefeller, Abortion Law Reform-The Moral Basis, in 1 ABORTION IN A CIIANGING
WORLD, supra note 686.
119 Id. at xv, xvii.
690 Id. at xviii.
"I Id. at xix.
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not "favor liberalizing abortion laws for the purpose of fostering
abortion as a method of birth control." 92
611 Id. at xx. Whitney Young, at the 1967 conference, had expressed some ambivalence,
arguing vigorously, on the one hand, that if "abortions are a fact of life" in this country and
"are engaged in substantially by people who can afford them," then the poor should have
equal access, yet conceding that he was "a little suspicious when the first intervention, first
concern as regards the Negro is around liberalizing sterilization laws and abortion laws, but
the real concern is less with the human being involved and there is much more concern
about increased Aid to Dependent Children and welfare caseloads." THE TnmuuML CHoIcE,
supra note 594, at 64.
Dorothy Height, then-President of the National Council of Negro Women, felt that "[i]f
we had the courage to deal" with problems like "poverty," "deprivation," and "racial dis-
crimination," "it would allow these children to come into life really wanted." Id. at 19-20.
And Dr. Eric Lincoln of Union Theological Seminary reported that
[tihere is a very broad suspicion on the part of many Negroes that what ap-
pears to be a sudden concern with contraception and with abortion is thought
by many to be a part of a very heinous plot to eliminate, or further control, not
only the black minority in this country, but dark minorities everywhere.
Id. at 24.
At the 1968 Conference, Percy Sutton (then Borough President of Manhattan, and black),
whose role in the panel on Abortion and Poverty was to "speak about abortion in the Negro
ghetto," 2 ABORTION IN A CmAmoNG WORLD, supra note 686, at 31, spoke only about the
(real) problem of access and availability of abortions for poor women. See id. at 32-35.
Recent data reveals that while nonwhites have often, when surveyed, reported more oppo-
sition to abortion than whites, (see, e.g., IV. ROOF & W. McKINNEY, supra note 26, at 209-13
(Black Protestants)), abortion rates among nonwhites are dramatically higher than their
white counterparts:
In 1981, based on reported data from thirty-four states, black (and other)
women had approximately 240,000 abortions and white women approximately
580,000. The abortion ratio (number of legal abortions per 1000 live births) was
549 for black women and 329 for white women.
THE ABORTION QUESTION, supra note 13, at 153. A more recently published study reports
that "[i]n the mid-1980s, there were about 64 abortions per 100 live black births and 30
abortions per 100 white births in a 13-state reporting area." Children and Families, in A
COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMEcAN SOCIETY 509, 513 (G. Jaynes & R. Williams, Jr. eds.
1989) (citation omitted).
The authors of The Abortion Question conclude from such data that "black women are
currently exercising more reproductive controL" THE ABORTION QUESTION, supra note 13, at
153.
Perhaps the issue is more complicated and places in question the experiential meaning of
"choice." Consider the following statement from a black mother, as reported by Robert
Coles:
They say no, no-no more kids; the welfare worker she tells you you're
"overpopulating" the world, and something has to be done. But right now one
of the few times I feel good is when I'm pregnant, and I can feel I'm getting
somewhere, at least then I am-because I'm making something grow, and not
seeing everything die around me, like all it does in the street, I'll tell you. They
want to give me the pill and stop the kids, and I'm willing for the most part;
but I wish I could take care of all the kids I could have, and then I'd want
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The first plenary session of invited participants at the confer-
ence, entitled "The Ethical Aspects of Abortion,' 69 3 seems to have
been structured to neutralize any lingering theological concern.
The first two presenters were an embryologist whose conclusion
amounted to a refutation of ensoulment at conception,9 and an
historian with a careful, critical review of Noonan's account of
church doctrine.69 5 For the "Protestant position" the convenors
brought Joseph Fletcher himself, the author of Situation Ethics,90
to celebrate those Protestants who advocated a "free and responsi-
ble ethics of abortion"-especially Unitarians, who had decided in
1968 in favor of leaving the abortion decision in the hands of "duly
licensed physicians and their patients. ' a9 7 In a telling case of
clouded crystal ball, Fletcher, seemingly unaware of conservative
evangelicalism, observed that "[t]he majority of Protestant
churches have remained silent and will probably stay that way un-
til the question is resolved for them in the social-cultural debate.
They will not give much leadership, even if their opposition to
medically responsible abortion is not as plainspoken and theologi-
cally sophisticated as Catholicism's." 98 He conceded that some
Protestants had actually taken "the Catholic position," oddly nam-
ing Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer.699 Nevertheless, in
Fletcher's "modern world of scientific biology and medicine" we
could rely on "an ethics of responsible decision rather than sub-
mission to inflexible moral laws. 70 0 In such a world, he said,
plenty of them. Or maybe I wouldn't. I wouldn't have to be pregnant to feel
hope about things. I don't know, you can look at it both ways, I guess.
D. CALLAHAN, supra note 13, at 506.
"1 1 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD supra note 686, at 3-57. Volume 1 reports on the
five plenary sessions at the conference. Volume 2 reports the 10 subsequent panels, which
ran, five at a time, simultaneously. Among the panels were discussions entitled "Abortion
and Animation," "Abortion and Poverty," "Abortion and Morality," and "Abortion and
Womankind."
M Comer, An Embryologist's View, in 1 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 686,
at 3.
""' Means, A Historian's View, in 1 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 686, at
16.
J' d. FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICs, supra note 576.
", Fletcher, A Protestant Minister's View, in 1 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra
note 686, at 25.
698 Id. at 25-26.
... Id. at 26. On Barth and Bonhoeffer in this regard, see supra text accompanying notes
617-32.'10 Fletcher, A Protestant Minister's View, in 1 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra
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"traditional church positions become more and more archaic."'70
Indeed, the entire history of both legislative and theological re-
striction of abortion he reduced to a "motivation" of "conscious
and unconscious male chauvinism."70 2 A sentiment like "a life is a
life" is, for Fletcher, just "tautolog[y]," a case of mere "feeling,"
"sublogical," "an attitude only. ' 70 3 For him, the "task is to reedu-
cate people on a deeper level than logic," to "the level of empirical
fact and a situational versatility which fits the realities of modern
life." °7 " Fletcher, going even further than Rockefeller's opening ad-
dress, concluded that abortion was the "best method of birth
control."
70 5
For a Jewish counterpart to Fletcher, the convenors found Re-
form Rabbi Israel Margolies, who wanted nothing to do with "ho-
lier-than-thou religionists" overly preoccupied with "sin," deeming
note 686, at 26.
701 Id.
702 Id.
703 Id. at 27.
704 Id. Fletcher elaborated on his views during the subsequent panel discussions. At the
panel entitled "Abortion and Animation" (ensoulment), Fletcher proclaimed:
[T]his whole discussion is like the argument about the death of God-pointless
because we cannot establish whether God was ever alive to begin with.
All of the positions taken by people about animation are a matter of faith
rather than empirical reasoning;, therefore, the debate provides no foundation
for social policy with respect to abortion.
... Desirability-that is, a bill of goods and evils in any concrete situation
realistically assessed in terms of human needs and social welfare--should de-
cide whether we terminate a life in utero or postnatally just as we would in any
case of self-defense or common defense.
2 ABORTMON IN A CH GING WORLD, supra note 684, at 5.
Fletcher went even further at the panel entitled "Abortion and Morality. The Relation-
ship between Available Abortion and Sexual Freedom" (all seven of the panelists were
men). Fletcher made clear that his goal was sex without consequences, that his moral posi-
tion was maximization of human satisfaction. To that end, he announced that early abortion
was "the best method of fertility control because it would entail, if present research suc-
ceeds, the least discomfort and the least risk of failure due to emotion or carelessness and
the least hazard of ineffectiveness." Id. at 93.
Fletcher summed up his moral outlool
I say, let's be done with all objective morality, that is to say, any notion in
terms of scriptural law or natural law, that right and wrong and good and evil
are intrinsic values, and take instead the view that all values are quite extrin-
sic, dependent upon the varieties of circumstances.
Id.
700 Fletcher, A Protestant Minister's View, in 1 ABoRTmioN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra
note 686, at 28.
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such behavior "spineless and irrational subservience to the dogma-
tism of theologians . . . unbecoming to the rational and largely
moral society of a great nation. '2 7 8 He therefore called upon us to
"disavow the old taboos" and "assert proudly and honestly that, as
creative partners of God, we reserve the right to build our families
purposefully and joyfully, not accidentally and reluctantly. '707
Nevertheless, a more poignant dimension to Rabbi Margolies'
participation in the ethics panel emerged in the follow-up discus-
sion. Margolies listened to three successive testaments to the secu-
lar/rational character of the abortion issue, followed by a con-
cerned question about potential life from Daniel Callahan.
Callahan's question was dismissed by Fletcher, whose only baseline
was the utilitarian one, what will "augment our sense of well-be-
ing. ' 708 At that point Margolies suddenly shed his complacent ve-
neer of secularism, reverting to the very theology he had dismissed
as so "unmodern":
I also believe that there is something very special about
what we call the soul, the spiritual nature of man. If you
deny this and lean entirely on the rational you are in
danger of falling into the kind of trap that occurred in
Nazi Germany, which was by all objective judgment a
highly rational society. We used to refer in German to
the Luftmensch-"people who live on air." This was a
people of philosophers, musicians, and scientists, and yet
it was out of this company that the kind of philosophy
was able to come which, having no consideration for the
spiritual nature of man, was able to condemn a certain
segment of the population to extinction in the interest of
its own point of view.
... I think this is why the religious emphasis at the
beginning of this conference certainly has a place.70 9
However begrudgingly, the convenors gave the penultimate slot
on the ethics panel to Thomas J. O'Donnell, a "traditional Catho-
706 Margolies, A Reform Rabbi's View, in 1 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note
686, at 32.
707 Id. at 33.
708 Discussion, in 1 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 686, at 46, 53.
109 Id. at 53.
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lic," who stated the prevailing Catholic opposition to abortion71
O'Donnell was followed immediately by what was touted as a "lib-
eral Catholic view." Its advocate, Joseph Donceel, dissented from
the theory of "immediate animation" (ensoulment at conception)
in favor of "mediate" or "delayed" animation, but he did so by
rejecting the basic dualistic premises of Western Englightenment
rationalism and by locating theological error in the deference of
Catholic thinkers to Cartesian scientific rationalism.711 Citing
Aquinas, Donceel argued for the notion of hylomorphism, under
which both body and soul proceed together from conception
through vegetative and animal states, toward true hominization:
"Hylomorphism holds that the human soul is to the body some-
what as the shape of a statue is to the actual statue. The shape of a
statue cannot exist before the statue exists .... The human soul
can exist only in a real human body. '71 2 For Donceel this theory
was more consistent not only with the dynamics of fetal develop-
tnent but also with the most advanced epistemological philosophy
of the time-the existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty7
1 -
The upshot of Donceel's position was that "a prehuman embryo
cannot demand from us the absolute respect which we owe to the
human person"; however, "it deserves a very great consideration"
and "only very serious reasons should allow us to terminate its
existence. 714
The panel conversation was lurching dangerously out of control.
710 O'Donnell, A Traditional Catholic's View, in 1 ABORION IN A CHANGING VoRL, supra
note 686, at 34.
7 See Donceel, A Liberal Catholic's View, in 1 ABorrIoN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra
note 686, at 39-45 (italics omitted).
712 Id. at 39-40.
713 Id. at 44.
74 Id. at 45. Curiously, the delayed animation notion has recently gained some scientific
support as a way to solve the abortion dilemma. By defining the beginning of life to achieve
symmetry with our standard for its termination, brain wave activity, Hans-Martin Sass of
the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University, has proposed that we "set the
begiftning of life at about 70 days after conception, when he says the brain has started to
function and connections between nerve cells are rapidly forming." His model abortion law,
fashioned accordingly, would legalize abortions only in the first 10 weeks of pregnancy, ex-
cept, perhaps, for medical indications. See Beck, Let's Use Scientific Basis to Fix Beginning
of Life and Settle Abortion Issue, Buffalo News, Nov. 25, 1990, at G-7, col 3; see also E-1.
KLUGE, THE PRACrIcE OF DEATH 88-100 (1975); Steinfels, Catholic Scholars, Citing New




Participants who had been assembled to give polite, deferential re-
ligious sanction to the requirements of enlightened secularism
found themselves in an arcane discussion of ensoulment theory
which was, at the same time, a sophisticated modern epistemologi-
cal challenge to the whole tradition of Enlightenment dualistic ra-
tionality. Ralph Gampell of Stanford Law School expressed the
view that this whole debate should be kept away from courts and
legislatures:
When you are dealing with the courts and legislatures I
think that the matter of ensoulment is not irrelevant, for
if you tell them that we are dealing with a choice between
two lives in being, they will move away from you in holy
horror. I think that such a proposition does have Nazi
overtones that society would recognize. If you are going
to persuade legislatures, you have to say that there is ma-
ternal, but not fetal life in being.
15
Gampell hoped that he could trap O'Donnell by asking why
spontaneous abortions were not given the rites of the church.
O'Donnell informed him that rites were given, in the form of con-
ditional baptisms, although he conceded that it was not "one of
our clerical duties.., to watch over every missed menstruation."716
He then pointed out that the Church's primary concern was not
"about the soul surviving or not"--on that question the church
had no lack of confidence-but rather about the moral state of
American society.7 17 Finally George Corner, speaking as a medical
biologist and philosopher, concluded the unraveling discussion by
stating that "many great problems of our responsibility to each
other-abortion, moral restraint, penal law-can never be settled
by delimiting fixed stages of development of body or soul."118
70 Discussion, supra note 708, at 54.
"" Id. at 54-55.
717 Id. at 55-56.
"' Id. at 56-57. While there was no feminist presence as such at the 1968 confelence,
which was hardly atypical for the early abortion reform movement, one of the 10 subsequent
panels was devoted, almost in the manner of a traditional "ladies' auxiliary," to "Abortion
and Womankind: Abortion as an Inherent Right, an Occasional Prerogative, or a Special
Privilege." 2 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 27, at 191. The group consisted of
8 of the 11 women listed as conference participants-four physicians, a psychologist, a social
scientist, a lawyer and Vera Houghton, "Chairman, Abortion Law Reform Association,
London, England." (See the alphabetical entries of participants in id. at 213-18).
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Gampell's own solution lay with the medical profession. A prac-
Mary Calderone, M.D., Executive Director of the Sex Information and Education Council
of the U.S., and moderator of the panel opened the session by reminding the group that
"Dr. Robert Hall deliberately made this a panel of women so that we would approach the
question as women." Id. at 193. The first third of the session consisted of reports and dis-
cussion with respect to incidence of abortion and surveys of attitudes toward abortion, espe-
cially in England where a reform law had recently been enacted. Id. at 193-201.
Then Sophia Kleegman, M.D., Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology at New York Uni-
versity Medical Center, spoke from her 44 years of medical practice, focusing on serious
problems of poverty and illegal abortion, concluding that we should "have all legal restric-
tions removed entirely to allow physicians to take care of their patients within the frame-
work of sound medical judgment and practice." Id. at 201-03, 215. Ruth Lidz, M.D., Associ-
ate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Yale, reported on her work in the "unwed mother"
project at Yale, where she gave therapeutic counseling to women seeking abortions and then
advocated for those she believed deserved the abortions (40 of 42 she regarded as de-erved).
Id. at 204-06, 216. Her conclusion was somewhat cautious:
[W]hile I would like very much to have all restrictive abortion laws removed, I
would like to caution that this is not going to settle all of our problems. It is
two different things, to be pregnant and to have the child, and many women
are very much mortified by becoming pregnant, but not by having a child.
Id. at 205.
Then Ruth Roemer, a lawyer and Associate Researcher in Health Law at U.C.LA., spoke
in what we have come to regard as "rights terms": "[WIomen, particularly in the developed
countries, are coming to regard abortion as a fundamental human right.... It is a right so
fundamental, so personal to women, that its denial nullifies the right to freedom and to
security of their person and of their families." Id. at 207. Roemer then called for the panel
to "address itself to political action designed to make abortion freely available to women
who want it." Id. at 208.
Interpreting the call as a motion, Calderone replied that she "would like to include in it
the motion that with every right go certain obligations." Id. Then things got a little heated:
ROEMER We are carrying out our obligations.
CALDERONE: Not with repeated unwanted pregnancies. The rights and obli-
gations should balance.
R. LIDZ: Yes. I think that I am also for removing the law. I am very much for
that, but I do not think that will solve our problems.
Id. at 208.
Dr. Kleegman then offered her view-
I do not believe in abortion on demand. I feel very strongly that if a woman
asks for an abortion, it is a medical problem, and I do not think physicians
should be chaplains. When a woman requests an abortion, then I think it is
important that she be given the opportunity to be seen by someone who is
trained.
Id. at 209. And Calderone would not let the moral issue go:
The point I want to make is that we have a picture of many young people
marrying today because they know if things do not work out properly, they can
get a divorce all too quickly. And to have young people growing up and saying,
"Well, we can always get an abortion"--this is what I was driving at. This has
already happened in Japan, where multiple abortions are carried out on the
same woman. It is too easy.
Id. at 209.
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ticing physician with a law degree from Stanford who co-taught
with Herbert Packer a law and medicine course at Stanford,
Gampell had co-authored a law review article with Packer in 1959
calling for the decriminalization of "therapeutic abortions" in favor
of procedural delegation to committees of doctors, who would gain
plenary control over the process. 19 Consistent with Packer's ap-
proach to criminal law in other problematic areas, 20 the authors
called for the repeal of dysfunctional criminal law, seeing the prob-
lem of therapeutic abortion as one calling for the deliberate appli-
cation of informed medical judgment; their solution would both
privatize the issue and transfer authority over it to the realm of
medical expertise.
By 1968, however, when the Gampell and Packer article was re-
printed in Guttmacher's The Case for Legalized Abortion Now,
72 1
the cutting edge of advocacy with respect to abortion reform had
become the privacy right enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Griswold. Particularly influential was the nearly fifty-page article,
Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of State Abortion Statutes, published in 1968 by Roy
Lucas, 722 who would go on to be an important legal activist for
abortion rights. Eschewing the incrementalism of legislative re-
form, Lucas called for the constitutionalization of choice. Given
the legal rhetoric to which we have become accustomed since Roe
v. Wade, it is difficult to recall how startling it was for Lucas to
assert in 1968 that "[a]lthough interests at stake in the abortion
controversy are diverse, subtle, novel, and sensitive, the case ap-
pears ultimately to fit within the classical framework of govern-
mental interference with important interests of individual liberty
By way of testament to the diversity of viewpoints, Natalie Shainess, M.D., Lecturer in
Psychiatry at Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgery, id. at 217, gave the
last long statement of the session, seeing "the abortion problem [as] one manifestation of
the power struggle between the sexes, with man fearful of and reluctant to surrender power,
as is every group which is in comniand," and citing Simone de Beauvoir regarding male-
female 'relations. Id. at 210-11.
711 Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and Medicine, 11 STAN.
L. Rav. 417 (1959).
720 E.g., H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
72 THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION Now 147 (A. Guttmacher ed. 1967).
722 Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration
of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REv. 730 (1968). On its significance, see D. CALLAHAN
supra note 13, at 468-73.
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and to be capable of resolution in traditional constitutional
terms." "2 He concluded that
[a] right to abortion by consent performed by a licensed
physician can be strongly asserted in at least three re-
lated forms within the Bill of Rights and fourteenth
amendment framework-first, as a fundamental right of
marital privacy, human dignity, and personal autonomy
reserved to the pregnant woman acting on the advice of a
licensed physician; second, as a penumbral right emanat-
ing from values embodied in the express provisions of the
Bill of Rights themselves; or, third, as a necessary and
altogether reasonable application of precedent, namely,
Griswold v. Connecticut.
72 4
While Lucas' law review article displayed the understandable
self-assurance of advocacy, it was far from certain in 1967 and 1968
that litigation would lead to abortion as constitutionally protected
privacy. Another early abortion rights activist, Harriet Pilpel,
noted at the 1968 conference in the panel entitled "Abortion and
Constitutionality: The Means of Assessing and Testing the Consti-
tutionality of Abortion Law in the United States," that even losing
test cases could have a valuable educational effect: "So whether or
not we are eventually successful in declaring clauses unconstitu-
tional in this area, the fact that attacks are mounted and the pub-
lic is educated as to the infirmities in the laws will become, I think,
extremely useful.
'725
Accompanying the zeal for solving the abortion problem through
constitutional litigation was a striking contempt, even distaste, for
sectarian religion, religiously rooted morality or even the notion
that abortion might raise a serious question of morality from a the-
ological perspective. It was routinely assumed that Protestants and
Jews overwhelmingly favored extreme liberalization, and even re-
peal, of abortion laws, supporting the characterization of "the sole
major organized body opposing all abortion reform-officials of the
Roman Catholic Church."72 According to Lucas, "[rto make the
11 Lucas, supra note 722, at 738.
*24 Id. at 756-57 (footnotes omitted).
"' 2 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WVORLD, supra note 686, at 137.
726 Lucas, supra note 722, at 737. Interestingly, Milner Ball, who was a Protestant parish
minister in the 1960s and who had not yet gone to law school, recalls the perception among
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decision that a fetus ought to be considered a human being is a
subjective belief of religious character," and "[there is no valid
state interest in implementation of religious belief sufficient to
serve as a basis for legislation.
72 7
The distinction between "developing fetal tissue," on the one
hand, and "fully established human life," on the other, becomes
the only appropriate one in the secular realm of legislation and,
accordingly, the secular moral value of choice itself becomes the
only allowable position. To allow otherwise would contradict "the
ethical value of not forcing the subjective moral assumptions of
one group upon all other groups. ' 728 We are told by Lucas that,
according to H.L.A. Hart, "the unimpeded exercise by individuals
of free choice may be held a value in itself with which it is prima
facie wrong to interfere. "729 Thus, a somewhat bizarre claim of lib-
ertarianism becomes the only acceptable constitutional norm.
Lucas, curiously, having been requested to offer an establish-
ment clause perspective on the abortion issue at the conference,
took a position in the panel on Abortion and Constitutionality
seemingly at odds with his law review article:
Now, I will try to summarize the separation of church
and state position. This is perhaps the final argument
which can be raised, that the laws regulating abortion are
laws respecting an establishment of religion. The quick-
est way to sum this up is to show that the abortion re-
strictions arise out of a metaphysical theory that the fer-
tilized ovum is a human being entitled to the protection
of ultimate birth and life. But in the same sense, all of
the statements in the Decalogue can be said both to be
religious and to represent some state interest.
The chief obstacle to knocking out the abortion laws
on the establishment of religion point, even though you
can prove that maintenance of the laws is religiously mo-
his fellow theologians that the Griswold decision was basically a statement to the Roman
Catholic Church that it should not enact its doctrine into law. The Catholic Church was
presumed by Ball and his colleagues to exercise legislative power in Connecticut. Letter
from Milner Ball to Elizabeth Mensch and Alan Freeman (October 1990).
721 Lucas, supra note 722, at 760.
Id. at 751.
729 Id. at 751-52 (quoting H.L.A HART. LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 21 (1963)).
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tivated, is the argument of the other side that there is a
state interest in protecting the sanctity of life. This is an
argument not easily dismissed.
-30
Despite such concessions, the basic constitutional argument
ruled out of order any sectarian claim about preserving the sanc-
tity of life, gradually turning the legal abortion debate into an all-
or-nothing affair obsessively focused on who does or does not have
"rights." The opponents of reform took up the challenge. The 1970
Noonan volume, for example, contains one entry that was written
in 1970, after the California Supreme Court had invalidated its
state abortion law on constitutional grounds,"' which, unlike the
other essays that had come from the 1967 conference reflects the
stark and uncompromising posturing of contemporary pro-life
legalists. s2
If the abortion rights strategy was to load the constitutional ar-
gument on the mechanical category of "liberty" (or privacy), then
the equally mechanical pro-life response was to load everything on
the category of "person" by definitionally including the fetus for
all purposes. Just as creationists took on their evolutionist adversa-
ries by appropriating through "creation-science" the status of secu-
lar positivism, 733 abortion opponents, heeding the warnings of
those like Lucas, reprocessed their own position as firmly rooted in
secular constitutional legalism. The particular essay written by
Noonan and his colleague David Louisell displays for the most part
(to the shame of legal realists everywhere) a facile, manipulative
conceptualism with an unrelenting insistence on deduction based
on the all-or-nothing category of "human being."731 In fact, it is
exactly the sort of legalism that has become standard fare in pro-
730 2 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 686, at 160.
731 People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969) (finding the
phrase "necessary to preserve" the life of the mother insufficiently certain to satisfy due
process requirements without violating constitutional rights), cert. denied, 397 US. 915
(1970).
"I Louisell & Noonan, Constitutional Balance, in THE MoRALrrv OF AoRToN, supra
note 594, at 220.
733 See our discussion of this in Mensch & Freeman, Religion as Science/Science as Reli-
gion: Constitutional Law and the Fundamentalist Challenge, TIKKtN, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at
64.
11 See Louisell & Noonan, supra note 732, at 220-30, 244-58. They are on more solid
ground when they argue that the precedential route from Griswold to abortion is far from
obvious. See id. at 233-34.
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life tracts and is strikingly at odds with the sensitivity and deliber-
ation of the theological essays in the same volume.
Then came Roe v. Wade, ensuring that the defenders of choice
would be situated in a context that was almost exclusively legalis-
tic and rights-based. Like all legalisms, it invited interminable le-
galist debate. The pro-choice legal arguments rested upon the sec-
ular morality that was being developed to shore up the liberal
activism of the Supreme Court. So starkly secular did the pro-
choice position become that a leading liberal theorist could argue
that successful theological opposition to the pro-choice position
would amount to an unconstitutional establishment of reli-
gion-which crudely oversimplified what was nonetheless a subtle
and difficult question of church-state relations, from the perspec-
tive of both theology and law.
7 35
Although Roe secularized the abortion issue through the insulat-
ing effect of the privacy right, a growing opposition to Roe became
ever more resolutely absolutist in theologically defending the pro-
life position. Triggered in part by reaction to Roe itself, Catholics
and fundamentalists formed an alliance (hitherto unheard of) in
opposition to abortion, with some fundamentalists quite self-con-
sciously seizing upon abortion as a vehicle for reasserting religion
in what seemed to be an increasingly secular world.736
731 See, e.g., Richards, Constitutional Privacy, Religious Disestablishment, and the Abor-
tion Decisions, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 148 (Q. Garfield & P. Hennes-
sey eds. 1984). Tribe himself made this argument back in 1973 and later repudiated it. Com-
pare Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1, 21-25 (1973), with L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1349-50 (2d ed. 1988) and L. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF Anso-
LUTES 116 (1990).
" See ANJ. REICHLEY, supra note 26, at 319-27; see also M. BARONE, OUR COUNTRY: TlHE
SHAPING OF AMERICA FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 565, 610 (1990); C. MOONEY, P6DBLIC Vln-
TUE: LAW AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF RELIGION 16-17 (1986); G. WILLS, UNDER GOD, supra
note 340, at 121. See generally id. at 15-93.
Reichley describes the lay Catholic reaction to Roe v. Wade:
The sweeping nature of the Court's decision practically guaranteed that oppo-
nents of abortion would fight back in a similarly draconian spirit. Many lay
Catholics who had stopped listening to their bishops over contraception and
had been prepared to accept some modification of absolutist laws against abor-
tion were startled and outraged by the Court's contention that for the first six
months of gestation, unborn life has no rights whatever. They agreed with the
bishops that the Court's ruling violated the fundamental value attached to in-
dividual human life not only by Catholicism but by the entire Judeo-Christian
tradition, and indeed by most forms of Western humanism. Catholic opponents
1118 [Vol. 25:923
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As a result of that historical sequence, the public debate on
abortion, as it later developed, seemed almost to concede to the
pro-life position the moral high ground, however over-absolutist it
was perceived to be, while the pro-choice rhetoric seemed to de-
fend one's legal right to do moral wrong-and even to assert that
morality was an inappropriate, virtually impermissible concern. At
the most insidious political level the moral high ground of the pro-
life position was used to cover a multitude of real evils: the Chris-
tian rhetoric of authentic pro-life advocates was exploited by a ma-
nipulative Republican right wing.7ar
of abortion ... were psychologically prepared to accept defeat in those states
which enacted abortion reform, though they clearly did not relish the prospect.
But "deciding this question in the courts... was steadfastly opposed by the
anti-abortion forces because it undermined the process of negotiation and com-
promise and denied effective representation to the unborn."
A.J. REiCHLEY, supra note 26, at 292. Reichley's observation confirms the impression of our
Catholic colleague, Tom Disare, who recalled family discussions of the abortion issue during
the period just prior to Roe v. Wade. Disare recalls that while there was much debate about
the particulars of concededly inevitable reform, Roe itself was perceived as an outrageous
and enormous shock, to be opposed by all. He also observed that he thought that for many
Catholics who had refused to comply with the Church's teaching on contraception, the abor-
tion issue, in its clear moral purity, offered an opportunity to reaffirm commitment to the
Church's ethical tradition.
Although diehard apologists for Roe v. Wade, like Tribe, discount and minimize the pre-
Roe legislative process (for instance stating that, "it is instructive in this regard that be-
tween 1971 and 1973 not one additional state moved to repeal its criminal prohibition on
abortion early in pregnancy," L. TRBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES, supra note 734,
at 51, there is reason to believe that the legislative process might well have done a better, if
not perfect from the pro-choice or pro-life side, job of resolving this issue through compro-
mise. Barone is less pessimistic in retrospect: "Rockefeller and (much to his later regret)
Reagan signed liberalized abortion laws which were among the most sweeping of the sixteen
such laws passed, in states with 41% of the nation's population, in the five years preceding
January 1973." M. BARONE, supra, at 460. Or, further.
[B]y the time the Roe v. Wade decision was issued, about 70% of the nation's
population lived within 100 miles-an easy two hours' drive-of a state with a
legalized abortion law. And just as the Supreme Court was speaking, legisla-
tures in almost all of the states were going into session; many would probably
have liberalized their abortion laws if the court had not acted.
Id. at 756 n.14.
This is not to suggest that the legislative path would have been a neat, linear one leading
to total repeal, since, if nothing else, it would have given voice to the widespread and deeply
felt, religiously rooted concern about abortion. The close-out move in Roe is, in this regard,
another instance of what Gary Wills described as the unfortunate mindset of liberal elite
intellectuals as far as their attitudes and assumptions about religion in America. See G.
WILLs, UNDER GoD, supra note 340, at 89.
71" For an account of just how manipulative and successful this effort was, see A.J.
REIcaLEy, supra note 26, at 319-27.
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Nevertheless, the anomaly continues: in the current debate as
publicly perceived, the pro-life position is defended as a religious/
moral position, while the pro-choice position is defended as if it
were purely secular. Yet, despite the liberal secularist presumption
that appeals to morality, and certainly to the "supernatural," are
wholly out of order in public life, deeply felt theological appeals to
conscience are more compelling than claims rooted in analytic phi-
losophy. Moreover, the claims rooted in analytic philosophy are ul-
timately rooted either in consensus (which does not exist on this
issue) or on a natural law that is surreptitiously hidden from
view.
73 8
In fact, when either side in the debate resorts to pure, secular
legalism, its position becomes foolish and self-contradictory. The
labels, selectively deployed by pro-lifers, like "judicial usurpation,"
"judicial legislation" or "anti-democracy" simply do not work.739
73 See supra note 681 and accompanying text.
71" These labels are just another way of saying that Roe is, somehow, clearly and objec-
tively unconstitutional, a conclusion at odds with any realistic perception of judicial inter-
pretation. Thus, we can agree with Tribe that Roe is "not unconstitutional," yet remain
unpersuaded by his defense of the decision in L. TRiBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES,
supra note 8, at 77-112.
We think that, in retrospect, Roe v. Wade may be fairly characterized as a mistake for
three combined reasons; it was legally problematic at best, sociologically inaccurate and po-
litically disastrous. As to the first, the precedential line from Griswold to Roe was far from
clear. For a recent elaboration of this point, see Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of Constitu-
tional Review from Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Decision
Merely Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1677. While substantive due process may be a con-
stitutional fact of life, it is also the case that as the Court moves in particular decisions from
clearer realms of text and tradition to more open-ended interventions, circumspection and
prudence become a necessary part of the constitutional calculus. For example, the Court in
Roe might have overturned the Texas law on the ground that criminalization of all abortion
exceeded the bounds of the due process clause, while merely remanding, or even summarily
sustaining, the statute in the companion case of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), which,
after all, involved a version of the reform statute promulgated in the 1962 American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code, id. at 182.
In other constitutional areas the Court has basically announced a principle of deference to
state decisionmaking processes, intervening to overturn the occasional egregious case, usu-
ally drawing an illogical yet pragmatic line between the two. Compare Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973) (upholding enforcement of local standard for obscenity), with Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (holding film Carnal Knowledge not constitutionally obscene
despite contrary finding under local standards). Compare Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960) (striking down racial gerrymandering), with Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52
(1964) (not striking down racial gerrymandering). Compare San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (denying constitutional right to equalized school financing),
with Phyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1983) (mandating access to public education for illegal
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Conservatives have consistently applauded a robust interpretive
activism to protect property rights from democracy, in a tradition
running all the way from John Marshall 4  to Antonin Scalia,74 1
culminating in a perverse distortion of egalitarianism to overturn a
democratically adopted and modest affirmative action plan in City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company.
74 2
For their part, liberals traditionally have celebrated democracy
and judicial restraint in the context of economic regulation but
then applauded judicial "activism" for the sake of protecting rights
of personal autonomy.7 4 This inconsistency is heightened by the
correspondence between the rhetoric of privacy and that of prop-
erty. The claim of privacy as autonomy is one of self as owner, as
having dominion. One can easily imagine (and may see) the Re-
publican pro-choice candidate who can use the same rhetoric to
defend both abortion rights and unregulated plant closings. Simi-
larly, the president can use the language of free economic "choice"
to justify the veto of mandatory family care leave legislation, yet
be against choice on the abortion issue.
Our point is not just the political manipulability of the rhetoric
but the extent to which the rhetoric of autonomy at the secular
level is bound up with a celebration of "self" as the ultimate con-
cern, the final arbiter, the trump to all moral claim. In that con-
text, by immunizing abortion from the legislative process, Roe
could be read as inviting, or even encouraging, routine use of abor-
aliens under equal protection clause).
The ultimate point here, which is where the "wisdom" of the decision meets the Zociolo.-i
cal point, is that Roe v. Wade, in its particularity, is the kind of decision that cannot survive
without consensus, because it involved a moral issue with sincere and deeply felt positions
on both sides. Thus it is not just that there was division (as there surely was on racial
segregation, but there the Court could summon up a powerful history and seize the moral
high ground), but that there were plausible moral arguments on both sides of this one. The
sociological error was the failure to appreciate the pervasive reality of religion in American
life, which, in turn, led to political disaster.
740 E.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) (employing expansive interpretation of Con-
tract Clause to protect property rights).
741 E.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (using heavy-handed
formalism on behalf of property rights).
742 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
741 For a wonderful example of a defense of Roe v. Wade that works equally well as a




tion for the instrumental realization of self-interest.7 44 This criti-
cism, of course, has nothing to do with the moral character of pro-
choice activists, who are often selfless in their service to other
women; nor does it even reflect their attitude toward abortion:
many are appalled, for example, that a person might have an abor-
tion for purposes of sex selection.7 4 5 The problem lies in a secular
discourse that seems unable to deal with difficult moral questions,
combined with a marked tendency by many to rule those ques-
tions, politically and legally, out of bounds.
Consider, for example, the hypothetical case which is often
treated as a close-out argument for choice-the Thomson violinist
case. 74 The case has the advantage of pointing out that imposing
an obligation of unselfishness on women runs contrary to the usual
libertarian legal (and cultural) assumption that one should be per-
fectly free to be perfectly selfish. Yet because the pro-choice posi-
tion found itself framed so completely by Roe, and therefore by the
issue of a woman's "right," defense of that libertarian right became
oddly aggressive, as in Tribe's account of the Violinist Case. "In-
deed, just about everybody would agree with Professor Thomson
that no law could justly compel you to take this situation lying
down, at least if the violinist were an uninvited intruder-and per-
haps even if he had been invited but had overstayed his wel-
come." 747 (Would Tribe suggest that economic regulation demand-
ing self-sacrifice for moral purposes, such as mandatory family
7" The claim of "neutrality" seems as problematic as its counterpart in Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), where the Court struck down California's Proposition 14 (af-
firming a decision of the California Supreme Court), which had "repealed" fair housing laws
by constitutionalizing freedom of choice in housing rentals or sales. Id. at 377. By removing
the issue from the legislative process altogether (albeit by referendum), California was guilty
of "encourag[ing]" racial discrimination in housing. Id. at 381. Roe, by judicial decision
alone, similarly removed the abortion issue from the legislative process nationally by consti-
tutionalizing freedom of choice.
115 On the seriousness of this problem in India, and its implications for the principle of
choice, see E. BUMILLER, MAY You BE THE MOTHER OF A HUNDRED SONS 113-24 (1990).
746 Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48-49 (1971) reprinted in
THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION 121-39 (J. Feinberg 2d ed. 1984). It is often cited by pro-choice
advocates as a virtual close-out. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES,
supra note 8, at 129-35; Sherry, Women's Virtue, 63 TULANE L. REv. 1591, 1593-97 (1989).
Thomson poses the hypothetical case of a person who finds herself waking up having been
involuntarily plugged into a life support system for a famous violinist who will otherwise die
unless the hapless and involuntary supporter is kept so connected and confined for nine
months. See Thomson, supra.
117 L. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES, supra note 8, at 129-30.
1122 [Vol. 25:923
THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE
leave time, would be unconstitutional because anti-libertarian?) As
Tribe does successfully argue, the problem with Roe is not its sup-
posed unconstitutionality, but the failure of its "rights" methodol-
ogy to grapple with the moral issue. More exactly, the language
of rights, as formulated by Roe, and even more glaringly by Thom-
son, seems to exclude analysis of precisely those points one would
want to consider in order to do a careful moral analysis of the
problem.
There are, of course, many ways in which Thomson's case, mor-
ally, is simply different from abortion-in some ways easier, in
some ways harder. As the careful Aristotelian philosopher Rosalind
Hursthouse argues, many of those contextual differences are pre-
cisely the ones that would require emphasis if one were to frame
the issue in terms of virtue, or the supposed correlative to rights,
the question of duty.7 49 For Thomson, those contextual differences
can be ruled irrelevant since the issue is framed so starkly as a
question of rights alone. Because the only analytic presupposition
is a self with rights, the only analytically appropriate moral ques-
tion is whether the self's rights have been invaded, not the sub-
stantive question of virtue. This is, of course, the Enlightenment
version of rights, wrenched, as Maritain said, from the context of
the moral order, as if (going back to d'Entreves) one could logically
separate the question of rights from the moral foundation upon
which we build a conception of duty.
This rights-based language of choice fails to capture the moral
and social experience of many women. It assimilates disparate ex-
perience to a false Enlightenment universal. Not surprisingly, it
captures most closely the experience of white, educated, middle-
class women who, as Condit writes, were in a "position to articu-
late this private vocabulary as a public one," 710 whereas poor
women were not. "Because the 'articulate' class's primary limits on
their choices were not economic, but legal, these primary argu-
ments were directed at the single factor that prevented their wants
from being realized-the coercive power of the state.'"7 1 Thus, for
748 Id. at 129.
749 See R. HURSTHOUSE, supra note 13, at 181-94 (critical of Thomson).
75 C. CoNDrr, supra note 4, at 35-36, 76-77.
75, See id. at 76-77 n.25. Condit rejects the "feminist account, which attributes the entire
contemporary controversy to desires to continue male control of procreation." Id. at 74 n.5.
This raises the issue of the origins and politics of the abortion reform/repeal movement in
1991] , 1123
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them, the libertarian emphasis on choice was consistent with expe-
rience. As a result, however, the needs of other particular groups of
women-especially the poor-were "pruned out" of the pro-choice
discourse. This was not a function of-ill will but of the interplay
between language and power, combined with our culture's general
inability to confront the question of class.
For many poor women, legalized birth control and abortion may
mean coercive pressure to limit childbearing.752 Forced steriliiza-
tion was reported in some areas of the United States, and even in
the pre-Roe years. While modern feminists may yearn for a "full, documented history... of
the national and international involvement of the sixties women's movement in abortion
reform in the decade that ended with Roe," the actual story, based on already available
histories, is more complicated and heavily dependent on the role of male, as well as, femalo,
law and health professionals. Cohen, Comparison-Shopping in the Marketplace of Rights,
98 YALE L.J. 1235, 1242 n.24.
The modem American abortion reform movement began with the ALI's Model Penal
Code reform, influenced by British jurist Glanville Williams, with subsequent and important
support for reform/repeal coming from those concerned with population control and medical
autonomy (for example, Alan Guttmacher and Robert Hall respectively) and the publicity of
the Sherri Finkbine case in 1962. As the 1960s drew to a close, distinctively feminist voices
began to join the others (remember that Ms. did not appear until 1972). See, e.g., D. CALLA-
HAN, supra note 13, at 448-83; F. GINSBURG, supra note 13, at 35-42; K. LUKER, supra note
13, at 73-113 (focusing on California); THE ABORTION QUESTION, supra note 13, at 94-104
(emphasizing legal rights).
Consider Luker's account of the California reform movement:
As we have seen, women as individuals were amply represented in the elite
groups that supported the Beilenson [reform] bill; women who were lawyers,
public health officials, and physicians argued forcefully and effectively that the
1872 law was oppressive and unfair. But two critical points about those women
must be kept in mind. First, with very few exceptions, they were, like their
male colleagues, professionals who had been trained in and were affiliated with
elite institutions. Second, their arguments in favor of the bill were virtually
indistinguishable from those of their male peers.... The language of a right to
abortion, however, was not to be found in their claim.
The emergence of women as a self-conscious interest group that claimed
abortion as a right marked a new and fundamentally different stage in the
abortion debate. Although its origins can be traced back to 1961, this interest
group was only a nascent force when much of the debate on the Beilenson bill
took place. Its full effect came only after 1967, in the period leading up to the
Supreme Court decision of 1973.
I. LUKER, supra note 13, at 92-93. As Ginsburg points out, lobbying efforts that helped
produce the legislative successes gained strength from the affiliation of diverse groups, such
as the National Organization of Women (NOW) (1968), the AMA (1967), the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) (1969) and Planned Parenthood World Population (1969). F. GINS-
BURG, supra note 13, at, 37-38.
78 See supra note 692.
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Canada. In Canada, where coercion was more subtle, Kathleen Mc-
Donnell reports that "less educated women were two to ten times
more likely to be sterilized in conjunction with an abortion than
educated women," with physician pressure being cited as a "proba-
ble factor. 753 Moreover, while women usually seek abortions for a
complex set of reasons, economic hardship is the most frequently
proffered reason. Rarely is it the only reason, but it is often the
"paramount factor, the one that tips the scales. ' '75 ' Of course this
is most true for low-income and single women.
The pro-choice movement has been sensitive to this fact, point-
ing out that illegal abortions are most likely to be either dangerous
or unavailable to those without money.55 Yet the "choice" rhetoric
only conceals the reality of no choice:
If poverty is the reason [a woman] is terminating the
pregnancy, if in fact she wants the child but cannot af-
ford to have it, she is actually being coerced into an abor-
tion. She does not, in fact, have a choice at all. For many
women, this is precisely their perception of the situation:
they go to abortion counsellors saying that they "have no
choice," they "have to" have an abortion. 8
In fact, even for those not facing extreme economic hardship, there
are other social pressures that can give one the experience of hav-
ing "no choice. 7 57 Those pressures include an internalized feminist
pressure to be successfully autonomous and independent, and, as
pro-life advocates have argued with some force, male pressure for
women to be sexually available without reproductive consequences.
Playboy is a big supporter of the pro-choice movement.758
"Choice" contains its own coercions, in other words, which may
be a necessary price to pay but should not go unnoticed. Ironically,
it is the pervasiveness of the language of choice and freedom in our
71 K. McDONNELL, supra note 19, at 68-80 (discussing inherent coercions in the concept
of "choice").
I Id. at 71.
755 Id.
75e Id.
7 See id. at 71-80.
"I Id. at 60. For the "pro-life feminist" position that derives from this observation, see




culture which makes a forthright examination of those coercions so
legally and politically out of bounds. Because we so resolutely and
uniformly process all of social reality, rhetorically, as being a func-
tion of private choice, from income distribution to purchasing be-
havior, to politics, to lifestyle, we seem unable even to think about
the paradoxes of freedom's relation to coercion-one of those real
post-Reformation dilemmas that, as d'Entreves warned his Ameri-
can audience at Notre Dame, were as yet unresolved.
Perhaps for that reason the current academic move away from
the problematics of choice to the rhetoric of "reproductive free-
dom" rings hollow. How are we, morally, to understand the mean-
ing of this freedom? When does freedom' bring coercion, and when
is coercion an instrument of freedom? Calvin, who thought deeply
about that dilemma and cared about freedom with the intensity
that comes of believing salvation itself to be on the line, was too
given to mistaking coercion for freedom. At least, however, he rec-
ognized the paradox. 09 It is easy to be confident of having left Cal-
vin behind, only to find that Calvinist dilemmas tend to reappear.
In its starkest, but hardly unusual, form, our contemporary secu-
lar notion of freedom combines expectations of security or entitle-
ment on the one hand, with unaccountability on the other. This
vision is basically that of the spoiled suburban teenager who ex-
pects to be fed, clothed and otherwise taken care of, but becomes
indignant at authoritarian interference with lifestyle choice.100
"I According to Patrick Collinson, "Luther and all subsequent Protestants" (including
Calvin) understand the "gospel of Christ" as follows:
The key to this transaction was faith, defined as a total and trustful commit-
ment of the self to God, and in itself not a human achievement but the pure
gift of God. "Faith cometh by hearing and hearing by the word of God": fides
ex auditu. Thereafter the justified Christian man, in himself and of his own
nature a sinner but not seen as a sinner by God, brings forth those good works
which consist in the love of God and neighbour, not slavishly to win any re-
ward but gladly, that service which is perfect freedom.
Collinson, The Late Medieval Church and its Reformation (1400-1600), in THE OXFORD
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 233, 258-59 (J. McManners ed. 1990). For a series of
essays on the complex relationship between faith and freedom, see THE WORLD TREASURY OF
MODERN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT, ch. 8 (J. Pelikan ed. 1990).
760 As reported by Lawrence Friedman, of Stanford Law School:
Contemporary individualism implies as large a menu of choices as possible for
each human being; only in this way can people freely develop their selves, their
personalities, their central core of being.... Modern individualism is far from
inconsistent with security; indeed, it thrives on security, it depends on security.
... The world of modem individualism.., presupposes, in the West, a certain
1126 [Vol. 25:923
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There is another kind of freedom, however, which would have been
more familiar to Calvin,"'l and is more familiar to contemporaries
like Vaclav Havel. 2 That version presupposes a relationship be-
tween freedom and responsibility; it is a freedom that understands
both gratitude and obligation, not toward people but God.
The second version of freedom has obvious implications for the
abortion debate, which is not to say, however, that the appropriate
policy is equally obvious. The second version may not demand
criminalization of abortions, but may offer a broader context for
looking at the issue, even without certainty of outcome. Consider
base of wealth and leisure, and, what is more, a basic floor of guarantees, enti-
tlements, social services, and rights.
L FRERtmAiN THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE 109 (1990). In fact, the entire Friedman volume is a
celebration of this version of freedom, which is most aptly characterized by the vord
"choice."
See supra note 759.
762 According to Havel, in his speech to Congress,
[T]he salvation of this human world lies nowhere else than in the human heart,
in the human power to reflect, in human meekness and in human responsibil-
ity ....
... We are still incapable of understanding that the only genuine backbone
of all our actions, if they are to be moral, .s responsibility. Responsibility to
something higher than my family, my country, my company, my suc-
cess-responsibility to the order of being where all our actions are indelibly
recorded and where and only where they will be properly judged.
Tism, Mar. 5, 1990, at 14, 15 (publishing the text of Havel's speech). He also has observed
that,
We are going through a great departure from God which has no parallel in
history... I feel that this arrogant anthropocentrism of modern man, who is
convinced he can know everything and bring everything under his control, is
somewhere in the background of the present crisis. It seems to me that if the
world is to change for the better it must start with a change in human con-
sciousness, in the very humanness of modern man.
V. HAvEL, DIs URBING THE PEACE A CONVERSATION wrr K PmL HVizDmA 11 (Paul Wilson
transl 1990). See also id. at 181.
We find ourselves unpersuaded that Robin West's facile appropriation of Havel is any-
thing other than a tactical ploy to shore up the same old liberal agenda (e.g., Ronald Dvor-
kin, whom she cites approvingly). We think she is being less than faithful to Havel's con-
text, which, as she concedes, was opposition to bureaucratic totalitarianism, and his content,
which we think is as spiritual as it is secular, as the passages quoted above indicate. For
West's rendition of Havel's notion of freedom and its application to abortion, see R. West,
Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HRv. L Rv. 43, 43-47, 63-85 (1990). Our reac-
tion to West is similar to our critical reaction to those who were touting "republicanism" a
year or two ago. See Mensch & Freeman, A Republican Agenda for Hobbesian America?, 41
U. Fi.A L REv. 581 (1989). On the other hand, we do think it is an advance to talk about
freedom plus responsibility, if done sincerely, over freedom regarded as sheer
unaccountability.
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the views, for example, of noted Catholic moral theologian Richard
McCormick, who wants to be both faithful to Catholic tradition
and sensitive to contemporary conditions. In fact, he regards him-
self as occupying the "extreme middle.
'76 3
For McCormick, the abortion debate raises the "general problem
for the Catholic community of moral pluralism and public policy,"
or, more specifically, "what is to be done at the policy level when
people disagree on the moral level that is the basis of the pol-
icy?"7 64 He rejects the notion that there is no relation between law
and morality, noting that in the heat of the American debate on
the subject, "the very relationship between morality and law has
been obscured. 76 5 From his perspective, the proper concern of law
is the welfare of the community, which "cannot be unrelated to
what is judged promotive or destructive to human beings, to what
is morally right or wrong.
'7 66
Thus, the mere fact that an act is "private" does not exempt it
from law. On the other hand, to be feasible, "law must rest on a
sufficiently broad shared conviction or on a very fundamental
moral or constitutional principle that people are reluctant to
deny."M
6 7
What do we do when we are faced with profound con-
flict, where there is not agreement on the basic underly-
ing equation? Some have suggested that present policy is
a reasonably adequate way of living with conflict (no one
forces another to have an abortion; no one forces another
to carry a pregnancy). However, that is a deceptively sim-
ple point of view. What represents a better way of living
703 R. MCCORMICK, HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN THE CATHOLIC TRADITION: TRADITION IN
TRANSITION 3 (1985). In an earlier volume, McCormick offered an excellent review of the
literature on abortion as a moral issue. See R. MCCoRMIcK, How BRAVE A NEw
WORLD?-DILEMMAS IN BIOETHICS 117-75 (1981). Also instructive is his brief chapter, "Rules
for Abortion Debate," id. at 176-88, which includes suggestions such as "Avoid the use of
slogans," id. at 178, "Represent the opposing position accurately and fairly," id. at 179,
"Admit doubts, difficulties, and weaknesses in one's own position," id. at 181, "Distinguish
morality and public policy," and "Incorporate the woman's perspective, or women's perspec.
tives." Id. at 186.
76, MCCORMICK, HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN THE CATHOLIC TRADITION, supra note 763, at
135.
761 Id. at 136.
76o Id.
717 Id. at 137.
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with conflict will depend to some extent on what one
supports as the resolution of the conflict. For example, if
I grant that the conflict makes prohibitive law impracti-
cable, but I believe (as a moral position) that nascent life
is human life deserving of protection and hope that
others come to share this view, then I might think the
Supreme Court's decision [Roe v. Wade] simply deepens
the difficulty of arriving at a resolution since it allows
free. abortion in a way that further blunts our sensitivi-
ties to the sanctity of nascent life. Widespread abortion
is, after all, self-perpetuating.
What is to be done? Any moral position, whether that
of Vatican H or that of the Supreme Court, is going to be
experienced as an imposition .... Indeed, the Supreme
Court... should have remanded the matter to legisla-
ture.... [C]onditions are such that any legal disposition
of the question must be accompanied by hesitation and
large doses of dissatisfaction. That means that it is the
right and duty of conscientious citizens to continue to de-
bate the matter, to attempt to persuade in the public
forum.
7 68
Only a thoroughgoing insistence on the secular version of free-
dom described earlier renders irrelevant, as a matter of public pol-
icy, the concerns of those like McCormick, who would at least have
us confront our obligation toward life regarded as a gift from God.
There is some irony in the claim of post-Enlightenment secular ra-
tionalism to resolve moral and political problems without recourse
to outmoded appeals to theology. Kant, we are told, was ashamed
once, when he was discovered praying.769 More to the point, as
Alasdair MacIntyre has so effectively demonstrated, both histori-
cally and philosophically, the very notions of "freedom" and
"equality" so central to Enlightenment moral and political thought
were rooted in theology
7 7 0
" Id. at 137-38.
769 See D. BoNHOEFEa. ETHICS 146 (1955). On the fundamentally Christian basis of
Kant's moral philosophy, as well as his own confrontation with faith, see P. LnmANN, supra
note 270, at 128, 165-89.
710 See A. MAcINRr, AFrER VuTuE, supra note 1, at 34-72. For a similar account, see C.
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Thus, even as they rejected medieval concepts like "teleology" or
"hierarchy," turning instead to modern notions like "passions"
(Hume) or "reason" (Kant), the very same philosophers took for
granted that the resultant substantive morality would reflect Cal-
vinist (Hume) or Lutheran (Kant) values.7 7 1 John Stuart Mill, sim-
ilarly, saw in utilitarianism the realization of assumed Christian
values. 7 2 We have inherited these post-Enlightenment structures
of thought, which form the basis of our secular moral discourse.
Detached from their theological origins, however, our moral posi-
tions, even when articulated as such, appear as little more than
masks for expressions of personal preference. We are so accus-
tomed to thinking of the realization of "self-interest" as the basis
of market economics, for example, that we can no longer under-
stand the morally corrective notion of self-interest, "rightly-under-
stood,"" 3 which might form the basis for "responsible" capitalism,
as an antidote to our unabashed greed and consumerism.
77 4 Simi-
larly, our inherited assumption of "domination" of nature for the
instrumental realization of human goals has lost its grounding in
stewardship, humility and respect. 7 5 So long as there is some pub-
lic consensus, we can avoid these issues and pretend that our moral
vocabulary is about "something." As soon as consensus breaks
down, however, as with both animals/nature and abortion, respec-
tive positions become incommensurable.
Peter Singer's utilitarian analysis of the animal rights question,
for example, assumes that the pleasure derived from cosmetics or
from tender white veal meat cannot possibly outweigh the suffer-
TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 82-107 (1989). Another
important book in this regard is J. STOUT, THE FLIGHT FROM AUTHORITY: RELIGION, MOHAL-
ITY, AND THE QUEST FOR AUTONOMY (1981), a rare instance of a secular philosophy book that
takes theology seriously as an independent body of knowledge. See id. at 95-176. Notably,
Stout places much emphasis on Karl Barth, id. at 141-48, saying that, "It would be hard to
overestimate the importance of Barth's authorship, taken as a whole, in twentieth-century
theology," id. at 145, and that "[t]heology since Barth is a sad story." Id. at 147.
71 See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 1, at 51-60.
772 See id. at 63-66, 70-71.
73 See Kelly, Bayle's Commonwealth of Atheists Revisited, in RELIGION, MORALITY AND
THE LAW, supra note 14, at 78, 86.
77' For our own effort to talk about "responsible" capitalism, in the context of advertising
and antitrust law, see Mensch & Freeman, Efficiency and Image: Advertising as an Anti-
trust Issue, 1990 DUKE L.J. 321; see also A. ETzIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW
ECONOMICS (1988).
77 See supra note 619 and accompanying text.
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ing incurred by the animals who are victims of their production.77
Hidden within that supposedly quantitative calculus is a (Chris-
tian) moral judgment about whether pleasures of vanity or glut-
tony should be allowed to outweigh the suffering of the innocent.
One might likewise describe fetal suffering in abortion as minimal,
since little or no pain is involved, unless one decided to count the
cost of a lost potential life, which might be said to have incalcula-
ble value, as a gift from God. To speak of God is of course to re-
turn to the issue of appropriate public discourse.
V. AFTERWORD
We will not offer any programmatic solution to the abortion is-
sue, for we doubt it is a problem that can be "solved." Perhaps,
like other immediate issues of life and death, it must simply be
confronted, which will lead to different solutions in different set-
tings. Our goal has been more to explore the issue as one appropri-
ate for moral debate and to question whether either side has the
close-out resources (morally or politically) to compel an across-the-
board solution in this culture at this time.
Abortion in particular, influenced by our prior thought about an-
imals and nature, has led us to consider how our culture under-
stands moral questions in general, especially those of life and
death. What we discovered was an insistence on a peculiarly secu-
lar attitude, especially in elite institutional settings, 7 with more
traditional religious approaches relegated to the status of irra-
77 See P. SINGER, supra note 33, at 121-28.
7" Another book with which we find ourselves in great agreement is C. LASCii. THE Tatu
AND ONLY HEAVEN, supra note 420. On the intellectual elite as "new class," and how its
right- and left-wing members, despite their tendency to caricature each other, have more in
common with one another than with the ostensible beneficiaries of their politics, see id. at
509-29. Their common outlook, in its idealized form, writes Lasch, is "an inordinate respect
for educational credentials, a refusal to accept anything on faith, a commitment to free in-
quiry, a tendency to question authority, a belief in tolerence as the supreme political vir-
tue." Id. at 527. The downside of this "critical temper" is that it
can degenerate into a snobbish disdain for people who lack formal education
and work with their hands, an unfounded confidence in the moral wisdom of
experts, an equally unfounded prejudice against untutored common sense, a
distrust of any expression of good intentions, a distrust of everything but sci-
ence, an ingrained irreverence, a disposition (the natural outgrowth of irrever-




tional, supernatural or backward, despite the persistence and vital-
ity of such traditions.
That insistence on and celebration of the secular is an instance
of a venerable and recurring human folly-to universalize one's
own physical or temporal moment, and then project its under-
standing across space, or time, accordingly. The spatial metaphor
suggests how the interests of elite professionals can be universal-
ized as those of all citizens, or all women, as with "choice," while
ignoring the lived reality of those projected upon, especially their
religious reality.
There is little novelty in observing that the relatively powerful,
whether of the political left or right, will seek to present, and even
experience, their particular agendas as universal norms. Such is the
interplay of culture and power. More intriguing is the tendency to
universalize one's moment in time, forgetting historical conditions
of origin.
Just as Christianity, like it or not, is compelled by its origins to
be engaged in a permanent dialogue with Judaism,"8 and as Prot-
estantism is similarly consigned to a never ending dialogue with
Catholicism 7"9 (the Reformation did not just happen, back then),
7" The Jewish Bible is, after all, the Christian "Old Testament." The characteristically
Christian injunction to "love your neighbor as yourself" appears first in the Torah, in Levit-
icus 19:17-18, 33-34. New England Calvinists, for example, identified themselves with the
Israel of the Old Testament, and, accordingly, "as a people feel constituted by God's law."
See C. TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 770, at 229-30.
Jewish/Christian similarity/difference becomes even more complicated when one seeks to
understand the early Christianity, of, for example, the first century, A.D. The Sermon on
the Mount, Matthew 5:3-7:27, which may be the oldest of Christian texts, is both a pecu-
liarly Jewish Christian text, and a peculiarly Christian Jewish text. See generally H.D. BET,
ESSAYS ON THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT (L.L. Welborn transl. 1985); see also Kermode, Mat-
thew, in THE LITERARY GUIDE TO THE BIBLE 387-401 (R. Alter & F. Kermode eds. 1990). On
St. Paul as both Jew and Christian, see A. SEGAL, PAUL THE CONVERT: THE APOSTOLATE AND
APOSTASY OF SAUL THE PHARISEE (1990). Perhaps, if the remaining Dead Sea Scrolls are ever
released to the public, we will learn more about these complexities. See Who Controls the
Scrolls?, BIBLICAL ARCHEOLOGY REVIEW, Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 52-60.
779 It was just a small shift in orthodox Augustinian theology that led the Reformers to
understand "faith, defined as a total and trustful commitment of the self to God, and in
itself not a human achievement but the pure gift of God." That small shift was, however,
important enough to topple the entire institutional and theological structure of the Catholic
system. See Collinson, The Late Medieval Church and its Reformation (1400-1600), in TiH.
OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 233, 259 (J. McManners ed. 1990). On the
closeness of Augustinian Catholicism to radical (Roger Williams) Protestantism, see G.
WILLS, UNDER GOD, supra note 340, at 349-50.
On the other hand, Rev. Richard Neuhaus, who as a Lutheran minister has been an avid
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so also our secular culture, despite its pretentions, cannot outgrow
its theological roots. When Dr. Hall, the abortion reformer/re-
pealer, proclaimed that countries with stringent abortion laws have
"buried their heads in the sands of time, 7 8 0 he surely implied that
fate for religion itself. Ironically, as of the onset of the 1990s, it
seems that all three of the great "isms" of the twentieth century
that sought to displace religion as the source of human meaning
and possibility-Marxism, Freudianism and Existentialism-are
rapidly fading blips on the screen of history.781
The more durable adversary of religion in our culture has been
science, which has often threatened, and in the twentieth century
nearly succeeded in claiming the realm of truth for its own. Science
itself, through which nature becomes more known, more managea-
ble and more amenable to our wishes, is simply amoral and not in
conflict with religion. In fact, when science proceeds provisionally,
cognizant of doubt, in a spirit of humility and finitude, it is not
only compatible with a religious sensibility, but may be regarded
as part of shared enterprise.
78 2
proponent of "civic religion," see supra note 23, recently became a Catholic, having decided
that Luther's goals have been achieved, and the Reformation should be over. See N.Y.
Times, Sept. 9, 1990, § 1, at 26.
With respect to ethics and law, Paul Ramsey's NINE MoDRN MoRALIsTS, supra note 126,
is an effort to prove that neither "Catholic" essentialism/natural law/absolutism nor "Prot-
estant" faith/immediacy/particularity can effectively rule out the other, that both are two
sides of the same ethical dilemma.
7810 See Hall, Commentary, in ABORTION AND THE LAW 224, 234 (D. Smith ed. 1967). He
expresses some incredulity, for example, that anything important might turn on "the mean-
ing of a five-word phrase in the book of Exodus." Id. at 231.
78! In this retrospect, three works, dismissed at the time for their affront to orthodoxy,
seem more prophetic in retrospect- . BECKER, THE DENLL OF DEATH (1973) (cultural an-
thropologist criticizing orthodox Freudianism for its failure to understand religion and, con-
sequently, death); J. ELLUL, THE BETRAYAL OF THE WEST (M.J. O'Connell trans]. 1978)
(French Protestant criticizing Western Marxism); F. H. HEINEIANN, EXISTENTIALISM AND TlE
MODERN PREDICAMENT (1958) (criticism "from within" with emphasis on religion and
theology).
See also A. MAcINTYRE. AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 1, at 103 (reminding us of our "vulnera-
bility and fragility"). In a similar vein, see Ball, The City of Unger, 81 Nw. UL. Rav. 625
(1987) (reviewing R. UNGER. PoLrrCs (1987)), in which he suggests: that "the City of Unger
has room, it seems to me, only for an elite that is both intellectually and politically ath-
letic," id. at 641; that Unger's "self-transcending self travels deeper into its own space, los-
ing contact with the limiting love of the neighbor and therefore with the possibility of tran-
scendence," id. at 661; moreover, he chides Unger for trusting "in the ultimate harmony of
being and goodness in human nature," and, consequently, leaving "out of account" what the
"Bible calls sin." Id. at 661 & n.196 (quoting UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITrCS 247 (1975).
82 Which Karl Barth understood as well as anyone. See supra notes 235-43 and accompa-
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Science becomes wicked only when it becomes infused with
pride, with the attitude that we can know everything and do any-
thing. As Bonhoeffer noted in 1944, reflecting on our impulse to be
"independent of nature":
Nature was formerly conquered by spiritual means, with
us by technical organization of all kinds. Our immediate
environment is not nature, as formerly, but organization.
But with this protection from nature's menace there
arises a new one-through organization itself.
But the spiritual force is lacking. The question is:
What protects us against the menace of organization?
Man is again thrown back on himself. He has managed to
deal with everything, only not with himself. He can in-
sure against everything, only not against man.
7 83
As Bonhoeffer wrote those words, he was confined in Tegel Prison
Dying text. One of the most astute twentieth-century philosophers of science, Michael Po-
lanyi, affirmed both the provisionality of knowledge and the significance of presuppositions,
and, like Barth, saw the resemblance, rather than opposition, between theology and science.
As Polanyi describes Christian religious faith:
The indwelling of the Christian worshipper [sic] is therefore a continued at.
tempt at breaking out, at casting off the condition of man, even while humbly
acknowledging its inescapability. Such indwelling is fulfilled most completely
when it increases this effort to the utmost. It resembles not the dwelling within
a great theory of which we enjoy the complete understanding... but the heu-
ristic upsurge which strives to break through the accepted frameworks of
thought, guided by the intimations of discoveries still beyond our horizon.
Christian worship sustains, as it were, an eternal, never to be consummated
hunch: a heuristic vision which is accepted for the sake of its unresolvable ten-
sion. It is like an obsession with a problem known to be insoluble, which yet
follows, against reason, unswervingly, the heuristic command: "Look at the un-
known!" Christianity sedulously fosters, and in a sense permanently satisfies,
man's craving for mental dissatisfaction by offering him the comfort of a cruci-
fied God.
M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 198-99 (1964).
For both science and religion, absolute truth is the illusion:
Objectivism has totally falsified our conception of truth, by exalting what we
can know and prove, while covering up with ambiguous utterances all that we
know and cannot prove, even though the latter knowledge underlies, and must
ultimately set its seal to, all that we can prove. In trying to restrict our minds
to the few things that are demonstrable, and therefore explicitly dubitable, it
has overlooked the a-critical choices which determine the whole being of our
minds and has rendered us incapable of acknowledging these vital choices.
Id. at 286. On "religious doubt," see id. at 279-86.
183 D. BONHOEFFER, LrrERs AND PAPERS FROM PRISON 208-09 (1953).
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in Berlin, and subjected regularly to bombing raids by the Allied
Forces seeking to destroy Hitler's Nazi Empire. The success of that
military technology would help to create a faith in science, technol-
ogy and expertise that would permeate the post-War culture of
both the victors and the vanquished, but especially that of ours,
which had lost lives but never experienced bombs. There is at least
some tragic irony in the fact that, as we write, renewed faith in
American technology has been occasioned by its capacity to kill
and immobilize an enemy in war.
Despite the best efforts of enterprises like the Natural Law Fo-
rum, which tried to suggest that the legacy of World War IE and
the Nazis was a profound moral and spiritual agenda, its more last-
ing legacy was the triumph and extension of science. Issues tradi-
tionally regarded as moral ones could be recast as questions of
"medical judgment," or submitted to the expertise of "social sci-
ence." Profound dilemmas like that of sin, once thought basic to
the human condition, could be recast as occasions for "therapy."71
The same culture produced a generation, of which we were a
part, that had little use for humility, no knowledge of our own sin-
fulness (as opposed to that of our enemies, whoever they were) and
no sense of restraint or limits. In retrospect, a number of appropri-
ate responses to oppressive conditions led to a culture of unre-
strained excess. Thus, the Supreme Court's long-overdue interven-
tions with respect to race and reapportionment set the stage for
bypassing more cumbersome political process and instead relying
on federal courts to implement the new moral and political agenda
with wave after wave of new "rights."7 85 Similarly, our reaction to
the oppressive conventionality of the 1950s, especially with respect
to matters of sex, led us to reject any and all moral orthodoxy, in
the name of "lifestyle freedom," to the point of defying all reli-
78 See E. BEcKz_. THE DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 781, at 268-81; A. MAclm, 'Tn AFR
VIRTUE, supra note 1, at 73-78. One aspect of this enterprise, which may be regarded as
another reaction to Nazis, was the invention of the category of the "authoritarian personal-
ity" to offer a "scientific" explanation for fascism. The concept was employed in turn to
recharacterize the culture and fervent religious belief of lower middle-class people as a kind
of psychopathology. See C. LASCH. THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN, supra note 420, at 445-65.
For recent employment of the same basic idea, see also Lifton & Strozier, Waiting for
Armegeddon, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1990, § 7, at 1, 24-25 (offering their generalizations about
"50 million Americans" who are "fundamentalist Christians").
711 See C. LAscH, THE TuE AND ONLY HEAVEN, supra note 420, at 37.
1991] 1135
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
gious tradition in assuming we had a "right" to "happiness. 75 0
And more-to the point, a sensible effort to modernize repressive
abortion laws became a claim of right to abortion on demand, with
some 1.5 million abortions as the current annual norm in the
United States.
In our pridefulness, we took on the transformative utopian fan-
tasy, which is perhaps the undoing of all revolutions, that a select
elite could through mere human agency transform the entire so-
cial/cultural world around it and discard all inconsistent tradition
to the rubbish heap of history.
In that euophoric process, we surely forgot our finitude. Ernest
Becker, anthropologist and critic of therapy as religion, posed this
question back in 1973 (the year Roe v. Wade was decided):
What do we mean by the lived truth of creation? We
have to mean the world ... as it would appear to crea-
tures who assessed their true puniness in the face of the
overwhelmingness and majesty of the universe .... What
are we to make of a creation in which the routine activity
is for organisms to be tearing others apart with teeth of
all types-biting, grinding flesh, plant stalks, bones be-
tween molars, pushing the pulp greedily down the gullet
with delight, incorporating its essence into one's own or-
ganization, and then excreting with foul stench and
gasses the residue. Everyone reaching out to incorporate
others who are edible to him. . . .not to mention the
daily dismemberment and slaughter in "natural" acci-
dents of all types: an earthquake buries alive 70 thousand
bodies in Peru, automobiles make a pyramid heap of over
50 thousand a year [back in 1973] in the U.S. alone, a
tidal wave washes over a quarter of a million in the In-
dian Ocean. Creation is a nightmare spectacular taking
place on a planet that has been soaked for hundreds of
" Jonathan Edwards had a different view of the matter. He understood that it is difficult
to reconcile the "expectation of worldly success and happiness, so often undone by events,
with the idea of a just, loving, and all-powerful creator." For Edwards, the reality was "a
God who did not regard human happiness as the be-all and end-all of creation," and the
"central paradox of Christian faith" was "that the secret of happiness lay in renouncing the
right to be happy." See C. LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN, supra note 420, at 248
(discussing Edwards). On Edwards, see id. at 246-56. On "rights," see A. MACINTrYn, AFrrR
VIRTUE, supra note 1, at 68-70, 119.
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millions of years in the blood of all its creatures. The so-
berest conclusion that we could make about what has ac-
tually been taking place on the planet for about three bil-
lion years is that it is being turned into a vast pit of
fertilizer. But the sun distracts our attention, always bak-
ing the blood dry, making things grow over it, and with
7817its warmth giving... hope ....
Such a depiction is congenial to a theological tradition that runs all
the way from Jonathan Edwards to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, both of
whom had absorbed the lessons of Englightenment rationality and
were prepared to deal in their respective ways with a world come
of age. To be sure, God reveals Himself in nature, but on His
terms, not ours. We tend to forget what God reminded Job with
relentless interrogation-that we, after all, are not the authors of
creation. 88 In a fallen world, there is no particular basis for imme-
diate optimism, nor is there occasion for despair. Perhaps, as
Christopher Lasch suggests, the best we can do is to exchange opti-
nism for hope, and recall our own imits. 789
And the limit that marks our finitude regularly and relentlessly
is death. We can neither avoid death, as some pro-choicers would
have us do, by renaming the fetus as tissue, or, as the meat indus-
try does, with its cellophane packages backed with sponge-pads to
absorb the animal's blood; nor can we conquer death, as some pro-
lifers would have us do, by simply compelling the birth of all the
unborn, or as animal activists would do, by banning all hunting or
mandating vegetarianism.
The starting point for a discussion about abortion ought to be
the frank recognition that the issue is life or death. To abort a
fetus is to kill, to prevent the realization of a human life. But to
say that much is not to answer the moral question involved. We
(Americans) have just completed a war in which we killed many
thousands of people, some of whom were civilians, others of whom
were exposed to danger against their will. That we choose to kill
does not make it wrong on that score alone; but we surely need a
7E. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH, supra note 781, at 282-83. Despite his criticisms of
Freud, Becker does acknowledge, approvingly, the "somber pessimism" of Civilization and
Its Discontents. See id. at 281.
I" See Job 3842:6.
78 See C. LASCH, THE TuE AND ONLY HEAVEN, supra note 420, at 487-92, 530.
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vocabulary for talking about life and death issues in moral terms
that underscore the seriousness of any choice for death. Our expe-
rience with abortion, and, perhaps, with war, suggests that the lack
of such a vocabulary will lead inevitably to excess. Religion has
served for many hundreds of years to offer some hope in the face
of despair, to offer life in the face of inevitable suffering and death.
We discard those traditions at our peril.
